Soutter v. Equifax Information Services, LLC, No. 3:2010cv00107 - Document 223 (E.D. Va. 2015)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Robert E. Payne on 04/15/2015. (tjoh, )
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Soutter v. Equifax Information Services, LLC Doc. 223 APR 15 2015 Wj IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT Richmond Division RICHMOND. VA DONNA K. SOUTTER, For herself and on behalf Of all similarly situated Individuals, Plaintiff, Civil Action No. v. 3:10cvl07 EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, LLC, Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION This AMENDED matter MOTION is FOR before CLASS the Court CERTIFICATION the reasons set forth below, on PLAINTIFF'S (Docket No. SECOND 205). For the motion will be GRANTED. BACKGROUND A. Procedural Background The present case commenced when Plaintiff Donna K. ("Soutter'7 Defendant or Equifax "Defendant") ("FCRA"), "Plaintiff") 15 for filed Information violations U.S.C. § Soutter filed a Motion of 1681, a Services, the et. 2011 WL ("Equifax" or Credit Reporting Act On October for Class Certification, 1226025 (E.D. Servs., Va. Mar. against LLC Fair seq. granted in Soutter v. Equifax Info. 3:10cvl07, Complaint Class Soutter 29, 2010, which this Court LLC (Soutter I), No. 30, 2011) and which Dockets.Justia.com Equifax appealed to the Fourth United States Court of Appeals Circuit. In Soutter II), F. App'x (Soutter Circuit held requirement with 498 that of the Soutter Fed. R. 260 had Civ. instruction (4th P. any [a] it reverses [on] other not v. is 2012), satisfy the and remanded the the made Corp., F.3d here. explicitly by a a fresh Rule that, that conducted Rule 23(b) different Court's First To in a the "when court, and the and 2d 2001), foremost, "rigorous extent I, that the Second, definition Fourth Supp. Cir. new Soutter analysis. class under all a the Circuit's 74, analysis. higher that the this Court (D.R.I. approach Court previous of under 2000) is not Appeals all Rule differs from also proposes remand, disturbing United States analysis must court determinations 83 analysis" Soutter on 23 a case without lower F. (1st requested factors. for Soutter proposed a revised conduct case 103 89 applicable 23(a) case request reversed continue to be the law of the case," 272 typicality ^rigorous analysis' one ground and remands determinations aff'd, Fourth 498 F. App'x at 266 n.*. and will often Kayser-Roth the LLC This Court provided the parties a clean slate for their arguments Although Servs., "renewed As the Fourth Circuit predicted, class definition. Info. Cir. 23(a) (3) that factors." Equifax failed to certification" be "subject to four Rule 23(a) v. for the revisit a rendering analyses its materially both of this limited value. Lastly, material Soutter has established on remand that representations made by Equifax in its certain briefs and supporting documents in Soutter I and Soutter II were, in fact, untrue. 299 See Soutter v. 126 F.R.D. 2013 affidavit substantive (E.D. of facts Equifax Info. Va. Apr. Mark as 8, 2014) Johnson the Servs. LLC (striking the April containing November (Soutter III) , 23, many 2010 in foundation, Soutter I and Soutter II the same of Mark affidavit Johnson relied upon in Soutter I and Soutter II) .* opinions of rested 19, Because the upon a faulty the Court must apply the class certification factors and conduct its "rigorous analysis" anew based on the record as it now stands. B. The Fair Credit Reporting Act Soutter's et. seq. claim arises under "Congress enacted [the] the FCRA. 15 FCRA in 1970 U.S.C. § 1681, to ensure fair and accurate credit reporting, promote efficiency in the banking system, v. and protect consumer privacy." Burr, Trust 551 Co. before the U.S. of Va., modern 47, 526 rise 52 (2007); F.3d of 142, "big Safeco Ins. Co. Saunders 147 data," (4th v. Branch Cir. Congress of Am. Banking 2008). found that & Even the credit industry's reliance upon "computerized data banks" posed 1 In oral argument on the motion to strike resolved by Soutter III, Equifax represented that it no longer relied upon the 2010 affidavit in its opposition to class certification. See Soutter III, 299 F.R.D. at 127 n.l. a "great danger" be "reduced to and stolid that an individual's impersonal unthinking ^blips' machine" life and character would and key-punch and that, holes in thereupon, a his reputation would be ruined without cause. See Dalton v. Capital Associated 414 (citing Indus. , 116 Cong. Inc. , Rec. 257 F.3d 36570 (1970)). keypunch cards may have receded, promise") of gleaning one's 409, (4th Although the the "great danger" reputation Cir. 2001) role of (and "great from a complex nest of data points remains more relevant than ever. To serve the twin needs of commerce and the FCRA requires that consumer reporting agencies2 accurately report credit information. 147. consumer, ("CRAs") the must See Saunders, 526 F.3d at "In recognition of the critical role that CRAs play in the credit markets because of and the inaccurate serious consequences information borne disseminated by consumers in consumer credit reports prepared by CRAs, Congress placed on a CRA what can only Burke v. be described Experian 1085874, at *4 Info. as very high Solutions, (E.D. Va. Mar. legal Inc., duties of 1:10-CV-1064, care [. ]" 2011 WL 18, 2011). 2 "The term ^consumer reporting agency' means any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports." 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f). One such duty is articulated in § 1681e(b), that, "[w]henever a consumer reporting which provides agency prepares a consumer report,3 it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information individual about whom the report relates." (emphasis added). 1681e(b) if information Dalton, this (1) the (2) F.3d at provision private right 1681n. See "malice or is of 15 evil to 415. action U.S.C. § motive" "knowingly conscious disregard and for report reporting § 1681e(b) contains agency assure maximum If the CRA's "willful," defendant Dalton, consumer the procedures 257 15 U.S.C. the "Thus, a consumer reporting agency violates § and reasonable concerning and to failure to a seek statutory prove The consumer the may willfulness, rights of comply with maintain under need not only that committed the follow accuracy." damages plaintiff intentionally not possible then 1681n. did inaccurate an act consumer." a § show the in See 257 F.3d at 418. 3 "The term ^consumer report' means any written, oral, or other communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer's credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer's eligibility for (A) credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; (B) employment purposes; or (C) any other purpose authorized under section 1681b of this title." 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1). C. Equifax's Information Collection Methods Equifax is a CRA. Equifax record court Although the FCRA does not require that judgments on consumer Equifax chooses to include that information. credit Equifax obtains this information by contracting with vendors that gathering information related to court filings. - LexisNexis since 2007. - has provided Virginia court reports, specialize in One such vendor records to Equifax In Virginia, each county and independent city has a general district court with jurisdiction over small claims. addition, there are 120 circuit courts of general jurisdiction. state court records are managed by the Office of Executive All Secretary ("OES") of In each court of the Supreme Court of Virginia. uses a uniform system for recording The clerk judgments, which feeds into a shared case management system operated by the OES. In Soutter collection II, methods the Court used by of Appeals LexisNexis detailed the to capture records": [LexisNexis] used in-person review for all circuit courts through independent contractors. These in-person reviews have some variety as well - some clerks provide a weekly summary printout to the reviewer, some let the reviewer peruse paper records, and some permit the reviewer use of the computer and case management system. For the general district courts, the Supreme Court provided LexisNexis with bulk data feeds until May 2009. LexisNexis then used various "court independent contractors to verify the bulk feeds in person. In May 2009, the Supreme Court stopped providing these feeds. LexisNexis then used a "webscrape" program to grab the data from the Court's website. This practice ended in December 2009 when the Virginia Supreme Court enacted new security measures, including a challenge- response test, that automated programs records. LexisNexis exclusively to December 2009 to district 498 F. that thus had to switch in-person review from February 2010 for general court records. App'x at 262. recitation limited the ability of to access the public to Subsequently developed evidence has shown have been based on an inaccurate record respecting legally determinative distinctions. the record now shows that, Indeed, II, in Soutter I and Soutter Equifax blurred the critical difference between the manner in which and the it collects manner in disposition of LexisNexis information which followed it judgments. about the collects The record materially entry of information now similar shows judgments about clearly procedures for the that the automated collection of judgment disposition information through at least December 2009 and - unlike judgment entry information - did not require information from "runners" the to courts manually in the collect first verification purposes prior to this time.4 4 LexisNexis fashion December from 2009 collected one source when the disposition - the OES Virginia instance See Dep. information database Supreme disposition - in until Court or for of Mark automated at least introduced a Johnson, 30:13-32:25 109:12-18 (Docket No. (Docket No. 209-17); (Docket (Docket No. Under 206-16); 209-14); Dep. of No. Dep. of Cynthia 158-1); Dep. of Mark Johnson, Dep. of Sandra Arrington, Pamela Vicari, Long, 19:5-9 66:20-67:5; 26:8-17 (Docket No. 68:5-25; 69:7-70:4 186-3) . the terms of its contract with Equifax, LexisNexis was obligated to collect and provide all affirmative judgments (i.e., the contrast, entry of LexisNexis dispositions if was it reasonable" to do judgments in only first obligated determined so. the that it required to collect was "provide Equifax In judgment "commercially Equifax/LexisNexis Agreement, to Agreement, 5C.3.d (Docket No. 222). was to instance). Exhibit A In addition, LexisNexis with its[] procedures for collecting dispositions" and provide changes to these procedures to Equifax "10 business days prior to implementation[.]" For example, when LexisNexis lost its ability to Id. purchase judgment disposition records in bulk, it advised Equifax via email. 215). PL's Reply at 3-4 (Docket No. Further, at this stage of the proceedings, the record is sufficient to permit the inference that neither LexisNexis nor Equifax considered manual "captcha" test. Whether this uniform collection of centralized data was conducted by bulk feed or webscrape prior to December 2009 is an immaterial distinction for certification purposes. Regardless, Soutter's revised definition now limits the class period to the bulk feed timeframe. 8 collection or verification of judgment disposition information "commercially reasonable." D. Donna Soutter's Credit Report In June 2007, payments to Donna Soutter fell behind on her credit card Virginia Credit Union ("Credit Union"). As a result, the Credit Union filed suit against her in the Richmond General District Court to debt. After Soutter and the Credit Union entered into a payment plan, the Credit Unfortunately, that District Court, Soutter. After moved recover $15,000 in unpaid credit card to set Union intention which the aside agreed was entered mistake the to not a came judgment, dismiss relayed default to and light, on to the the judgment the March suit. General against Credit 20, Union 2008, the General District Court set the judgment aside and dismissed the action without prejudice. In order to forestall to her credit records, the mistake's predictable contagion Soutter sent Equifax a letter explaining that the judgment had been entered in error and enclosing a copy of the order setting it aside and dismissing the case. 23, On May 2008, Equifax advised Soutter that the judgment was not yet in its file on her. By July 2008, however, Soutter alleges that Equifax was reporting the judgment as unpaid and not vacated.5 5 Technically, Soutter's judgment was set aside and dismissed, not vacated. 9 Soutter sent a Equifax in second letter containing a copy of the order to December 2008, explaining that she credit due to an erroneous Equifax report. removed the judgment from her file. at least three inaccuracy. consumer Those reports were In response, All told, credit had been denied Equifax Equifax furnished reports containing furnished on October 19, the 2008, November 6, 2008, and December 16, 2008. E. The Proposed Class and Class Claim Soutter claims that Equifax violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) by failing to establish or to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy in the preparation of the consumer reports that it furnished regarding her and other class members. Soutter contends that Equifax's violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) U.S.C. In § was willful, rendering Equifax liable pursuant to 15 1681n. her second amended motion for class certification, Soutter defines the proposed class as follows: All natural persons who meet every one the following definitional requirements: 1. of the computer database of the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia shows that the person was the defendant in a Virginia General District Court civil action or judgment; 2. the computer database of the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia shows that as of the date 20 days after the 10 Court's certification of this class, the civil action or judgment was dismissed, satisfied, appealed, or vacated on or before April 1, 2009 ("the disposition date"); 3. Equifax's records note receipt of a communication or dispute from that person about the accuracy of Equifax's reporting of that civil action or judgment status; and 4. Equifax's records note that a credit report regarding the person was furnished to a third party who requested the credit report, other than for an employment purpose: (1.) no earlier than February 17, 2008, (2.) no later than February 21, 2013, (3.) after the date that Equifax's records note its receipt of the consumer dispute regarding the judgment status, and (4.) at least thirty (30) days after the disposition date but before the judgment notation was corrected by Equifax to report that it was satisfied, appealed or vacated. PL's Mem. at 6 (Docket No. 206). drawing guidance from Soutter II, period, to The who definition, narrows the applicable time excludes circuit court judgments, consumers proposed had notified Equifax of and limits the class the disposition of a judgment before Equifax published an inaccurate report. DISCUSSION Class-action claims were designed to be "an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the U.S. individual named parties only." 682, appropriate' 700-701 when the (1979). Califano v. "Class relief 'issues involved are 11 Yamasaki, is common to 442 'peculiarly the class as a whole' in the same manner of Sw. v. In such courts and when they 'turn on questions to each member of the class.'" Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982) cases, and affecting class the every actions parties" class save by member the Gen. Tel. Co. (citing id^ at 701.). resources litigating "in an of law applicable "of issues economical both the potentially fashion." See id. Before harnessing these economies, four prerequisites be met: "(1) Rule 23(a) the class is so numerous joinder of all members is impracticable; of law claims the or or fact common defenses to are representative Civ. of P. the Inc., 155 will Rule certification "questions of 337 tests. under law Rule or (3) the (4th Cir. the class; (4) represent Meineke 1998) and Disc. the Muffler (quoting Fed. R. putative classes must satisfy one Where, 23(b)(3), fact representative's adequately See Broussard v. In addition, 23(b) and that (2) there are questions of those of fairly F.3d 331, 23(a)). class; typical interests of the class." Shops, the demands that as here, the the Court common to class plaintiff must members seeks ensure that predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is for superior to other available methods and efficiently adjudicating the controversy." 23(b)(3). normal Fed. R. fairly Civ. P. Because adjudication by class is an exception to the rules of litigation, the 12 Court must perform a "rigorous analysis" of each class Pinkerton Gov't Servs., 2013) (summarizing 23(a) certification Inc., the factor. 514 F. App'x 299, rigorous See 307-08 required analysis Ealy v. (4th Cir. under Rule and Rule 23(b)(3)). In conducting its analysis, the Court may face factual questions bearing on both class certification and the merits of the action. party "A affirmatively demonstrate is, be seeking he must his prepared class compliance to prove certification with that the there Rule must that in are — fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 2541, take 2551 a (2011) . 'close question and, Because look' if at the 445 F.3d facts necessary, 311, 319 564 U.S. of this, propriety of certification." Co., Dukes, "the district relevant make , 131 S. Ct. to the specific court must certification findings on the Thorn v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. (4th Cir. 2006). Such findings are necessary "even if the issues tend to overlap into the merits of the underlying the case," but merits ... success on whether certification determinations should farther. Compare court's] 'rigorous merits of the is "the is not proper." go only Wal-Mart, analysis' plaintiff's likelihood 131 S. will Ct. to The far as at entail underlying 13 the relevant Id. as of claim. the issue Court's necessary 2551 some plaintiffs' of factual and ("Frequently overlap with That cannot no [a the be helped.") with Amgen Inc. v. 568 U.S. , 133 S. Ct. Conn. 1184, Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, 1194-95 (2013) ("Rule 23 grants courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification stage. Merits questions may be considered to the extent - but only to the extent - that they are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied."). I. Rule 23(a) The purpose of Rule 23(a) is to "ensure [] plaintiffs are appropriate representatives claims they wish to litigate. that the named of the class whose The Rule's four requirements - numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate representation - effectively limit the class claims to those fairly encompassed by the named plaintiff's claims." (quoting Falcon, omitted) . Of 457 the U.S. four at Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2550 156) explicit characteristics adequacy) and the represent second two necessary quotation marks requirements, (numerosity and commonality) factors (internal the first two represent necessary class factors attributes (typicality for the and class representative. In addition to the states that define the Fed. R. Civ. "[a]n class requirements of Rule order and the that certifies class P. 23(c)(1)(B). claims, a 23(a), class issues, Rule action or 23(c) must defenses." This reflects the prior decisional 14 law holding that prerequisite to "the maintaining 550 F.2d 1343, Inc., for example, definition 1348 a of class (4th Cir. threshold class be 'readily identifiable.'" 347, 358 F.2d 1053, class is action." 1976). an essential Roman v. ESB, The Fourth Circuit, has "repeatedly recognized that Rule 23 contains an implicit F.3d the requirement (4th 1055 Cir. 2014) (4th Cir. that the EQT Prod. (citing 1972)). members Co. Hammond This of a proposed v. Adair, v. 764 Powell, 462 is more often referred to as the "ascertainability" requirement. See id. Ascertainability A. In order to certify a class under Rule 23, a court must be able to "readily identify Id. objective criteria." able to identify every certification," the members be will the class members in class plaintiff member must identifiable proposes sources in order to records; and (2) to Although the plaintiff "need not be at the demonstrate "without comparing data the electronic copy of that of class and Id. from ascertain class members: time extensive individualized fact-finding or 'mini-trials[.]'" Soutter reference two (1) the OES information Equifax's own database. The parties would use the OES database to identify each defendant in a Virginia General obtain his information or District Court her would be name, used civil address, to locate 15 action or judgment and and the case number. That individual's Equifax file, which would the consumer information; then be reviewed to provided (2) when, judgment status; and determine: notice at if contesting Equifax all, (1) the updated whether judgment the file's (3) whether an inaccurate credit report was furnished to a third party after the consumer provided notice to Equifax. Equifax contests the ascertainability of the class in three ways. First, Equifax argues that the class is not objectively determinable. Equifax Specifically, states that the approach proposed by Soutter involves several costly and time-consuming steps, requires some degree of manual review by Equifax employees, and misstates Equifax's ability to ascertain the date of any "corrective file. updates" Equifax Because made to accesses an individual archives of consumer's files through "frozen scans" reflecting the state of the file on a single day of each frozen month, scans it to says that determine is not on possible which day by reviewing the within the month a particular change took place. Second, Equifax argues that Soutter's definition imposes a requirement to report judgment dispositions within thirty days, and that the current class reports were disposition FCRA contains definition furnished date but no such identifies "at least before 16 requirement. class thirty the members (30) judgment Soutter's whose days credit after notation the was corrected." Equifax argues that this definition engrafts a "bright-line" liability rule onto the FCRA. Equifax Third, of the proposed judgment was contends class. not yet that Soutter Equifax argues no action for Equifax to take." Equifax reports were then states furnished Equifax in December and, not following the credit erroneous file when she "therefore, Def.'s Resp. that, even a member that listed on Soutter's first contacted Equifax in May 2008, 206) . is because at 20 no Soutter's there was (Docket No. consumer second 2008, Soutter does not meet credit notice to her own class definition. None of these certification. reflect an arguments First, inability to none of determine reference to objective criteria. process and the time whether the are Equifax's Moreover, through initial of class concerns the class by The number of "steps" in the or are not Life Ins. Co., objectively 214 F.R.D. ("[T]he class can be identified through an examination of the individual burdensome defeat the members See Dunnigan v. Metro. 125, 136 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2003) participants. to and effort required have no bearing on individuals ascertainable. serve files of each of the The fact that this manual process may be slow and cannot defeat the ascertainability requirement."). the majority of sifting in this case will be achieved dataset searches and other 17 forms of electronic data analysis. After these steps are complete, review finalize 1,000 to class consumers. membership These files any additional manual would and reach approximately communications could be reviewed by a handful of attorneys in a matter of days. Nor render does this the recourse inquiry to manual, member-by-member "subjective." Here, most review of the determinations are readily discernible and almost always binary: an individual was either listed as subject to a judgment or was not; this judgment was either recorded by Equifax or was not; Equifax either received a communication from the individual or did not; and so communications ultimate on. may question And, while require a degree from that arising Equifax was "on notice" or not. giving rise to those requiring mini-trials a class definition Litig., 279 F.R.D. 90, What language of of some consumer interpretation, communication is the whether The individualized fact-finding that determinations administrative review to of the defeat on the ascertainability merits — not are an determine whether an objective element is met. See In re 116 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. Vitamin 26, C Antitrust 2012). Equifax is really arguing when it laments the burden imposed is manageability, not ascertainability. The difficulty and burden of such an undertaking are undoubtedly relevant to a manageability below. Unlike analysis under the ascertainability, superiority however, the factor explored manageability of adjudication by class is measured in relation manageability of adjudication by other means. to the See infra at 80. As such, manageability should only be used to deny certification "where the attention devoted strictly relief ultimately Cameron-Brown to and administrative accruing Co., resources 92 (citation omitted). which matters to the plaintiff F.R.D. 32, 49 (E.D. would will have overwhelm class." Va. to Oct. be any Brown v. 16, 1981) And, that simply is not the case here. Equifax's protests ring especially hollow in light of its own substantial capabilities. As Soutter noted, Equifax describes itself as a business that: [C]reates customized and delivers unparalleled insights that enrich both the performance of businesses and the lives of consumers through the comprehensive and differentiated data it manages, the expertise in advanced analytics it provides, the stateof-the-industry solutions it develops, and the leading-edge proprietary technology through which the solutions are delivered. The company organizes, assimilates and analyzes data on more than 600 million consumers and more than 80 million businesses worldwide and its databases include more than 200 million employee files. PL's Reply at 12 (Docket No. 215) http://www.equifax.com/about-equifax/company-profile visited Oct. 22, 2014)). In short, Equifax's very (citing (last business model includes gathering and distilling information from a wide variety of sources in order to glean insights about individuals. 19 The irony here presumably is not lost on Equifax, is not lost on the favorably upon the Court. In general, argument that records and certainly courts do not a defendant look treats as accurate for business purposes are not accurate enough to define a class. See Herrera v. 674 Cal. (N.D. June LCS Fin. 1, 2011) Servs. Corp., ("What was 274 F.R.D. ascertainable to 666, Ocwen in the course of adhering to its own policy is ascertainable for the purposes of identifying members of the class."). Moreover, Equifax has already proven its ability to determine whether and when a consumer has judgment pursuant Stipulated notified to it this Court's Discovery Order SI 1 of an inaccurate September (Docket 17, No. Virginia 2010 Order. 61) (requiring Equifax provide Soutter with a list of the names and addresses of each consumer who made a dispute concerning a Virginia judgment on their file at any time since February 17, 2008 under dispute codes 101, 102, 103, and/or 112) . In sum, the Court is confident that Equifax can perform the task ahead because the record shows as much. Perhaps the closest objective determinability "frozen exact files. scans" date In consumer's on used file corrective words, and a comes to lodging argument is its contention for archival which other Equifax if a information do updates were corrective credit 20 report is not made update a valid that the reflect to is furnished the consumer made on to a that consumer within the same month, to determine the whether report, or defeat class little more such a vice stage. than a a paper See EQT, situation Miller & Mary Kay Kane, 2005) v. 41 F.R.D. 377, class does not have to be Second, can be identified Equifax may no the record 2014 from member Charles (Docket No. not Trans Union, argues that by reaching LLC, No. at this at Alan the time Arthur Wright, of R. (3d (quoting Fischer (S.D.N.Y. 8, Dec. 1966)) ("[A] so ascertainable that every potential the commencement record that Burton 215-6) class. Miller & Kane"] 384 at suggests Donald this that ("The plaintiffs need not be the exact LexisNexis information and has provided such data Letter evidence necessary of to Matthew in the day judgment record or disposition from LexisNexis, in constructed for not to Federal Practice & Procedure § 1760 [hereinafter "Wright, Kletz, member 7A has exists is publishing of insufficient Equifax even class also is offering accounting every see argument First, 764 F.3d at 358 identify preceded the obstacle, precise certification."); ed. That certification. such to correction versa. hypothetical Moreover, able the Equifax claims it will be unable it action."). receives a but information does maintain this a related case. See Erausquin dated Mar. 26, (confirming data production in Soutter v. 3:10-cv-514). Although Soutter also the class definition already addresses this concern only those individuals 21 whose credit reports were furnished "at but before least thirty the judgment (30) days notation after the disposition date was corrected," the Court is not convinced that condition rectifies the hypothetical posed by Equifax. Presumably, to avoid the report would need to have been days "frozen scan" notation "before the been corrected) judgment furnished at was problem, (30) least thirty corrected" rather than "at least thirty the (if it has (30) days after the disposition date," as required by the current class definition. This is because the frozen scan issue is only avoided if the date the report is furnished and the date the file is corrected (if it has been corrected) to avoid both will make are separated by at least one month falling within the this change to same the frozen scan. definition The Court accordingly. Regardless, the class is more than sufficiently ascertainable by reference to objective criteria at this stage. Second, imposes Equifax's a contention thirty-day disposition that the class reporting definition requirement is misplaced and - based on the revision above - inapplicable. The class definition The Court today rules for summary motion whatever itself liability, imposes no on a motion for class judgment. if any, liability determined Equifax. certification, Equifax will is on be at not a responsible for trial. the If class definition cuts counter to those findings on the merits, final motion to amend the class definition 22 will be a entertained. At this stage, circumscribe Equifax a was category on potentially revised however, is people for of notice inaccurate class Soutter and whom furnished information definition simply a it is true report despite accomplishes attempting this this aim to that containing notice. and The articulates an objectively determinable class. Equifax's final ascertainability contention is that Soutter is not a member of the proposed class. ascertainability argument. Soutter be Systems, a member Inc., of 255 That, however, is not an Typicality and adequacy demand that the F.3d class. 