Droste v. Vert Capital Corp et al, No. 3:2014cv00467 - Document 64 (E.D. Va. 2015)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Robert E. Payne on 04/02/2015. (tjoh, )
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Droste v. Vert Capital Corp et al Doc. 64 [ L t ? FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA f APR-2 2015 ||j Richmond Division CLERK. U.S. DISTRICT COURT IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \— i RICHMOND. VA BEN H. DROSTE AND CALVIN CASH, Individually and as Class Representatives, Plaintiff, Civil Action No.: v. 3:14-cv-467 VERT CAPITAL CORP, WOLFF FORDING HOLDINGS, LLC, AND WOLFF FORDING & CO., Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter CERTIFY CLASS is before (Docket No. the 47). Court on PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted. BACKGROUND A. The Proposed Class and Class Claims In FOR PLAINTIFF'S CLASS MEMORANDUM OF LAW CERTIFICATION AND RELATED IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION RELIEF Droste and Cash seek to certify two classes. which Plaintiffs call the "June 10 (Docket No. 48), The first class, Subclass", is defined as follows: For the all those who worked at Richmond "June 10 Plant Subclass," and or who the members are reported to the were terminated and/or laid off without cause on their part Dockets.Justia.com from their employment on or within thirty (30) days of June 10, 2014, as part of, or as the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the mass layoff/plant closing ordered by Defendants and that occurred 2014, who do not file opt out of the class." Docket No. 48, 4. at The a on timely second June 10, request proposed to class, which Plaintiffs call the "June 23 Subclass" is defined as follows: For the "June 23 Subclass," the members are all those who worked at or reported to the Richmond Plant and who were terminated and/or laid off without cause on their part from their employment on or within thirty (30) days of June 23, 2014, or thereafter, as part [of], or as the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the mass layoff/plant closing ordered by Defendants and that occurred on June 23, 2014, who do not file a timely request to opt out of the class. Id. Both Second subclasses Amended assert Complaint the same ("SAC"). claims See for Docket relief No. 41, Specifically, they both allege that: 93. At all relevant times, Defendants employed more than 100 employees who in the aggregate worked at least 4,000 hours per week, exclusive of hours of overtime, within the United States. 94. At all times relevant, each Defendant was an "employer" as that term is defined in 29 U.S.C. §639.3(a). §2101(a)(l) and 20 C.F.R. 95. Specifically, the Vert Defendants, with Wolff-Fording, constituted a "single in the 17-20. employer" Sublass 96. of [sic] The the Plaintiffs and the WARN Members under the WARN Act... Vert Defendants, as a single employer with Wolff-Fording, ordered and arranged for plant closings/mass layoffs, as those terms are defined by 29 U.S.C. §2101 (a) (2). 97. The plan closings/mass layoffs at the Richmond Plant each resulted in "employment losses," as that term is defined by 29 U.S.C. §2101(a)(2) for at least fifty of Defendants' employees as well as thirtythree percent (33%) of Defendants' workforce at the employment site, excluding "part-time employees," as that term is defined by 29 U.S.C. §2101(a)(8), and at least 50 employees (again excluding any part-time employees) on each occasion experienced an "employment loss" at a single site of employment. 98. The Plaintiffs Members were and the terminated WARN by Subclass the Vert Defendants (as a single employer with WolffFording) without cause on their part, as part of or as the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the mass layoffs/plant closings ordered by them. 99. The Plaintiffs and the WARN Subclass Members are "affected employees" of Defendants as their single employer within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §2101(a)(5). 100. Defendants were required by the WARN Act to give the Plaintiffs and the WARN Subclass Members at least 60 days' advance written notice of their terminations. 101. Defendants Plaintiffs and the failed WARN to give Subclass written notice that complied requirements of the WARN Act. the members with the 102. The Plaintiffs, subclass Members, are of the Defendants as and each of the WARN "aggrieved employees" that 29 U.S.C. Defendants defined in §2104(a) (7) . 103. term is Plaintiffs and failed each to of WARN the Members their respective commissions, bonuses, and days following pay Subclass wages, benefits their the salary, for 60 respective terminations. SAC, Docket "[a]ward of No. 41 ft at Damages 93-103. in favor Both classes request of each named Plaintiff and the each Other Similarly Situated Individual, equal to 60 days' wages and benefits, including pursuant prejudgment under the the interests, preceding fees and costs." B. to Id. as WARN allowed Act...All by law paragraphs...