Deavers v. Rappahannock Regional Jail Authority et al, No. 3:2013cv00821 - Document 74 (E.D. Va. 2015)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge James R. Spencer on 02/18/2015. (ccol, )
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Deavers v. Rappahannock Regional Jail Authority et al Doc. 74 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA RICHMOND DIVISION CASSANDRA DEAVERS, Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 3:13-CV-821 v. KATHY DIGGINS, et al., Defendants. MEMORAN D U M OPIN ION THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Kathy Diggins’s Motion for Sum m ary J udgm ent (“Sum m ary J udgm ent Motion”) (ECF No. 57), and a Motion to Order Finding Lack of Federal Court J urisdiction and Motion to Dism iss Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) by Defendant Rickard K. Dalberg, M.D. (“Dalberg’s Motion”) (ECF No. 59). Additionally before the Court is Rickard K. Dalberg, M.D.’s Motion and Notice of Waiver of Statute of Lim itations in Action Filed Against Him by Cassandra Deavers in Stafford County Circuit Court and Reasons in Support of His Motion to Dism iss for Lack of Subject Matter J urisdiction (“SOL Waiver Motion”) (ECF No. 68). For the reasons set forth below, the Sum m ary J udgm ent Motion, Dalberg’s Motion and the SOL Waiver Motion are hereby GRANTED. I. BACKGROU N D a. Fa ct u a l Ba ck g r o u n d Cassandra Deavers was forty-eight years old on Decem ber 8, 20 11, when she was sentenced to serve thirty days’ incarceration in the Rappahannock Regional J ail (“J ail”) for her conviction of Driving Under the Influence, second offense. At the tim e, Deavers was under the treatm ent of a physician for a prior pulm onary em bolism and had been prescribed a daily dose 1 Dockets.Justia.com of the blood thinner warfarin.1 On Decem ber 1, 20 11, seven days prior to her sentencing, Deavers’ prim ary care physician increased her dosage of warfarin to twelve m illigram s per day and had ordered that her International Norm alized Ratio and Prothrom bin Tim e (“INR/ PT”) levels be checked on a weekly basis. An individual’s INR/ PT levels are indications of the tim e required for a patient’s blood to clot and, therefore, are im portant indicators of whether the patient’s warfarin dose is too high, putting her at risk for internal bleeding, or too low, putting her at risk for em bolism . After being sentenced on Decem ber 8, 20 11, Deavers was transferred to the J ail to begin her incarceration. Deavers’ personal property was inventoried, and the J ail m edical staff perform ed a physical exam ination of Deavers. During these procedures, Deavers inform ed the J ail m edical staff that she was prescribed warfarin, which was to be taken daily, and that her INR/ PT levels were to be checked weekly. The m edical staff also noted that Deavers was allergic to aspirin. On Decem ber 10 , 20 11, a nurse em ployed in the J ail took Plaintiff’s blood for the intent of obtaining her INR/ PT levels. The results of this first test showed that Deavers’ INR/ PT levels were too high, putting her at risk for uncontrolled bleeding and indicating that her dose of warfarin should have been decreased.2 The Am ended Com plaint alleges that the Defendants “failed to check on the test results, and failed to take the necessary therapeutic steps to correct” Deavers’ out-of-range INR/ PT levels. (Third Am . Com pl. ¶ 25.) On Decem ber 12, 20 11, a Physician Orders sheet signed by Licensed Practical Nurse (“LPN”) Kathy Diggins (“Diggins”) indicates that Deavers’ INR/ PT levels were scheduled to be checked again in two weeks. The sam e nurse never attem pted to follow up on the results of her 1 Warfarin is the generic nam e for the brand-nam e drug Coum adin. The Com plaint and the docum ents attached thereto use warfarin and Coumadin interchangeably. For the sake of ease, the Court refers to the drug throughout this Memorandum Order by its generic nam e, warfarin. 2 The Com plaint alleges that “norm al” INR levels range from 0 .8 to 1.2, but that Deavers’ INR level was 1.8; and that norm al PT levels range from 9.1 and 12.0 , but that Deavers’ PT level was 19.5. 2 first blood test. On that sam e day, Deavers subm itted a written inquiry to the J ail staff inquiring about her test results, but was not given any inform ation. On Decem ber 21, 20 11, Deavers com pleted a m edical request form (“First Medical Request”) com plaining of a headache lasting for the previous three days. Deavers indicated that m edical request form s had not been available for the prior three days. The following day, on Decem ber 22, 20 11, Deavers had a m edical exam ination at which tim e it was noted that a hard, red bum p had appeared on her buttock two days prior. Defendant Dahlberg, not having exam ined Deavers, signed off on a physician order sheet diagnosing her with Methicillinresistant Staphylococcus aureus (“MRSA”). No one addressed the fact that severe headaches are a sym ptom of warfarin toxicity, and failed to check on the results of her Decem ber 8 th blood test or otherwise address Deavers’ INR/ PT