Sullivan v. Younce et al, No. 3:2015cv00010 - Document 51 (E.D. Va. 2017)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. See for complete details. It is so ORDERED. Signed by District Judge Robert E. Payne on 02/16/2017. (mailed copy to pro se plaintiff) (nbrow)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Sullivan v. Younce et al Doc. 51 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Richmond Division THEODORE SULLIVAN, IE FEB I 6 20!7 -·-·-··· ______ _J-1T I CLERK, U.S. RICHlv'iOhD. v'f\ f ' Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 3:15CV10 R.W. YOUNCE, et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION Theodore Sullivan, in forma pauperis, matter proceeds ECF No. 1 30) on a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and filed this the 42 U.S.C. Particularized § 1983 action. 1 Complaint The ("Complaint," alleging that Defendants 2 violated his First 3 and The statute provides, in pertinent part: Every person who, under color of any statute . . . of any State . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law . . . . 42 u.s.c. § 1983. R.W. Younce is the former Warden of the Greensville Correctional Center ( "GCC" ) . ( Compl . 1 . ) Eddie Pearson is the farmer Lead Warden of GCC. (Id. 2 . ) Wendy S . Hobbs was the Eastern Regional Administrator. (Id. 3.) Lt. Investigator Harrison was an institutional investigator at GCC who has since retired. (Mero. Supp. First Mot. Dismiss 1 n. 1 & 2, ECF No. 36.) Sgt. Medilia was a correctional officer at GCC. (Id. at 2.) The Court corrects the spelling of the Defendants' names to what is reflected in the Motion to Dismiss. 2 Dockets.Justia.com Fourteenth4 Amendment rights and his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutional Persons Act ( "RLUIPA") . 5 The matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants R.W. Younce, Sgt. Medilia, and Wendy S. Hobbs ("First Motion to Dismiss," ECF No. 35), and a separate Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Lt. Investigator Harrison ("Second Motion to Dismiss," ECF § No. 1915A. reasons 47) , 6 and the Court's obligations Sullivan has responded. set for below, the Court under 28 (ECF Nos. 45, 50.) 7 will grant the U.S.C. For the Motions to "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . . " U.S. Const. amend. I. 3 "No State shall . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . . " U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 4 5 2 u.s.c. § 2000cc-l(a). Both Motions to Dismiss are substantially similar, thus, the Court addresses both simultaneously in this Memorandum Opinion. 6 In his two Replies to the Motions to Dismiss, Sullivan attempts to allege new facts and provide evidence to correct the deficiencies in his Complaint identified by Defendants. Sullivan may not do so. "[I]t is axiomatic that a complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss. To hold otherwise would mean that a party could unilaterally amend a complaint at will, even without filing an amendment, and simply by raising a point in a brief." Morgan Distrib. Co. v. Unidynamic Corp., 868 F.2d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, the Court's review of the new facts alleged in the Replies fails to alter the conclusion that Sullivan fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Thus, the Court considers the new facts alleged in the Replies. 7 2 Sullivan's Dismiss. claims will be dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief and as frivolous. I. STANDARD OF REVIEW Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ( "PLRA") this Court must dismiss any action filed by a prisoner if the Court determines the action ( 1) a claim on which § 1915(e) (2); includes see claims "is frivolous" or ( 2) relief 28 may U.S.C. based upon § be The indisputably u.s.c. 28 granted." 1915A. "'an "fails to state first standard meritless legal theory, '" or claims where the " 'factual contentions are clearly Clay v. baseless.'" 1992) The Yates, (quoting Neitzke v. second standard is 809 F. Williams, the Supp. 417, 490 U.S. familiar 427 (E.D. 327 319, standard for a Va. (1989)) . motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6). "A motion sufficiency of to a dismiss complaint; under importantly, contests surrounding the facts, applicability of defenses." 980 F.2d 943, 952 Rule 12(b) (6) it does the merits of a tests not claim, the resolve or the Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, (4th Cir.1992) (citing SA Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 1356 (1990)). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed in the light 3 most favorable to the plaintiff. Cir. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th 1993) ; see also Martin, applies only to factual considering a identifying pleadings conclusions, motion are allegations, to dismiss that, not This principle 980 F. 2d at 9S2. can because entitled to however, are "a to choose they the and begin no court more assumption of by than truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, SS6 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require [ ] only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, ' in order to notice of what the . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 111 (second alteration in original) U.S. 41, 47 (19S7)). 'give the defendant fair SSO U.S. S44, SSS (quoting Conley v. (2007) Gibson, 3SS Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints containing only "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a Id. Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts (citations omitted) . sufficient level, " "to raise a id. (citation "plausible on its face, at S70. pleads right "A claim has factual reasonable content inference misconduct alleged." to relief above omitted), /1 cause of action." stating a the speculative claim that rather than merely "conceivable." is Id. facial plausibility when the plaintiff that that Iqbal, allows the the defendant court is SS6 U.S. at 678 4 to liable draw the for the (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. Therefore, at 556). in order for a complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a plaintiff must "allege facts sufficient elements of [his or] her claim." & Co., 324 F.3d 761, Microsoft Corp., 765 to claim or state the all the Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours (4th Cir. 309 F.3d 193, 213 2003) (citing Dickson v. (4th Cir. 2002); Iodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)). Lastly, complaints, 1978), it while Gordon does not the v. Court Leeke, act as liberally 574 the F.2d construes 1147, inmate's 1151 advocate, pro (4th sua se Cir. sponte developing statutory and constitutional claims the inmate failed to clearly raise Carroll, 107 concurring) ; on the F.3d 241, Beaudett v. face of 243 his (4th complaint. Cir. City of Hampton, See Brock v. (Luttig, J. , F. 2d 1274, 1278 1997) 775 (4th Cir. 1985). II. In December December 26, SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS AND CLAIMS 2013, 2013, was housed in the GCC. On Defendant Medilia searched Sullivan's cell, confiscated Sullivan's Defendant Harrison. Sullivan "religious (Compl. 