Murphy et al v. Ross, No. 3:2014cv00870 - Document 15 (E.D. Va. 2015)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Robert E. Payne on 4/14/15. Copy sent: Yes (tdai, )

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Murphy et al v. Ross Doc. 15 JL_i_E (n) IN THE UNITED APR I 52015 M STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Richmond Division CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT RICHMOND, VA ROLAND F. MURPHY and KATHRYN BEERMAN, Plaintiffs, v. Civil Action No. ROBERT M. ROSS, 3:14cv870 MAGISTRATE, Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION This DISMISS matter is (Docket No. before 11). the Court For the on Defendant's reasons set MOTION forth below, TO the motion to dismiss will be granted and Defendant's prior MOTION TO DISMISS {Docket No. 8) will be denied as moot. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Robert M. Commonwealth Ross of {"Ross") Virginia. is In a this state 42 magistrate U.S.C. § for 1983 the action, Roland F. Murphy and Kathryn Beerman ("Plaintiffs") allege that Ross "abandoned his judicial role and duties [when he] to perform violating Fourth, No. 4) . as the Fifth, a detached Plaintiffs' and neutral constitutional and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, search warrant when the Plaintiffs allege affidavit entered magistrate" rights fail[ed] thereby under the Compl., at 2 (Docket that in Ross issued a support of the Dockets.Justia.com search warrant lacked probable cause, did not establish a nexus between illegal activity and the Plaintiffs' business, and did not provide a detailed description of the persons to be searched or a reliable informant. and Id. credible description of the confidential Plaintiffs seek money damages against Ross in the amount of $250,000.00. DISCUSSION I. Legal Standard Ross has filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive complaint must plausible F.3d Twombly, 222 550 plausibility allows the defendant "provide enough facts on its face." 218, a Rule 12(b)(6) {4th U.S. 544, when court the to to state Robinson v. Cir. 2009) 555 draw Am. the Bell "A pleads a claim that Honda Motor Co., (quoting (2007)). plaintiff motion to dismiss, a Atl. claim factual reasonable is liable for the misconduct alleged." 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, v. facial content inference 551 Corp. has is that that the Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 550 U.S. at 556). A court "will accept the pleader's description of what happened . . . along with any conclusions that can be reasonably drawn therefrom," but "need not accept conclusory allegations encompassing the legal effects of the pleaded facts." A. Wright & Arthur R. 1357 (3d ed. 1998); Miller, Federal Chamblee v. Charles Practice and Procedure § Old Dominion Sec. Co., L.L.C., 2014 WL 1415095, *4 made the clear that (E.D. Va. 2014). analytical "Twombly and Iqbal also approach for evaluating Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss requires courts to reject conclusory allegations that amount to mere formulaic recitation of the elements of a claim and to conduct a context-specific analysis to determine whether the well-pleaded factual plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief." II. allegations Id. Analysis In his motion to dismiss, immunity and the Plaintiffs from entitlement to doctrine stating relief. Ross argues that both judicial of a issue claim Based preclusion plausibly on Ross' prevent the suggesting any judicial immunity contention alone, this Court agrees. Plaintiffs bring their claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 provides: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or jurisdiction other thereof person within the to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, action brought against for an act or except that in any a judicial officer omission taken officer's judicial capacity, relief shall not be granted in such injunctive unless a § 1983. declaratory decree was violated declaratory relief was unavailable. or It is beyond dispute that judicial officers may not be held liable for an award of money damages if they have acted within their jurisdiction. (1984); ("As Pressly v. Gregory, judicial immunity officers, for McCluskey v. 586, See Pulliam v. 588 acts New (2d 831 Cir. F.2d 514, magistrates performed York Allen, State 2011) in are their 466 U.S. 517 ("[T]he (4th Cir. entitled to judicial Unified Court 543 1987) absolute capacity."); Sys., claims 522, 442 F. against the App'x State Defendants are based solely on judicial acts performed by judges in their Judge judicial Lippman capacity. are barred immunity."); Robinson v. 2007) Hence, by Smyth, the claims the 258 F. against doctrine App'x of 469, judicial 470 (3d Cir. ("We agree with the District Court that Judge Smyth is absolutely immune from a suit for money damages. complaint does Robinson judicial capacity[.]"); 754 Chief (10th Cir. 2012) contend that Smyth Nowhere in the acted outside F. his Chavez v. Schwartz, 457 App'x 752, ("Generally speaking, the only type