levels. Deavers was kept on the sam e dosage of Warfarin. On Decem ber 31, 20 11, Deavers had her blood drawn by Defendant Diggins for a second INR/ PT test. Deavers asked Diggins what the results of her first test were and Diggins responded, “No news is good news.” That sam e day, Deavers com pleted another m edical request form (“Second Medical Request”). The Second Medical Request indicated that Deavers had bruising on the backs of both legs and was experiencing significant pain as a result. On J anuary 1, 20 12, Deavers com pleted yet another m edical request form (“Third Medical Request”) com plaining of a stom ach ache lasting for two days and irregular bowel m ovem ents since her incarceration began. That sam e day, Deavers was given a physical exam by Diggins. Despite knowing that Deavers was taking warfarin, Diggins took no action beyond prescribing Deavers Tylenol for her pain com plaints. Diggins did not check the results of either of Deavers’ INR/ PT tests and did not refer Deavers for additional care. On J anuary 4, 20 12, Deavers’ blood was redrawn for an INR/ PT test by Diggins. By this tim e, Deavers still had not learned the results of her initial lab work. At 9:0 0 p.m . that evening, Deavers began bleeding profusely from the needle site. Deavers continued to bleed out in her 3 cell throughout the night. Finally, at 5:0 0 a.m ., when the cell doors were unlocked, Deavers attem pted to leave, but im m ediately lost consciousness, fell and hit her head. Deavers was transported to Mary Washington Hospital, where she was diagnosed with a large retroperitoneal hem atom a “m ost likely secondary to Coum adin (Warfarin) toxicity,” acute blood loss, anem ia, and dehydration secondary to blood loss. Deavers rem ained in the hospital for five days, receiving m ultiple blood transfusions and placem ent of an inferior vena cava filter. Deavers was released back to the J ail on J anuary 12, 20 12, and was released from the J ail on J anuary 15, 20 12. b . Pr o ce d u r a l Ba ck g r o u n d On Decem ber 10 , 20 13, Deavers filed suit against Defendants Rappahannock Regional J ail Authority (“RRJ A”), Superintendent J oseph Higgs, J ail Licensed Practical Nurses Nasm h, Diggins, and Canzon, as well as the Fredericksburg Em ergency Medical Alliance, Incorporated (“FEMA”), three J ane Doe Defendants and eight J ohn Doe Defendants, and Dr. Rickard K. Dalberg (“Dalberg”). As the result of m ultiple m otions to dism iss and later consent orders, Plaintiff was allowed to am end her Com plaint on three different occasions. Plaintiff’s third Am ended Com plaint now alleges two counts– (1) a § 1983 claim for violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Am endm ents against Diggins; and (2) a negligence claim against Dalberg. These rem aining Defendants filed their present Motions on J anuary 23, 20 15. After the issues were fully briefed, the Court held a hearing on February 13, 20 15. II. LEGAL STAN D ARD a. M o t io n fo r Su m m a r y Ju d g m e n t A m otion for sum m ary judgm ent should be granted where “the m ovant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any m aterial fact and the m ovant is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If there is no genuine dispute as to any m aterial fact, it is the “affirm ative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claim s and defenses from proceeding to trial.” Drew itt v. Pratt, 4 999 F.2d 774, 778– 79 (4th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation m arks om itted). However, if the court finds that there is a genuine issue of m aterial fact, the m otion m ust be denied. 10 A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2720 (3d ed. 20 11). A court m ust look to the specific facts pled to determ ine whether a triable issue exists. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby , Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-49 (1986). The m oving party bears the burden of establishing the nonexistence of a triable issue of fact by “showing—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonm oving party’s case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325 (internal quotation m arks om itted). “The judge’s inquiry, therefore, unavoidably asks whether reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the [nonm oving party] is entitled to a verdict.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. A district court m ust “resolve all factual disputes and any com peting, rational inferences in the light m ost favorable to the party opposing that m otion.” Rossignol, 316 F.3d at 523 (internal quotation m arks and citations om itted). On ly disputes over facts that m ight affect the outcom e of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of sum m ary judgm ent. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “Mere unsupported speculation is not sufficient to defeat a sum m ary judgm ent m otion if the undisputed evidence indicates the other party should win as a m atter of law.” Francis v. Booz, Allen & Ham ilton, Inc., 452 F.3d 299, 30 8 (4th Cir. 20 0 6). Thus, if the nonm oving party’s evidence is only colorable or is not significantly probative, sum m ary judgm ent m ay be granted. Anderson, 477 at 249– 50 . b. M o t io n t o D is m is s Pu r s u a n t t o Fe d e r a l R u le o f Civ il Pr o ce d u r e 12 ( b ) ( 1) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a defendant to m ove for dism issal of a claim when the court lacks subject m atter jurisdiction over the action. The Court m ust dism iss the action if it determ ines at any tim e that it lacks subject-m atter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists in federal court. Richm ond, Fredericksburg & Potom ac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991). The district court m ust then weigh the evidence to determ ine whether 5 jurisdiction is proper. Adam s v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982). In its determ ination, a court should grant a Rule 12(b)(1) m otion to dism iss if the m aterial jurisdictional facts are known and the m oving party is entitled to prevail as a m atter of law. Richm ond, Fredericksburg & Potom ac R.R. Co., 945 F.2d at 768. III. D ISCU SSION a. Su m m ary Ju d gm e n t Mo tio n The Eighth Am endm ent prohibits cruel and unusual punishm ent and prohibits prison officials from acting with deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious m edical needs. Jackson v. Sam pson, 536 F. App’x 356, 357 (4th Cir. 20 13).3 The Fourth Circuit has stated, “Prisoners are entitled to reasonable m edical care [citation om itted]. However, m istreatm ent or non-treatm ent m ust be capable of characterization as ‘cruel and unusual punishm ent’ in order to present a colorable claim under § 1983 [citation om itted]. The prisoner’s allegations m ust reach constitutional dim ension before a federal court will interfere with the internal operations of a state penal facility [citation om itted].” Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318, 318– 19 (4th Cir. 1975). To reach that constitutional level, a prisoner m ust establish that “the treatm ent, or lack thereof, [was] so grossly incom petent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundam ental fairness.” Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1990 ), overruled in part on other grounds by Farm er v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). To successfully allege a claim of deliberate indifference to a serious m edical need, a prisoner m ust satisfy a two-pronged test consisting of an objective elem ent and a subjective elem ent. See Farm er, 511 U.S. at 837. First, the plaintiff m ust allege that he had an “objectively, sufficiently serious” m edical condition. Id. at 834. Second, he m ust allege that the prison official actually knew of and disregarded an excessive risk of harm related to the inm ate’s serious 3 “In order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it m ust be affirm atively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights. The doctrine of respondeat superior has no application under this section.” W right v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (citation and internal quotation m arks om itted). 6 m edical condition. Id. at 837 (rejecting the invitation to adopt an objective test for deliberate indifference). “Actual knowledge or awareness on the part of the [prison official] is essential to proof of deliberate indifference.” Brice v. Va. Beach Corr. Ctr., 58 F.3d 10 1, 10 5 (4th Cir. 1995). Stated differently, this second prong of the test requires a “sufficiently culpable state of m ind.” W ilson v. Seiter, 50 1 U.S. 294, 297 (1991). An inadvertent failure to provide adequate m edical care or m ere negligence will not establish a constitutional violation. Estelle v. Gam ble, 429 U.S. 97, 10 5– 0 6 (1976); see also Farm er, 511 U.S. at 835, 836 (stating that “deliberate indifference describes a state of m ind m ore blam eworthy than negligence” and equating deliberate indifference to “recklessness”). It is adm ittedly undisputed that Plaintiff had a serious m edical condition. Farm er, 511 U.S. at 834.4 Thus, Defendant’s sum m ary judgm ent is instead prem ised upon Plaintiff’s purported inability to m eet the subjective elem ent of a cognizable Eighth Am endm ent claim . Here, Plaintiff’s Third Am ended Com plaint states, “Defendant m ade no attem pt, despite the Plaintiff’s repeated requests, to docum ent the results of even the first blood test, thus reflecting the m ost gross deliberate indifference, not only to Plaintiff’s m edical care, but to her survival.” (Third Am . Com pl. ¶ 45.) However, even viewed in light m ost favorable to Plaintiff the record creates no genuine issue of m aterial fact to support Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim . The Suprem e Court has stated that “prison officials who act reasonably cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishm ents Clause.” Farm er, 511 U.S. at 8 45. In other words, even if the prison officials actually knew of a substantial risk to inm ate health or safety, they will not be held liable “if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultim ately was not averted.” Id. at 844. Defendant Diggins responded reasonably to Plaintiff’s m edical condition. As she notes, she was not responsible for evaluating Plaintiff’s INR/ PTR results. (Def.’s Mem . in Supp. of Sum m . J . Ex. 2, at ¶ 5– 7.) Rather, the physician’s assistant or physician 4 Plaintiff had experienced a pulm onary em bolism and was under the care of Dr. Haffizulla, M.D. (Third Am . Com pl. ¶¶ 19, 20 .) She was prescribed a daily dose of warfarin. (Id. ¶ 19.) 