6.) literature," and gave it to The purpose of removing the items was to determine whether the items were gang-related "Five Percent[er]" materials. (See id. 5 8-9, 60.) Sullivan filed an informal complaint requesting the return of his property. (Compl. , 8; id. Ex. 1, at 1.) Sullivan's unit manager informed him that his property was turned over to the investigator and that it was under review, and if there was anything that was not considered contraband, it would (Compl. returned to him at the conclusion of the investigation. , id. 9; Ex. Sullivan then submitted a 1. ) be regular grievance indicating that his religious materials were taken and he wanted them returned to him. (Compl. , id. 10; Ex. Assistant 2.) Warden Carolyn Parker found Sullivan's grievance unfounded for (Compl. , 11; id. Ex. 4.) the same reasons as his unit manager. Sullivan appealed that decision, decision of Parker. and Defendant Hobbs upheld the (Compl. , 12; id. Ex. 5.) On January 31, 2014, Sullivan was transferred from GCC to Keen Mountain Correctional Center ("KMCC") at the request of the (Compl. Eastern Region Administrator. Sullivan filed several informal , requests complaint complaining about his transfer. 3.) In his informal requests, 15; id. and Ex. one informal (See id. Ex. 6, at 1- he complained that his security level was too low for him to be transferred to KMCC. at 2-3.) Staff responded to Sullivan, incorrect, stating: "you were Classification Services. houses [Security Level] You 3 at 1.) 6, explaining that he was assigned to are and 6 4 (See id. [Security KMCC by Cent [ral] Level] offenders." KMCC 3. (Id. at 3.) Sullivan filed an informal complaint on March 7, 2014, that was sent to the GCC grievance office, complaining that his "transfer to K.M.C.C. was retaliation for the complaints and grievances I wrote (Id. II at 1.) K. Whitehead responded and explained the following: You were transferred to Keen Mountain on 1-31-14 at the request of Eastern Region Administrator. While at Greensville only one regular grievance was receipted from you on 1-30-14 concerning confiscation of religious property which was one day before your transfer[;] therefore[,] it is highly unlikely your transfer was retaliatory to grievance writing. Sullivan continued to file informal complaints and grievances regarding his transfer and the confiscation of his property throughout 2014. confiscated property has (Compl. not 16-37.) been returned to him. Sullivan's (Compl. 50.) Sullivan lists his claims as follows: 8 Claim One: "Defendants Younce, Harrison, and Sgt. Medilia, violated his First Amendment Right Free Exercise clause to be allowed to have his religious materials by the Nation of Islam to meet his religious needs." (Compl. 13.) Claim Two: "Defendants Younce, Harrison, and Sgt, Medilia violated his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act to be allowed his religious materials to meet his religious needs." (Id.) The Court corrects the spelling and quotations from Sullivan's Complaint. 8 7 capitalization in Claim Three: "Defendants Younce, Pearson, Harrison, and Sgt. Medilia violated his Fourteenth Amendment Right (Id. ) to Equal Protection • Claim Four: • • • II "Defendants Younce, Pearson, and Hobbs, violated his Fourteenth Amendment Rights to the Due Process Clause by transferring Plaintiff over eight (8) hours away from his home and family as a means of retaliation for filing his numerous requests, letters, complaints, and grievances due to the unlawful taking of his religious material. (Id.) 11 While Sullivan did not list a fifth claim, Defendants have generously construed Sullivan to raise the additional claim in the body of his Complaint: Claim Five: Defendants Younce, Pearson, and Hobbs violated Sullivan's due process rights by taking his property from his cell. Sullivan demands monetary damages and injunctive relief. (Id. at 33-34.) 9 Sullivan brings this action against Defendants in their individual and official capacities. RLUIPA fails to authorize a private cause of action for money damages against state officials in their official or personal capacities. Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 293 (2011) (holding that state officials sued in their official capacities enjoy Eleventh Amendment Immunity against RLUIPA claims for damages); Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 189 (4th Cir. 2009) (concluding that, as an exercise of Congress's spending clause authority, RLUIPA failed to authorize claims for monetary damages against state officials in their individual capacities) ; see Haight v. Thompson, 763 F.3d 554, 569-70 (7th Cir. 2014) (concluding that, as an exercise of Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause, RLUIPA failed to authorize claims for monetary damages against state officials in their individual capacities). Accordingly, Sullivan's demands for monetary damages with respect to RLUIPA will be dismissed. Thus, with respect to Claim Two, only Sullivan's demand for injunctive relief remains. 9 8 III. The Federal complaint Rules contain "a ANALYSIS of Civil short and Procedure plain require statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." P. 8(a)(2). complaints, 1978), While Gordon v. should Leeke, liberally 574 F.2d the Fed. R. construe 1147, 1151 claim Civ. pro (4th a se Cir. "[p] rinciples requiring generous construction of pro se complaints are not Hampton, not courts of that . . without limits." 775 F. 2d 1274, attempt plaintiff." 