Crump v. Tcoombs & Associates, LLC, trading as TCAssociates et al, No. 2:2013cv00707 - Document 381 (E.D. Va. 2017)

Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER: granting 340 Motion for Attorney Fees; granting 372 Motion for Attorney Fees. Having performed the required "lodestar analysis," having considered all of the Johnson factors. Barber, 577 F.2d at 226n.28, and having adjusted the lodestar figure to reflect the "degree of success achieved" by Plaintiff, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees and litigation expenses and Plaintiff's motion for supplemental attorney's fe es. ECF No. 340; ECF No. 372. After making a downward adjustment to the total hours requested by Plaintiff and adjusting for Plaintiff's overall success, the Court hereby AWARDS attorney's fees toPlaintiff in the amount of $493,721.72. Such total figure represents a fee of $461,873.02 to Sullivan Legal Group, Plaintiff's counsel, and a fee of $31,848.70 to Mr. Pearline, Plaintiff's co-counsel. Copy of Opinion and Order provided to all counsel of record. Signed by District Judge Mark S. Davis on 3/27/2017. (bgra)

Download PDF

Crump v. Tcoombs & Associates, LLC, trading as TCAssociates et al Doc. 381 FILED tJNITED STATES DISTRICT COtJRT MAR 272017 EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Norfolk Division CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COUKI NORFni K. VA SUMMER CRUMP, Plaintiff, Civil Action No. V. 2:13cv707 UNITED STATES DEPT OF NAVY, by and through RAY MABUS, SECRETARY OF DEPT OP NAVY, Defendant. OPINION AND This matter Plaintiff, and Summer seeking motions is are before Crump, supplemental filed the ORDER Court on motions seeking attorney's attorney's pursuant to 29 fees, fees, ECF U.S.C. § filed by ECF No. 340, 372. Such No. 794a(b}, and are predicated on Plaintiff's success in obtaining a jury verdict in her favor Defendant, a and the Court's subsequent grant United States Department of Navy of back ("the Navy"), pay. filed responsive brief acknowledging that Plaintiff may be eligible as a prevailing party to seek attorney's fees, the Court but arguing that should nevertheless not award her any attorney's due to her minimal recovery in the instant case. For the reasons attorney's fees discussed below. Plaintiff's ECF No. motion fees 361. seeking and motion seeking supplemental attorney's fees Dockets.Justia.com are GRANTED, but the amount of such award is less than Plaintiff seeks. I. Factual and Procedural Background Plaintiff hearing suffers loss, and from has bilateral utilized approximately fifteen years. No. 368 Order ("Nov. 2, ECF omitted). No. After became a With 2016 30, see also {"Sept. obtaining cochlear Nov. Order") 337 profound 2016 assistance generally able to of hear her and Sept. LLC Id. In providing employed the purposes of of 1973. these Plaintiff, determining and Op. citations implants. Plaintiff Nov. cochlear speak 2016 implants. without Order at Plaintiff further 2. was assistance. LLC and TCMP Health to begin providing physician 2010 at the Navy's Sewells contract between TCA and the Navy. services, as 2016 8, ECF cochlear such (collectively "TCA") pursuant to a Order 2, (internal extender services on or about June 3, Point Clinic, for Op.") Plaintiff was hired by TCoombs & Associates, Services, implants 2016 Mem. licensed physician assistant. the sensorineural this TCA Court liability under I ^ (citing Sept. 22, and the Navy previously the jointly found, for Rehabilitation Act 2015 Op. and Order, ECF No. 183 ("Sept. 2015 Op.")). ^ These facts are essentially a re-statement Court's Memorandum Order of November 30, 2016. of those ECF No. 368. summarized in the Plaintiff left her position at Sewells Point Clinic, on unpaid leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act {"FMIjA")i to have cochlear implant revision surgery on or about April 26, 2011, after she began experiencing significant hearing deficits. Id. {citing Sept. 2016 Op. at 4). As of July 2011, Plaintiff's full hearing capabilities had not yet returned. W. therefore successful returning noise requested to levels work an at Sewells and use teletype service) accommodation of a Point video to be Clinic, Plaintiff including relay service reduced (rather for communication on the telephone. in than a W. at 3. At the most basic level of description, with a teletype service, also referred to communications as a TTY, assistant a hearing ("CA") who impaired person calls then calls the a recipient, and communications are typed by the hearing impaired person and spoken by the communications CA. With between a video the relay hearing service interpreter are signed, using American Sign Language way of a video monitor, the person impaired ("VRS")/ and ("ASL"), by and the hearing impaired person can use her own voice and utilize any residual hearing capacity to hear the voice of the hearing person. TTY, June Plaintiff sought a VRS, not a She began seeking such accommodation and return to work in 2011. M. Plaintiff believed been approved by the that Navy her request in August 2011, for a but videophone had also understood she could not installed. return Id. Agreed Ex. involving 300, 55, As Navy. for Id. contended relayed in at and 4 was videophone in the had been ECF No. 22-23, 334; Trial Tr. of 7, numerous and not 2011, (citing it of because October October through one 332; compatibility accommodation that Plaintiff, such lack Court's challenges of accomplished ECF No. effective by October September 8, 2016 after Plaintiff communicated with TCA and the August accommodation, requests But, explained Opinion and Order, between until ECF No. installation Id. Navy 308, 30). technology communication, 2011. work (citing Excerpts Trial Tr. Excerpts Trial Tr. 358; to on TCA, these a form that offers, Navy's Opening Br. 6-7, Op. at her to her 6-7). December involving ECF No. for submitted again request the the Navy offers 16, to 2011, Virginia to Plaintiff. 