Craddock v. Fisher et al, No. 3:2012cv00430 - Document 45 (E.D. Va. 2015)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Robert E. Payne on 4/21/15. Copy sent: Yes (tdai, )
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Craddock v. Fisher et al Doc. 45 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Richmond Division CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT RICHMONDLVA ORILLION CRADDOCK, Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. CLYD N. FISHER, 3:12CV43 0 et al. , Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION Orillion Craddock, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, before the filed Court Leonard's Motion Dismiss") and on the reasons Judgment Motion 28 Clyd on U.S.C. the in part, N. the Summary below, Motion to Dismiss, Summary Judgment, for to stated Bivens1 action. Defendants for evaluation pursuant this The Fisher's will the to Court's and 1915A. grant is Scott ("Motion and § 1915(e)(2) Court and Pleadings Judgment matter For Defendants' will grant Defendants' Motion for and will dismiss the action. I. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") this Court must dismiss any action filed by a prisoner if the Court determines the action (1) a relief claim on Bivens Narcotics, which v. Six 403 U.S. 388 "is Unknown frivolous" may be Named or (2) "fails to state granted." Agents of 28 Fed. U.S.C. Bureau of (1971). Dockets.Justia.com § 1915(e)(2); includes see 28 U.S.C. claims based upon § 1915A. The first standard M^an indisputably meritless legal theory,'" or claims where the w*factual contentions are clearly baseless.'" 1992) The Clay v. Yates, (quoting Neitzke v. second standard is 809 F. Supp. Williams, the 417, 490 U.S. familiar 427 319, standard (E.D. Va. 327 (1989)). for a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "A motion to sufficiency of a contests dismiss under complaint; surrounding the 12(b)(6) importantly, facts, applicability of defenses." the tests the it does not resolve merits of a claim, or the Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.1992) Arthur R. Miller, Rule (citing 5A Charles A. Wright & Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (1990)). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and the complaint is plaintiff. Cir. viewed in the only to factual considering a identifying pleadings conclusions, most favorable to the MyIan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th 1993); see also Martin, applies light motion are Ashcroft v. Iqbal, not 980 F.2d at 952. allegations, to that, dismiss entitled to however, can because This principle and choose to they the are no "a begin more assumption of 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). court by than truth." The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[ ] only xa short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to *give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, (second alteration in original) U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints containing only "labels and conclusions" "formulaic Id. at allege recitation 555 of (citations of a cause Instead, a of action." plaintiff must (citation omitted), stating a claim that "plausible on its Id. plaintiff pleads reasonable Corp., face," id. at 570, rather than merely "A claim has facial plausibility when the factual inference misconduct alleged." Atl. elements or a facts sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the "conceivable." the the omitted). speculative level," id. is 355 content that Iqbal, 550 U.S. at that the the court Ct. to draw is defendant 129 S. 556) . allows for liable at 1949 Therefore, the (citing Bell in order for a claim or complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff elements of must "allege facts [his or] her claim." & Co. , 324 F.3d 761, 765 Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, sufficient to state all the Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Dickson v. 213 (4th Cir. 2002); Iodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)). Lastly, complaints, 1978), while the Gordon v. Court Leeke, liberally 574 F.2d construes 1147, 1151 it does not act as the inmate's advocate, pro se (4th Cir. sua sponte developing statutory and constitutional claims the inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his complaint. See Brock v. Carroll, (Luttig, J., 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 107 concurring); (4th Cir. F.3d 241, Beaudett v. 243 (4th Cir. City of Hampton, 1997) 1985) . II. Craddock Claim One, SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS AND CLAIMS raises two claims in his sworn Complaint. he argues that Defendants Detective Clyd N. In Fisher, Detective Scott Leonard, and the Richmond City Police Department "violated [his] Fourth Amendment[2] constitutional right not to be subjected (Compl. 