2006) . "to 1278 discern Laber v. (4th Cir. the Harvey, Beaudett v. 1985) . unexpressed 438 F.3d 404, The Court need intent of 413 n.3 of course, the (4th Cir. The Fourth Circuit has explained that "though litigants cannot, City of [pro se] be expected to frame legal issues with the clarity and precision ideally evident in the work of those trained in law, neither can district courts be required to conjure up and decide issues never fairly presented to them." Beaudett, 775 F.2d at 1276. are not mind readers." As above a do In other words, Id. at 1278. preliminary matter, not correspond Sullivan's with the delineated to support each claim. Sullivan Younce, alleges Pearson, filing grievances. a "[d) istrict judges due process and Hobbs claims facts that For example, violation as Sullivan forth has in Claim Four, because transferred him as set Defendants retaliation for The body of his Complaint that purportedly 9 corresponds to Claim Four, however, alleges that his due process rights were violated 71-72.) Sullivan "Retaliation" (id. when his later at 25), property adds an was entire taken. (Compl. section titled, although he alleged no freestanding claim of retaliation. Liberal construction of a pro se pleading does not mean that a court should invent inadequately pled claim. Instead, master and of his responsible complaint for articulating cognizable claim." Cir. 1998). Davis v. the is, the in facts Scott, facts to remedy an "plaintiff remains the end, that the give person rise 157 F.3d 1003, the 1006 to a (5th Sullivan has had more than ample opportunity to plead his claims. Accordingly, the Court will not cull through the allegations and supporting facts to create legal claims for Sullivan. A. No Personal Involvement Alleged In order to state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived him or her of a constitutional right or of a right conferred by a law of the United States. See Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998). the unconstitutional theory of 662, 676 "Government officials may not be held liable for conduct of respondeat superior." (2009) (citations omitted). 10 their subordinates Ashcroft v. Iqbal, under a 556 U.S. "[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, own individual "Where a actions, through the official's has violated the Constitution." complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the complaint is defendant except complaint is for his properly name appearing in even dismissed, F.2d 1206, 1207 Brzozowski v. Randall, As discussed below, (7th Cir. 1974) fails the caption, 312 to the the liberal Potter v. Clark, (citing 281 F. Supp. 306, Sullivan silent as to the under construction to be given pro se complaints." 497 Id. U.S. (E.D. allege ex rel. Pa. 1968)). any personal involvement in the deprivation of his rights by the majority of the Defendants. B. In First Amendment (Claim One) Claim One, Sullivan alleges that "Defendants Younce, Harrison, and Sgt. Medilia, violated his First Amendment Right Free Exercise clause to be allowed materials by the Nation of Islam . needs." to have his religious to meet his religious (Compl. 13.) As an initial alleges no personal matter, Defendants involvement in the constitutional rights by Defendant Younce. argue that deprivation Sullivan of Sullivan fails his to mention Defendant Younce in the body of his Complaint, much less allege personal involvement in the deprivation of his religious rights. For the first time in his Reply, and in an attempt to 11 correct the deficiencies identified by Defendants' Motion to Dismiss with regard to Claim One, in Sullivan adds new allegations that amend paragraph 48 of his Complaint. Complaint, Sullivan searching alleged Sullivan's cell, that, he while received asking "Did you find anything yet?" a their Sgt. call Medilia on (Comp 1. In his was his radio In his 48 . ) Reply, Sullivan now contends that Sgt. Medilia received the call from Defendant Younce and that Defendant Younce was in "direct line of sight of [Sullivan] when he stated this," thereby, (Reply Defendant Younce had personal involvement in the search. 5, ECF No. 45.) As discussed previously, a reply in response to a motion to dismiss is not the proper place to allege new facts to correct the deficiencies because Sullivan' s the Court with a complaint. Nevertheless, First Amendment claim clearly lacks merit, addresses conjunction in any its claim against discussion of Defendant Defendants Younce Harrison in and Medilia. To state a First Amendment free exercise claim, must allege facts belief is that Harrison and that suggest religious Medilia (citing 2011 WL Hernandez "(1) he holds in nature" and (2) that imposed practice of his religion. (CMH/JFA), that substantial a sincere Defendants burden on the Whitehouse v. Johnson, No. 1:10cv1175 5843622, v. a Sullivan at 12 (E.D. 4 9O Comm' r, *4 U. S . Va. 6 8 O, Nov. 699 18, 2011) ( 19 8 9) ) . "Government officials exercise of impose a religion by substantial burden on the 'put [ting] free substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.'" Massenburg v. Adams, No. 3:08cv106, 2011 WL 1740150, at *4 (E.D. Va. May 5, 2011) (alteration quotation marks omitted) in original) (some internal (quoting Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 187 (4th Cir. 2006)). Sullivan "declares that he practices Islam under the prescribed laws of his prophet The Honorable Elijah Muhammad, and he also declares that the religious materials that confiscated members of [were] [were] the exact same religious materials that the Nation of Islam study (Comp!. II , 42.) Sullivan indicates that "[h] e is a true and devout Believer in the teachings of Master Fard Muhammad, Elijah Muhammad . II (Id. , and the Most Honorable 54.) Thus, the Court assumes without deciding that Sullivan's religious beliefs are sincere. Defendants argue that Sullivan fails to allege facts that plausibly suggest Medilia that intentionally practice his either Defendant deprived religion. Harrison or Defendant Sullivan "[O] nly of intentional actionable under the Free Exercise Clause." at 201. denials Clause." Thus, of ability to conduct is Lovelace, 472 F. 3d "[n]egligent acts by officials causing unintended religious Id. his rights (citations do not violate omitted) . 13 the Sullivan Free Exercise contends that Defendant Medilia took religious materials and his black history books from Sullivan's cell because they were suspected Five Percenter gang-related materials that are forbidden in the GCC. (Compl. 43, 48.) 10 Sullivan suggests that Defendant Harrison took the confiscated property immediately from Defendant Medilia to determine whether the property was prohibited. Here, Sullivan fails to Medilia "conscious [ly] free that Defendants or intentional [ly] Lovelace, exercise rights." contrary, assert 472 (Id. 49.) Harrison interfere [d] F.3d at or with his To the 201. the record shows that Defendants Harrison and Medilia took a variety of books and materials from Sullivan's cell, not just religious materials. because they were fails to with free § 1983." allege suspected gang-related materials. anything more exercise Id. 11 Both Defendants took the materials Thus, rights," than a "a negligent claim "not Sullivan interference actionable under Claim One can be dismissed on this basis alone. Even if Sullivan had alleged that the confiscation of his religious property was an intentional act, claim fails to state a claim for relief. the Court finds this Sullivan fails to Sullivan himself labels these confiscated materials as "my five percenter/ [Nation of Islam] material." (Compl. Ex. 1.) 