348). by The accommodation on Service that works with TTY phones, her provided 2016 several and about Plaintiff Sept. relayed 2011 Id. TCA Relay (citing The Navy contended that this was an offer of TTY at the Military Acute Care Department ("MACD") clinic, Plaintiff email and responded from TCA was that by not it was asserting a formal a reasonable that the accommodation. December accommodation offer 16, 2011 because it did not comply with Navy procedures and i t did not come from an authorized decision-maker. ECF No. 359). Moreover, Id. (citing Pl.'s Resp. Plaintiff contended that Br. she 15-16, still believed in December 2011 that 2011 to provide her with a VRS, such arrangements, that the Navy had agreed in August that the Navy was trying to make the December 16, 2011 email was not a withdrawal of that August 2011 offer, and that the Navy just had not finalized the provision of the offered VRS. contended that a reasonable juror could conclude that the Navy did not offer TTY until June 15, May 24, 2012 offering a official TTY, accommodation requested. if the offer, Plaintiff 2012, when Plaintiff received a letter from an authorized decision-maker and also offering as an additional/alternative a specific M. at December 5. 16, i t was not a model of Moreover, 2011 videophone she had earlier Plaintiff contended that even email was an actual reasonable accommodation. accommodation Id. After further communication from December 2011 through July 2012, was and with no notification installed July 27, August 2012, 9, began to functional. an agreed-upon videophone Plaintiff resigned from TCA on and communicated her resignation to the Navy on 2012, accommodation. was unable and that Id. formally rejecting {citing Sept. the 2016 Op. to return to work at Sewells seek work elsewhere. Sept. Navy's at 10) . Point 2016 Op. time that she communicated her resignation to TCA, of While she Clinic, at offer 11. Plaintiff At the Plaintiff had already begun working at other medical facilities and continued doing so after her resignation from TCA. Id. at 11-15. On and December the Navy accommodate Plaintiff lost sought compel to provide morning that and the for loss requested issues to pain of damages, trial injunctive future of life. relief to began, Nov. and Id. February 16, 2016 Order at 5 to [and] reasonable fees interest. 1. suffering, enjoyment defendant/ joint employer TCA settled with Plaintiff, Navy as the sole defendant. No. wages, and attorney's TCA reasonably ECF lost related post-judgement jury failure against "more responsive processes, on punitive pre-judgment and suit Compl., emotional also institute training alleged damages anguish, Plaintiff the Navy to brought disability. benefits, mental accommodations," and their compensatory and 15. Plaintiff upon Plaintiff's earnings at 2013, based inconvenience, Id. 19, costs, On the 2016, co- leaving the (citing Trial Min., ECF No. 304; Stipulation of Dismissal, ECF No. 18). Following verdict a two-week in Plaintiff's provide Plaintiff a jury favor, trial, finding reasonable the conclusion of that jury the Verdict Form, trial, returned the Navy failed accommodation, Plaintiff no compensatory damages. Following the the but to awarded ECF No. Court a 314. heard additional evidence on Plaintiff's request for equitable relief. On September 8, fully briefed, 2016, the after the Court issue of equitable relief was issued an Opinion and Order awarding back pay damages to Plaintiff in the amount of $4 0,842.42 plus pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. (internal citations omitted). Court 338. ECF entered the jury's verdict, same day, J. Plaintiff thereafter filed a No. 340, and, following the in a a motion for at 80 supplemental id. Civ. at 81, Case, and ECF No. motion for attorney's fees, Court's motion for judgment as a matter of law, filed 2016 Op. The Court requested the Clerk of to enter judgment on the judgment was Sept. ruling ECF No. attorney's on the 3 68, fees, Navy's Plaintiff ECF No. 372. Having been fully briefed, this issue is ripe for review. II. Standard for Attorney's Fee Award A. Traditionally, lawsuit bears Entitlement to Fee Award under the its own "American Rule," attorney's explicitly authorizes otherwise. 424, the 429 (1983). Hensley v. The instant civil Rehabilitation Act of fees 1973, seeking to remedy an alleged failure Plaintiff's authorized medical courts to disability. award unless a statute Eckerhart, 461 U.S. case was 29 U.S.C. filed pursuant to § 791, reasonable H 1. in this case, (holding that a least some Farrar v. Hobby, "prevailing party" relief on the merits 7 sag., attorney's Congress fees see 29 U.S.C. and it is undisputed that Plaintiff qualifies as a party" efc to reasonably accommodate Compl. "prevailing party" under this statute, each party in a 506 U.S. 103, to the § 794a(b), "prevailing 111 (1992) is one who has obtained "at of his claim" such that the legal relationship between the parties has changed);^ Def.'s Resp. Br. 6, ECF No. 361 ("The Navy does not dispute Plaintiff's formal status as a prevailing party."). Because Plaintiff qualifies for reasonable attorney's fees as a prevailing party, the Court must determine what a in this case. B. 29 U.S.C. § "reasonable attorney's fee" is 794a. Calculation of "Reasonable" The Fourth Circuit has outlined a Pee Award three step framework for calculating a reasonable attorney's fee: First, the court must "determine the lodestar figure by multiplying the number of reasonable hours expended times a reasonable rate," Servs., LLC, 560 F.3d 235, ascertain what is Robinson v. Equifax Info. 243 (4th Cir. 2009). To reasonable in terms of hours expended and the rate charged, the court is bound