5.)3 to In unlawful Claim searches, Two, seizures, Craddock claims or arrest." "[m]y Eighth "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const, amend. IV. 3 The Court employs the pagination assigned by the CM/ECF docketing system for citations to and quotations from Craddock's Complaint. The Court corrects the capitalization in the quotations from Craddock's Complaint. Amendment[ ] constitutional right was violated due to unlawful incarceration, and loss of freedom." (Id. at 10.) Craddock fails to suggest how the process used to obtain his conviction violated the 3:07cv319, Eighth 2010 Amendment. WL 1225741, Cf. *8 Shanklin v. (E.D. Va. Seals, Mar. 26, No. 2010) (explaining that when conduct plaintiff complains of occurred prior to his conviction, "the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment does not apply" Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 3886, 394 (1989))). (citing Moreover, to the extent he seeks to raise a constitutional claim under the Eighth Amendment challenging his unlawful incarceration, legally frivolous. See Heck v. see infra Part III.A. Thus, the was invalid search. to (Compl. Defendant Fisher Leonard executed Dundee Avenue, proceeds alleges due a applied that Craddock's (1994); his federal Fourth Amendment firearm conviction search warrant Specifically, Craddock for warrant warrant Richmond, on defective 8.) the 512 U.S. 477 Claim Two will be dismissed. action claim in which he Humphrey, such claim is a search upon a Virginia residence 23225, and illegal argues and Defendant located at specifying that that 305 the house was to be searched for weapons and "included the incorrect factual assertion that [Craddock] resided at the address." 4 (Id. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. Const, amend. VIII. at 5. ) Craddock contends that the warrant "was constitutionally flawed" for a litany of reasons including that Craddock did not live at that address, the warrant failed to specify the areas of the home to be searched, affidavit ... so he Defendant could Fisher unlawfully "lied in his arrest" warrant Craddock, and Defendant Leonard executed the warrant in Craddock's absence and knowing Craddock did not reside at the address. Craddock arrest argues Mr. Craddock (Id. at 8.) by the that for state, defective incarcerated." No. murder search yielded and unlawful evidence gun "to possession." but the gun possession (Id.) search was transferred to the Craddock contends that in light of warrant he "has been and punitive unlawfully (Id.) Craddock "vacation or illegal at 6-7.) Craddock states that "the murder was nolle prose[d] federal authorities." the the (Id. seeks compensatory invalidation of 3:08CR49." (Id. at [his] 12.) claims seeking invalidation of As criminal discussed damages, and conviction in Case below, Craddock's his conviction and sentence are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and any Fourth Amendment claim for damages that may withstand Heck is barred by the statute of limitations and also lacks merit. III. A. MOTION TO DISMISS ANALYSIS Claims Barred By Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) The basic premise behind Craddock's complaint, vacate or alter damages stemming through a Humphrey, civil his criminal conviction that he can and obtain monetary from his purportedly improper incarceration, lawsuit 512 U.S. 477 "is legally frivolous under Heck v. (1994), and related cases." Payne v. Virginia, No. 3:07CV337, 2008 WL 1766665, at *2 (E.D. Va. Apr. 17, 2008) . In Heck, the Supreme Court emphasized that civil tort actions are "not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments." 486. Heck, 512 U.S. at The Supreme Court then held that: [I]n order unconstitutional to recover damages for allegedly conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87 (internal footnote omitted). The Supreme Court then required that "when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated." Id^ at 487. The rationale in Heck and related cases applies with equal force to Bivens actions. Chasanow, 318 F. App'x 188, 189 n* (4th Cir. See Omar v. 2009) (citing Clemente v. Allen, 120 F.3d 703, 705 (7th Cir. 1997); Abella v. Rubino, 63 F.3d 1063, 1065 (11th Cir. 1995); Tavarez v. Reno, 54 F.3d 109, 110 (2d Cir. 1995)). The Supreme Court has extended Heck to civil rights actions that do not directly challenge confinement, procedures which Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. Supreme Court necessarily concluded imply unlawful 641, that the sanction confinement. 