10 The Court finds Defendant Younce if he Sullivan's cell. 11 that a similar conclusion applies to directed Defendant Medilia to search 14 allege that Defendants Harrison, substantial burden on his Medilia, ability to and Younce imposed a practice his religion. Sullivan has not alleged that Defendant Harrison's, Medilia' s, and Younce' s actions have put "substantial pressure" on him to "modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs." F.3d at 187. Sullivan alleges at most, "Plaintiff declares that being deprived of Islam and religion Lovelace, 472 his these religious materials of the Nation of religious generally. books, This he placed a could not practice his burden' and 'substantial placed pressure on the plaintiff to modify his behavior, which ( Compl . , violates his beliefs." 52 . ) Sullivan states nothing more than the legal standard for a First Amendment claim with no facts supporting his claim that his religion was substantially burdened by "Threadbare supported Harrison, Defendants recitals by mere of the elements conclusory Medilia, of a statements" or cause is 556 Twombly, U.S. 550 allegations Harrison, rights. Cir. 662, U.S. fail and 678 544, Medilia see 555 to Ashcroft v. (citing Bell Atl. (2007)). action, Corp. Sullivan's v. vague to plausibly suggest that Defendants Younce, See Krieger v. 2012); (2009) of insufficient plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Iqbal, Younce. also substantially Brown, Shabazz 496 F. v. Va. burdened his App'x 322, Dep't of religious 325-26 (4th Corr., No. 3:10CV638, 2013 WL 1098102, at *6-9 (E.D. Va. Mar. 15, 2013). 15 Moreover, Sullivan does not allege that he is prohibited from engaging in the tenets of his religion including meeting for religious study, praying, viewing sermons, religious diet, or receiving new religious See 2011 Whitehouse, WL 5843622, at *4 eating a reading materials. (holding that where inmate may still engage in religious practices but "not through his preferred vendor" and where inmate possesses the ability to handwrite religious coursework instead of his preferred method of typing, inmate failed to allege a substantial burden on his religion); cf. Coleman v. Governor of Mich., 875-76 (6th Cir. 2011) 413 F. App'x 866, (concluding that policies limiting access to religious radio and television failed to substantially burden religious exercise because inmates "may receive religious literature via the mail and may receive visitors at the prison to discuss their religious beliefs"); Smith v. U.S. Congress, No. 3:12CV45, 2015 WL 1011545, at *14-15 (E.D. Va. Mar. 6, 2015) (concluding that substantially access to prison's burden new his religious single religious sermons vendor policy exercise when available to engage in that practice) . by other failed denying methods to him were Because Sullivan fails to allege facts that show that Defendants Younce, Medilia, and Harrison substantially burdened his practice, Sullivan states no First Amendment claim. Claim One will be dismissed. 16 C. RLUIPA {Claim Two} In Claim Two, Harrison, and Sullivan contends Sgt, Medilia violated that "Defendants Younce, his rights under Religious Land use and Institutionalized Person Act . allowed his (Id.) religious materials Sullivan argues that religious materials and books leaving him without any to meet his the . to be religious needs." "defendants confiscated his [in violation of RLUIPA] religious materials for more than 2 years and 4 months, and as of this day he has still not received them ( Compl . back." injunctive relief, , 84 . ) In support of his claim for Sullivan also states that "there needs to be some type of criteria set out to distinguish the lessons of the NOI from gang paraphernalia." (Compl. , 93.) In the Motion to Dismiss, Defendants argue fails to state a RLUIPA claim because: any personal involvement of the alternative, (2) to Defendants Younce, he fails Medilia, his religious exercise; and (1) that he fails to allege three Defendants; allege Sullivan facts and in the suggesting that or Harrison intentionally burdened ( 3) he fails to allege facts that plausibly suggest that the named Defendants have any involvement in "enacting the policy Sullivan is presumptively challengingspecif ically, possession of VDOC' s 'Five zero tolerance policy with respect to the Percenter' 17 materials within the inmate (Mem. Supp. First Mot. Dismiss. 15; see Mem. Supp. population." Second Mot. Dismiss 10.) Defendants are correct in the first regard. to mention Defendants Younce, Harrison, or Medilia in the body of his Complaint much less allege personal deprivation of his "R.L.U.P.A." a materials demonstrate that blind Younce, vague on , his 85.) allegation Harrison, under that is confiscated As Defendants insufficient Defendants failed to allege Younce, Medilia, facts or to or Medilia were personally involved in the deprivation of his rights under RLUIPA. Sullivan has his states eye (Compl. II such a most, Sullivan turn [ed] correctly assert, involvement in the At rights. section, "defendants . religious religious Sullivan fails Thus, plausibly indicating that Harrison violated his rights under RLUIPA. For the first time in response to the Motions to Dismiss, Sullivan attempts to correct the deficiencies in his Complaint and alleges that the individual Defendants were involved in the deprivation of his rights. third argument, Younce [, Sullivan and Harrison] the VDOC no Responding to Defendants' second and states that Defendants "Medilia [,] acted intentionally under the guise of tolerance policy to deprive Plaintiff of certain material that is known not to be 5% literature by those who have been trained to recognize 5% literature." 18 (Reply 14, ECF No. 4S; Reply 7, Sullivan also claims that because ECF No. SO.) staff took his property, that included some religious material, this was an "'intentional Plaintiff's religion." burden (See, on the free exercise' Reply 7, ECF No. SO.) of The Court need not address Defendants' second and third arguments because facts religious Sullivan exercise fails was to allege indicating substantially burdened as is that his required under RLUIPA. 12 To the extent that Sullivan argues that Defendants Younce, Medilia, materials and Harrison applied in violation of the RLUIPA, VDOC policy Sullivan fails against to gang state a claim for relief for the reasons stated below. 1. Whether the Burdened Activities Are A Religious Exercise RLUIPA provides, in pertinent part, that: No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person( 1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and First, to the extent that Sullivan argues that the VDOC anti-gang policy violates his rights under RLUIPA, he fails to allege that Defendant Younce, Medilia, or Harrison, as employees of the GCC, had any role in adopting, enacting, or amending the global Virginia Department of Corrections ( "VDOC") policy that presumably applies not just to GCC, but to all VDOC facilities. See Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 193 (holding that "there is a claim only against" the individual in his official capacity "who issued the challenged policy as an official of the Commonwealth"). 