Lewis v. Newton et al, No. 3:2014cv00431 - Document 13 (E.D. Va. 2014)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge James R. Spencer on 10/22/14. (kyou, )
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Lewis v. Newton et al Doc. 13 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA RICHMOND DIVISION FREDERICK LEWIS, Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 3:14-CV-431 v. NEWTON, et al., Defendants. MEMORAN D U M OPIN ION THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants Motion to Dism iss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (b)(6) ( Motion ) (ECF No. 4). Plaintiff filed a Mem orandum in Opposition on J uly 22, 20 14 ( Opp n Mem . ) (ECF No. 6), and Defendants subsequently filed a reply on J uly 25, 20 14 ( Reply Mem . ) (ECF No. 7). The issues are fully briefed and a hearing was held on Thursday, October 16, 20 14. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is hereby GRANTED. I. FACTU AL an d PROCED U RAL BACKGROU N D Plaintiff, Frederick Lewis ( Lewis) alleges that the Defendants, J effery L. Newton ( Newton ), Walter J . Minton ( Minton ), J oan Lafland ( Lafland ), and Paula McKenzie ( McKenzie ) [hereinafter, collectively Defendants ] knowingly restrained him in Riverside Regional J ail ( RRJ ) without adequate legal justification for approxim ately three m onths. Lewis alleges violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as a state law claim of false im prisonm ent. Newton is, and was, the Superintendent of RRJ . He is responsible for m anaging the jail, as well as supervision of the other Defendants. Minton is, and was, the Assistant Superintendent of RRJ . As such, Minton is responsible for the overall operations of the J ail. Lafland is, and was, 1 Dockets.Justia.com the Records Supervisor of RRJ . The Records Supervisor is responsible for the m anagem ent of inm ates, staff, and facility records to insure com pleteness and correctness of official files at all tim es. McKenzie is, and was, the Records Technician of RRJ . McKenzie is responsible for m aintaining inm ate records which include com m itm ent and release docum ents and posting inm ate release dates when applicable. On J uly 9, 20 12, Lewis was charged with felony habitual offender driving under Va. Code § 46.2-357, which becam e Case No. CR13-287. He was subsequently released on bond on J uly 12, 20 12. At that tim e, however, Lewis had two other outstanding offenses from Novem ber 20 11, including a DUI charge (Dkt. No. CR13-288) and a felony habitual offender driving charge (Dkt. No. 13-289). Based on these additional charges, on October 9, 20 12, the Petersburg General District Court suspended Lewis bond. Lewis contends that his bond for CR13-287 was suspended on this date as well. However, Defendants contend that Lewis was held without bail only on CR13-288 and CR13-289. (See Mot. Ex. 1 ( Com m itm ent Order ); Mot. Exs. 5, 6 ( Order for Continued Custody )). An order for continued custody on CR13-28 7 was not issued until May 20 , 20 13. (Mot. Ex. 8.) 1 This Order indicated no change in existing am ount of bond and no change in existing bail conditions. (Id.) On May 29, 20 13, a continued custody order was issued for CR13-28 8 and CR13-289. (Mot. Ex. 10 .) An order for continued custody on all three charges was subsequently issued on August 14, 20 13. (Mot. Ex. 11.) Again, this order noted no change in existing am ount of bond and no change in existing bond conditions. (Id.) On August 27, 20 13, Lewis was tried and convicted before a jury in Case No. 13-287 and was sentenced to the m andatory m inim um of twelve m onths incarceration. A disposition notice was issued to RRJ . (Mot. Ex. 12.) Based on this notice, Defendant McKenzie calculated Lewis projected release date of August 27, 20 14. On Septem ber 12, 20 13, Lewis was found not guilty on 1 This change was noted in Lewis Inm ate Activity Report as an FYI to inform RRJ to transport Lewis on the designated hearing date. (Com pl. Ex. X.) 2 CR13-289, (Mot. Ex. 4), and an order for continued custody on CR13-288 was issued. Finally, on October 15, 20 13, CR13-288 was nolle prosequi. (Mot. Ex. 3.) Lewis alleges that when he was sentenced for CR13-287 on August 27, 20 13, Defendants failed to credit him with the tim e he served in jail between when his bond was allegedly suspended on October 9, 20 12 and the date of his sentence. As a result of Lewis allegations, his public defender, Shaun Huband ( Huband ), filed a m otion with the Petersburg Circuit Court and also attem pted to contact the Defendants to request that they check and/ or recalculate Lewis sentence. (Com pl. Ex. H.) In support of his argum ent, Huband attached a General District Court warrant for CR13-287. (Id.) The warrant contained handwritten notations which Huband asserted suspended Lewis bond on CR13-287 on October 9, 20 12 until Novem ber 9, 20 12. In his m otion to the Court, Huband argued that there is no evidence on the warrant or in any