to apply the factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 {5th Cir. 1974). Id. at 243-44. Next, the court must "subtract fees for hours spent on unsuccessful claims unrelated to successful ones." Id. at 244. Finally, the court should award "some percentage of the remaining amount, depending on the degree of success enjoyed by the plaintiff." Id. McAfee (Jan. v. 23, Boczar, 2014) 738 F.3d 81, 88 (4th Cir. 2013), as amended (footnote omitted). ' The Court notes that many of the cases cited throughout this Opinion and Order analyze statutes authorizing attorney's fees in contexts different from the instant case. However, the United States Supreme Court has noted that the same legal standards for attorney's fee awards are "generally applicable in all cases in which Congress has authorized an award of fees to a 'prevailing party.'" Hensley, 461 U.S. at 455 n.7; Brinn v. Tidewater Transp. Dist. Comm'n, 242 F.3d 227, 234 (4th Cir. 2001) {"Because of the scarcity of case law interpreting . . . § 794a(b), courts faced with the task have relied on the body of law interpreting federal civil rights attorney's fees provisions."). 8 The calculation of a lodestar figure is "[t]he most useful starting point for determining the amount of a because it "provides an objective basis on reasonable fee," which to make an initial estimate of the value of a lawyer's services." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; 559 U.S. 542, (2010) 551 guiding light of see Perdue v. proving the . . . fee-shifting attorney's Winn, own jurisprudence") (quotation The fee applicant bears the burden reasonableness requested hourly rates, the ex rel. (characterizing the lodestar calculation as "the marks and citation omitted). of Kenny A. of the hours expended which generally requires affidavit and timesheets and the submission of as well as "'satisfactory specific evidence of the prevailing market rates in the relevant community for the type of work for which attorney] seeks an award.'" F.3d 313, 321 273, (4th Cir. 1990)). determine both 277 order to (4th Cir. 2008) number of hours expended, following twelve factors (1) a Grissom v. The Mills (quoting Plyler v. In evaluating reasonable rate Corp., Evatt, the and 549 902 F.2d submissions a [the in reasonable the lodestar analysis is guided by the (the "Johnson factors"): the time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised; (3) the skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered; (4) the attorney's opportunity costs in pressing the instant litigation; (5) the customary fee for like work; (6) the attorney's expectations at the outset of the litigation; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount in controversy and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case within the legal community in which the suit arose; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship between attorney and client; and (12) attorneys' fees awards in similar cases. Barber v. Kimbrell's 1978) (adopting the Inc., 577 twelve F.2d 216, factors 226 n.28 identified by Circuit in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express Inc., (1974)); cf. objective Perdue, lodestar approach outlined 559 U.S. approach at is in Johnson, 550-52 to failing Cir. the Fifth 488 F.2d 714 (explaining superior but (4th the to hold why the subjective that it is improper to be informed by the Johnson factors when performing a lodestar analysis). Court of Appeals be guided by figure, "to already been factor(s) precedent of the United States for the Fourth Circuit requires this Court to the the Because Johnson extent factors that incorporated should not later into be determining of any in the the Johnson lodestar considered a the lodestar factors analysis," second time has such to make an upward or downward adjustment to the lodestar figure because doing so would "inappropriately weigh" such factor. F.3d a t 738 91. The second step in the the McAfee, Court to exclude unsuccessful claims Robinson v. Equifax fee fees calculation procedure requires for counsel's that are unrelated to Info. Servs., 10 LLC, the 560 time spent successful F.3d 235, on claims. 244 (4th Cir, 2009) ; see Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435 ("The congressional intent to limit awards to prevailing parties requires that . [unrelated claims based on different facts and legal . . theories] be treated as if they had been raised in separate lawsuits, and therefore no fee may be awarded for services on the unsuccessful claim[s]."). The Supreme Court has recognized that " [i]t may well be that cases involving such unrelated claims are unlikely to arise with great frequency," because "[m]any civil rights cases will present only a single claim," and in other cases, claims related "will involve legal a common theories." latter circumstance, core of Hensley, "[m]uch of facts 461 U.S. counsel's generally to the litigation as a whole, or will at time be 435. will based on In be the such devoted making it difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis," with the nature of the lawsuit precluding series of discrete claims." it from being "viewed as a Id. The third and final step, after a lodestar calculation has been made and any unsuccessful efforts on unrelated claims have been excluded, requires the Court to award "'some percentage of the remaining amount, depending on the degree of success enjoyed by the plaintiff.'" V. City of Aiken, Grissom, 278 549 F.3d at 321 F.3d 333, 337 (4th Cir. (quoting Johnson 2002)). It is appropriate for the Court to reduce an award at this third step of the analysis if "'the relief, however significant, 11 is limited in comparison McAfee. 