12 19 (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 42 u.s.c. facts § Thus, 2000cc-l(a). to begin, plausibly suggesting that Sullivan must allege Defendants' policies "substantial burden" on his religious exercise. if Sullivan has met this questions: "(1) and if so (2) the a In determining Court must answer two Is the burdened activity 'religious exercise,' is the burden 'substantial'?" 393 F.3d 559, 567 197, (4th 200-01 standard, impose Adkins v. (5th Cir. 2004); see Couch v. Jabe, Cir. 2012) (employing similar Kaspar, 679 F.3d two-part inquiry) . "RLUIPA defines the term 'religious exercise' broadly to include 'any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.'" at 200 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A)). Couch, 679 F. 3d Sullivan's claim implicates one activity-his ability to possess religious reading (Comp 1. , , materials. of religious constitutes exercise, religious 5843622, at *3 83 - 84 . ) Given RLUIPA's broad definition the Court exercise. assumes See this Whitehouse, activity 2011 WL (assuming inmate's enrollment in seminary course constituted religious exercise for purposes of RLUIPA) . 2. Sullivan Fails To Demonstrate A Substantial Burden On His Religious Exercise RLUIPA fails to define the term substantial burden. Couch, 679 F.3d at 200. See The United States Court of Appeals for 20 the Fourth Circuit jurisprudence determined interpreting the that Free Supreme Court's Clause Exercise See Lovelace, guidance on the issue. the provides Thus, 472 F. 3d at 187. the Fourth Circuit has explained that a substantial burden is one that put[s] substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, or one that forces a person to choose between following the precepts of h[is] religion and forfeiting [governmental] benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of h[is] religion . . . on the other hand. Couch, 679 F. 3d at 200 (quoting Lovelace, (alterations and omission in original) 472 F.3d In at 187). conducting the substantial burden inquiry, the plaintiff "is not required . to [allege facts indicating] that required by or essential to his Brown, 496 F. App' x 322, 325 [or her] the substantial exercise burden (2005)). test at religion." (4th Cir. 2012) Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 minimum the issue is Krieger v. (citing Cutter v. Nevertheless, requires that a "at a RLUIPA plaintiff [allege facts indicating] that the government's denial of a particular religious . . . observance inconvenience to one's religious practice." F.3d 1255, 1278 v. (11th Cir. 2007) Town of Surfside, was more than Smith v. Allen, 502 (citing Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 an (11th Cir. Inc. 2004)) ; 13 In Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 293 (2011) , the Supreme Court abrogated Smith's ultimate holding that RLUIPA allows for monetary damages against state officials acting in their official capacity. 13 21 cf. Krieger, 496 F. App'x at 326 (affirming grant of summary judgment where inmate failed to "show that the deprivation of an outdoor worship circle and the requested sacred items modified his behavior and violated Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 187)). his religious beliefs" (citing Thus, no substantial burden occurs if the government action merely makes the "religious exercise more expensive or difficult," but fails to pressure the adherent to violate his or her religious beliefs or abandon one of the precepts of his religion. Living Water Church of God v. Charter Twp. of Meridian, 258 F. App'x 729, 739 (6th Cir. 2007). Two recent cases from the Fourth Circuit illustrate plaintiff's responsibility with respect to alleging facts plausibly suggest a substantial burden. "testified that the primary religious a that In Couch, the plaintiff texts of Islam command that he grow a beard and that the refusal to maintain a beard is a sin comparable in severity to eating pork." at 200. The VDOC' s grooming Couch, policy prohibited 679 F. 3d inmates from growing beards and enforced this rule by placing a noncompliant inmate in a program that "restricted or limited access to personal property, movement rights, and associate time." Id. with at 199. others, recreation time, [the inmate's] the right to eat and visitation The Fourth Circuit concluded that VDOC' s grooming policy and enforcement mechanism "fit squarely within the accepted definition of 'substantial 22 burden'" because it placed substantial behavior and pressure violate his on the plaintiff beliefs. Id. at to modify 200-01 his (citing Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 995-96 (9th Cir. 2005)). In Krieger, inmate had the Fourth Circuit declined to find that an demonstrated a substantial burden where prison officials denied "his requests for an 'outdoor worship circle' and certain 'sacred items' related to his religious practice of Asatru." Krieger, 496 F. App'x at 322. The plaintiff "asserted that deprivation of the outdoor worship circle would require him to pray indoors, and that the 'Blot' ceremony is 'best performed outdoors.'" concluded Id. that at 325 the (emphasis added) . mere performing the substantial burden explanation regarding denial ceremony "Blot" where the the of the could optimal not plaintiff reason The Fourth Circuit "failed for demonstrate to why indoor Id. compromise his religious beliefs." manner Similarly, offer worship a any would the inmate failed to demonstrate a substantial burden with respect to the denial of assertion" additional that sacred items simply "the sacred items were 'well-established rituals.' /1 Id. by the 'necessary' at 326. "blanket to perform The Fourth Circuit noted that plaintiff "did not identify those rituals, or explain why the absence of the sacred items had an impact on the rituals and violated his beliefs." Id. 23 Krieger illuminates another consideration in conducting the The availability to an inmate, substantial burden inquiry. the most general sense, in of other means to practice his or her faith is not relevant to the RLUIPA substantial burden inquiry. Al-Amin v. Shear, "Nevertheless, retains courts other means activity, denial 325 such as of the Dep't Mar. 15, 2013) 3:10CV638, Thus, F. in (4th Cir. 2009). whether the ceremony, the inmate particular 2013 religious in assessing whether a method for engaging WL 1098102, at that Shabazz v. substantial burden." (citing Krieger, 413 193 consider preferred imposes a Governor