138, See 147 Lienhart v. Cir. 2001) (4th Dryvit ("If [plaintiff] is not even a member of the class, her claims cannot be typical and she cannot be an adequate representative of the class."). Therefore, be addressed in at Equifax's class membership argument 55. Where a the discussion on typicality below. will plaintiff proposes objective criteria See infra capable of identifying those individuals described in the class definition, the ascertainability requirement is satisfied. just that. The fact that applying the Soutter has done criteria could take significant time and effort may be a relevant consideration for weighing options the under manageability Rule of 23(b) (3), the but class it Court's ascertainability determination. 23 does device not against factor other into the Holding otherwise would mean that defendants conduct affects a could defeat large class certification when their number of individuals and the class- action device can be most useful. B. Numerosity Rule class 23(a) (1) action is provides that one of the that requirements for a the class be "so numerous Fed. R. all members is impracticable." Civ. that P. joinder of 23(a)(1). "No specified number is needed to maintain a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23; application of the rule is to be considered in light of the particular circumstances v. of the case[.]" Newport News Gen. & Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 653 (4th Cir. 1967) . Cypress 375 F.2d 648, "Courts consider a number of factors in considering whether joinder is practicable including the size of ease of identifying its numbers and determining their the class, addresses, facility their geographic 162, 170 (D. of making service Adams v. dispersion." Md. Nov. 1, on 2000) them if joined Henderson, (internal and 197 F.R.D. quotation marks omitted). The parties have stipulated that the Decl. include roughly 1,000 persons. Ex the 1, Ex. 2 (Docket No. 206-7). revised class of Leonard Bennett, 1 7, Equifax does not contest that numerosity requirement is satisfied in this Court agrees. Actions § See 3:11 William (5th ed. would B. Rubenstein, 2013) 24 instance. Newberg [hereinafter on The Class "Newberg"] ("[J]oinder fewer is than 20 generally members deemed and practicable impracticable in in classes classes with with more than 4 0 members."). C. Commonality Rule fact 255 23(a)(2) common to F.3d claims at of requires the class. 14 6. the The class that there Fed. R. Civ. commonality as a be questions P. 23(a) (2); requirement whole, and of or Lienhart, focuses whether law they on the "turn on questions of law applicable in the same manner to each member of the class." Califano, requirement, class. there See Cent. 442 need be U.S. at only a Wesleyan Coll. 701. single v. W.R. 628, 636 (D.S.C. 1992), aff'd 6 F.3d 177 To issue satisfy common Grace & Co., (4th Cir. this to the 143 F.R.D. 1993). In discussing the typicality requirement in Soutter II, the Fourth Circuit commonality establish once, ' Perry, merely S. by 675 Ct. at the "the members that that provision invoked 'their by the alleging same F.3d 832, 2551); ("Likewise, claims Soutter of can a the plaintiff to M.D. regarding class be do not litigated the rel. same 498 F. Stukenberg v. App'x typicality by Equifax."). that the at legal (quoting Wal-Mart, II, demonstrate 25 of ex 2012) satisfy asserting a violation of § 1681e(b) requires productively Soutter cannot Wal-Mart proposed violation (5th Cir. also of a defendant." 840 see lesson 131 at 266 simply by "Commonality class members have suffered the same injury. they have law." all suffered Wal-Mart, quotation 131 marks implicitly a This does not mean merely that violation S. Ct. at omitted). recognized, 2551 As if the of the same (internal the level Fourth of provision citations Circuit generality of and panel at which commonality is established is insufficiently specific to first satisfy the commonality prong, then the class representative's proposed point of typicality cannot attempt to intersect at that juncture. relevant A - success of point enough an of that commonality it could individual claim. commonality are the must help be form specific the and for basis - the These specific points of class points at which the putative representative's claim must intersect in order to be typical of the class. If the representative's claim attempts to intersect at a higher level of generality - either because that is where commonality has been forged or because it is the only level at which typicality can be achieved - then the class will fail. In this ground. meaningless observation, It has where Newberg § 3:26 In that the order to be always Fourth Circuit been commonality ("In essence, representative's fact the claims class "typical," is case not that first tread new typicality achieved. is See typicality requires that the class share members' the did not the common claims Soutter's 26 share questions with claims must of each be law or other."). advanced at the same level of generality - i.e., degree of specificity - as the class' with the same type alleged commonality, and which itself must be specific enough to buttress the class claim. This lesson mandate. is reiterated As Wal-Mart in indicated, Wal-Mart's "one stroke" class claims "must depend upon a common contention ... of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution truth or falsity will validity of each one 131 at — S. Ct. must answers to of the possess in members' 70, underlying facts defeat 78 of 1, 1997)). commonality system. See Stott Inc., which v. 185 requires will Haworth, individual class commonality where 2006) F.R.D. propel 916 211, that U.S. 216 (D. Md. class case 134, Airways, (citing Hewlett the the F.2d common Id. of of 22, of litigation." DiFelice v. Mar. points generate the showing law." (E.D. Va. Int'l, questions a its Wal-Mart, proposed "to the Premier Salons dispositive capacity of is central to the stroke." the of v. But, words, the there are common questions 235 F.R.D. in one resolution not Inc., determination the "Minor differences do that claims other In drive cases means resolve an issue that 2551. commonality apt which present through 145 May (4th the Cir. 1990). This does not mean, of course, decided by a single issue. to think, require that a that the entire case must be Wal-Mart does not, common 27 fact be one as Equifax seems upon which the entire case would be render decided the [if] it one of the Rather, [is] 'will resolve an claims Mart, S. Ct. in citations Rule 23(a)(2) element stroke." inquiry under a nature that is central to one a requirement Rule will stroke.'" omitted) its (emphasis determination the validity of each EQT, 764 added); F.3d see within the at also 360 Wal- ("We quite agree that for purposes of and brackets omitted) . generate 23(b)(3) "[a] single common question will such at 2556 Such even a single common question will do.") quotation marks evidence of issue that (internal 131 one predominance entirely meaningless. suffice "in Put simply, a common answer class' common claim, help to then (internal if common resolve Wal-Mart's an "one stroke" demand is satisfied. The Supreme Court has long observed that "[t]he commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 n.5. tend to merge." As the Falcon Court noted: Both serve as guideposts for determining whether under the particular circumstances maintenance of a class action is and whether the named plaintiff's the class the interests fairly claims and of are the so claim and interrelated class adequately economical members protected that will in be their absence. Those requirements therefore also tend to merge with the adequacy-ofrepresentation requirement, although the latter requirement also raises concerns about the competency of class counsel and conflicts of interest. 28 Wal- 457 U.S. at 158 n.13. Although these concepts when commonality and typicality intersect, are indistinguishable not or ideally "merge" the two requirements interchangeable. Whereas commonality "looks at the relationship among the class members generally," proposed Newberg typicality class § "at representative 3:26. typicality, looks In order the and to relationship the rest meaningfully of between the examine the class." Soutter's the Court must first clearly identify the alleged commonalities of the class. The Court finds rigorous analysis: reasonableness require the inaccuracy of the consumer reports, of inaccuracies, four proposed "commonalities" that the whether procedures Equifax's alleged conduct was to cause willful, the these and the determination of statutory damages. 1. The element Inaccuracy inaccuracy of a § of 1681e(b) a consumer's claim. See report Dalton, is 257 a necessary F.3d at 415. Soutter argues that one of the "common questions" for the class is whether "credit reports that omitted the current status of a terminated judgment [are] inaccurate." No. 206) . The answer to this question is, by definition, But this truism does the PL's Mem. at 21 (Docket resolution of little to the yes. forge class commonality or drive litigation. 29 The relevant question is whether the inaccuracy common answer. As alleged is capable of resolution by It is. in Soutter I, the Plaintiff individualized proof will not be has necessary, shown that because the members of the class can all demonstrate the inaccuracy of their reports by reference to common evidence: 1226025, will at be By evaluating the OES data, *9. able the OES database. to show the status of the their See 2011 WL class members judgments in contradistinction to the statuses published by Equifax in their consumer reports. Virginia "Thus, database inaccuracy with ... reports[.]" typicality of Id. or comparison Equifax's the of commonality in of Supreme records putative Nothing the class Soutter this will Court prove members' II and the consumer challenged element, of the the Court believes that this common question of inaccuracy remains capable of resolution by common answer. Equifax contends that this "[i]naccuracy is an uncommon, inaccuracy will require Farmer Phillips the issued by Agency, case because individualized issue" and proving at 25, 26 (Docket No. 209). v. be "consumer-specific proof" judgment-related documents Resp. cannot Inc., such . . . the court." For support, which held as "the Def.'s Equifax cites to that "to determine whether the source of a particular consumer's records was faulty or inaccurate . . . will necessarily 30 entail individualized inquiry for many reports . . . ." Sept. 20, Indep. 2012). Similarly, Drivers Ass'n v. 285 F.R.D. 688, 703 (N.D. Ga. Equifax cites USIS Comm'1 Serv. to Inc., Owner-Operator where the Tenth Circuit agreed with the lower court that "the accuracy of each individual's claim, 1194 [report], require [s] a an essential particularized (10th Cir. does of inquiry." a 537 § 1681e(b) F.3d 1184, 2008) . The element Court not believe that Farmer or Owner-Operator established categorical commonality rules regarding this element of § 1681e(b). the adverse In Farmer, information multitude of different for example, in each sources, the court observed that consumer's report See 285 F.R.D. at 702. to source whether the of a particular records was faulty or inaccurate . . . the need to determine the from a which obtained information from a number of jurisdictions. determine came source of "[I]n order consumer's [Farmer] court would each piece of adverse information in a consumer's report and then evaluate the quality of that source." Id. at 703. That problem is not present here. The inaccuracy at issue in this case involves one variable that is inaccurate in verifiable by a common manner across the class and is easily reference to a single court-run database without resorting to complex "mini-trials." The even a record summary here shows witness, that could an expert present 31 witness, this kind or of perhaps evidence after a thorough study of the Supreme Court of Virginia. argument of counsel records kept Equifax has advanced the unsupported as the predicate inaccuracy is an individual issue.6 basis its upon which to by Equifax and the for That find resolution of its view that is an insufficient the community issue in favor. In demonstrated that the inaccuracy is satisfies Wal-Mart's command that common issues "be of such a nature that [they are] element short, Soutter of class the capable of classwide 131 Ct. S. required at to has claim one resolution" While 2551. sustain that by common only Soutter's a claim answer. single under Wal-Mart, common Rule issue 23(a)(2), is the Court will evaluate all alleged commonalities. 2. To must meet the demonstrate reasonable 257 claims: (1) the "caused second element that procedures Dalton, that Reasonableness of Procedures F.3d at to § reporting assure 415. a In 1681e(b) agency maximum its claim, did not possible defense, Equifax question inaccuracy" in is any whether given Equifax's credit report. Soutter follow accuracy." makes that "reasonableness" is not a common issue, relevant the "the of two and 2) procedures Neither argument is persuasive. 