738 "What the level of the F.3d at scope 92 success that basis 461 U.S. of the litigation (quoting Hens ley, court must ask satisfactory Hens ley, to is whether makes for the making at 434) . a expended reasonable hourly cases "where nonfrivolous, 436. it on rate the may hours fee an plaintiff's at 439-40). achieved a reasonably award.'" litigation be whole,'" 'the plaintiff Accordingly, the a 461 U.S. expended Id. a (quoting when "a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited success, reasonably as the product of hours as a excessive claims whole Hens ley, a even amount," were and raised in good faith." times in interrelated, 461 U.S. at An attorney's fee award is therefore not driven by whether was reasonable to file suit or whether plaintiff's litigated the case "with devotion and skill"; rather, critical factor is the degree of success obtained." counsel "the most Id. I I I . Discussion A. Entitlement to Fee Award It is Def.'s Resp. undisputed Br. 6. that As a Plaintiff is a prevailing party. over $1.2 million in attorney's fees: 12 "prevailing party." Plaintiff requests Sullivan Law Group - Litigation $1,002,481.00 Sullivan Law Group - Fee Petition $40,446.50 Crenshaw, $16,227.00 Ware & Martin David Pearline^ $64,968.75 Sullivan Law Group - Supplemental Motion $76,895.50 David Pearline - Supplemental Motion $15,875.00 $1,216,893.75 TOTAL Pl.'s Opening Br. 2-3, ECF No. 373. "eligible for, fees." 16-17, ECF No. 341; Pl.'s Suppl. Status as a prevailing party makes Plaintiff rather than entitled to, Mercer v. Opening Br. Duke Univ., an award of attorney's 401 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 2005). The Navy contends that Plaintiff only obtained "nominal damages" because she failed that she sought, to obtain the significant monetary damages and therefore she "is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees." Def.'s Resp. Br. 6. A plaintiff obtains nominal damages when a "trifling sum" is awarded because "a legal injury is suffered but there is no substantial loss or injury to be compensated." Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); see Farrar, Damages, Black's 506 U.S. at 112 (recognizing that nominal damages are awarded to vindicate legal rights while substantial actual injury"); McAfee, damages 738 F.3d are at awarded 88 n.6 "to ("An compensate award of ' There was an error in the calculation of David Pearline's fee request as stated in Plaintiff's opening brief. Pl.'s Reply Br. 3 n.l. 13 nominal damages signifies not proved actual App'x 291, 298 definition, that V. [violation of a loss."); (4th Cir. W. legal] LP v. Insulation, 2009) ("Nominal right but has Moore, damages 316 do F. not, by- compensate the aggrieved party-they merely recognize the aggrieved party's rights have been violated."); City of Charlotte, N.C., 93 F.3d 1241, 1246 Price (4th Cir. 1996) ("A plaintiff's failure to prove compensatory damages results in nominal damages, prevails failure but to typically "recovers prove monetary relief, all," because an the the one only dollar."). nominal essential of damages element only reasonable recovery When only fee of 506 omitted); U.S. see discretion, . at also . . attorney's fee.") However, merely Justice "[not] de 29 U.S.C. § nominal added) 794a [a] claim for damages fee at indicates or "de minimis." (internal {"[T]he court, citation in its a reasonable (emphasis added). every award minimis or purely explained in of nominal "technical" her Farrar damages legal represents victory. concurring a As opinion, all nominal damages awards are de minimis. Nominal relief does not necessarily a at 121 (emphasis of is usually no may allow the prevailing party, not O'Connor 115 plaintiff because [the] that the legal victory was purely "technical" Farrar, a (J. O'Connor, nominal victory make." concurring). Farrar, 506 U.S. To identify when a party who has obtained only a nominal damages award has nevertheless still 14 obtained Justice more than O'Connor a de offered minimis three or technical factors for legal courts victory. to consider: (1) the extent of relief sought compared to the relief obtained; (2) the significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff prevailed; Id. at and (3) 122. the pxiblic purpose served by the litigation. The Fourth Circuit adopted Justice O'Connor's three-factor test to distinguish "the usual nominal-damage case, which warrants no fee award, from the warrant an award of attorney's fees." see also Doe v. cert, denied, (applying which Kidd, No. Justice the 13, 2017) to evaluate No. F. 16-530, WL 643, 69234 but case {4th Cir. (U.S. 2017 WL 128503, Jan. test received that does 401 F.3d at 204; 656 three-factor prevailed 16-1140, Mercer, App'x 2017 O'Connor's plaintiff Kane v. Lewis, 656 unusual to no 9, a damage at *5 2016), 2017) case in award); (4th Cir. Jan. ("The district court abused its discretion by failing the three determining whether a factors this court has adopted for nominal-damages award warrants attorney's fees."). Here, awarded the attorney's O'Connor's "nominal Def.'s Navy three damages" Resp. recovery was Br. contends fees factors and 6-7. "nominal" that Plaintiff because shows achieved and application that Plaintiff only According to represented 15 should a de the a of Navy, be Justice received minimis de not only victory. Plaintiff's minimis victory because the "monetary recovery was between 3% and 4% of what she sought {$40,842.42 awarded versus almost $1.2 million initially sought)," Plaintiff did not prevail on a significant issue, and the litigation achieved no public purpose. 