of Mich., 190, engaging "Blot" inmate's Corr., App'x properly for the religious exercise Va. F. *7 (E.D. Va. 496 F. App'x at 326; Coleman v. App'x 866, 875-76 (6th Cir. 2011)). an inmate failed to demonstrate the denial of additional group study time imposed a substantial burden upon his religious exercise where prison officials already provided three hours of group study and worship time and allowed inmate to study in his cell. See Van Wyhe v. Reisch, 2009) . Similarly, 581 F.3d 639, 656-57 (8th Cir. the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that prison policies which limited the inmates' access to religious radio and television failed to substantially burden the inmates' because the inmates "may receive mail and may receive visitors at 24 religious broadcasts religious exercise literature via the the prison to discuss their religious beliefs." below, Coleman, 413 F. App'x at 876. in light of the foregoing principles, As explained Sullivan fails to allege facts that plausibly suggest any substantial burden upon his religious exercise. Sullivan fails to allege facts indicating that Defendants placed a substantial burden on his religious exercise. fails to Younce' s, materials, allege facts Harrison' s, plausibly Sullivan suggesting removal or Medilia' s that suspected of Defendant including his religious reading materials, cell on one occasion, placed "substantial pressure" gang from his on him to violate his religious beliefs or abandon one of the precepts of his religion. Whitehouse, 2011 WL 5843622, at *4 (citing Lovelace, 472 F.3d 187); cf. Living Water Church of God, 258 F. App'x at 739. At most, Sullivan alleges an inconvenience to his religious exercise. that a burden exercise" that 502 F. 3d at 1278 merely "inconvenience is an (explaining on religious is not substantial) ; Living Water Church of God, F. App'x at 739 difficult") . materials. the "religious exercise more expensive or Sullivan claims prohibited 258 (no substantial burden occurs if the government action merely makes not See Smith, by [the Thus, VDOC that policy the confiscated items were that forbids gang-related does not allege that he is unable to have access to these religious materials, just that his personal copies were taken from him. Sullivan does 25 not allege, for example, that he is forbidden to acquire new religious reading materials or materials from another inmate, or read religious materials in the library. See Smith, or books, borrow religious 2015 WL 1011545, books Sullivan fails at *14-15. to allege facts plausibly suggesting that Defendants Younce, Harrison, or Medilia violated his rights under RLUIPA. Cf. Heleva v. Kramer, 330 (depriving F. App'x possessing [inmate's] 406, 409 (3d. literature Cir. 2009) "designed faith in God" to was not a uphold and inmate of strengthen substantial burden because inmate did not have to abandon the precepts of his religion and was not pressured Accordingly, to substantially modify his behavior) . to the extent that Sullivan even alleges a RLUIPA claim against Defendants Younce, Harrison, or Medilia, he fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Claim Two will be dismissed. D. Equal Protection (Claim Three) In Claim Three, Pearson, Harrison, Amendment Right - Sullivan alleges and Medilia that Defendants Younce, "violated to Equal Protection clause - equal treatment (Compl. 13.) II Fourteenth his to be provided In his section alleging facts in support of his equal protection claim, Sullivan vaguely contends conduct] continues that "defendants on behalf to hold of were Defendant Plaintiff's 26 notified [of Harrison who religious the is offending holding materials" and (Compl. , 67) and t "Defendants that (Id. treatment." , 69.) are As aware of discussed this below, unequal Sullivan's "[v]ague references to a group of 'defendants,' without specific allegations tying the unconstitutional Defendants conduct," Younce, Anderson, individual fails 778 to and Pearson, 538 F.3d 763, defendants state to alleged claim a the against Medillia. (7th Cir. Grieveson 2008) v. (citing Alejo v. Heller, 328 F.3d 930, 936 (7th Cir. 2003)). 1. As a Defendant Defendants Younce, Pearson, and Medilia preliminary Medilia at matter, all in Sullivan the fails portion addressing his equal protection claim. of to his mention Complaint Thus, Sullivan fails to explain how Defendant Medilia was personally involved in the deprivation of his equal protection rights. Sullivan fails to state a claim against Defendant Medilia and Claim Three against Defendant Medilia will be dismissed. The section of Sullivan's Complaint pertaining to his equal protection with claim mentions respect "Defendants to are a aware Defendants different of this Younce claim. unequal and Sullivan treatment, unequal treatment is intentional discrimination . to his complaints GRCC . . Hobbs, this and grievances led to against the 27 ( 8) states: and this [and] institution the Defendants Younce, transferring plaintiff over eight Pearson only Pearson, due of and hours away to a Maximum Security requested nor facility about involvement do Defendant not have Younce's a (Compl. warranted." allegations when (KMCC) and transfer Sullivan's 69.) Pearson's any bearing on his wasn't equal purported protection claim, but instead are the subject of Claim Four, a due process claim. Sullivan fails to allege facts indicating that Defendants Younce and Pearson had any personal involvement in the deprivation of his rights under the Equal Protection Clause. Again, for the first time in his Reply, Sullivan attempts to correct the deficiencies in his Complaint and add new facts about the personal involvement of Defendants Younce and Pearson. Sullivan claims during the that Defendant Younce confiscation" (Reply 8, "was physically present ECF No. 45), which is inconsistent with Sullivan's previous allegations in his Reply that Younce was in a different part of the pod. claims that Defendant deprivation of his Sullivan also Pearson was personally involved in the equal protection rights because he "was notified of the violations via verbal complaints, and letters." (Id.) the These belated assertions are not properly considered. extent Defendant there Younce remains or any Pearson, equal it explained below. 28 is protection entirely To claim against frivolous, as 2. Defendant Harrison Sullivan only names Defendant Harrison in the body of the Complaint as it relates to his equal protection claim. is holding and continues contends that "Defendant Harrison . to hold Plaintiff's religious materials As evident from Sullivan's Complaint, various grievances, on September II (Comp!. , 67.) in response to Sullivan's 10, 2014, Lt. Harrison asked about Sullivan's allegations and noted that idea of what Ex. 17.) 