other order from the General District Court that the court reinstated the defendant s bond on the case which eventually becam e case CR13-287 on or after Novem ber 9, 20 12. (Id.) On October 29, 20 13, Huband wrote a letter to Defendant McKenzie, attaching a m em o from Tucker Kile, the Court Adm inistrator for the Petersburg Circuit Court, indicating that the m em o confirm s Lewis contention that he has been held on CR13-287 and in custody since October 9, 20 12. (Com pl. Ex. I.) On that sam e day, RRJ accessed the Virginia state court website, which reflected that Lewis had m ade bond on J uly 12, 20 12 on CR13-287 and nothing about any bond revocation. (Mot. Ex. 14.) Additionally, RRJ spoke with the Petersburg Circuit Court Clerk regarding the notations on the warrant that the J ail had received for the first tim e as an attachm ent to Huband s m otion. (Com pl. Ex. X.) After speaking with the Clerk, RRJ determ ined that the handwritten notations on the warrant stated the following under the Virginia Code violation section: 8 -20 -12 Ct. orders dft to be evaluated for com petency to stand trial in inpatient basis. In the right colum n on the warrant front, there is a reference to eval at CSH. The handwritten notation on the warrant back, at the top, indicates that on 8/ 20 / 12, Bond: Revoked until 9-24-12 @ 10 30 or such later date as necessary to com plete eval., on 93 24-12 Bond reinstated [initials] 9/ 24/ 12, and on 10 -9-12 Bond Suspended until 11-9-12 @ 830 [initials]. Consequently, as reflected on his Inm ate Activity Report, Lewis credits were recalculated to give him an additional 66 days of credits toward his 12 m onths sentence on CR13-287. (Com pl. Exs. X, E.) As also reflected on that Report, RRJ received from the Sheriff of Petersburg a Certified Credit for Tim e Spend in J ail there from J uly 9, 20 12 until J uly 14, 20 12, when Lewis was released from there on bond on CR13-287. (Com pl. Ex. X.) Lewis was credited with an additional five days for the period that he was at the Petersburg J ail before bonding out, for a total of additional credits of 71 days. (Com pl. Ex. E.) On Novem ber 12, 20 13, a hearing was held in Petersburg Circuit Court before the Honorable Pam ela S. Baskervill to review Huband s original m otion. (Com pl. Ex. J .) The Court issued a disposition notice that gave Lewis credit as of May, 20 , 20 13 on CR13-287. (Mot. Ex. 16.) However, the Court also noted that it did not have legal authority or jurisdiction to interpret a General District Court s order. Thus, the Circuit Court was without authority to rule on Lewis m otion. With this disposition notice, RRJ then recalculated Lewis Projected Release Date again, giving him credit from May 20 , 20 13 on CR13-287, plus the 71 days of additional credits described above, for a new Projected Release Date of March 10 , 20 14. (Com pl. Exs. X, Z.) Based on the Circuit Court s lack of jurisdiction, Lewis subsequently filed a m otion in the Petersburg General District Court requesting that the Court m ake a factual finding that he had been held in custody since October 9, 20 12. The Court ultim ately granted Lewis m otion on J anuary 6, 20 14. (Com pl. Ex. W.) The Court order was then transferred to RRJ on J anuary 7, 20 14. (See Com pl. Ex. C.) Lewis was released from custody the following day. (Com pl. Ex. Y.) By the tim e he was released on J anuary 8, 20 14, Lewis had allegedly served approxim ately 90 days in jail when he should have been free. Lewis filed a com plaint on J une 12, 20 14, which contains three counts against the Defendants. First, Count 1 alleges a violation 4 of due process under the 14 th Am endm ent.2 Lewis argues that the Defendants, while acting under color of state law, deprived him of his liberty by im prisoning him beyond the tim e to which he was sentenced without legal authorization and without providing notice or an opportunity to be heard. Second, Count 2 is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants acted in a m anner that was deliberately indifferent to Lewis right to be free from cruel and unusual punishm ent under the Eight Am endm ent and the Fourteenth Am endm ent. Lewis argues that the Defendants knew they did not correctly calculate his sentence and failed to release him when he finished serving the tim e to which he was sentenced. Third, Count 3 is a state law claim alleging false im prisonm ent. Lewis argues that the Defendants knowingly restrained him in RRJ without adequate legal justification. Lewis dem ands judgm ent against all Defendants, jointly and severally, in the am ount of $ 90 0 ,0 0 0 for com pensatory dam ages, together with all costs and attorneys fees incurred. Additionally, Lewis dem ands the award of punitive dam ages against the Defendants, jointly and severally, in a just am ount to be established at trial. II. LEGAL STAN D ARD A. D is m is s al fo r Failu re to State a Claim Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defendant to raise a num ber of defenses to a com plaint at the pleading stage, including failure to state a claim . A m otion to dism iss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted challenges the legal sufficiency of a claim , rather than the facts supporting it. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Goodm an v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 20 0 7); Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). A court ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) m otion m ust accept all of the factual allegations in the com plaint as true, see Edw ards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th 2 Although Lewis does not so specify in Count 1, presum ably he is seeking to assert his due process claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Com pl. ¶ 46 ( Defendants . . . while acting under the color of state law, were deliberately indifferent . . . . ). 5 Cir. 1999); W arner v. Buck Creek N ursery , Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 246, 254 55 (W.D. Va. 20 0 1), in addition to any provable facts consistent with those allegations, Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), and m ust view these facts in the light m ost favorable to the plaintiff, Christopher v. Harbury , 536 U.S. 40 3, 40 6 (20 0 2). To survive a m otion to dism iss, a com plaint m ust contain factual allegations sufficient to provide the defendant with notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (20 0 7) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Rule 8(a)(2) requires the com plaint to allege facts showing that the plaintiff s claim is plausible, and these [f]actual allegations m ust be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 555 & n.3. In other words, the plaintiff s com plaint m ust consist of m ore than a form ulaic recitation of the elem ents of a cause of action or naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancem ent. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (20 0 9) (citations om itted). The Court need not accept legal conclusions that are presented as factual allegations, Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 555, or unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or argum ents, E. Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 20 0 0 ). When a court considers a Rule 12(b)(6) m otion to dism iss a civil rights com plaint, the court m ust be especially solicitous of the wrongs alleged and m ust not dism iss the com plaint unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any legal theory w hich m ight plausibly be suggested by the facts alleged. Edw ards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Harrison v. U.S. Postal Serv., 8 40 F.2d 1149, 1152 (4th Cir. 1988)). Although a m otion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) invites an inquiry into the legal sufficiency of the com plaint, not an analysis of potential defenses to the claim s set forth therein, dism issal nevertheless is appropriate when the face of the com plaint clearly reveals the existence of a m eritorious affirm ative defense. Brooks v. City of W inston-Salem , 85 F.3d 178, 181 (4th Cir. 1996) (citation om itted). Qualified im m unity is such an affirm ative defense because, if 6 applicable, qualified im m unity includes an entitlem ent not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 30 6 (1996) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsy th, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)); see Jenkins v. M edford, 119 F.3d 1156, 1159 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc). B. 4 2 U .S.C. § 19 8 3 Every person who, under color of any statute . . ., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im m unities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law . . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To prevail on a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff m ust show: (1) the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im m unities secured by the Constitution and laws; (2) by a person acting under the color of state law. Dow e v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley , 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998). Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights; it m erely provides a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere. City of Oklahom a City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 80 8 , 816 (1985). III. D ISCU SSION This Court properly has jurisdiction over this m atter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. To satisfy federal question jurisdiction, a plaintiff s com plaint m ust, as an essential elem ent, contain a right or im m unity created by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 415 U.S. 125, 127 (1974). In the present case, Lewis com plaint has clearly asserted a federal civil rights cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 198 3. See Durkin v. Davis, 538 F.2d 10 37, 10 39 