6-14. While Plaintiff's Court it is that the jury returned a Id. at 3, verdict favor but awarded her no compensatory damages, awarded pre-judgment Plaintiff and back pay post-judgment between February 26, 80. true legal damages interest, 2012 and July 27, of for 2012. $40,842.42, her Sept. lost in the plus wages 2016 Op. at Notwithstanding what Defendant characterizes as Plaintiff's "relatively meager recovery," Def.'s Resp. Br. at 2, because the Court's award of back pay was designed to compensate Plaintiff for her lost wages as a result of the Navy's actions, Sept. 2016 Op. at award, 76, Plaintiff obtained more see Farrar, 506 U.S. at 121 than a mere nominal damage (plaintiff who requested $17 million and received $1 only received nominal damages); Mercer, 401 F.3d McAfee, a at 202 ($1 dollar 738 F.3d at 88 n.6 damages amount," award was was a nominal damage award); cf. (rejecting defendant's argument that nominal when, "though small in dollar the award nevertheless represented the entirety of the plaintiff's out-of-pocket expenses). As Plaintiff is a an award of nominal prevailing party who obtained more than damages, the 16 Court is not required to consider whether her legal victory was more than de minimis.* Therefore, the Court moves on to the issue of Plaintiff's entitlement to reasonable attorney's fees. See Farrar, at (noting 114 (internal quotation marks omitted) plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees, 506 U.S. that once a "the degree of the plaintiff's overall success goes to the reasonableness of a fee award"). * The Court notes that even if Plaintiff's damages award could be considered "nominal," after application of Justice O'Connor's three-factor test, it is apparent that Plaintiff achieved more than a de minimis legal victory in the litigation and thus it would be appropriate to award Plaintiff attorney's fees. First, while Plaintiff received a substantially smaller monetary recovery than she initially requested, her award of $40,842.42 in back pay damages is not insignificant. See McAfee, 738 P.3d at 84 (holding that, under Mercer and Farrer, an award of $100,000 in attorney's fees was reasonable when the plaintiff recovered only $2,943.60 in damages). Next, Plaintiff prevailed on significant legal issues throughout the litigation, such as the Court's summary judgment ruling that, based upon the facts before it, there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the reasonableness of TTY as an accommodation in the factual circumstances of this case. Sept. 2015 Op. Sc Order 113-14 ("Consequently, while a TTY or other non-video TRS system might qualify as a reasonable accommodation for hearing-impaired individuals in most jobs . . . on the specific facts of this case, the Court cannot find, as a matter of law, that a TTY or other non-video TRS system was a reasonable accommodation to Plaintiff." {internal citations omitted)),- see Heyer v. United States Bureau of Prisons, No. 15-6826, 2017 WL 715823, at *3 (4th Cir. Feb. 23, 2017) {"TTY does not permit real-time conversations, and each conversation over a TTY device takes significantly longer than signed or spoken conversations. . . . TTY is old technology that is fast becoming obsolete."). Moreover, the jury found that, based upon the evidence before it, the Navy failed to provide Plaintiff a reasonable accommodation, Nov. 2016 Mem. Order 8, ECF No. 368, and the Court held that "a reasonable jury could have concluded that, on these facts, an offer reasonable accommodation for Plaintiff," id. at 16. of TTY was not a Finally, Plaintiff's victory served a public purpose in defining the responsibilities of joint employers to offer reasonable accommodation, which may be more than TTY, to medical professionals in similar health care facilities. Thus, Justice O'Connor's three factors, as adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Mercer, weigh in favor of finding that, even if Plaintiff's recovery could be considered "nominal," it was not a de minimis or purely technical legal victory. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee—with her relative degree of success considered as part of any adjustment to the lodestar figure. 17 B. Calculation of "Reasonable" Fee Award 1. Lodestar Analysis The first determine the step in calculating "lodestar" figure a reasonable "by multiplying fee reasonable hours expended times a reasonable rate." F.3d at 88 to number the is of McAfee, 738 (quoting Robinson, 560 F.3d at 243). a. Reasonable Rate As fees indicated as a above. Plaintiff prevailing party who was damages. A party entitled to the of burden establishing rates requested." Cir. to 1987). the is Spell v. market the reasonableness McDaniel, rates in (E.D. 2016) v. (1984)). This is generally from disinterested counsel, or other specific 'actual rates market.'" Supp. 14 02) . evidence which Va. the hourly 1402 (4th 189 F. Stenson, accomplished community.'" Supp. 465 3d 588, U.S. "through 886, 596 895 affidavits evidence of awards in similar cases, that counsel 710 (E.D. "bears of relevant allows can the command Project Vote/Voting for America, 2d 704, fees 824 F.2d 1380, the Inc., Blum than nominal 'to be calculated according Dollar Tree Stores, (quoting attorney's recover attorney's LaFleur v. Va. to awarded more "The reasonable rate is prevailing entitled 2012) court in to determine the [relevant] Inc. v. Long, (quoting Spell, 824 887 F. F.2d at "The relevant market for determining the prevailing rate is ordinarily the community in which the court where the action 18 is prosecuted sits." F.3d 169, 175 Rum Creek Coal Sales, (4th Cir. submitted affidavits hourly rates Opening Br. they Ex. purport 3, 4, Ex. 1, Buckius Decl., has submitted Shoemaker Decl., both be ECF No. ECF No. ECF No. affidavits reasonable. for indicating Pi.'s Additionally, attorney 31 have the PI.' s Opening 341-4; with Def.'s Resp. 361-1. each parties Compare 341-3; their relevant work experience. ECF No. Br. Plaintiff and paralegal that See generally PI.' s 341. Plaintiff attorneys to Butler Decl., Ex. Ex., Here, from disinterested counsel Br. describes 1994). Inc. v. Caperton, who requests worked on the following the case: hourly $400 for rates for the Ann Sullivan, law firm founding partner with thirty-nine years of experience; $315 for Melissa experience; Picco, $235 senior associate for Deborah Collins, with nineteen years of mid-level associate with six years of experience; and $375 for David Pearline, co-counsel with thirty-seven years of experience. requests the worked on the following case: $100 hourly for rates Plaintiff additionally for the paralegals Skylar Gallagher, who paralegal with five years of experience; $125 for Angela Mastin, paralegal with fifteen years of experience; and 19 $150 for B. Thomas Reed, attorney with over thirty-five years of experience but acting as a paralegal for this case.