[and] at interest, on the amounts reasonable owed attorneys' 19. Defendants' Alleged WARN ACT Violations Plaintiffs have sued Retraining Notification Act Defendants violated the under the Worker ("WARN Act")1, statutory Adjustment and alleging that the scheme by terminating Plaintiffs without providing the notice required under the Act2 and without adequately compensating employees3. 1 29 U.S.C. §§2101 et seq. 2 "(a) An employer shall not order a plant closing or mass layoff until the end of a 60-day period after the employer serve written notice of such an order: (1) to each representative of the affected employees as of the time of the notice, or, if 4 All named plaintiffs and proposed class members were employed at Wolff Fording & Co. in Richmond, Virginia where they manufactured and of dance year." sold "hundreds of thousands SAC, Docket No. 41 at 55. costumes a In June of 2014, Vert Capital incorporated Wolff-Fording Holdings and, according to the Second Amended Complaint, Also in June of owns "100% of that entity." 2014, Vert Capital IcL at 55 1-2. and Wolff-Fording "purchased a controlling interest" in Wolff Fording Holdings Co. Id. at 54. On the afternoon of June 10, 67 employees was being Named that their terminated plaintiff employment effective Calvin 2014, Cash was the Defendants informed at the Wolff-Fording plant immediately. one of the there is no such representative at that time, Id. 55 employees 38-40. whose to each affected employee; and (2) to the State or entity designated by the State to carry out rapid response activities under section 2864(a)(2)(A) of this title, and the chief elected official of the unit of local government within which such closing or layoff is to occur." 29 U.S.C. §2102. 3 "(a)(1) Any employer who orders a plant closing or mass layoff in violation of section 2102 of this title shall be liable to each aggrieved employee who suffers an employment loss as a result of such losing or layoff for: (A) back pay for each day of violation at a rate of compensation not less than the high of - (i) the average regular rate received by such employee during the last 3 years of the employee's employment; or (ii) the final regular rate received by such employee; and (B) benefits under an employee benefit plan described in section 1002(3) of this title, including the cost of medical expenses incurred during the employment loss which would have been covered under an employee benefit plan if the employment loss had not occurred." 29 U.S.C. §2104. 5 employment at Wolff-Fording Co. ended on June 10, 2014. 540. not These employees were provided with terminations before the afternoon of June 10, Sometime after June 10, the terminated the two days the employees had 2014. of Id. employees return to Wolff Fording on June 21, 2014, for notice Id. at were their at 541. told to to receive a paycheck worked immediately before their discharge and for any accrued vacation they were entitled to. Id. at 55 42, 48. "Many" of these checks they were issued because of insufficient funds. bounced after Id. at 55 53- 54. On June 23, 2014, "all but four" of the remaining employees were told that they were being terminated. included named plaintiff Plaintiffs, the totaled "at least" were terminated Defendants number Ben of Id. Droste. employees 50 people. Id. did at not Id. 61. The June 23 receive for the days that they had worked vacation time as the June 10 employees had. "as a result [Virginia Department of Labor] This According terminated on 4 The Plaintiffs state that at 559. on to June 23 employees who checks or from the for accrued Id. at 64.4 of pressure that the put on the Vert Defendants, in August 2014, the Vert Defendants caused certain employees to be paid wages for the last days of their employment." SAC, Docket No. 41 at 567. However, the Court has not been provided with information regarding the number of employees who were paid and whether the paid employees were members of the June 19 or June 23 subclass. 6 C. Class Representatives - Ben Droste and Calvin Cash Ben Droste was employed at the Wolff Fording & Co. plant in Richmond, Virginia as a plant controller. in position that since June of 2013 He had been employed and remained position until he was terminated on June 23, 2014. in that Droste was one of the few former Wolff Fording & Co. employees who received a check from Wolff-Fording Holdings for wages he had earned prior to being terminated as a result of Virginia Department of Labor pressures. Calvin Cash was employed at the Wolff Fording & Co. retail store in Richmond, June 10, Virginia since 1986. She was terminated on 2014. CLASS CERTIFICATION DISCUSSION To obtain class certification, a plaintiff must satisfy the four requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Additionally, the case must be consistent with at least one of the types of class actions defined in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). different classes for certification; of the pertinent requirements. Plaintiffs propose two each class must satisfy all None of the three defendants have responded to the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification at this time. A. Rule 23(a) Rule 23(a) They are that: has four requirements class certification. (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; common to the class; are typical for (3) (2) there are questions