646 (1997). a challenge purported bias of the decision-maker, invalidity of but instead contest imposed by See In Balisok, the based upon the necessarily implied the the decision-maker thus was subject to the bar announced in Heck. and The Supreme Court summarized that Heck and the related cases teach that: [A] state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)-no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner's suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) . Heck and related cases bar Craddock's claim seeking invalidation of his sentence and subsequent release as it is predicated on his assertion that his conviction and incarceration are improper. See id. at 79 (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973)). allegation that conviction. the Heck, federal Craddock also presents no court has 512 U.S. at 486-87. is frivolous under Bivens. invalidated his Thus, current Craddock's claim Id. at 81-82; see Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500 (holding that writ of habeas corpus is the sole federal remedy when an inmate challenges the fact of imprisonment and relief sought release). is finding that the inmate is entitled to Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in part. Of course, Amendment the Supreme Court has noted that certain Fourth claims § 1983 action. for damages See Heck, potentially may be 512 U.S. at 487 n.7.5 raised in a No need exists to extensively explore the applicability of Heck to Craddock's inchoate Fourth Amendment claim for damages because his Fourth Amendment claim is barred by the statute of limitations. 5 The Court explained: For example, allegedly challenged a suit for unreasonable search damages search produced may attributable lie evidence even to if that an the was introduced in trial resulting in the § 1983 plaintiff's still outstanding conviction. Because of doctrines like independent source and inevitable discovery and especially harmless error, . . . such a § 1983 action, even if successful, would not necessarily imply that the plaintiff's conviction was unlawful. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.7 (internal citations omitted). B. Fourth Amendment Claim Is Untimely Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must dismiss claims which the relevant statute of limitations clearly bars. Brown v. Harris, No. 3:10CV613, 2012 WL 12383, at *1 (E.D. Va. Jan. 3, 2012) (citing Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 655-57 (4th Cir.2006); 951, 955 Nasim v. (4th Cir. Warden, 1995)). limitations for 42 U.S.C. borrow personal the relevant state. 471 U.S. 261, House of Corr., Because § 1983 injury Md. no explicit of § of the courts limitations from the Nasim, 64 F.3d at 955 (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 266-69 (1985)). Virginia applies statute of limitations to personal injury claims. Ann. statute actions exists, statute 64 F.3d 8.01-243 (A) (West 2014). Hence, Craddock a two-year See Va. Code should have filed his Complaint within two years from when the underlying claims accrued. "A claim accrues when the plaintiff becomes aware of his or her injury, United States v. Ill, 123 (1979), Kubrick, 444 U.S. or when he or she xis put on notice ... to make reasonable inquiry' as to whether a claim exists." Almond v- Sisk, No. 3:08cvl38, 2009 WL 2424084, at *4 (E.D. Va. Aug. 6, 2009) (omission in original) (quoting Nasim, 64 F.3d at 955) . Craddock filed his Complaint May 1, 2012.6 Thus, for Craddock's claims alleging an invalid search and seizure to be Craddock signed his Complaint on this date. (Compl. 12.) Craddock or the institution, however, mailed the Complaint on 10 timely, the claims must have accrued after May 1, 2010. The Complaint fails to contain any facts indicating that Craddock's claims accrued after May 1, 2010. Instead, Craddock challenges the search warrant issued on August 10, that occurred on August 11, 2008. (Compl. 7.) because "his 2007, April 3, judgment (Id. in his at 9.) two-year and April 14, criminal case was not affirmed § 2255 motion ... is still First, even using January 14, the date his claim accrued, the 2008, Craddock states that his claims are timely until on January 14, 2 010; and his pending." 2007 and three searches 2010 as the claim would still be barred by limitation period. More importantly, Craddock's claims of illegal search and seizure arise from events on August 11, April dates, 3, not 2008, after and the collateral challenge. Cnty. Gov't, 543 F. April 14, conclusion 2008 of and his accrued on criminal those case or See Hornback v. Lexington-Fayette Urban App'x McCarthy, 349 F. App'x 851, 499, 502 (6th 857 (4th Cir. Cir. 2013); 2009) Smith v. (finding § 1983 claims challenging search and seizure untimely because claims accrued as of date of search). Nothing in Craddock's Complaint suggests that he lacked awareness that the search took place as of the June 1, date 2012. of the search. (ECF No. 1-6, Accordingly, at 1.) While Craddock's the Fourth Court believes that Craddock waited nearly a month the mail his Complaint, even using the May 1, 2012 date, Craddock's claim is untimely. 