® Requested Rates Name Rate iboipsTED Ann Sullivan $ 400 Melissa Picco $ 315 Deborah Collins $ 235 David Pearline $ 375 Angela Mastin (para) $ 125 Skylar Gallagher (para) $ 100 B. Thomas Reed (para) $ 150 Plaintiff Butler, Jr., III, in offers and a support a declaration Plaintiff attorney Harris declaration by attorney James H. of the reasonableness Pl.'s Opening Br. Ex. 3-4. rates by of these D. Shoemaker, fee amounts. Both attorneys agree that all of the requests are reasonable for the type of work performed in light of each attorney's and paralegal's respective amount of experience. declaration provided Norfolk, ® Mr. of the Id. employment following Virginia: as In law response, attorney employment the Dean law $350/hour for partners, Navy offers the T. who Buckius market rates in $250/hour for senior Reed is a licensed attorney in the state of Virginia, but during the period of time he worked on behalf of the Plaintiff he was not working as an attorney, but was instead performing work as a paralegal for the Plaintiff. Shoemaker Decl., EOF No. 341-4, at 4 n.l. 20 associates {7-8 years experience) , associates (4-6 years associates (1-3 years paralegals. $225/hour Buckius Decl. 1. experience) , experience), $200/hour and In determining the reasonable rates, n.28. First, the Court evaluates junior for Barber, Johnson 577 F.2d at factor two, the and Johnson factor the skill required to perform the legal services of the various attorneys significant while and expenditure legal issues in a and for the Court is required novelty and difficulty of questions raised, three, mid-level $110-125/hour to consider the relevant Johnson factors.® 226 for the paralegals. of time This and labor case required involving a complex niche area of employment discrimination law, Court will make appropriate adjustments to the time and labor expended, the Court finds that the hourly rates requested are by Plaintiff appropriate for the novel difficult questions raised in this specialized area of law. the Court observed above. Plaintiff vigorously litigated and As and prevailed on significant legal issues throughout the litigation that addressed significant novel skill. and These difficult issues questions included, for requiring example, the Court's summary judgment ruling that the Navy and TCA were joint employers, and that, based upon the facts before it, there was a ® While the Court considers the Johnson factors out of numeric order, the Court does so for analytic clarity by evaluating factors together that analyze closely related topics. 21 genuine issue of material fact regarding the TTY as an accommodation in the to the Court. Indus. (E.D. of Sept. Carriers, Va. each 2014) 2015 Op. Inc., No. factual reasonableness of circumstances presented & Order 113-14; see Flame S.A. 2:13-CV-658, 2014 WL 7185199, at v. *6 {authorizing the requested hourly rate because attorney's "skillful and proficient handling" of the legal issue). Next, the opportunity six, costs the and the case. pressing Johnson the litigation, expectations Johnson factor at seven, the law it firm is a without small significant firm, outset time firm's rate than also available expected time, if there the were case no factor of the of to this thus lost progress Navy's vigorous litigation regarding factual presented issues than expected other paying by and the cost clients. 22 resources. client on a large case requiring much taking on such a case necessarily justifying a opportunities. more quickly, other cases in the Eastern District of Virginia, represent the limitations financial representing involved loss of other opportunities, longer four, Johnson the the contingent fee basis in what became a of factor Plaintiff represents that the Sullivan Legal Group is small Because in considers attorney's litigation, a Court the case, counsel to but due to the took the Counsel similar significant it higher legal substantially opportunity Nevertheless, and despite to the ultimate length of time between filing the judgment, the imposed a tight timeline for discovery and pretrial motions this case. such time nature Court For a notes small limitations, of the case, that firm, in the complaint and final Court's such as light of likely meant the the that pretrial order in Sullivan Law Group, vigorously this case litigated almost fully occupied the resources of the firm at times. Next, the Court evaluates undesirability Johnson of factor the case eleven, Johnson within the factor this ten, legal nature of community, the and professional relationship between Plaintiff and her attorneys. factor ten, the asserted Under Johnson the Court considers Plaintiff's representation that the case was undesirable because "it involved going against the Navy in a 'Navy town' [where] of its larger employer," the "perception provide inherent rate medical in undisputed than deaf on employees Pl.'s may might counsel otherwise be relationship had a not Opening such undesirable professional that and because the case could perpetuate services." taking higher Plaintiff's that the community is very supportive be Br. competent 21. litigation the with The her longstanding risk