of law or fact the representative's claims or defenses of those of the class; and (4) the representative will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class. See Fed. R. Civ. Shops, Inc., bears the Lienhart 155 P. F.3d 331, burden v. 23(a); of Dryvit Broussard v. 337 proving Systs., Meineke (4th Cir. all Inc., Disc. 1998). The plaintiff requirements 255 F.3d Muffler of 138, 146 Rule 23. (4th Cir. 2001). As Thornton, the Fourth LLP, 368 Circuit F.3d courts are not required explained 356, 365 in Gariety (4th Cir. 2004), "to accept plaintiffs' the certification findings on the question Gariety, and, propriety Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. (quoting "close look' Co., of if district Rather, "the at the facts relevant to necessary, make certification." 445 F.3d 311, 368 F.3d at 365). Grant pleadings when assessing whether a class should be certified." district court must take a v. 319 "Such specific Thorn (4th Cir. findings v. 2006) can be necessary even if the issues tend to overlap into the merits of the underlying case," but "[t]he likelihood of the plaintiffs' success on whether the merits ... certification is is not relevant proper." Id. to the issue (internal of citations omitted). 1. Ascertainability of the Proposed Class Rule 23 action must define defenses." the states Fed. the of "[a]n class R. Civ. certification definition that (4th Cir. class 1976); the that class P. 23(c)(1)(B). see listed is maintaining a class action." 1348 and requirements the order an certifies claims, a class issues, or This is in addition to in Rule essential 23(a). "The prerequisite to Roman v. ESB, Inc., 550 F.2d 1343, also F.R.D. 49, 53 (M. D.N.C. 2004). Kirkman v. N.C. R. Co., 220 "The court should not certify a class unless the class description is "sufficiently definite so that it is administratively feasible for the court to determine whether a particular individual is a member.'" Solo v. Bausch & Lomb Sept. Inc., 2009 WL 4287706, at (quoting 7A Charles Alan Wright, *4 (D.S.C. Arthur R. 25, 2009) Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1760 (3d ed. 2005)). In class the a recent cannot class be decision, certified unless members in Production Co v. Adair, see also Wm. the reference Fourth a court to can objective 2014 WL 4070457, Moore et al., Circuit at *7 held that readily "[a] identify criteria." (4th Cir. EQT 2014); 5 Moore's Federal Practice § 23.21[1] (3d ed.) ("A definition class action provides a is court possible with only tangible when and the class practicable standards for determining who is and who is not a member of the class.") . "The plaintiffs need not be able class member at the time of certification. are impossible fact-finding or inappropriate." class to resolve be the excluded Moore, to identify without "mini-trials', EQT, to But if class members extensive then a defined, the the class by reference court to action is Rather, "[f]or a must question of whether class members from individualized class 2014 WL 4070457, at *7. sufficiently identify every are be able to included or objective criteria." supra, § 23.21[3][a]. The two classes would consist of individuals who were formerly employed at the Wolff Fording & Co. plant and store in Richmond, Virginia before they were terminated on either June 10, 2014 or June 23, 2014. Assuming that business records exist which contain the names of former employees, subclass are certainly the members of the ascertainable. Thus, the ascertainability requirement is satisfied. 2. Rule 23(a)(1) Numerosity Rule 23(a)(1) for a class provides that the second of the requirements action is that the 10 class be "so numerous that joinder of all 23(a) (1). action rule members "No under is is impracticable." specified number Fed. to R. be Civ. 23; considered circumstances of the case & Nonsectarian Hosp. (finding a that P. in 375 of numerosity requirement). 18 needed to [rather], was Civ. maintain of the Cypress v. F.2d R. a application light . . . ." Ass'n, class is Fed. 648, P. class of the particular Newport News Gen. 653 (4th sufficient to Cir. 1967) fulfill the "Courts consider a number of factors in considering whether joinder is practicable including the size of the class, ease their addresses, and their F.R.D. of identifying facility of making service geographic 162, its numbers 170 (D. Md. 5 Moore's Federal Practice §23.22 Ass'n, v. 375 F.2d 648, 653 or Newport more News is usually Gen's (4th Cir. 1967) Henderson, quotation numerous." Cypress 41 (internal them if joined v. Adams a See of 2000) on Typically, Ed.) . "class dispersion." and determining 197 omitted). sufficiently (Matthew Bender 3d Nonsectarian Hosp. (finding that a class of 18 was sufficiently numerous); Newberg on Class Actions §3:11 (6th Ed. 2014) ("[J]oinder is generally deemed practicable in classes with fewer than 20 members and impracticable in classes with more Ctrs., than Inc., 40 183 members."); F.R.D. 487, Ganesh, 489 LLC (E.D. v. Va. Computer Learning 1998) ("As forty [class members] can suffice in an appropriate case.") 11 few as a. The June 10, 2014 Class Plaintiffs of assert approximately number 67 indicates that the "June individuals." that the class 10 WARN Docket is Subclass No. 48 at sufficiently consists 9. This numerous to satisfy the Rule 23(a)(1) requirement. b. The June 23, 2014 Class Plaintiffs assert that the "proposed June 23 WARN Subclass consists While of approximately 51 employees." this subclass, subclass it too is is Docket No. smaller than the June sufficiently numerous to 10, 48 at 2014 9. proposed satisfy the Rule 23(a)(1) numerosity requirement. 