Nanry v. Berryhill, No. 2:2017cv00083 - Document 16 (E.D. Va. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER denying 8 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 9 Motion to Remand; granting 11 Motion for Summary Judgment; adopting Report and Recommendations re 13 Report and Recommendations.. See Order for details. Signed by District Judge Raymond A. Jackson on 07/12/2018. (Copies distributed as directed 7/12/18.) (jjon)
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Nanry v. Berryhill Doc. 16 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUL 12 2018 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Norfolk Division TERESA A. NANRY, Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:17-cv-83 V. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER This matter is currently before the Court on Teresa A. Nanry's ("Plaintiff') objections to the MagistrateJudge's Report and Recommendation ("R&R"). For the reasons set forth below, the R&R is ADOPTED, the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration's ("Defendant" or "Acting Commissioner") motion for summaryjudgment is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs motions for summary judgment and remand are DENIED. I. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DID") and SupplementalSecurity Income on January 31,2013, and February 15,2013, respectively, and alleged that due to post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"), anxiety, depression, and other back related problems, she became disabled on November 30,2012. R. 294-308,367. The Acting Commissioner denied Plaintiffs application first, and again after reconsideration. R.90-153,208-09. At Plaintiffs request, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") held a hearing on this matter on March 9,2015, and again denied the benefits. R. 64-89,154-66. The case was further appealed and on July 15,2015, the Appeals Council vacated the ALJ's decision and remanded the case. R.173-75. The ALJ was directed to "[g]ive further consideration to the claimant's maximum mental residual functional 1 Dockets.Justia.com capacity andprovide appropriate rationale with specific references to evidence of record in support of the assessed limitations " Id. After a second hearing, the ALJ denied PlaintifTsclaim for benefitson December 18, 2015. R. 22-37. On January 6, 2017, the Appeals Council denied PlaintifFs request to review the decision, thereby making the ALJ's rulingthe final decision of the Acting Commissioner. R. 1-6. On February 8,2017, Plaintiff, through counsel, filed a complaint seeking the Court's review of the AU's decision. ECF No. 1. The Acting Commissionerfiled an Answer on June 8,2017. ECF No. 4. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and a Motion to Remand on July 7,2017, and Defendant filed a response in oppositionand its own motion for summaryjudgment on August 7,2017. ECF Nos. 8-12. On January 31,2018, a United States MagistrateJudge filed an R«&R, and recommended that Plaintiffs Motions for Summary Judgment and Remand be denied and Defendant's Motion for Sunmiary Judgment be granted. ECF No. 13. On February 14,2018, Plaintiff filed Objections to the R&R. ECF No. 14. On February 26, 2018, Defendant filed a response in opposition to the objections. ECF No. 15. This matter is now ripe for disposition and does not require a hearing. 11. STANDARD OF REVIEW A district judge is required to "determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly objected to." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). The "de novo" requirement means that a district court judge must give "fresh consideration to those issues [in the R&R] to which specific objection has been made by a party." United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 675 (1980); see Wilmer v. Cook, 774 F.2d 68, 73 (4th Cir. 1985) ("[A]ny individual findings of fact or recommendations for disposition by the [Magistrate Judge], if objected to, are subject to final de novo determination on such objections by a district judge "). "The districtjudge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). A district court reviewing an administrativedecision under the Social Security Act must determine whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and were reached through applicationof the correct legal standard. Craig v. Chafer, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996)(superseded by statute on other grounds). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," and "consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than preponderance." Id. (internal quotation and citations omitted). In reviewing for substantial evidence, the Court does not re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner or the Commissioner's designate. Id. The ALJ's findings as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). III. DISCUSSION Plaintiff raises two objections to the R&R: 1) the ALJ failed to properly weigh the medical opinion evidence; and 2) the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Plaintiffs credibility. ECF No. 14. After a full review of the record and the parties' briefs, the Court, having given fresh consideration to the Magistrate Judge's findings, holds that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, for that reason and additional reasons discussed below, the Court ADOPTS the R&R. 1. Medical Opinion Evidence Plaintiff first objects to the Magistrate Judge's finding that the ALJ did not err when it rejected the opinions from treating physicians Dr. Bryan and Dr. Zane regarding her mental impairments. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of psychiatrist Dr. Bryan and psychologist Dr. Zane, while giving too much weight to the opinion of non-examining state agency mental health experts. See ECF Nos. 14 at 2-6; see also. No. 10 at 12-17. The Social Security Administration ("SSA") follows a five-step analysis in determining disability claims and considers whether the claimant is: (1): engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) suffers from a medicallysevere impairment; (3) the impairmentmeets or medically equals one of the SSA's listed impairments; (4) the impairment prevents performance of any past relevant work in light of the residual functional capacity ("RFC")'; and (5) if the claimant can perform any other work considering his orher RFC, age, education, and work experience. See 20 C.F.R. § § 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). In making the determination of a claimant's RFC, all relevant medical and other evidence should be considered. Id. at §§ 404.1545(a), 404.1527(a)(1). Moreover, controlling weightwill be given to a treating doctor's opinion so long as the opinion is "not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record " 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). However, even where the treating doctor's opinion is not given controlling weight, the opinion is still entitled to deference and must be weighed using all of the factors provided by the regulations. Id. The weighing factors are: 1) the examiningrelationship, giving more weight to a source that examined the claimant; 2) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship; 3) the supportability of the opinion with evidence; 4) the consistency with the rest of the record; 5) specializationof the doctor; and 6) any other factors which tend to support or contradict the opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(l)-(6); 20 C.F.R. § 4l6.927(c)(l)-(6). Having carefully reviewed the record, the Court rejects PlaintifTs argument that the AU failed to properly weigh the medical opinion evidence. First, the Court finds that the record supports the ALJ's decision not to give controlling weight to treating providers Drs. Bryan and Zane. Here, the ALJ considered all the relevant evidence together and found that their opinions were either inconsistent with their own examination findings or the overall evidence of record. See R.30-35. Finding that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence, the Court ends its inquiry here as precedent dictates that the Court does not re-weigh conflicting evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ, so long as the ALJ's findings are supported by "substantial evidence" and are reached through application of the correct legal standard. See Craig, 76 F.3d at 589 (holding that in reviewing for substantial evidence, the Court does not re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner or the Commissioner's designate such as an ALJ). ' Aclaimant's RFC refers to the maximum ability to work despite his or herlimitations. See 20C.F.R. § 404.1545,416.945. 4 Second, the Court finds that after correctly deciding not to givecontrolling weightto these opinions, the ALJ gave consideration of these opinions in accordance with the appropriate legal standard. Here, afterdetermining that controlling weight was not appropriate, the ALJ still gavethe opinions of Dr. Bryan and Zane appropriate deferenceand consideration in accordance with the factors provided in 20 CFR 404.1527 (c) and 416.927 (c). First, the ALJ explained the weight assigned to the medical opinion as required and indicated that it gave "little weight" to Dr. Bryan's and Dr. Zane's opinions. See Gordon v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted) (discussing that a court cannot determine if fmdings are unsupported by substantial evidence unless the hearing officer explicitly indicates the weight given to all relevant evidence); R. 34. Moreover, the ALJ also provided ample explanation to justify its conclusion. For example, with respect to Dr. Bryan, the ALJ gave the opinions little weight because they were inconsistent with Dr. Bryan's own findings. Id. Likewise, the ALJ gave Dr. Zane's opinion little weight, because it was inconsistent with the overall evidence of the record. Id. In addition, although the ALJ did not specifically recite each factor verbatim, the Court finds sufficient evidence demonstrating that the ALJ evaluated and considered the medical opinion evidence of these physicians. For example, the ALJ discussed Dr. Zane's treatment relationship with Plaintiff including initial intake examination notes, the medical source statement, and the results of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory ("MMPI") test ofadult personality and psychopathology. Id\ 541-46. Similarly, the ALJ also discussed Dr. Bryan's background and credentials, the extent of the treating relationship, and his treatment records and source statements from 2013 through 2015. R.28 -30,32-34. Moreover, the ALJ also considered and ultimately accepted some or all of Dr. Bryan's and Dr. Zane's diagnoses and recommended courses of action relating to Plaintiffs: depression, anxiety, PTSD and attention deficit disorder; daily activity capacity; and improvement and capacity to return to work. R. 2830,35, 511, 513-18,561,602-05. In sum, the Court finds that the ALJ applied the correct legal standard. Here, the ALJ indicated the weight it gave to the treating physicians' opinions and also provided ample justification supporting the decision. The ALJ also appropriately weighed the opinion evidence in accordance with the legal standard and the findings were supported bysubstantial evidence.^ 2. Plaintiffs Credibility Plaintiffs secondobjection is that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Plaintiffs credibility. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by finding that Plaintiffs testimony concerning her impairments was not credible. "The determination of whether a person is disabled by pain or other symptoms is a two-step process. First, there must be objectivemedicalevidence showing 'the existenceof a medical impairment(s)... whichcould reasonably be expectedto produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.^ " Craig, 76 F.3d at 594 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.929(b) & 404.1529(b)) (emphasis in original). "At this stage of the inquiry, the pain claimed is not directly at issue; the focus is instead on establishing a determinable underlying impairment... which could reasonably be expected to be the cause of the disabling pain asserted by the claimant." Id. Plaintiff has established that such impairment exists in this case. In the second step of this determination process, "the intensity and persistence of the claimant's pain, and the extent to which it affects her ability to work, must be evaluated." Id. at 595. "[T]his evaluation must take into account not only the claimant's statements about her pain, but also 'all the available evidence,' including the claimant's medical history, medical signs, and laboratory findings; any objective medical evidence of pain ...; and any other evidence relevant to the severity of the impairment, such as evidence of the claimant's daily activities, specific descriptions of the pain, and any medical treatment taken to alleviate it." Id. Further, "[a]lthough a claimant's allegations about her pain may not be discredited solely because they are not substantiated by objective evidence of the pain itself or its severity, they need not be accepted to the extent they are inconsistent with the available evidence. ^The Court also finds that the ALJ properly weighed the testimony of the non-examining state officials because there was sufficient evidence to support their findings. See Kyle v. Cohen, 449 F.2d 489,492 (4th Cir.1971 (holding that testimony of a non-examiningphysician can be relied upon when it is consistent with the record). 6 including objective evidence of the underlying impairment, and the extent to which that impairment can reasonablybe expected to cause the pain the claimant alleges she suffers." Id. Here,the ALJ determined that Plaintiffs testimony about her impairments was not credible because hercharacterization of the symptoms wasinconsistent withthe "objective medical evidence" in the record and with Plaintiffs own descriptions of tasks she was able to perform. R. 31-34. The Court finds that the AU's decision is supported by the substantial evidence and it was reached through the application of the correctlegalstandard. Further, the determination is explained sufficiently in the ALJ's decision. Therefore, the Court must defer to the AU's decisionand will not re-weigh conflicting evidence,makecredibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ, and thus Plaintiffs argument fails. IV. CONCLUSION This Court has independently reviewed the record in this case and the objections to the R&R. Having done so, the Court finds that there is no meritorious reason to sustain Plaintiffs objections. Af^er careful review of the R&R, the Court does hereby ACCEPT and ADOPT the findings and recommendations set forth in the report of the United States Magistrate Judge filed on January 31,2018. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and Plaintiffs motions for summaryjudgment and remand are both DENIED. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to provide a copy of this Order to the parties. IT IS SO ORDERED. Norfolk, Virginia ^ ^—• July2018 Raymond A.Jackson United Slates
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