justifies case. to a Regarding counsel, relationship it is with Plaintiff beginning during the course of her efforts to seek a reasonable accommodation before suit was filed, and the Court perceived from Plaintiff's testimony that she felt strongly that 23 she was seeking employment principle to vindicate disability by a an important discrimination client often results law. principle Such in devotion in greater challenges to for counsel in contingent fee cases. The Court further considers Johnson "customary hourly rate of compensation" similar work, {internal Daly v. Hill, citations and five, 1077 {4th Cir. Johnson factor attorney's hourly fee awards in similar cases, Grissom, at 323 {evaluating the approved hourly rates factor five, the Court for 1986) twelve, 549 F.3d in cited cases as examples of "similar fee awards in like cases"). Johnson the charged to clients 790 F.2d 1071, omitted), factor considered In evaluating the affidavits submitted by both parties regarding reasonable hourly rates for the specific legal work in this rates typically Plaintiff's See Rum customary market skill for charged attorneys Creek rate to and Coal, 31 clients their F.3d is the rate based upon the rates Navy has noted that at 175 similar to in could attorneys and counsel's at least that one attorney is work similar (determining counsel paid customary hourly that command of by cases. in the the "comparable own typical in similar circumstances"). based on an hourly rate rate to clients, for paralegals that in similar circumstances" "similar services case and the fees Although the seeking an award is higher than his normal hourly the Court again notes that a 24 reasonable hourly rate for a fee Creek Coal, F.3d . . 68, . petition is the "relevant 31 F.3d at 175; Trimper v. 76 (4 th holds Cir. that 1995) ("[T]he market" rate. City of Norfolk, great the proper measure of weight fees is Rum Va., of the 58 law the prevailing market rate in the relevant market, and not the rate charged by the actual attorney in question."). Recovery at the market rate does not constitute that counsel could a windfall, command if but merely counsel reflects charged for their services. See JP ex rel. Peterson v. Hanover F. 499, Cty., 641 Supp. (authorizing an hourly rate the attorney's relevant 2d of $300 experience rate market the the rate Sch. (E.D. 516 Cty. Bd. Va. 2009) based upon the market instead of the of and discounted rate of $165 per hour that the attorney would have charged the client); a Pearline Suppl. Decl. normal hourly rate that is 1, ECF No. below 370-1 the ("I have chosen market middle class individuals can afford my services, access to statute justice in for play."). customary hourly clients when there Therefore, charged fees the clients to is Court so that which provides no has for rate fee shifting considered the similar work and compared i t to those hourly fees charged in this case. In market, determining under the Johnson reasonable factor twelve hourly rate awarded in similar cases. V. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. 25 rate the within Court the relevant considers the E. Associated Coal Corp. Programs, 724 F.3d 561, 572 {4th Cir. 2013) {"[P]rior prevailing market contexts."). rate Because fee awards that may be the constitute considered parties have evidence in of a fee-shifting cited to so few employment law attorney fee cases from the Norfolk Division, the Court broadly surveyed the attorney's fee awards in recent employment law cases in the entire Eastern District of Virginia and attorney's fee awards in other types of cases within the Norfolk Division of the Eastern District of Virginia in order to assist it in determining what an hourly attorney fee award would be for a similar case in the Norfolk Division."' Id. at 572 ' Taylor v. Republic Servs., Inc., No. 1:12-CV-00523-GBL, 2014 WL 325169, at *5 (E.D. Va. 2014) (authorizing in the Alexandria division of the Court the following hourly rates for attorneys specializing in employment law: $600 for attorney with twenty-nine years of experience; $475 for attorney with fourteen years of experience, $400 for attorney with seventeen years of experience, and $325 for attorney with three years of experience); Stewart v. VCU Health Sys. Auth. , No. 3:09CV738-HEH, 2012 WL 1120755, at *1 (E.D. Va. 2012) , aff'd, 479 F. App'x 459 (4th Cir. 2012) (authorizing in the Richmond division of the Court the following hourly rates for attorneys specializing in employment law: $470 for lead counsel with more than thirty years of experience, $360 for attorney with more than ten years of experience, $295 for a "highly efficient" fifth-year associate, $265 for a third-year associate, and $180 for a paralegal with more than ten years of experience in federal litigation); Porter v. Elk Remodelincr, Inc., No. l:09-CV-446, 2010 WL 3395660, at *7 (E.D. Va. 2010) (authorizing in the Alexandria division of the Court an hourly rate of $380 for an employment law attorney with sixteen years of experience); see also Carr v. Rest Inn, Inc., No. 2:14-CV-609, 2015 WL 5177600, at *4 (E.D. Va. 2015) (finding in the Norfolk division of the Court that an hourly rate of $275 and $310 would be reasonable for a lawyer who successfully resolved a Fair Labor Standards Act case); Two Men & A Truck/Int'l, Inc. v. A Mover Inc., 128 F. Supp. 3d 919, 927 (E.D. Va. 2015) (approving in the Norfolk division of the Court in an intellectual property case hourly rates of $600 for a partner, $400 for an associate, and $250 for a paralegal); Lismont v. Alexander Binzel Corp., 47 F. Supp. 3d 443, 459 (E.D. Va. 2014) (authorizing in the Norfolk division of the Court in a patent case hourly rates of $550 for an attorney who had practiced for thirty-eight years but only $170 for a first year associate) ; Alexander v. Se. Wholesale Corp., No. 