14 Sullivan Sullivan [materials Sullivan was] "he had no (Compl. referring to." Defendant Harrison is now retired from GCC; fails to allege facts that plausibly was thus, suggest that Defendant Harrison has continued to hold his religious materials in violation of equal protection. To the extent that an equal protection claim remains against any Defendant, Sullivan's allegations are convoluted and frivolous. "The Equal Protection Clause . . is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). In order to state an equal protection claim, Sullivan must allege that: inmate (1) differently that and he were and a comparator similarly situated; and were (2) treated that the The same grievance indicates that Sullivan was informed that "this material has not been located in the Intel Dept." ( Compl . Ex. 1 7 . ) 14 29 different treatment was the result of discrimination. v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 2002) To succeed on an equal protection claim, forth "specific, non-conclusory establish improper motive." (4th Cir. 2001) omitted) . a "the disparity treatment in court level of scrutiny." (4th Cir. 2001) disparate treatment proceeds can be that to determine Garraghty, muster so 293 F. 3d at 732 that whether the as the requisite 239 F. 3d 648, "In a long (citation satisfies justified under Morrison v. passes omitted) sufficiently (citations omitted). Veney, allegations factual treatment is 'reasonably related to [any] interests.'" a plaintiff must set quotation marks plaintiff requirement, (citation omitted). Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 405 (internal If See Veney 654 prison context," "the disparate legitimate penological (alteration in original) (quoting Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 225 (2001)). Sullivan alleges Nation of Islam. that "his religious material is that of These lessons are the exact same. The Nation of Islam members are allowed to study the exact same religious materials, materials he should also be allowed to study the exact same without having them confiscated." (Comp 1 . 68 . ) Sullivan seemingly argues that he has been treated differently than other members of the Nation of Islam because he is a member of the Nation of Islam. this statement, and In his Reply, provides: 30 he attempts to clarify "[T]he reason that it is intentional discrimination ·is because Plaintiff does subscribe to the teaching just like other members of the Nation of Islam, but he is not being equally treated as them because they are allowed to keep the same religious material as that which was taken from him." (Reply 5, ECF No. 50.) Sullivan claims prohibits that gang-related Protection Clause. similarly situated the application of materials Sullivan groups to him fails violates the Equal allege to inmates of the policy that facts that have been treated differently under the policy that prohibits inmates from having gang-related materials, much less that Defendants Younce, Pearson, or Harrison acted with discriminatory purpose . 15 First, while Sullivan claims to be a member of the Nation of Islam, he himself identified the items Percenter/N.O.I. Material." taken from ( Compl. Ex. 1. ) him as "Five Sullivan fails to allege facts that other inmates who have possessed property that is "Five Percenter/N.O.I. differently than him. Thus, have been to make the Material" he fails treated threshold showing for an Equal Protection challenge and the Court finds his claim frivolous. See In re Long Term Administrative "The Court need not proceed to the succeeding question of whether [Sullivan]' s differential treatment, had it occurred, would have been rational under Turner [v. Safley]" because he fails to allege facts indicating that Defendants had a discriminatory intent. In re Long Term Administrative Segregation of Inmates Designated as Five Percenters, 174 F. 3d 464, 471 n.5 (4th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). 15 31 Segregation of Inmates Designated as Five Percenters, 464, 471 (4th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted) 174 F. 3d ("There is nothing in the Constitution which requires prison officials to treat all inmate groups alike where differentiation is necessary to avoid an imminent threat of institutional disruption or violence.") Claim Three will be dismissed as frivolous. E. Due Process Five) And Retaliation Claims (Claim Four and The Court discusses Claims Four and Five together because Sullivan fails to differentiate between the claims. claims are scour the disjointed and record to find rambling require the Court to the one instance where he mentioned Defendants in relation to this claim. contends that and These two "Defendants Younce, In Claim Four, Pearson, and Hobbs, Sullivan violated his Fourteenth Amendment Rights - to the Due Process Clause by transferring Plaintiff over eight ( 8) and family as a means of hours away from his home retaliation for filing his numerous requests, letters, complaints and grievances due to the unlawful taking of his religious material." ( Compl. 13 . ) The only instance where these three Defendants are named in the body of the Complaint with regard to this claim is the section titled "Retaliation," where he alleges that "Younce, Pearson, and Hobbs transferred him to KMCC, to punish him for complaining grievances concerning misconduct by prison officers." 32 and (Compl. , 74.) Sullivan fails to allege any facts indicating that Defendants Younce or Pearson had any personal involvement in the deprivation of his due process rights or retaliated against him for exercising a constitutionally protected right. 16 Instead, Sullivan the was record transferred before one the day Court after he establishes filed his that first grievance and at the request of Central Classification Services. With respect to Defendant Hobbs, the Court construes Sullivan to argue that, because complaint that, K. Whitehead responded to at 1) , (Compl. Ex. and because Defendant Hobbs was the Eastern Region Administrator, deprivation of Sullivan informal "You were transferred to Keen Mountain on 1-31- 14 at the request of Eastern Region Administrator" 6, his fails Defendant Hobbs was necessarily involved in the his to due process plausibly rights. suggest As that discussed below, Defendant Hobbs For the first time in his Reply, Sullivan attaches an affidavit from another inmate who swears that he heard Defendant Younce say to Sullivan, "[s] ince you have so many complaints about how you' re being treated here, we' re going to send you somewhere more to your liking. Then he chuckled and left." (Reply Ex. 1, ECF No. 45-1.) That belated filing is not properly considered. But, even assuming that Sullivan had alleged that Defendants Younce or Pearson were personally involved in the deprivation of his rights with regard to his transfer, for the reasons stated in conjunction with Sullivan's allegations against Defendant Hobbs, this claim is both frivolous and fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 16 33 retaliated against him in violation of his constitutional rights. Claims of retaliation by inmates are generally treated with skepticism officials because is by "' [e]very definition act of retaliatory 74 1317 (4th Cir. 1996) (4th Cir. 1994)) "[P] laintiffs who by sense Morris, prison that it 73 F. 3d 40 F.3d 72, (some internal quotation marks omitted) . 