3. Rule 23(a)(2) Rule 23(a)(2) Commonality requires fact common to the class. Drvvit Sys., Inc., 255 that there Fed. F.3d be R. Civ. 138, questions of law or P. 23(a)(2); Lienhart v. 146 (4th Cir. 2001). The commonality requirement focuses on the claims of the class as a whole, and it "turn[s] on questions of law [or fact] applicable in the same manner Yamasaki, 442 requirement, class. 628, to each member of U.S. 682, 701 the (1979). class." To Califano v. satisfy this there need be only a single issue common to the See Cent. Wesleyan Coll. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 143 F.R.D. 636 (D.S.C. 1992), aff'd 6 F.3d 177 12 (4th Cir. 1993). In Wal-Mart v. Dukes, the Supreme Court focused on the commonality requirement, stating that: Commonality requires demonstrate that the the plaintiff class members to "have suffered the same injury." This does not mean merely that they have all suffered a violation of the same provision of law. •k ~k Jc [The proposed class members'] claims must depend upon a common contention for example, the assertion of discriminatory bias on the part of the same supervisor. That common contention, moreover, must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution determination resolve an validity of - its issue of each which truth that one means or is falsity central of the that to claims in will the one stroke. 131 S. Ct. 2541, a. 2551 (2011). The June 10, 2014 Class There are several "factual and legal allegations" that form a "common common set core of of Subclass Members' facts legal concerning issues rights." with Defendants' actions respect each Docket No. 48 at 12. in order to prevail under the WARN Act, member would have to establish that to and a putative For example, each putative class Defendants were subject to the WARN Act5, that the class member was employed by Defendants, 5 Under the WARN Act, an "employer" is "any business enterprise that employs 100 or more employees, excluding part time employees; or 100 or more employees who in the aggregate work at least 4,000 hours per week (exclusive of hours of overtime)." 28 U.S.C. 2101 (a) (1) . 13 that Defendants terminated the class member on or about June 10, 2014 the without class Id. proper members notice, the and that required 60 Defendants days These common legal issues are of truth or falsity will resolve an to validity of each Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. b. Just The June 23, as the cases of one of the several and benefits. issue that claims in is one central stroke." 2014 all June 24 subclass members. of pay Thus, commonality is satisfied. June 10 around common issues of fact and law, resolution wages to such that "determination of [their] the failed subclass members revolve so too do the cases of all Each subclass member's case requires common issues (i.e. failure to notify, Defendant's qualification as an "employer" under the WARN Act) that are central generally. 4. to each claim and that can be resolved Thus, commonality is again satisfied. Rule 23(a)(3) Typicality The Fourth Circuit has described the typicality requirement as follows: The typicality requirement goes to the heart of a representative [party's] ability to represent a class, particularly as it tends to merge with the commonality and adequacyof-representation requirements. The representative party's interest in prosecuting his own case must simultaneously tend class to advance members. plaintiff's the interests For claim that cannot 14 of the essential be so absent reason, different from the claims of absent class members that their claims will not be advanced by plaintiff's proof of his own individual claim. That is not to say that typicality requires that the plaintiff s claim and the claims of class members be perfectly identical or perfectly aligned. But when the variation in claims strikes at the heart of the respective causes of actions, we have readily denied class certification. In the language of the Rule, therefore, the representative party may proceed to represent the class only if the plaintiff establishes that typical the of his claims claims or or defenses defenses of are the class. Deiter v. Microsoft Corp., (emphasis in original) omitted). Thus, "involves[s] with those conduct 436 F.3d 461, 466-67 that the the appropriate absent analysis, 2006) (internal citations and quotation marks analysis a comparison of the plaintiffs' of (4th Cir. class [the members." district court] of typicality claims or defenses Id. at 467. begin [s] "To with a review of the elements of [the plaintiff's] prima facie case and the facts on which the plaintiff would necessarily rely to prove it." Id. Then, the district court must determine "the extent to which those facts would also prove the claims of the