7 was the one with authority to adjust the dose and discuss the results of such testing with Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Defendant did draw blood from Plaintiff on Decem ber 31, 20 11. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Lab Corp, however, never processed that Decem ber 31 blood sam ple. 5 Upon learning that such sam ple was not processed, Defendant took a new sam ple on J anuary 4, 20 12. (Id. at ¶12.) With this in m ind, there is no evidence to support a finding that Defendant acted with deliberate indifference towards Plaintiff’s serious m edical condition. At worst, and as adm itted by Plaintiff’s expert Dr. Terrance L. Baker, (see Def.’s Mem . in Supp. of Sum m . J . Ex. 1 at 130 :7– 18), Defendant was m erely negligen t by failing to docum ent the results of Plaintiff’s blood tests. However, negligence does not establish a constitutional violation. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 10 5– 0 6. Consequently, the Court GRANTS the Sum m ary J udgm ent Motion. 6 b. D albe rg’s Mo tio n District courts have supplem ental jurisdiction over state law claim s that “form part of the sam e case or controversy” as the federal claim . 28 U.S.C. § 1367. A district court m ay decline to exercise supplem ental jurisdiction over a claim if the district court has dism issed all claim s over which it has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also United Mine W orkers of Am . v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (generally, if federal claim s are dism issed before trial, state claim s should be dism issed as well). But, that being said, “[t]he doctrine of supplem ental jurisdiction is one of flexibility, and there is no ‘m andatory rule’ requiring dism issal when the federal claim is disposed of before trial.” Peter Farrell Supercars, Inc. v. M onsen, 82 F. App’x 293, 297 (4th Cir. 20 0 3); see also Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (20 0 9) (“A district court’s decision whether to exercise [subject-m atter] jurisdiction after dism issing every claim over which it had original jurisdiction is purely discretionary.”); Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 10 6, 10 9 (4th Cir. 1995) (“The doctrine of supplem ental jurisdiction indicates that federal courts generally have discretion to retain or dism iss state law 5 Plaintiff subm its that Defendant never called Lab Corp to pick up the blood tests. Defendant Diggins’ Sum mary J udgm ent Motion also raises the issue of qualified im m unity. But because the Court disposes of the Motion based on the deliberate indifference standard, the Court will not address this latter issue. 6 8 claim s when the federal basis for an action drops away.”). Am ong the factors that inform the Court’s discretionary determ ination are “convenience and fairness to the parties, the existence of any underlying issues of federal policy, com ity and considerations of judicial econom y.” Shanaghan, 58 F.3d at 110 . Plaintiff’s Third Am ended Com plaint was properly brought before this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as Plaintiff alleged an Eighth Am endm ent claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Diggins. Count II of Plaintiff’s Third Am ended Com plaint alleged a state law negligence claim against Defendant Dalberg, which was also properly before this Court pursuan t to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Because the Court GRANTED Defendant Diggins’ Sum m ary J udgm ent Motion above, the Court now exercises its discretion in either retaining or dism issing the rem aining state law claim against Defendant Dalberg. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Plaintiff argues that the Court should retain jurisdiction, as “[d]ism issal at this point would . . . serve to im m unize Defendant Dalberg from responsibility for his negligence as the statute of lim itations has run.” (Pl.’s Mem . in Opp. to Def. Dalberg’s Mot. to Dism iss for Lack of J urisdiction at 3.) However, because Defendant Dalberg has now waived any potential statute of lim itations defense, (see SOL Waiver Mot.), Dalberg’s Motion is hereby GRANTED. IV. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, the Sum m ary J udgm ent Motion, Dalberg’s Motion and the SOL Waiver Motion are GRANTED. Let the Clerk send a copy of this Mem orandum Opinion to all counsel of record. An appropriate Order will issue. ENTERED this 18th day of February 20 15. 9 ______________________/s/_________________ James R. Spencer Senior U. S. District Judge
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