11 Amendment claim is also barred by the statute of limitations. Nevertheless, even somehow timely, if Craddock's Fourth as explained below, Amendment claim was Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on any remaining Fourth Amendment claim. IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD Summary judgment must be rendered "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material movant Civ. fact and the is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." P. 56(a). Fed. R. The party seeking summary judgment bears the responsibility to inform the court of the basis for the motion, and to identify the parts of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). See Celotex Corp. " [W] here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a reliance summary solely judgment on the motion pleadings, may properly depositions, be made in answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file." Id. at 324 (internal quotation motion marks omitted). When the is properly supported, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and, by citing affidavits interrogatories, or "'depositions, and admissions on file,' answers designate xspecific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) and 56(e) 12 (1986)). to Id. In reviewing a summary judgment motion, draw all justifiable inferences in favor the court "must of the party." United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 832, (4th Cir. (citing Anderson v. nonmoving 835 Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 1992) 255 (1986)). However, (citing Improvement Co. 442, 448 (1872)). judge, v. Liberty Lobby, a mere scintilla of evidence will not preclude summary judgment. at 251 978 F.2d Munson, Anderson, 477 U.S. 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) "' [T] here is a preliminary question for the not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party . . . upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.'" Id. (quoting Munson, 81 U.S. at 448). In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants cite to Craddock's exhibits, including: Complaint 1) the and Affidavit 305 Dundee Avenue dated August 11, and 2) several for of the attached Search Warrant 2007 (Compl. the search warrant issued on August 11, Ex. 2007 for D(l)-(2); (id. Ex. D(3)) . As a general rule, a non-movant must respond to a motion for summary judgment with affidavits or other verified evidence. Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 324. Craddock has not responded to the Motion for Summary Judgment. Craddock's failure to respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment permits the Court to rely solely on the submissions of the Defendants 13 in deciding the Motion for Summary Judgment. 1537 (5th Cir. 1994) See Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, ("'Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment."' (quoting Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1992))); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) consider only the cited materials . . . ."). ("The court need Furthermore, "[i]n determining a motion for summary judgment, the Court may assume that facts identified by the moving party in its listing of material facts are admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine issues filed in opposition to the motion." E.D. Va. Loc. Civ. R. 56(B). In light of the foregoing principles and submissions, the following facts are established for the purposes of the Motion for Summary Judgment. All permissible inferences are drawn in favor of Craddock. V. On August 11, UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 20 07, Defendant Fisher, a Detective with the City of Richmond Police Department, sought a search warrant for 305 Dundee Avenue, (D)(2).) in Richmond, Virginia. (Compl. Ex. D(l) and In support of the affidavit, Defendant Fisher swore: On August 10, 2007, police were called to Avenue. Upon arrival Albertus BROWN, at approximately 2231 hours, the residence of 305 Dundee they found the victim Naeem shot and unresponsive and laying on 14 the front [steps] of the residence. Following the shooting incident, the suspect Orillion CRADDOCK was observed running around the building and down the alley. Prior to the shooting incident the suspect CRADDOCK was observed going into the basement of the residence situated at 305 Dundee Avenue. Witnesses reported prior knowledge of the utilizing the basement situated at while possessing a firearm. suspect 305 CRADDOCK Dundee Avenue (Id^ Ex. D(l).) In the affidavit, Defendant Fisher explained that warrant the search was requested to seek (Id. relation to the first-degree murder offense. Defendant Fisher requested to search "[t]he evidence Ex. entire in D(2).) residence (including the basement) located at 305 Dundee Avenue (two story house, white in color with house numbers clearly visible above the front door) to include all curtilage, the City of Richmond . . . ." (Id.) which is located in Defendant Fisher requested that the warrant be issued to search for " [b]lood, weapons, DNA evidence, firearms and any evidence connected (Id.) commission of the crime of First Degree Murder." on the information found probable contained cause existed in the affidavit, for search warrant on August 11, 2007. The search warrant was the search with the Based a magistrate and issued the (Id. Ex. D(4).) executed on August 11, 20 07, by Defendant Leonard, a Detective with the City of Richmond Police Department. (Id^ Ex. D(5).) Defendant Leonard found and seized a shotgun and cartridges from 305 Dundee Avenue. (Id.) Police conducted subsequent searches of 305 Dundee Avenue on April 3, 15 2008 and April 14, 2008. at 3 05 Dundee conducted; Avenue his (Compl. 