6 For example, counsel argue that accuracy necessitates a look at each underlying court record, but has not so. 32 explained why this is Equifax judgments reiterates varies between that the the 134 procedures General for District collecting Courts and argues that what is reasonable for one may not be reasonable for Equifax others. according contends to the "quintessentially a that "reasonableness" circumstances fact-specific, vary and presented will is individualized inquiry." determination regarding This argument fails for three reasons. First, a procedures question is "individualized" varied Home Loans, by assess basis"). the individual. Inc., "reasonableness 319 reference to irrelevant. that, on a Equifax's the That time period, argument 134 is although the See F.3d Court.7 0'Sullivan 732, 742 court (5th in v. Cir. would have transaction-by-transaction fails General because because District the upon judgment collection methods the disposition centralized source: the its Courts evidence repeated is OES simply remand shows varied by court collection method was for the entirety of the class period, a procedures Even Equifax does not allege that to be the case here. Second, from if (class certification inappropriate where 2003) and only actually Countrywide to "reasonableness" uniform with the information drawn of the Virginia See PL's Mem. at 22, 24-26 (Docket No. 206). Supreme As such, 7 Although the uniformity of the procedures are evidence that the contention may be resolved "in one 33 stroke," it may be possible it is difficult to see how "the frequency with which a particular consumer's file should have been updated ... is a question that is each consumer" can judge. specific to the circumstances particular to if there is a common baseline by which the jury Def.'s Resp. at 28 (Docket No. 209). Equifax makes a similar argument in its discussion of Rule 23(b)(3), rural Virginia consumers is stating that what may be reasonable for consumers in an is different in urban individual argument bespeaks areas. than Thus, issue. what says, Putting Equifax, aside initial commonality, is the reasonable for reasonableness fact that this not final predominance, Equifax's contention is at war with logic. Perhaps that is why Equifax cited no authority to support it. Equifax's contention is based default entirely on procedures dispositions varied simply is not true. the for now disproven collecting from notion information jurisdiction to that about judgment jurisdiction. Based on the current record, continued invocation of the Equifax's That Equifax's varying judgment collection methods that evidence of procedural variation itself could prove a basis for the "unreasonableness" of the procedures. In other words, Equifax cannot rely upon this opinion as support for the notion that it can insulate itself from liability under the FCRA by intentionally complicating its collection methods through a multitude of contracting co-parties or processes because a jury conceptually could find such an approach itself "unreasonable." 34 is a form of argumentation through obfuscation. And, it is rejected.8 Third, the collection of record here shows judgment dispositions that the procedures themselves are but for one set of procedures employed by Equifax that bear upon the inaccuracy alleged. Another, for example, collects and synthesizes Equifax on notice is the method by which Equifax communications regarding the from customers potential for placing erroneous information, which the Court will discuss below. Equifax next contends that the uniformity of the procedures "obscures the actual question, 'cause the inaccuracy' credit file." which is whether those procedures in Resp. Def.'s any particular at 32 (Docket consumer's No. Equifax 209). Equifax challenges the commonality of this causal link by arguing that it is possible that attributable to This argument any another is too whether clever not "causation" Equifax's procedures such as by half. or has were conceivably court Mere procedures argument were a disturb the Equifax's Equifax's inaccuracy source, wayward scriveners does class: given no not could be clerical error. conjecture about question common to the were bearing unreasonable. on unreasonable. whether That 8 It is indeed troubling that Equifax continues to make arguments regarding its collection of "court records" generally, when the collection of disposition information is the legally relevant question. 35 question is common across the class and capable of resolution on a classwide basis. Equifax retorts that the EQT court rejected this line of argument court 764 vacating placed uniform are by an F.3d to at commonality without 366. the In the emphasis on considering assessing of certification where inordinate practices relevant class defendants' essence, that the class claim and, forward by procedures an Equifax cannot stroke. reasonableness of issue the actually central so. be that the is only EQT requires relevant to the drive the litigation to legitimately uniform liability." argues Not of practices determination in the words of Wal-Mart, resolving district number those ultimate Equifax unreasonableness common sheer whether "relevant" if causality is also common. only the "the the claim claim procedures in that at one the issue is "irrelevant" to the class claim. In examining certification "procedures" procedure the evidence decision, supporting the necessary Court Soutter's is common across § the class finds to at 1681e(b) and make a least claim. capable class three Each of classwide resolution based on jury findings. First, the Court finds that the agreement between Equifax and LexisNexis structuring the terms of each party's obligations distinguishes, on its face, between the collection standard for 36 judgment information and the collection standard for disposition information. that This govern contract LexisNexis' establishes collection the overarching practices and rules could reasonably be found to constitute part of Equifax's procedures. Although LexisNexis affirmative instance) was judgments to Equifax, dispositions obligated (i.e., to entry collect of and judgment in the all first it was only obligated to collect judgment if it determined that to do so was reasonable." provide Equifax/LexisNexis Agreement, Agreement, SIC.3.d (Docket No. 222). "commercially Exhibit A to Also, the record shows that LexisNexis was contractually obligated to inform Equifax of the procedures being employed, thorough standard disposition was applied information information. In permitting the inference that a less than to to other words, the collection collection the of of judgment judgment record permits the entry inference that Equifax approved the widespread use of a procedure that was likely not to reveal that an entered judgment had been disposed of favorably to the consumer. structuring the Equifax's duty contract to in adopt A jury could reasonably find that this manner procedures to was unreasonable assure maximum given possible accuracy. Second, LexisNexis the for Court finds collecting across the class period. that the disposition procedures information employed were by uniform Because part of the factual predicate 37 animating the the concerns raised inapplicable on appeal, in appellate the on decision by the remand. Fourth this point Circuit Contrary to on was and the method was uniform for the duration of evidence this Equifax's Equifax was for collecting are dispositions the class period. from which a jury could aware Soutter has determine that disposition information purchased, consistent, of is a the that the namely, was that not being or incorporated into consumer files in a adequate, credibility procedures point representations procedures employed by Equifax were unreasonable; collected, incorrect, judgment and judgment dispositions were not collected same manner, produced on or timely evidence and responsibility manner. the Weighing reasonableness reserved for jury. of the the At this stage, it is sufficient to find, as a fact, that, throughout the class period, entire Equifax employed uniform procedures affecting the class, and that a jury's decision regarding the reasonableness of these procedures will resolve an issue central to the class' Third, Soutter has narrowed the class to include only those individuals who inaccuracies furnished claim "in one stroke." respecting information consumer report. procedures submitted some an about form of entered the notice judgment judgment in to Equifax about before the Equifax form of a Thus, the common question is whether Equifax's or policies for handling 38 such inquiries and notice were reasonable. CSC Credit As the Seventh Circuit recognized in Henson v. Servs., prior when consideration consumer weighing the notice is an reasonableness of approach to ensuring "maximum possible accuracy." 280, 285 (7th reporting Cir. agency inaccurate is inaccurate.") Experian (N.D. not P [A] s liable a (emphasis Jan. added); Solutions, 9, 2014) Inc., law, FCRA for court's see the F. (allegations a CRA's credit reporting Judgment Docket, information may also 991 a See 29 F.3d of the from the consumer that Information Tex. matter under information obtained from a absent prior notice be 1994) important Shaunfield Supp. that 2d 786, credit v. 799 agency disseminated incorrect information after being notified of error raise a utilize reasonable inference reasonable that procedures agency to failed assure accuracy of information under 15 U.S.C.A. to adopt and maximum possible § 1681e(b)). Ensuring that consumer notice is appropriately incorporated into a CRA's procedures is critical, position than appearing in the because "[t]he consumer is in a better credit court reporting documents prior litigation history." dealing agency with to the detect errors consumer's own Henson, 29 F.3d at 286. The Court finds that Equifax has a system in place whereby it See uses codes supra procedures at for to 20. track A customer jury addressing or can inquiries and determine incorporating 39 communications. whether this Equifax's information before producing a consumer report were reasonable.9 common issue common that is capable of classwide That is a resolution through a answer. 9 The Court recognizes that this decision is at odds, to some extent, with the holdings in Swoager v. Credit Bureau of Greater St. Petersburg, 608 F. Supp. 972 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 15, 1985) and Grenier v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., 892 F. Supp. 57 (D. Conn. June 20, 1995). Those courts held that allowing a plaintiff to challenge "reinvestigation and grievance procedures" under § 1681e(b) would "engraft" a "redundant" duty onto § 1681e(b) decisions miss where one already exists under § 1681i. the mark for several reasons. First, Those this case does not involve "reinvestigation and grievance" procedures. The focus here is on the procedure for assuring maximum accuracy of the consumer report in the first instance. Second, the purpose of § 1681e(b) of an is to prevent the disclosure inaccurate consumer report. A "consumer report" is "any written, oral, or other communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer's credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living[.]" 15 USCA § 1681a(d)(l). The purpose of § 1681i, on the other hand, is to set forth dispute resolution procedures and reinvestigation duties after a consumer challenges the accuracy A "file" means "all of the information on of his or her file. that consumer recorded and retained by a consumer reporting agency regardless of how the information is stored." 15 USCA § 1681a(g). Although the Swoager court uses these terms interchangeably, the "file" actually represents the latent information stored by the CRA, whereas the "report" represents the prepared document furnished to a third party. As the Swoager court observed, "the standard of conduct imposed under § 1681i is 1681e(b)." lower than the standard 608 F. Supp. at 975. of conduct imposed under § This higher threshold reflects the higher consequences of publishing an inaccuracy to a third party. Third, the Swoager court believed that § 1681e(b) applied to the accuracy of the "initial compiled consumer credit report" before any dispute and found the higher standard of conduct appropriate because "where the only information available to the creditor is that initially compiled by the credit bureau, it is essential 40 In sum, the Court finds that Soutter has advanced three procedures applicable across class members that raise a common contention answers of on reasonableness a classwide that basis. can be resolved Therefore, with the common commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) is satisfied. Before proceeding to the question of willfulness, another "common question" will address posed by these procedures violate § 1681e(b)?" No. Wal-Mart 206). makes clear the Court Soutter: PL's Mem. at 21 that the question "Did (Docket whether a that the compilation procedures utilized ensure maximum possible accuracy." Id. As the court in Lazarre v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. noted, "the plain language of section 1681e(b) applies the maximum possible accuracy standard to every consumer report issued by a CRA," not just the first report. 780 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1336 n.4 This Court, (S.D. like Fla. the June 23, Lazarre 2011). court, also observes that the Swoager court hedged its position: Assuming arguendo a contrary result on the § 1681e(b) issue as to reinvestigation procedures, result. the As the Court would reach this set standard of forth above, conduct the under § same Court views 1681i to be slightly lower than under § 1681e(b). It necessarily follows that the failure to correct inaccuracies upon reinvestigation also constitutes a failure reasonable procedures possible accuracy. to to assure follow maximum Swoager, 608 F. Supp. at 976 n.4. Lastly, there may be situations where, as here, a consumer provides notice to a CRA before the derogatory information reaches her file. It is not unreasonable to expect this notice to have the effect of preventing an inaccurate report, and a jury could find the CRA's treatment of such information unreasonable as well. 41 defendant violated the law does not satisfy Rule 23(a)(2). Fourth Circuit agreed in Soutter II, proposed class do not be litigated violation the same at 265 498 F. of App'x holding that "members of a establish productively at legal that once,' provision (quoting ^their merely by procedures violate all challenged the procedures that same were § Here, 1681e(b)?" statute, by same S. however, In 2551 she asks "Did the claims but the specific policies and challenged all varied. Thus, the claims and superficial, in this case allege violation of the same statute in the same way. And level. in Wal-Mart, at Soutter does Wal-Mart, were tied together at an impermissibly general, Unlike a defendant." Ct. Rather, can alleging 131 not ask "Did Equifax violate § 1681e(b)?" these claims the Wal-Mart, (quotations and citation omitted)). The the putative class members the question, as phrased by Soutter, incorporates the specific, common procedures at issue above. To the extent that this question reaches a scope different than that discussed concerns must outlined above they did reports. under report § not now be cannot cause above, addressed the was requires inaccurate; F. her [and] 42 the violations inaccuracies 498 Equifax's because constitute See Soutter II, 1681e(b) however, in common of the App'x at 265 to prove (2) "causality" that § procedures 1681e(b) class if members' ("Soutter's claim (1) Equifax's her credit unreasonable procedures (emphasis added). Notwithstanding the addition of the causality element, the Court finds caused the question probative of the the common to inaccuracy") be a common one. the unreasonableness of evidence proving the The common evidence the procedures paired with inaccuracies themselves will constitute sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a jury could find a violation individualized proof of is § 1681e(b). necessary to Because find a no further, violation, the question is still one capable of classwide resolution. 