of relief available to a plaintiff who sues a judicial officer is declaratory relief."). magistrates are {("^Judicial magistrate There judicial officer' serving the is officers, means, unless jurisdiction also see no Va. otherwise . . ."), question Code § 19.2-119 indicated, or that that a any state magistrate has warrants, authority see Va. following powers under state Code § 19.2-45 ... To law to issue search ("A magistrate shall have the issue search warrants in accord with the provisions of §§ 19.2-52 to 19.2-60 of the Code [.]"). Judicial immunity "is vitiated only when the judicial officer acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction." v. Gregory, 831 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987) Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978)). Ross' alleged failure to Pressly (citing Stump v. Plaintiffs appear to argue that "comply with specific laws, rules[,] and standards expected of a magistrate" mean that he "abandoned his judicial jurisdiction Pis.' But, Resp. as a role" and at 2 altogether the protections (Docket No. sister and court of 14); within therefore judicial Compl. the at Fourth 2 acted without immunity. See (Docket No. 4). Circuit so wisely summated: The problem with the Plaintiff's rationale is that he equates error with a clear absence of all jurisdiction. There is no support If in the the law for Plaintiff such a proposition. were correct in this reasoning, then judicial immunity would not exist because any error would be committed without jurisdiction, and as such would subject the judge to liability. Our judicial system would cease to function under such circumstances. Griffin (W.D.N.C. v. Thornburg, June indicated that 19, "[a] No. 2008). 1:08CV222, The judge will 2008 WL 2512901, Supreme Court not deprived of be itself at *4 clearly immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when jurisdiction.'" he has acted in the 'clear absence of all Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57 (emphasis added). "A judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural Instead, itself, judge, Id. at 359 (emphasis added). the relevant inquiry relates "to the nature of the act i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a and to the they dealt with 362. errors." expectations of the parties, the judge in his judicial i.e., capacity." whether Id. at Because Ross performed a function normally performed by a magistrate jurisdiction in his judicial regardless of capacity, whether he any acted errors within his attended the exercise of this jurisdiction. Conversely, declaratory Plaintiffs decrees," Pis.' argue Resp. that at 2 Ross (Docket "violated No. 14), and therefore falls within the law's exception that "in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory declaratory relief was unavailable." added). decree was violated or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis However, this alternate route is equally unsuccessful. First, decree in refers the to context an of order section directing 1983, a "a declaratory particular judicial officer to take or refrain from taking a particular action in a particular dispute." 3257824, failed at to *3 Puiia v. (D.N.H. point to Aug. any Cross, 8, such No. 2012). 12-CV-54-PB, The declaratory 2012 WL Plaintiffs decree. have Rather, Plaintiffs point generally to the "laws, rules[,] and standards expected of a magistrate taught through training and outlined in accordance with the Magistrate Manual of Virginia, Canons of Conduct for Virginia Magistrates, Code of Virginia, Constitution of Virginia, These are section and the not Constitution." "declaratory decrees" Pis.' within Resp. the at 2. meaning of 1983. Second, the "declaratory decrees" exception in section 1983 merely provides U.S.C. U.S. injunctive relief, not money damages. See 42 § 1983 ("injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated") (emphasis added). An injunction is an equitable, nonmonetary remedy wherein the court enters an order "prohibiting someone from doing some specified act or commanding someone to undo some Black's Law Dictionary 784 (6th ed. 1990). if Ross had violated a declaratory wrong or injury." In other words, even decree, this would not provide the grounds necessary to seek $250,000.00 in monetary damages. In short, the Plaintiffs have failed to allege any facts suggesting against the existence a judicial of officer a plausible clothed with section 1983 absolute claim immunity. Because the Court grants Ross' motion to dismiss on this basis, the Court does not reach the question of issue preclusion. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's MOTION TO DISMISS {Docket No. 11) will be granted and Defendant's prior MOTION TO DISMISS (Docket No. 8) will be denied as moot. The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Memorandum Opinion to the plaintiffs and counsel for the defendant. It is so ORDERED. /s/ ft-U> Robert E. Payne Senior United States District Judge Richmond, Virginia Date: April A*., 2015

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