40 (4th Cir. 1976) (footnotes om itted) ( It seem s recognized that the right to jail tim e awaiting trial on a bailable offense and pending appeal is not a m atter of legislative grace but is a right constitutionally m andated, available to state prisoners as well as federal prisoners. ). // // 7 A. Claim 1: D e fe n d an ts are En title d to Qu alifie d Im m u n ity i. Pa r t ie s Ar g u m e n t s Defendants argue that at all tim es they were acting in accordance with what they believed the law required, and if they are assum ed for present purposes to have been m istaken in that regard, that their m istake was not apparent then or now and their conduct was not unreasonable. In response, Lewis contends that in light of his well-docum ented pleas for release, a reasonable person would have known that their conduct violated Lewis constitutional rights. ii. An a ly s is Qualified im m unity is an affirm ative defense that m ust be proven by the governm ent official. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 80 0 , 815 (1982). Generally, governm ent officials perform ing discretionary functions 3 are protected from liability for civil dam ages so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Id. at 8 18. This protection is im m unity from suit rather than a m ere defense to liability. M itchell v. Forsy th, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). The Suprem e Court has stressed the im portance of resolving im m unity questions at the earliest possible stage of litigation. Hunter v. Bry ant, 50 2 U.S. 224, 227 (1991). A determ ination that a defendant is entitled to qualified im m unity involves a two-step procedure that asks first whether a constitutional violation occurred and second whether the right violated was clearly established. Gregg v. Ham , 678 F.3d 333, 338 39 (4th Cir. 20 12) (quoting Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 20 11) (en banc)). For a right to be clearly 3 The parties do not dispute in this section whether Defendants were perform ing discretionary functions, although with regards to his sovereign im m unity argum ent, Lewis contends that Defendants were perform ing m inisterial functions. (See Opp n Mem at 28 29.) The Fourth Circuit has held that [p]rocessing individuals for incarceration or release according to the term s of court orders does not generally involve the exercise of discretion. Kondrosky v. Pierce, 85 F.3d 616, 1996 WL 22880 3, at *1 (4th Cir. 1996). But, the Court also found that the Defendant in that case had to reconcile the court order and the Virginia Code to determ ine the length of the inm ate s sentence. Id. Therefore, this uncertain situation necessitated the exercise of discretion. Id. Here, Defendants subm it that they were following the records and instructions of the Petersburg General District Court and Circuit Court as well as applying Virginia law, including Va. Code § 53.1-187, directing that, In no case is a person on bail to be regarded as in confinem ent for the purposes of this statute. (Mot. to Dismiss 17.) Therefore, the Defendants were exercising their discretion, and qualified im m unity m ay thus be applicable. 8 established, it m ust be sufficiently clear that every reasonable officer would [have understood] that what he is doing violated that right. Reichle v. How ards, 132 S. Ct. 20 8 8, 20 93 (20 12) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 20 74, 20 78 (20 11)). The existing precedent m ust have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate. Ashcroft, 131 S. Ct. at 20 83. Furtherm ore, the Court s proper focus is not upon the right at its m ost general or abstract level, but at the level of its application to the specific conduct being challenged. Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 30 7, 312 (4th Cir. 1992). In sum , [r]uling on a defense of qualified im m unity therefore requires (1) identification of the specific right allegedly violated; (2) determ ining whether at the tim e of the alleged violation the right was clearly established; and (3) if so, then determ inin g whether a reasonable person in the officer s position would have known that doing what he did would violate that right. Id. To prove defendants are not entitled to qualified im m unity, a plaintiff can point either to cases of controlling authority in their jurisdiction at the tim e of the incident or to a consensus of cases of persuasive authority such that a reasonable officer could not have believed that his actions were lawful. Ashcroft, 131 S. Ct. at 20 86 (quoting W ilson v. Lay ne, 526 U.S. 60 3, 617 (1999)) (internal quotation m arks om itted). With this in m ind, the Defendants in the in stant case are clearly entitled to qualified im m unity. The records before the Court indicate that there was no basis for a reasonable officer to believe he was violating an inm ate s constitutional rights. Rather, to the contrary, the Defendants properly acted in accordance with each Court order they