3. Willfulness In addition reasonableness, willfulness well. to the Soutter under 15 questions contends U.S.C. § The Supreme Court has of that 1681n is inaccuracy the common and question the to of as class interpreted the phrase "willfully fails to comply," in 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a), to reach both knowing and reckless 57. A violations "reckless" unjustifiably high of the FCRA. violation risk of Both Soutter and is harm obvious that it should be known." Equifax See one that Id. cite is overstate not issue a as the common a importance issue matter of as law; a of rather, cases 43 of it either 551 U.S. entails known at "an or so at 68. their matter that is "willfulness" - writ large - either is or Both Safeco, to demonstrate isn't a common issue. citations. law is that or the an Willfulness individualized factual context of the was case that willful will in a impact or common, challenged determine manner whether with the defendant's individualized, discretionary generally applicable impact.10 behavior involves individual behavior Where the determinations or 10 Equifax circuitously cites to Soutter II for the proposition that "each class member must require[s] show willfulness, an individualized inquiry.'" which Gomez v. ^typically Kroll Factual Data, Inc., No. 13-CV-445, 2014 WL 1456530, at *4 (D. Colo. Apr. 14, 2014) (citing Soutter II, 498 F. App'x at 265). Such a statement would certainly help Equifax's case, if that's what Soutter II actually said. However, the original passage reads: In addition, Soutter to must recover show statutory willfulness. damages, Proof that Equifax's conduct was willful toward Soutter because she sent letters informing Equifax that the was dismissed will not in case advance advance against the her claims of other class members. These problems are exacerbated because Soutter is claiming only statutory damages, which typically require an individualized inquiry. Soutter II, 498 F. App'x at 265 (emphasis added). That passage, properly read, states that statutory damages "typically require an individualized inquiry," not willfulness. This Court holds no differently below. See infra at 48. The quoted passage in Soutter II could not possibly stand for the proposition that willfulness is individualized because the Court of Appeals relies upon a concurring opinion in Stillmock for support - a case that explicitly held that "where . . . the qualitatively overarching issue by far is the liability issue of the defendant's willfulness, . . . the individual statutory damages issues are insufficient to defeat class certification 23(b)(3)." Stillmock v. Weis Markets, 273 (4th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added). Inc., The Soutter's Fourth Circuit also observed that 385 under Rule F. App'x 267, letters would not advance the claims of other class members with respect to willfulness in Soutter II because such notice was not part of Nothing in Soutter II conveys the the prior class definition. idea that willfulness, as a general concept, is typically "individualized." 44 discretion, Where willfulness the challenged practice, or is likely behavior procedure to be takes with a the noncommon form generally at 305 (citing Stillmock, 385 F. a policy, applicable willfulness is likely to be a common issue. App'x of issue. impact, See Ealy, App'x at 514 F. 273) ("the qualitatively overarching issue by far is the [common] liability issue of the defendant's willfulness"); Dreher v. Solutions, Inc., WL (E.D. June Inc., 2007) Va. ("The 19, 2014); procedures readily 2014 Williams v. 2007 WL 2439463, Plaintiffs' these procedures, not 3:ll-CV-624, 3:06-CV-241, No. standard No. class violated 2800766, at at *6 (E.D. FCRA, & n.5 Mgmt. Va. charge and *3 Risk LexisNexis allegations the Experian Info. that, Aug. that in these adopting LexisNexis willfully violated the FCRA. apparent how an inquiry directed at 23, It is LexisNexis' state of mind in adopting standard procedures is affected by any particular case applied."). in which Soutter's those standard contention takes the procedures were form of the latter and poses common questions capable of classwide resolution. Based upon the common whether Equifax adopted conscious that doing substantially greater [of the law] The Court procedures above, (or declined to adopt) so "ran than the a risk risk that a reasonable 45 jury question Safeco, could is those procedures violating associated that was merely careless." finds of the with the a 551 U.S. come to law reading at 69. such a conclusion. jury With respect to the LexisNexis-Equifax contract, a could find that Equifax's conscious decision to categorically subject information about disposition of judgments to a different collection standard than information about imposition of the judgment inherently favors adverse information over that accurate are information alleged Similarly, here and to invites be in inaccuracies violation of of § the type 1681e(b). a jury could find that Equifax understood the risks associated information, with its its mode of purchasing collecting decisions, judgment and its disposition integration procedures and that, thusly aware, Equifax's conduct nonetheless "ran a risk of violating the law substantially greater than the risk associated careless." with Finally, a reading of the law that was merely a jury could find that Equifax's policy or procedure in handling consumer notices ran just such a risk as well.11 Of course, the fact that Equifax was on notice about potential problems before furnishing a consumer report speaks to Equifax's willfulness on at 265 11 The its own. (noting that the fact questions facing See Soutter II, [Soutter] the jury 4 98 F. App'x "sent letters to Equifax with respect to the reasonableness of the procedures and the presence of willfulness are closely related. If the jury finds that any of the were "unreasonable," the question then shifts to whether Equifax's adoption or use of those procedures was "objectively unreasonable" in light of its statutory obligations. See Safeco, 551 U.S. at 69. procedures 46 informing them of the possible inaccuracy before it occurred" bore upon "whether Equifax's behavior was willful"). Equifax review of class responds that it each alleged dispute member to determine to an individual letter received from a putative it is sufficient to place its conduct could be determined to Equifax is surely entitled to review the letters at issue to determine does not, upend the commonality of the willfulness inquiry. however, The common questions Equifax in if it was face high (any notice) accurate. on notice or not. This are whether the overarching policy employed by the unjustifiably notice" entitled whether Equifax on such notice that be willful. is Whether of risk "notice" of harm or (any notice) whether posed Equifax was an "on that the reports it was furnishing were not or not Equifax's policy or procedure regarding notice poses a risk rising to the level of willfulness is not affected by whether or not Equifax was on "more or less" notice on tone, tenor, or that any particular frequency of the occasion. individual Equifax either "knew" or "did not Neither does letters change know" the the fact that the accuracy of what it was reporting on or was about to report was in doubt. Once the threshold of "notice" is crossed Equifax's knowledge of, and procedures for, 47 at all, it is handling such notice that are implicated.12 across all class common contention In this case, common evidence applicable members and regarding drive the willfulness litigation will forward resolve by a common answers.13 4. Lastly, constitute Statutory Damages the a Court common examines issue. whether Soutter did statutory not damages explicitly raise 12 The class definition ties this threshold to Equifax's own dispute code records. In other words, Equifax is said to be "on notice" if its "records note receipt of a dispute" about the civil action or judgment. communication or If Equifax would like to contest the accuracy of its own dispute code records and internal determinations, it is entitled to do so. But this will only result in class members being excluded entirely because failure to provide notice would remove them from the class definition altogether. The question in this case is not whether an individual Equifax employee entrusted with some level of discretion willfully disregarded "dispute" information from any specific customer, but rather what Equifax does and knows once it receives such a communication. 13 It is worth noting that this holding would remain undisturbed even if individualized evidence were necessary to prove inaccuracy and, as a result, provide the circumstantial causal evidence necessary to show a violation under 1681e(b). This is because the question "Was Equifax's behavior willful?" can be answered on a classwide basis, even if the question "Is Equifax liable under § 1681n?" cannot. The latter depends upon a violation of § 1681e(b). The former simply requires showing that "Equifax's procedures - or again, lack thereof - entailed xan unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known [.]'" Soutter II, 498 F. App'x at 267 (Gregory, J., dissenting) (citing Safeco, 551 U.S. at 68). Neither the reasonableness of Equifax's procedures nor Equifax's perception of the risk posed by those procedures will in any way vary based on whether those procedures caused an inaccuracy in any particular application. 48 this as a common contention, but both parties debated the commonality of statutory damages in their briefing. As the Fourth Circuit observed in Soutter II, "statutory damages . . . typically require an individualized inquiry." F. App'x at 265. To support that point, the Court 498 of Appeals quoted Judge Wilkinson's concurring opinion in Stillmock for the proposition that, "because statutory damages are intended address harms that are small or difficult to quantify, about particular class members charged with this task." at 277 (Wilkinson, is Id. highly relevant (quoting Stillmock, to evidence to a 385 F. jury App'x J., concurring)). Even if statutory damages were based solely upon the number of inaccurate likely e.g., require as each an furnished, resolution Stillmock, damages with reports 385 F. on App'x individualized receipt printed a and this question member-by-member at 273 issue would basis. (approaching where plaintiffs See, statutory violations were still occurred "exposed to the same risk of harm every time the defendant violated the statute in [an] damages identical is manner"). Because the issue of statutory unlikely to be resolved on a classwide basis "in one stroke," it cannot constitute a point of commonality under Rule 23(a)(2). Whether individualized calculation of statutory damages, determinations, as the are sufficient to defeat class certification is reserved for Rule 23(b)(3). 49 such Although based upon three Soutter common has statutory inaccurate damages, contentions common answer: as failed to she capable demonstrate has of successfully classwide (1) whether class members' required by § commonality displayed resolution by consumer reports were 1681e(b); (2) whether Equifax's procedures were unreasonable as required by § 1681e(b); (2) and whether Equifax's actions were willful as required by § 1681n. Any of these contentions are sufficient to demonstrate class commonality under Rule 23(a)(2). D. Typicality While the numerosity and commonality prerequisites focus on the characteristics other, the of the typicality similarity of the class members prerequisite named in comparison to focuses representative's Inc., 782 F.2d language of the Rule, 468, 472 (5th therefore, legal the and general remedial See Jenkins v. Raymark theories to those of the proposed class. Indus., on each Cir. 1986). "In the the representative party may proceed to represent the class only if the plaintiff establishes that his defenses 461, claims of 467 (emphasis the class the (4th or class.'" Cir. omitted). and defenses Deiter 2006) The possess are ^typical v. (quoting class the of Microsoft Fed. R. the claims Corp., 436 Civ. P. or F.3d 23(a)(3)) representative "must be part same 50 interest and suffer the of same injury as the class members." quotation marks Falcon, 457 U.S. at 156 (internal omitted). The Fourth Circuit captured the necessary analysis best in Deiter, stating: The typicality requirement goes to the heart of a representative parties' ability to represent a class, particularly as it tends to merge with the commonality and adequacyof-representation requirements. The representative party's interest in prosecuting his own case must simultaneously tend to class advance the members. plaintiff's from the their claim claims claims interests For of that cannot absent will of the essential be so absent reason, different class members not be that advanced by plaintiff's proof of his own individual claim. That is not to say that typicality requires that the plaintiff's claim and the claims of class members be perfectly identical or perfectly aligned. But when the variation in claims strikes at the of the respective causes of actions, readily denied class certification. 436 F.3d at 466-67. In short, so go we have "[t]he essence of the typicality requirement is captured by the notion that the named plaintiff, heart the claims of 436 F.3d at 466 (quoting Broussard, ^as goes the claim of the class.'" Deiter, 155 F.3d at 340). This is the very reason that the Fourth Circuit emphasized that a plaintiff's arguments cannot be made at an "unacceptably general level." Soutter II, 498 F. App'x at 265 436 F.3d at 467). the If there are "meaningful differences" between representative's require Anew and (citing Dieter, claims and different the class proof,'" 51 claims then that "would "proving the representative's case would hardly prove a case on behalf of the class." Id. at 467, commonality and 468. On the other hand, begin typicality the concepts of when to "merge" the class representative's claims are "typical" in the same way the class claims are "common." It claims is not follow degrees the that these same legal specificity, of evidence enough than might persist and concepts theories a overlap. with markedly "substantial the concepts If gap" will different in fail the necessary to merge. Only when commonality and typicality merge both in legal theory and level of generality will the evidence proffered to advance the representative's claim serve to adequately advance the class claim. Without this nexus, the purposes of representation by class cannot be served. Thus, the Court's typicality comparison of the plaintiffs' the absent class members elements of plaintiffs' analysis "must those 467. facts The would Court also members." Id. the discussed claim The a claims or defenses with those of . . . begin [ning] with a review of the prima facie case and the facts on which the plaintiff would necessarily rely to prove it." F.3d at involve "then determine [s] prove Court above the will claims examine and 52 the of each evaluate extent the of the Deiter, 436 the to which absent class elements extent to of which Soutter's facts will tend to advance the claims of the putative class members accordingly. 