5-9.) at the grandmother, time Pearl in his the Brown (See id. at 5-7; Ex. A, at 1-2.) searches was used Craddock did not reside three searches resided at the were home. Evidence recovered from these criminal prosecution. (Id. at 8.) This Court convicted Craddock of one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and one count of possession of an unregistered sawed-off shotgun and was of incarceration. States v. ECF No. sentenced to 120 months (See Mem. Supp. Summ. J. Craddock, No. 3:08CR49 (E.D. 1-2 (citing United Va. October 14, 2008), 53).) VI. FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS The Fourth Amendment "protects persons against unreasonable searches of 'their persons houses' and thus be invoked by an . . is a right Minnesota v. original) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." Thus, Katz "'in Amendment, must . personal (citing that [and] Carter, v. 525 United order to U.S. 83, States, claim 88 389 the (1998) U.S. (alteration 347, protection individual." 351 of in (1967))). the Fourth a defendant must demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, expectation is reasonable.'" 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 & n.2 Id. (1978)). 16 and that his (quoting Rakas v. Moreover, Illinois, the expectation of privacy must have a "a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society." Id^ The burden lies with Craddock to show that he has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched. United States v. (citation argue, Rusher, omitted). much less As 966 F.2d 868, discussed establish, that 874 below, he had (4th Cir. 1992) Craddock fails to an of expectation privacy in 305 Dundee Avenue. A person who lives at tenant, has a reasonable a residence, whether as an owner or expectation of privacy in the residence, even if he is not on the premises at the time of the search. 2007); See United States v. Gray, United States v. Va. 1997). Beckford, 491 F.3d 138, 962 F. Supp. 767, took place. C.) 770 (E.D. the time the three He provides a copy of his presentence report to establish that he lived in another location. Ex. (4th Cir. Craddock, however, adamantly and repeatedly asserts that he did not live at 3 05 Dundee Avenue at searches 144 Thus, (Compl. it is undisputed that Craddock did not live in the home. "[I]n some circumstances a person may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house of someone else." 515 U.S. Fourth Carter, at 89 (explaining that an overnight guest may claim Amendment protection); see 17 Gray, 491 F.3d at 144 (explaining that "relatives of home owners who regularly reside at the residence" Carolina, may be protected 391 U.S. demonstrate 543, those Craddock puts 546-48 circumstances (citing Bumper v. (1968))). are North Craddock fails present here. to Indeed, forth no evidence demonstrating that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 305 Dundee Avenue. The record reflects that Craddock visited the home and engaged in illegal activity therein. A person, like Craddock, "who is merely present with the consent of the householder[,] may not" claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment. at 90 (citation omitted). to protect illegal individuals, activity in a Carter, 515 U.S. Similarly, the Fourth Amendment fails like Craddock, residence that who is are engaging not their own. in Cf. Gray, 491 F.3d at 146 (holding that person using an apartment to traffic drugs is not a social guest and has no reasonable expectation of privacy). Craddock fails to argue, much less demonstrate, that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 305 Dundee Avenue. Thus, he fails to establish any entitlement to the Fourth Amendment's protection with regard to recovery of prosecution. the gun and the search of other items the used residence and the in his criminal Craddock's Fourth Amendment claim is frivolous and will be dismissed. 18 VII. CONCLUSION The Court will grant in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. To the extent a Fourth Amendment challenge survives Heck and is timely filed, the Court grants Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Craddock's claims and the action will be dismissed. /?J)h J> -> / ' Date: (JfMJLjs'lf /^f 5> Robert E. Payne Senior United States District Judge Richmond, Virginia 19
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