absent class members." a. Id. The June 10, 2014 Class 15 All members of the proposed June 10, 2013 subclass essentially identical claims under the WARN Act6. Cash has "alleged that [he] make Specifically, suffered the same type of injury as the other Class Members... and that Defendants' failure to comply with the WARN Act represents the single course of resulted in the injury to [him] conduct that and the Class Members." He has alleged that, on or around June 10, 2014, he was terminated from his employment at Wolff Fording & Co. in Richmond, Virginia with proper notice requires. date, without being compensated He shares an alleged employer, and members. and an alleged Thus, lack of notice as the WARN Act alleged termination with all putative class there can be no argument that Cash's claims are anything but typical of putative class members' WARN Act claims against Defendants. For the foregoing reasons, typicality is satisfied. b. Again, The June 23, 2014 Class all members of the proposed June 23, make identical claims under the WARN Act. 2014 subclass This includes Droste, who is the named plaintiff representing the June 23, 2014 class. Thus, Droste's claim is typical of the claims raised by putative class members. 6 As discussed infra, the putative class members will receive different damages computed with reference to their previous wage levels. 16 5. Rule 23(a)(4) Adequacy of Representation The requirement for adequacy of representation necessitates that the Court be satisfied that "the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). This standard plaintiff has interests common with, the [c]lass' litigation." interests; and . . . the and generally In re Se. Hotel met if "the named and not antagonistic to, experienced qualified, is plaintiff's Props. able to Ltd. attorney is conduct P'ship the Investor Litig., 151 F.R.D. 597, 606-07 (W.D.N.C. 1993). Both Droste and Cash are adequate class representatives. Neither have interests antagonistic to those of the classes they seek to represent because "there is complete overlap of the relief sought" by the named plaintiffs and the putative class members. Cash Docket have No. 48 at participated 13. with Additionally, their both counsel, and Droste and have been cooperative with court deadlines and proceedings to this date. Thus, adequacy is satisfied by both class representatives. Class counsel is also adequate in this case. of Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg, LLP has The law firm "represented thousands of employees and served as lead or co-lead counsel in numerous cases." employment Ercole class action Declaration, lawsuits, Docket 17 No. primarily WARN 48-4. The Act attorneys have been retained not only by Droste and Cash, other class members. Docket No. 48 at 13. Additionally, attorneys have diligently prosecuted this case, with uncooperative, non-responsive but also by 54 the even when faced defendants. Thus, their representation of class members is adequate. B. Rule 23(b)(3) In order to be certified as a class action, the class must satisfy at least one of the class categories defined in Rule 23(b). Plaintiffs 23(b)(3). move members for under Certification where the Court the here certification Rule finds that questions of the class 23(b)(3) of is Rule appropriate law or fact common to over any questions predominate affecting only individual members, under and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 1. Predominance "Rule demanding' Gariety 2004) v. 23(b)(3)'s than Rule Grant predominance 23(a)'s Thornton, requires questions of ^questions of law law little and or LLP, 368 591, more fact, fact is commonality requirement (quoting Amchen 521 U.S. commonality requirement F.3d 623-24 than Rule the more . . . ." 362 (4th Cir. (1997)). "Whereas presence 23(b)(3) common to the 18 356, Afar members of requires of the common that class predominate over members.'" Thorn 311, 319 Fed. R. Civ. whether any (4th v. Cir. questions Jefferson-Pilot 2006) (internal P. 23(b)(3)). proposed adjudication classes by affecting Life only Ins. citation individual Co., 445 omitted) F.3d (quoting The predominance requirement "tests are sufficiently representation." cohesive Gariety, 368 to F.3d warrant at 362 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). As discussed requirement, in the analysis of Rule proper commonality there are several questions of law and fact which are common to all members of the classes. Defendants 23(a)'s were notice terminated, employers was given subject to to These include whether the employees WARN before Act, whether they were and whether Defendants paid the damages required in the event that proper notice is not given to employees under the WARN Act. Despite these similarities, some individualized inquiry would be necessary to determine the proper amount of damages if Defendants are found to have violated the WARN Act. §2104(a)(1) sets forth the formula through which a Court is to determine the amount of damages that an employee is entitled to in the event that his or her employer "orders a plant closing or mass layoff in violation of" the WARN Act. This formula states that the employee is entitled to "back