1. One of Inaccuracy the elements in Soutter's inaccuracy of her consumer report. In order to prove this element, prima facie See Dalton, case is the 257 F.3d at 415. Soutter will put forth the OES data and testimony about it and Equifax's records to demonstrate the error in probing and Soutter the will other rely consumer relying words, to prove upon similarly "the reports common advance facts on furnished datasets the which to claims and will also help "prove the claims of the Equifax. prove of [Soutter] [inaccuracy]" - the OES by her her By claim, peers. would In necessarily Equifax databases - absent class members." Although Equifax's counsel argue that resort to the consumer's individual court records will be necessary to prove inaccuracy, it has offered no proof on why or how that is so. not really possible to analyze the Equifax For these reasons, the Court finds Thus, it is inaccuracy defense. Soutter's claim typical of the class claim with respect to inaccuracy. 2. Reasonableness of Procedures Proving Soutter's case will also require her to demonstrate that Equifax "did not follow maximum possible accuracy." reasonable Dalton, 257 procedures F.3d at 415. questions that Soutter aims to resolve are common to 53 to assure Here, the the class, and the proof upon which Soutter relies will advance her own claim as well as those of the class members. With respect already her the Equifax/LexisNexis produced has to the contract judgment governed and the disposition procedure governing information. for Agreement, the This collection of Soutter collection same of contract judgment and disposition information for every other class member. With judgment respect to LexisNexis' disposition procedures regarding information into information was Soutter debunked has procedures information the purchasing consumer files, collected the and by notion Equifax's and has uniform that collecting the decisions and incorporation Soutter a for shown method. the of this that such On collection procedures for disposition of judgments varied in any meaningful has tailored her class to a narrower time period remand, way and and set of courts to further ensure that her claim is typical of the class claim. was Simply stated, the record shows collected using a method that respects for the duration of was the that disposition data uniform in all material class period. decisions and procedures regarding the collection, incorporation class members. of this data were On the other side, therefore Equifax's purchase, applicable Equifax has made no to and all showing that its pertinent policies and procedures respecting collection of judgment disposition information have 54 varied over the class period.14 Thus, the analysis turns, at least on this record, on Soutter's proffered evidence. The proof offered by Soutter will resolve the questions regarding reasonableness of Equifax's procedures for her claim just as it resolves these questions for the class. Finally, her own policies Soutter's notice and general. will on for of the and Equifax's conflicting about Equifax's notices presenting procedures consumer treatment reasonableness handling eliciting By harmonizing focus procedures reasonableness evidence and of Equifax's inaccuracy proof for data of of about synthesizing inputs, in the and Soutter's evidence will advance the claims of each class member. Here, it seems, "ascertainability" Soutter is of her May not is argument where Equifax's belongs. Equifax even a member of the class, 2008 reached her file, inquiry, the but that, misplaced argues because anticipated at error had that the time not yet after her December 2008 inquiry, the error was removed within two days and no reports were furnished in the intervening time. "no 14 According to Equifax, action for Equifax to Equifax has proffered take" in occasional May there was simply 2008 instances because of Equifax LexisNexis "runners" receiving disposition information alongside judgment information, but this does not alter the inquiry into the reasonableness of Equifax's procedures or the fact that Soutter's evidence will advance this inquiry for the class. 55 could not remove a judgment that wasn't reporting in the first place. Def.'s Resp. at 20 (Docket No. 209). Equifax's final argument analysis, has it lacks superficial merit. appeal, It is, of but, course, in true the that typicality and adequacy demand that Soutter be a member of the class as defined.15 whether Equifax But the legally relevant question is not was put on notice before conflicting information reached its files, was on notice parties, a before it prepared, consumer report information and it substantial evidence how responded that, before to three consumer reports about Soutter, judgment jury against were to her so had been find, it dispatched the that Equifax after the but whether Equifax and containing or erroneous notice. to third judgment There furnished any of is the it was on notice that the set aside also could and dismissed. find that If a Equifax's 15 See Lienhart, 255 F.3d at 147 ("If [plaintiff] is not even a member of the class, her claims cannot be typical and she cannot be an adequate representative of the class."); Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 360 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 32-33 (1962)) ("It is axiomatic that the lead plaintiff must fit the class definition."). There is nothing typical about a plaintiff who does not meet the class definition. And, if a plaintiff is not typical, she cannot be adequate. See Newberg § 3:32 (citing In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1083 (6th Cir. 1996)) ("The typicality prerequisite overlaps with the Rule 23(a)(4) requirement that class representation be adequate, for Ain the absence of typical claims, the class representative has no incentive to pursue the claims of the other class members.'"). 56 procedures were unreasonable, whether the notice was characterized as preventative or corrective. Equifax's argument that Soutter is not a part of the class as defined, point. class raises an interesting, but ultimately unsuccessful, Although it is apparent from Soutter's briefing that the is meant to anticipatory notice Soutter's actual reach both and disputes, class individuals it definition is so not who at all provides. provided clear For that example, Soutter's third "definitional requirement" for the class is that "Equifax's from that records person note about receipt the of a communication accuracy of that civil action or judgment status." No. 206). Similarly, Equifax's PL's Mem. the time dispute reporting at 6 of (Docket Soutter's fourth definitional requirement refers to "the consumer dispute" laid out above. At or that Soutter first gave Id. notice to Equifax, however, Equifax did not have the judgment information on file and was not reporting the judgment. Because Soutter did not contact Equifax regarding "the accuracy of Equifax's reporting," she simply would not be part of the class as it is now defined. But the inartful word choice in proposing a class definition does not forfeit what is otherwise a legitimate class claim. briefing Based on the rather obvious and definitional argument, the requirement to Court will read: 57 intent as replace expressed in Soutter's "Equifax's records the third note receipt of a communication or dispute from that person about the status of a civil satisfied, appealed substitute the action "dispute" in or phrase or judgment vacated." "communication Soutter's was addition, In that the or dispute" fourth definitional dismissed, Court for will the requirement. word Quite clearly, Soutter fits within that definition of the class. Relatedly, Equifax argues that, can be expanded to include not just formally used in the as Plaintiff problem uses for is here, not that term, another, so the ^disputes' because i.e., then Plaintiff she has definition as that term is Def.'s Resp. at 22 n.7 the test, and the "that the plaintiff's has added traded yet to be Again, violation of § 1681e(b) consumer report. one another decided Typicality does not claim and the claims members be perfectly identical or perfectly aligned." 436 F.3d at 467. ^notice' (Docket No. 209). issue is "typicality," not "identicality." require class FCRA but to include this type of individualized issue." That "if of class Deiter, it is important to keep in mind that turns on the furnishing of an inaccurate Variation in the exact timing of a consumer's notice to Equifax does not "strike at the heart" of the cause of action, so long as that notice occurred before Equifax furnished the inaccurate party. common. consumer report of the Soutter and her compatriots, class member to a third of course, have this in Equifax has not shown how proof of notice as given by 58 Soutter would fail to advance claims for those class At present, members who provided notice at a later time. absent there do not appear to be any meaningful differences (or "substantial gaps") underlying legal in the types Equifax theories. of proof required or the was "on notice" before furnishing a credit report or it was not. 3. Willfulness Because FCRA was evidence Soutter willful, of alleges she will willfulness. willfulness, Soutter knowingly or intentionally must be 15 that "recklessly" (i.e., that committed act an in violation required U.S.C. show 551 unjustifiably Equifax's also See rights of the consumer"). Safeco, that of the put forth 1681n. § to To prove Equifax Equifax conscious acted either "knowingly disregard and for the See Dalton, 257 F.3d at 418; see also U.S. at 68 high risk of (taking harm actions that is entailing either known "an or so obvious that it should be known"). The question then is whether, outlined above, Soutter's as to the evidence will help common procedures demonstrate that Equifax was conscious that its procedures (or lack thereof) "ran a risk of violating the law substantially greater than the risk associated careless." with a Safeco, reading [of 551 at U.S. 59 the 69. law] The that Court was finds merely that a reasonable jury could come to such a conclusion based upon the proof that Soutter uses to advance her own claim. With respect to the LexisNexis-Equifax could find that Equifax's decision to collection of a different information a jury categorically subject the information about the disposition of judgments to collection collection contract, of standard judgment over than that information accurate information which applied prioritized and invited to adverse inaccuracies of the type alleged to be in violation of § 1681e(b). Soutter has put forth the contract that governed the collection of her information as well as that of her peers. Deposition testimony is her to class' the same effect. It is clear that is the evidence as well. Similarly, a jury could find that Equifax fully understood the risks associated with the procedure that for evidence the collection judgments, its of information purchasing of about services, it the and elected to use disposition its of integration procedures and decisions and that Equifax knowingly "ran a risk of violating the law substantially greater than the risk associated with a reading of the law that was merely careless." This information was collected in an essentially uniform fashion and the evidence overarching put procedures forth and by Soutter decisions 60 will reflect affecting the Equifax's class as a whole. As such, Soutter's evidence will advance her own cause while serving to prove the case for the class at large. Finally, procedures Equifax's reports a jury could regarding find consumer ran just such a Equifax's notices handling of Soutter's - that - or evidenced as policies by letter and subsequent consumer risk as well. As noted above, evidence of how Soutter's inquiries were handled will elucidate the procedure /policy class members. unjustifiably obvious able high that to If it (or lack thereof) the decision to use this risk should of and harm have demonstrate unreasonable that been that that that known, the that was was applied to procedure posed an either then known was applied or so will Soutter procedure willfulness all be willfully across class members. As discussed above, the fact of notice itself also stands as evidence of willfulness insofar as Equifax furnished consumer reports notwithstanding having prior notification of a potential inaccuracy. members In this regard, who, regarding by the Soutter is typical of all the class definition, status of provided their judgment Equifax with notice before a report was can no typicality issued. 4. As the Statutory Damages Court discussed above, where commonality is lacking. there Newberg § 3:31 61 be ("[A] finding of typicality Where logically a presupposes contention is not resolution by common answer, a finding itself of commonality."). amenable to classwide the plaintiff s evidence can serve only her claim alone. Even if statutory damages were to vary only by the number of reports speaks furnished, to the qualitative typicality. easy, formulaic predominance nature rather See, e.g., Stillmock, 385 F. than of the proof commonality and App'x at 273 (holding that common questions regarding liability outweighed "simple and straightforward" Court has statutory already available to found drive the commonality criterion, damage that calculations). there resolution is no Because "common answer" of this 48, see supra at element the under there can be no the finding of typicality. E. Adequacy The adequacy satisfied that prerequisite "the requires representative the parties Court be fairly will to and adequately protect the interests of the class," Fed. 23(a)(4), and that "class counsel [will] 23(a)(4) protect the seeks class to in ensure matters that the germane P. fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class," Fed. R. Civ. Rule R. Civ. named to the P. 23(g)(4). plaintiff claims in will the litigation, and it also looks to the personal characteristics of the plaintiff named to see whether 62 he or she is a fit representative. 591, 625-26 See Amchem Prods., (1997). "The Inc. premise v. Windsor, of a class action litigation by representative parties adjudicates all class members, so basic due process 521 U.S. is that the rights of requires that named plaintiffs possess undivided loyalties to absent class members." Broussard, 155 F.3d at 338. Whereas "typicality focuses on the similarities between the class representative's claims and those of the class, incentives . that . . might litigating the action, § adequacy influence focuses the on class evaluating the representative such as conflicts of interest." in Newberg 3:32. Rule class 23(g), on counsel. the other hand, the adequacy concerning "Although questions examines of the adequacy of class counsel were traditionally analyzed under the aegis of the adequate Federal 2003, representation Rules Civil Procedure, of those been governed by Rule 23(g)." 