17 claim that plaintiff their constitutional retaliation must naked allegations of reprisal a the (quoting Adams v. Rice, been violated by official Instead, in Cochran v. responds to prisoner misconduct. ' " 1310, discipline must . allege present Adams, II facts rights have more than 40 F.3d at 74. that plausibly show "either that the retaliatory act was taken in response to the exercise of a constitutionally protected right or that the act itself violated Sullivan's participate Alba, 932 enjoys no such contention, in F. 2d a right." "there grievance 728, 729 constitutional Id. is no Cir. right to 75. Contrary constitutional proceedings." (8th at Id. 1991)) . right to to (citing Flick v. Because Sullivan participate in grievance proceedings, his act of pursuing a grievance about GCC staff was This case provides a prime example as to why claims of retaliation are met with skepticism. Here, at the point when Sullivan was actually transferred on January 31, 2014, he had filed one grievance the day before his transfer. The Court has serious doubts that the VDOC could effectuate a transfer of an inmate in one-day period. 17 34 not the exercise of a constitutional right. Id. (citing Flick, 932 F.2d at 729). Sullivan also fails to allege retaliatory act-transferring him to a violated his constitutional rights. Sullivan fails to allege facts that higher security prison- Cochran, that purported the 73 F. 3d at 1317. plausibly show that the alleged retaliatory act "was taken in response to the exercise of a constitutionally protected right or that violated such right." Adams, 40 F.3d at 75. the act itself Claim Four will be dismissed as frivolous. In Claim Five, Sullivan argues that Defendants Younce, Pearson, and Hobbs violated his due process rights by taking his property from his cell. Sullivan fails to allege facts that plausibly suggest that Defendants Younce, Pearson, or Hobbs had any personal involvement in Defendant Medilia' s and Harrison's confiscation of his books and other materials from his cell. To the Defendant, action extent that an property interest. individual remains against any claim is a legitimate liberty or The first step in analyzing a procedural to identify whether the alleged conduct affects a protected interest. (4th Cir. 1997) of Bd. of Regents of State Cells. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). 502 Five the Due Process Clause applies only when government deprives due process Claim Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, (citing cases). 35 Sullivan does not indicate that Defendants' liberty interest. 18 Complaint, Hobbs actions he resulted Instead, contends deprived him of that his in the deprivation of any generously construing Sullivan's Defendants Younce, Pearson, black history books and and purported religious reading materials without due process of law. First, negligent act Negligent state Due Process of state Daniels property. violate the v. and Clause official [the Due Process] post-deprivation 474 implicated unintended U.S. deprivations 327, of (1984) are by loss 328 a of (1986). property Clause provided . remedies Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 not causing Williams, intentional is "do not that adequate available." Hudson v. (finding due process satisfied by post-deprivation remedy to redress intentional destruction of personal property Moreover, Virginia's remedies forecloses by prison provision Sullivan's deprivation of property. (JCC/JFA), guard of due during adequate process a shakedown) . post-deprivation claim for the See id.; Wilson v. Melby, No. 1:12cv42 2012 WL 1895793, at *6-7 (E.D. Va. May 23, 2012); At most, he vaguely states that "Defendants deprived him of his 'liberty' interest in the fundamental right to (Petition of Grievances, Equal Protection of the Law, and Administrative transfer)." (Compl. 11 74.) As discussed above, Sullivan has no constitutional right to participate in the grievance procedure. With regard to "Equal Protection of the Law, and Adminstrative transfer, Plaintiff rambles on about his "legitimate claims of entitlement" to these two things, but fails to identify any of the three Defendants he named with regard to his claim in this section or how they were personally involved with the deprivation of his rights. (See Compl. 1111 71-82.) 18 11 36 Henderson v. Virginia, No. 7:07-cv-00266, 2008 WL 204480, at *10 n.7 (W.D. Va. Jan. 23, 2008). Virginia has provided adequate post-deprivation Under the Virginia for deprivations caused by state employees. Tort Claims damages for Act, Virginia "negligent has or waived wrongful" sovereign acts acting within the scope of employment. 195.3 (West 2015). 19 remedies of Va. immunity state for employees Code Ann. § 8. 01- The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that the Virginia Tort Claims Act and Virginia tort law provide adequate post-deprivation remedies for torts committed by state employees. 772 F.2d 75, 77-78 (4th Cir. 1985). See Wadhams v. Procunier, Because the availability of a tort action in state court fully satisfies the requirement of a meaningful post-deprivation process, claim for Amendment. the loss of See Wilson, 2008 WL 204480, his property Sullivan cannot state a under 2012 WL 1895793, at *10 n. 7. Accordingly, at the Fourteenth *6-7; Henderson, Claim Five will be dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a claim. Accordingly, Second Motion Sullivan's the First Motion to Dismiss to claims Dismiss will be (ECF No. dismissed. 47) (ECF No. will The be action 35) and granted. will be "[T]he Commonwealth shall be liable for claims for money. on account of damage to or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee while acting within the scope of his employment . . . . " Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-195.3 (West 2015). 19 37 dismissed. The Clerk will be directed to note the disposition of the action for purposes of 28 U.S.C. The Clerk is directed to send a § 1915(g). copy of the Memorandum Order to Sullivan and counsel of record. It is so ORDERED. /s/ Robert E. Payne Senior United States District Judge Richmond, Virginia Date: February -fI2_, 2017 38
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