pay for each day of violation" at 19 a rate of the greater of "the average regular rate received by such employee employment" during or employee." "the Id. individualized immediately the final This 3 years regular inquiry analysis before last of termination rate will each of the received obviously employee's and employee's the by such entail an salary of average level three the years preceding. Predominance is damages inquiry. among the satisfied despite the individualized In the Fourth Circuit, "differences in damages potential class members do not generally predominance if liability is common to the class." defeat In re Mills Corp. Securities Litigation, 257 F.R.D. 101, 109 (E.D. Va. 2009) (quoting Morris (E.D. Va. 2004)). individualized Defendants' can be v. Wachovia Sec, Inc., F.R.D. 284, 299 While it is clear that this case involves differences in damages, liability to class members resolved 223 by an overarching it is also is a common inquiry into clear that issue that Defendants' behaviors with respect to the two classes. Thus, because there are common, several resolution issues and individualized that because damages are capable these inquiry, issues the Rule 23(b)'s predominance requirement. 20 of predominate proposed class-wide over classes the satisfy 2. Superiority Superiority requires that use of a class action be "superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy." Superiority "^depends each case,'" the and "Mt]he objectives achieved.'" Miller the of the supra, class on the rule 385 § Civ. P. 23(b)(3). circumstances the court procedure F. App'x at 274 1779). action R. requires class-action Stillmock, & Kane, whether greatly Fed. surrounding to find that really will be (quoting 7A Wright, When making a "determination of device is superior to other methods available to the court for a fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy...[the court should] not contemplate the possibility that no action at all might be superior to a class action." 1981). not Brown v. Cameron-Brown Co., Factors that the limited to, "the 92 F.R.D. 32, 49 court should consider include, class members' interest in (E.D. Va. but are individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; the class action." and the likely difficulties Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 23(b)(3)(A)-(D). in managing When evaluating superiority, involves...a comparison mechanism to available alternatives." Newberg on Class Actions § ed. the 4:64 (6th of 2014). the class "the...determination According action...as to a procedural Supreme Court, policy at the very core of the class action mechanism overcome the problem that small recoveries "the is to do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights." Amchen, Ru Credit Corp., the choice class 109 F.3d 338, presented action, 521 U.S. at 617 to rather the than 344 (7th Cir. court an (quoting Mace v. Van is 1997)). between "individual "no Thus, action" action" if and and class small when action, a class action will be superior. The potential class members' considered in comparison to the them in court. of up to 60 days comparison, only requires finding an of initiating court dates, and As noted above, the back pay the WARN Act allows for recovery plus assisting in filings, requires a plaintiff to 60 days action time attorney willing to are effort it would take to pursue a WARN Act plaintiff's claims and accept on the will be responsible for their legal bills. 22 benefits. federal effort etc.), take in of (i.e. court In not attending but also necessitates such a low-paying case possibility that they In addition to ensuring a full and fair adjudication of all members' cases, instance for the several judicial economy. this case. class action is a superior method in this practical reasons. First, it preserves There are over 100 potential class members in To force each potential class member to bring and prove his or her case instead of consolidating these legal and factual questions in one case would resources and the individuals' Second, be judicial To begin, there seems to be little individual cases, members' on cases turn group. Of to opt issues course, out of as each individual class fact that class members of the class if are common would they be other related litigation to the given the believed that individual litigation was more beneficial for them. Similarly, of time and money. incentive to control opportunity waste the factors listed in Rule 23 weigh in favor of a class action's superiority. entire a There is no pending that bears on this analysis. the last factor is satisfied because the similarity of factual and legal issues indicates that a class action would be manageable from the parties' and court's perspective. CONCLUSION For the CERTIFY CLASS reasons set (Docket No. forth above, the 47) is granted. 23 PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO The June 10, 2014 and June 23, 2014 classes are certified pursuant to the class definition contained herein. It is so ORDERED. /s/ flt.f Robert E. Payne Senior United States District Judge Richmond, Virginia Date: April 2^" / 2015 24
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