606 F.3d 130, Adv. of requirement 132 Note Comm. (3d Cir. (2003 2010); Amendment, Rule questions see also Fed. subdivision . scrutiny of . . the Rule proposed subdivision will guide counsel part of as 23(a)(4) the the class court will in the since Sorensen, P. 23(g) ("Until now, . . . under Rule continue to representative, assessing certification 63 R. Civ. (g) ) of have, See Sheinberg v. courts have scrutinized proposed class counsel 23(a)(4). 23(a)(4) call for while this proposed class decision."). But see DiFelice, 235 F.R.D. 23(a) under and Va. Jan. 17, appointing Inc. BearingPoint, at 79, 2006) 83 (finding class counsel adequate class counsel Sec. Litiq., 232 F.R.D. under 534, 23(g)); 541, in Soutter experienced, 545 (E.D. (same). With respect to the adequacy of class counsel, found In re I that "Soutter's counsel this Court is and able to conduct this litigation. qualified, Counsel is experienced in class action work, as well as consumer protection issues, and has been approved by this Court and others as class counsel in numerous cases." Soutter I, 2011 WL 1226025 at *10. This remains true today and, as before, Equifax does not contest Soutter's on counsel's adequacy. Based the record and the Court's familiarity with counsel's work in this case and others, the Court finds that class counsel will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class under Rule 23(g) (4) eligible for appointment under the requirements and is of Rule 23(g)(1)(A)(i) through (iv).16 As renews to its because the adequacy contention that she has waived of the class Soutter is any claims to representative, Equifax in conflict with the class actual damages. Because 16 Counsel has identified and investigated the possible claims; counsel is experienced in handling cases of this sort in this Court and across the country; counsel is highly knowledgeable in the applicable law and about CRAs generally and how they work; and counsel has devoted the necessary resources to this and other like cases. 64 Soutter has testified to sustaining actual damages but excludes such damages from her that she could be No. 209). a Dixie Nat. deemed adequate. conflict requirement, Equifax to put it plainly, But, "For claim, Athat Life of Def.'s Co., must 595 to be 2003)). class members liability defeat of F.3d defeat 164, common objectives 180 Inc., 35 the [the defendant]. . . . ." Id. (Docket adequacy Ward (4th 348 and the and have the same interest Moreover, the adequacy requirement hypothetical at Cir. same in a v. 2010) F.3d 417, "A conflict is not fundamental when share legal positions Resp. fundamental.'" (quoting Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., (4th Cir. it "inconceivable" "that dog won't hunt." interest conflict Ins. calls 430 . . . all factual and establishing the conflict will not if it is merely speculative or (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). This Court has subjected each Rule 23 factor to a rigorous analysis, but here the outcome remains the same. Court can putative based discern fundamental class members this record." on Soutter shares class, has liability, not no the the who same same may conflict wish Soutter I, factual assert 2011 and interest to in between WL legal Soutter actual 1226025, establishing "The and damages at positions new as *11. the Equifax's and is bound by her prior representations that she is asserting an actual damages 65 claim. Moreover, as the Court held previously, hypothetical putative and speculative prediction that there are numerous class this who Id. contention putative retain members claims." actual damage up "[t]he conflict alleged by Equifax rests on the class the Gunnells, members on 348 to wish individualized at and wish opt-out F.3d "who who are to claims not litigate substantial done nothing to shore remains true that litigate actual to Rule 23(c)(2). that putative . requiring (holding pursue inquiry" to it pursuant 431-32 to seek Equifax has remand, members right would . . "''jammed,' any damages See class ^sacrificed' more or 'caught' in any class action against their will" so long as they are permitted a right to opt out) Equifax argues that approved such a result." (brackets omitted). "Plaintiff cites no case that has Def.'s Resp. at 35 (Docket No. 209). Of course, Equifax cites no case that disapproves such a result, save a passing, Mart. unexplained, and irrelevant reference to Wal- But Wal-Mart does not help Equifax's position. Wal-Mart stands for the proposition that the class must contain a single common contention capable of class-wide resolution; it does not stand for the proposition that the class claim must be common in every single respect or that the plaintiff's claim be typical in every single respect. 23(b)(3) does Even the predominance inquiry under Rule not go so far. Moreover, while commonality and typicality reflect and serve the values underlying adequacy, the 66 adequacy inquiry itself the extent commonality that and focuses adequacy on conflicts typicality, it is clear interest. To the incorporates of dictates of Soutter has satisfied each that satisfied those requirements above. For the reasons set out above, Soutter has of the Rule 23(a) prerequisites for class certification. II. Rule 23(b) In order to also justify certification of satisfy one of the Rule 23(b) these requirements, important public economy and persons a certification purposes. efficiency, remedy if it In class is relief through the traditional damage actions.'" Moore et al., would situated, . . a addition "If a lawsuit meets class action to promoting also 'afford economically 348 F.3d at 424 to . uniformity cover of of sacrificing undesirable time, Rule "in which effort, decision as procedural results." Certification under Rule 23(b)(3) to to obtain individual 1999)). 23(b)(3). a and class 521 Rule action expense, persons fairness Amchem, judicial (citing 5 James Wm. under cases serves aggrieved feasible framework of multiple certification economies without other for intended achieve promote about is as Soutter must Moore's Federal Practice § 23.02 (3d ed. Soutter moves 23(b) (3) Gunnells, tests. actions not a class, or U.S. and similarly bringing at 615. is appropriate where the Court finds that questions of law or fact common to the members of the 67 class predominate over any questions members, and that a class action is methods for the controversy. A. individual superior to other available efficient adjudication of the Predominance 23(b)(3), "must questions the common questions predominate individual members." inquiry, and only See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Under Rule 23(a)(2) fair affecting over Amchem, any 521 U.S. found under Rule questions at 615. Whether predominate over individual questions distinct affecting only common "is a separate from the requirements found in Rule 23(a)." Ealy, 514 F. App'x at 305 (citing Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556). This requirement Comcast Corp. (2013), and v. is "even Behrend, "tests more demanding 569 U.S. whether than , 133 S. proposed classes Rule Ct. are 23(a)," 1426, 1432 sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation," Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623. This is not simply a matter of counting common versus noncommon questions and checking the final tally. 23(b) (3) 's commonality-predominance than quantitative." Gunnells, 348 F.3d Stillmock, at 429). test 385 In F. other is qualitative App'x words, at 272 Rule "Rule rather (citing 23(b)(3) "compares the quality of the common questions to those of the noncommon questions." Newberg § 3:27. If the "qualitatively overarching issue" in the litigation is common, a class may be certified notwithstanding the need to 68 resolve individualized ("Indeed, when if some common issues of See questions generally Ealy, is F. App'x required."). predominate find 514 the regarding predominance For App'x at 273 Systems, because Inc., class economies of 323 (citing Smilow v. F.3d 32, certification time, 305 40 in requirement effort, and then to be Stillmock, Southwestern Bell Mobile (1st such example, liability, satisfied even if individual damages issues remain." 385 F. at liability may still predominate even individualized inquiry "common courts issues. Cir. 2003)). cases expense, will and This still is "achieve promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural undesirable results." fairness Gunnells, or bringing 348 F.3d at 424 about other (citing Amchem, 521 U.S. at 615); see also id. at 426 ("Proving these issues in individual trials would require enormous redundancy of effort, including duplicative discovery, testimony by the same witnesses in potentially hundreds similar, these of actions, and even identical, recurring common legal issues and relitigation of many issues. will also Consolidation of conserve important judicial resources."). Equifax advances no discernible arguments distinguishing between the commonality and predominance inquiries. Rather than arguing that individualized issues would predominate even if the Court found some common issues, 69 Equifax merely asserts that because Rule 23(b)(3) then, a fortiori, poses a higher Soutter must fail. predominance arguments. Rule the members of the because "the most uniform conduct that class by systems; willfulness No. knowledge 206) . individualized predominate Equifax its (Docket of on Equifax is law its or over commonality fact common individual to issues significant issues in the case all pertain to procedures[;] the questions down 23(a)(2), That strategy does not work. observes doubling than In other words, addressing Soutter by bar The — and of uniform notice its Court questions its of the conduct." examines below to credit each weigh reporting defects PL's of Mem. the the in its at common quality 30 and and complexity of each issue. 1. Inaccuracy Determining inaccuracy constitutes a common question. supra at 29. Inaccuracy is a principal element of See the class claim and its commonality weighs in favor of class certification under the predominance inquiry. Even basis if for this the element claim, predominate since inaccuracy inquiry Although considered the a however, any to would be of factor form common conceivable existence negative failed part questions qualitatively 70 the the analysis, common would individualization individualized in of of still the insignificant. inquiries the weight are upon the scale inquiry. is greatly influenced by the difficulty clerical can be assistance, accomplished using objective criteria and computer - records, thus rendering unnecessary an evidentiary hearing on each claim.'" that Where, as here, is inaccurate, easily verifiable Regardless consumer of additional documents in a common manner across the class and is objectively would whether reports rest the could could common be issues determinable, only lightly comparison be deemed individualized - Newberg § the evaluation regards a single variable and "individualization" that the "Common issues will predominate if ^individual factual determinations 4:50. of proof deemed prevail alleged the scales. upon between OES individualized - such necessary, over any as this data or whether original Court individualized and court would ones in hold this action. Nor the do Court Equifax's examples otherwise. of First, "contrary" the Court holdings has found convince that the inaccuracy inquiry here is a common question to begin with for the reasons stated above. See supra at those cases inapplicable. Second, the Court must avoid drawing superficial similarities shortcuts inquiry in it did in in its this between rigorous case cases analysis. constituted an Owner-Operator, Farmer, 71 29. or That alone renders adopting Even if the categorical inaccuracy individualized question as and Gomez, it would not overwhelm the questions common to the class. Far from it. The Court has reviewed those cases and finds meaningful distinctions in each. In Owner-Operator, defendant the company violated the plaintiffs FCRA when alleged it 1187. This considerably by employment history, individual. Each by each sections. previous Id. employer Each See 537 F.3d understandably, individual background with different prior employers. contained the disseminated their employment histories with inaccurate information. at that had a varied different The form filled out seventeen section contained several different descriptors and some sections included an option for prior employers to provide short explanations. understandably, that the Id. Similarly, information in different of made certification. The the the inquiries case of in Farmer, sources, Appeals, quite individualized and necessary to inappropriate determine for class at 1194. the court observed that each consumer's jurisdictions. Court found that the question was nature "inaccuracy" Id. which report obtained came from a multitude of information See 285 F.R.D. at 702. the adverse from a number of "[I]n order to determine whether the source of a particular consumer's records was faulty or inaccurate . . . the court would need to determine the source of each piece of adverse information in a consumer's report and 72 then evaluate the discussed above, Finally, or of that source." of the 703. As individualized inaccuracy determinations citing the outcomes in Owner-Operator and Farmer as In addition, willfulness tipping at the court declined to weigh the quality precedent without any further analysis. *3. Id. that is not the case here. in Gomez, complexity altogether, quality to the the be Gomez an scales court - individualized further predominance criterion. in See 2014 WL 1456530, at unlike this question favor of See id. at *4. Court well, as - thereby denial found under the For the reasons stated above, willfulness does not pose an individualized question, see supra the at decisions 44, n.10, and the in Owner-Operator Court or does Farmer not find appropriately that inform the predominance analysis in this case on this record. As the Gomez court itself observed, a plaintiff does not fail the predominance inquiry simply based on the existence of some individualized 1456530, F.R.D. at 378, *3 issues (citing or Cook factual v. 388 (D. Colo. Oct. 8, inquiries. Rockwell 1993) Intern. See 2014 Corp., WL 151 ("[W]hen one or more of the central issues in the action are common to the class and can be said to predominate, under Rule 23(b)(3) be tried the action will be considered proper even though other important matters have to separately."). The Court does not believe inaccuracy inquiry here is an individualized one. 73 that the But even if it were, the determinations required in this case would simple, straightforward, qualitatively and objective. insignificant That question is the under the epitome of a predominance test. 2. Reasonableness of Procedures The most qualitatively significant question of Soutter's § 1681e(b) claim is whether Equifax's procedures were reasonable. For the reasons previously explained, the reasonableness of the procedures Equifax has chosen to employ to satisfy its duty to assure maximum possible accuracy is a common issue across the class. For its predominance argument, than rehash its commonality Equifax does nothing more argument about the alleged procedural differences between jurisdictions and reiterate that individualized issues predominate. contention that reasonableness The Court rejects Equifax's is an individual issue and, a fortiori, Equifax's related predominance position. A similar result obtains for the question of "whether these procedures violate § 1681e(b)?" be easier to prove for some It is true that causality may procedures (such as Equifax's procedures for handling notice or purchasing and incorporating disposition data) adopt tiered LexisNexis) . over others collection (such as thresholds Equifax's decision to in its contract with It is also true that Equifax may wish to challenge 74 causality None of common in more this elaborate changes evidence plaintiff to resorting to at the the and individualized fact that moment will inaccuracy circumstantially additional there is demonstrate complex or ways be at trial. sufficient proven for causality the without individualized proof. Perhaps this will not be enough for Soutter to prevail at trial. But, the question at class certification is not whether Soutter is likely to win; the question is whether the quality of the questions common to the class predominate over the quality of any individualized issues. Because economies of They undoubtedly do. certification time, of effort, the and class would expense, and easily "achieve promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness undesirable results," Gunnells, 521 U.S. at 615), the Court or bringing 348 F.3d at 424 finds that the about other (citing Amchem, common contentions raised by Soutter predominate. 3. Willfulness Willfulness - another common issue - is a similarly weighty qualitative Stillmock, question. "where, As as here, the the Fourth Circuit observed in qualitatively overarching issue by far is the liability issue of the defendant's willfulness, and the purported class members were exposed to the same risk of harm every time the defendant 75 violated the statute in the identical manner, the individual statutory damages issues are insufficient to defeat class certification under Rule 23(b)(3)." 385 F. App'x question at of 273. It willfulness is - clear here resolved that by the critical common proof predominates over the comparatively simple question of statutory damages. The Gomez w Court serves does as not believe proper that the guidance. The illfulness to be an individualized issue. at *4. That Stillmock, n.10, based claiming that willfulness Id. court "typically Neither case both its decision cases require [s] so holds. As stood an contrary Gomez decision court in found See 2014 WL 1456530, on Soutter for the and notion that individualized discussed above, II inquiry." see supra 44, Soutter II held that statutory damages, not willfulness, "typically require an individualized inquiry." 498 F. App'x at 265 (emphasis added). Wilkinson's concurrence quotation: "Because harms are that Similarly, the Gomez court cited to Judge in Stillmock, with the following statutory damages are intended to address small or difficult to quantify, evidence about particular class members is highly relevant to a jury charged with this Stillmock, (emphasis willfulness task." 385 F. added). is Gomez, App'x at Nothing 2014 277 in WL 1456530, (Wilkinson, either case at J., (citing concurring)) suggests an inherently individualized issue. 76 *4 Rather, that the primary lesson statutory Stillmock damages qualitatively was that determinations weighty See Stillmock, at 305 of common simple do not questions, such or 385 F. App'x at 273; formulaic outweigh as more willfulness. see also Ealy, 514 F. App'x (citing Gunnells for the proposition that "common issues of liability may still predominate even when some individualized inquiry Dreher, is required" and 2014 WL 2800766, questions involving citing Stillmock the award of statutory issue remained the question such, Court Soutter II in an example); at *2 ("[E]ven though Stillmock raised predominant this as relies finding upon that the damages, the of liability."). As lessons willfulness of is Stillmock and common - and above, the a qualitatively predominate - question. 4. Statutory Damages As a predictable consequence of the analysis Court finds that the question of statutory damages may be individualized but is minimally influential in the predominance analysis. As in Stillmock, constituted a violation, a violation. Stillmock, where each receipt issued here each report furnished constitutes 385 F. App'x at 273 ("Pragmatically, the only substantive difference between putative class members for purposes of affixing the statutory damages figure within the statutory damages range of $100 to $1,000 or in awarding punitive damages is the number of receipts received by a single 77 class member issue."). during And, statutory straightforward." determinations points. is only questions Unlike simply See Williams, seeking damages damages, a and months which could matter both spawn a of statutory "simple and subjective series at *7 of mini- heads counting damages, at finds the individualized, 2007 WL 2439463, punitive eighteen like the Stillmock court, Id. of this approximately this Court, individualized trials, the and data ("Plaintiffs are neither of which require a showing of individual harm."). "Rule 23 individual contains damage typicality, or with Gunnells, Comm. 348 Note suggestion determinations predominance, certification. actions no In fact, such or Rule (1966 otherwise 23 necessity commonality, class envisions class damage determinations." R. subdivision for forecloses explicitly (citing Fed. Amendment, the destroys individualized F.3d at 427-28 that Civ. P. (c)(4)) 23 Adv. for the proposition that Rule 23(c)(4) permits courts to certify a class with respect to particular issues and contemplates possible class adjudication of liability issues with "the members of the class . . . thereafter . . . required to come in individually and prove the amounts of their respective claims"). of the Soutter II to the Fourth Circuit's position on this contrary would consistent issue. 78 inexplicably deviate - albeit See Dreher, Any reading from largely unpublished - 2014 WL 2800766, at *3 ("Sautter's of individual previous of admonition Rule damages (Gunnell, 23(b)(3)'s common issue of to best that a district restates, Stillmock) court rather consider than and subsequent predominance issue revises, (Ealy) requirements."). its discussions "Because the liability predominates over the question of how apportion statutory damages, [the] proposed satisfies Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement." • Resolution the of the common * class Id. * issues of fact and law in this case in a single proceeding will not only promote the efficient adjudication of these matters, it will dispose of the case's most complex questions entirely. As suggested above, the most significant issues in the case pertain to uniform conduct by Equifax - its uniform credit reporting procedures; its knowledge and notice of the defects in its systems; and the willfulness of its conduct. damages pales contentions. In contrast, the individual inquiry into statutory in comparison to the more significant, common Even if inaccuracy could be deemed individualized - which this Court does not so hold - the questions would become quantitatively close, but the answer would remain qualitatively clear. 79 B. Superiority The superiority requirement necessitates a finding that use of a class action be "superior to other fairly and efficiently adjudicating the Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Superiority available methods controversy." "depends Fed. greatly on for R. the circumstances surrounding each case," but "requires the court to find that will be the objectives achieved." of the Stillmock, class-action 385 F. App'x procedure at 274 really (quoting Wright, Miller & Kane § 1779). The analysis under comparative one. procedures, if any, it." Id. alternatives The court facet must of Rule first 23(b)(3) "consider what is a other exist for disposing of the dispute before Next, to this the court determine must whether "compare Rule 23 the is possible sufficiently effective to justify the expenditure of the judicial time and energy that is necessary to adjudicate a class action and to assume the risk of prejudice to the rights of those who are not directly before the court." class "(1) mechanism is the interest truly Id. In determining whether the superior, the court concentrating manageability." consider in controlling individual prosecutions; the existence of other related litigation; of should the litigation Hewlett, factors set out in Fed. R. in 185 F.R.D. Civ. P. 80 (3) the at 220 23(b)(3)). (2) the desirability forum; and (4) (summarizing the Soutter argues provisions in meaningful (Docket majority Even the statutory damage FCRA of if a that number suits. of by rights claims fee-shifting to support PL's Soutter affected their and insufficient Moreover, individuals know are individual 206). of unlikely to Id. the number No. that at that claims Mem. the Equifax's have were been to any 31-33 vast practices violated arise, are at Soutter all. says, they would inefficiently relitigate the common questions before the Court and risk generating inconsistent outcomes on the same essential facts. Id. at 34. Equifax responds that the existence of a fee-shifting mechanism in the FCRA "precludes" a finding of superiority. In addition, Def.'s Resp. at 38-39 (Docket No. 209). Equifax suggests that courts should not certify "novel" claims absent a "track record" of trials. Soutter's view is correct. The Stillmock Id. at 39. court squarely and unambiguously addressed the issue of statutory damages and attorney's fees under the FCRA: [The Defendant's] argument is without merit. First, the low amount of statutory damages available means no big punitive damages award on individual plaintiff's the horizon, action thus making unattractive perspective. Second, an from a there is no reasoned basis to conclude that the fact that an individual plaintiff can recover attorney's damages of fees up in to addition $1,000 to will statutory result in enforcement of FCRA by individual actions of a scale comparable to the potential enforcement by way of class action. 81 385 F. App'x at 274. Notwithstanding Equifax's sundry citations to contrary holdings outside the Fourth Circuit, this Court is persuaded to follow in Stillmock's footsteps. Soutter is additionally correct to point out that "there is a strong where, presumption as here, favor of a finding of superiority" "the alternative to a class action is likely to be no action at all v. Home Loan Ctr., 2006). in for the majority of class members." Inc., 236 F.R.D. 387, 396 (N.D. 111. Cavin May 10, Because "the effect of class certification on collateral estoppel redounds to the benefit of" Equifax, one suspects that Equifax "resists certification in an attempt to keep Plaintiffs with relatively small claims out of court altogether - precisely the problem the class action mechanism was designed to address." Gunnells, 348 F.3d at 427. Moreover, the interest in personal control of the litigation is minimal in this context. See White v. Imperial Adjustment Corp., No. 99-CV-3804 2002 WL 1809084, at *14 (E.D. La. Aug. 6, 2002) aff'd in part, appeal dismissed in part and remanded, 75 F. App'x 972 (5th Cir. 2003) ("Where, as here, the focus of the proceeding will be the alleged course of conduct of the defendants in conscious disregard of the consumers' rights, the purpose of which is to determine whether statutory personally and punitive controlling damages the are litigation 82 due, is the interest small."). To in the extent any individual actual damages, The favors will 275. of in as consistency finality Furthermore, retain and and well of control, efficient because results, repose." or seek class giving Stillmock, adjudication certification [Equifax] 385 F. the App'x at even if just a fraction of the class members were to bring individual suits, issues to consistent certification "promote[] benefit wish the opt-out mechanism will be available. interest class does the adjudication of the common in a single proceeding would be more efficient than the separate adjudication of individual claims. See, e.g., White v. E-Loan, Inc., No. 05-CV-02080, 2006 WL 2411420, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2006). In closing its superiority argument, Equifax fires one last parting shot, arguing that "the novelty" of Soutter's theory "forecloses any finding of superiority." 39 (Docket No. 209). legal Def.'s Resp. at This court has engaged in just the kind of "searching inquiry into the viability of [the] theory" required in such situations, In re Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, finds claim Soutter's proceed. New Motor Vehicles 26 (1st Cir. supported by Canadian Exp. 2008), however, and sufficient evidence to Furthermore, the legal theory at issue is not novel. It relies, instead, on basic legal principles applied to a case- specific set of facts. That does not equate to a "novel legal theory." 83 Compared Soutter's case constitutes the a Court. 23(a) to any demonstrate Therefore, complies has alternatives, that superior means prerequisites Soutter available of having the with the satisfied and both prongs of requirements facts class-action adjudicating affirmatively demonstrated the the each mechanism claims of the of before four Rule the Rule 23(b)(3) that proposed class necessary the for this test, Court to certify her class. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION PLAINTIFF'S (Docket No. SECOND 205) AMENDED will be GRANTED. The Court appoints Leonard Anthony Bennett as class counsel and certifies a class meeting the following definition: All natural persons who meet every one of the following definitional requirements: 1. the computer database of the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia shows that the person was the defendant in a Virginia General District Court civil action or judgment; 2. the computer database of the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia shows that as of the date 20 days after the Court's certification of this class, the civil action or judgment was dismissed, satisfied, appealed, or vacated on or before April 1, 2009 ("the disposition date"); 3. Equifax's records note receipt of a communication or dispute from that person about the status of a civil action or judgment that was appealed or vacated; and 84 dismissed, satisfied, Equifax's records note that a credit report regarding the person was furnished to a third party who requested the credit report, other than for an employment purpose: (1) no earlier than February 17, 2008, (2) no later than February 21, 2013, (3) after the date that Equifax's records note its receipt of the consumer communication or dispute regarding the judgment status, and and at least thirty notation Equifax was to (4) after the disposition date (30) days before the judgment corrected report that (if it has been corrected) it was dismissed, by satisfied, appealed or vacated. It is so ORDERED. /s/ Robert E. Ufi Payne Senior United States District Judge Richmond, Virginia Date: April 1ST 2015 85
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