received. As detailed above, Lewis inm ate activity reports reflect the calculation and recalculations of his sentence once the J ail received lawful authorization from the Court. For this reason, the Defendants Motion is GRANTED. For the sake of thoroughness, however, the Court will briefly address Defendants rem aining claim s. // // 9 B. Claim 2 : Failu re to State a D u e Pro ce s s Claim i. Pa r t ie s Ar g u m e n t s Defendants argue that Plaintiff at all tim es was lawfully held at RRJ pursuant to the records and inform ation the J ail received from the Petersburg General District Court and Circuit Court. Additionally, Defendants argue that Lewis was not actually in custody pursuant to Va. Code § 53.1-187, which states that [i]n no case is a person on bail to be regarded as in confinem ent for the purposes of this statute. Lewis, on the other hand, argues that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his repeated pleas that he was being held beyond his sentence. ii. An a ly s is To establish liability under § 1983, a plaintiff m ust show that the defendants acted intentionally in depriving him of his protected interest. Because the protections of the Due Process Clause are not triggered by the m ere failure to take reasonable care, negligent deprivations are not actionable under § 1983. Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73, 75 (4th Cir. 1995); see also Daniels v. W illiam s, 474 U.S. 327, 330 -31 (1986). In this case, Lewis cannot sufficiently m ake out a claim for intentional deprivation. The records in this case clearly illustrate Defendants efforts to recalculate Lewis sentence once they received lawful authorization from the Court. At best, Defendants acted negligently, but negligence is insufficient to establish a claim under § 1983. C. Claim 3 : Failu re to State a D e libe rate In d iffe re n ce Claim i. Pa r t ie s Ar g u m e n t s Defendants highlight the very high standard for proving deliberate indifference and cruel and unusual punishm ent. They argue that Lewis pleadings and exhibits coupled with public court docum ents show no basis for considering any defendant to have been deliberately indifferent to the basis or length of Lewis detention. In response Lewis argues that the Defendants had notice that he was being held unlawfully based upon his num erous docum ented requests for sentence recalculations and failed to prom ptly intervene. 10 ii. An a ly s is Incarceration beyond the term ination of one s sentence m ay state a claim under the Eighth Am endm ent. Golson v. Dep t of Corr., 914 F.2d 1491, 1990 WL 141470 , at *1 (4th Cir. 1990 ). To prevail on that theory, a plaintiff m ust dem onstrate that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference. Id. (citing Sam ple v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 10 99, 1110 (3d Cir. 1989)). The deliberate indifference standard has both an objective prong showing a sufficiently serious deprivation of a basic hum an need and a subjective prong showing that the official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of m ind. Farm er v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). This latter prong requires a showing that the defendant had actual knowledge of an objectively serious risk of harm and deliberately disregarded that risk. In the instant case, Lewis has failed to dem onstrate that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference. As stated above, Defendants properly acted in accordance with the orders and records received from the Petersburg courts. Defendants did not act with a culpable state of m ind; rather, they reasonably believed that they were acting pursuant to the Court s legitim ate authority. D. Claim 4 : Fals e Im p ris o n m e n t Claim i. Pa r t ie s Ar g u m e n t s Defendants argue that there was sufficient legal reasoning for detaining Lewis. Specifically, RRJ was following the inform ation and docum ents provided by the Petersburg General District Court and Circuit Court. Lewis, however, contends that he has sufficiently stated a claim for false im prisonm ent as defined under Virginia law. ii. An a ly s is In Virginia, the tort of false im prisonm ent is defined as the direct restraint by one person of the physical liberty of another without adequate legal justification. Jordan v. Shands, 50 0 S.E.2d 215, 218 (Va. 1998) (internal citation and quotation m arks om itted). This claim can 11 easily be dism issed in this case as Defendants clearly had legal justification for detaining Lewis specifically, Petersburg Circuit Court orders. Therefore, this claim is without m erit. IV. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is hereby GRANTED. Let the Clerk send a copy of this Mem orandum Opinion to all counsel of record. An appropriate Order will issue. _____________________/s/__________________ James R. Spencer Senior U. S. District Judge ENTERED this 22nd day of October 20 14. 12
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