2:13CV213, 2014 WL 1165844, at *11 (E.D. Va. 2014) (finding in the Norfolk division of the Court an hourly rate of $390 to be reasonable for an experienced litigator in consumer fraud cases); JTH Tax, Inc. v. Grabert, 8 26 (" [W] e have held that ' [e] vidence of fee awards in comparable cases is generally sufficient to establish the prevailing market rates in the Shipbuilding Cir. relevant & Dry Dock community.'" Co. v. (quoting Brown, 376 Newport F.3d 245, News 251 (4th 2004))) . Finally, evaluates with the Plaintiff respect experience relies on two to Johnson and recent factor reputation cases from nine, of the the each Court attorney. Norfolk division of the Court in support of her argument that the requested rates are reasonable in light of each attorneys' Prison Legal News v. 2015), aff'd, 2017), and Justice, Pl.'s 2:14CV577, Opening of 15-2197, Virginia-Pilot No. Legal News, years No. Stolle, Br. 129 F. 2017 Supp. WL Media Similar with {4th Companies, to both Ms. Sullivan and Mr. experience, 3d 390, 888234 2016 WL 4265742, 22-23. years of experience, at the LLC *5 403 Cir. of $400 129 F. Supp. (E.D. attorneys 6, Dep't of Va. 2016). in Prison Pearline have nearly forty extensive 3d at 403 Mar. v. experience in legal subject area of employment discrimination law. Legal News, (E.D. Va. the niche See Prison (authorizing an hourly rate for attorneys with forty-six and thirty-eight years of experience Division of in the a constitutional law case from Eastern District of Virginia). F. Supp. 3d 731, 738 (E.D. Va. Court an hourly rate of $225 acting as lead counsel). the Ms. Norfolk Picco has 2014) (finding in the Norfolk division of the to be reasonable for a fifth-year associate 27 nineteen than years the years of Navy's of proffered experience, partner. See attorney with usually experience, id. is substantially associate" charging a years hourly of rate of of lower of Ms. $255-265 7-8 than a for an $325 experience). rate higher category (authorizing an hourly rate an requesting $235, amount "senior but eighteen charges an Collins but is only a market rate consistent with her experience as established by Mr. Butler's and Mr. Shoemaker's declarations and within $10 of the Virginia-Pilot, market 2016 of at $235 per hour for years experience). Finally, paralegals Mastin reasonable rates proffered declaration stated that for to $125. Ms. and a by a are rate 1. See (authorizing as an attorney with five rates requested or Navy. than below Mr. paralegal Plaintiff lower Buckius. within the reasonable Mr. *5 the Gallager Buckius Decl. Gallagher, by 4265742, a $110 listed WL reasonable of rate rate by the Buckius's hourly rate is is requesting $100 that proffered by Mr. Buckius, and $125 for Ms. Mastin, a paralegal with fifteen years of experience. proffered by As the reasonable. With these rates Navy, the regard to are Court Mr. within or below finds Reed, Virginia attorney but not then practicing, he acted as preparation a paralegal based upon in this his who rates was a range to be licensed the Court notes that case and assisted with trial over 28 these the three decades of trial experience. The Court finds it reasonable to use an experienced lawyer acting as a paralegal and requesting only $150 per hour to accomplish trial preparation tasks attorney with a higher hourly rate. instead of using an See Virginia-Pilot, 2016 WL 4265742, at *5 {finding as reasonable an hourly rate of $155 for a paralegal with over 20 years of experience with the law firm). Thus, having considered all of the relevant Johnson factors, the Court finds are that the hourly rates requested by Plaintiff reasonable. b. Reasonable Hours As fees as indicated a above. Plaintiff prevailing party who was damages. Therefore, the Court must court also should entitled awarded more next attorney's than nominal the hours ("The exclude calculation hours that were not to Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 that were "reasonably expended." district is determine from this initial 'reasonably expended.'" fee (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 6 (1976))). Before party seeking should request hours unnecessary." has complied make a that an "[c]ounsel good faith are excessive, Hensley, with award, this 461 U.S. effort 29 the exclude redundant, at 434. obligation. to for or prevailing from a fee otherwise Representing that it Plaintiff has submitted billing records® and seeks compensation for the following hours expended in litigating this case: Requested Hours Hours Name Supplemental Litigation Fee Petition Ann Sullivan 1,173 .2® 40.3 69.5 Melissa Picco 621.8" 12.2 49.1 Deborah Collins 631.3 46,1 115.8" David Pearline 110.0 63.25 42.333 Angela Hastin (para) 598.7 77.2 73 .7 Skylar Gallagher (para) 747.3 B. Thomas Reed (para) 367.2 * The Navy challenges Plaintiff's billing invoices as Fee Petition not being a "contemporaneous" record because the date "9/22/2016" is listed in the upper right hand corner of each billing invoice, which, according to the Navy, indicates that the records have been "reconstructed." Def.'s Resp. Br. 16; Jones V. Southpeak Interactive Corp., (E.D. Va. 2014), a f f d, 777 F.3d 658 No. 3:12CV443, 2014 WL 2993443, at *12 {4th Cir. 2015) (" [R] econstructed time entries are not acceptable because it is nigh onto impossible to reconstruct old billing entries accurately.") (internal quotations omitted). Ms. Sullivan's supplemental declaration explains that Sullivan Law Group "has a written policy wherein employees are required to submit time records to me on a daily basis. The records are reviewed prior to the authorization of payroll on a weekly basis. . . . The dates on the invoices reflect the date the statement was generated and does not reflect the date the time record was created in the software." Sullivan Supp. Decl. H 1, EOF No. 370-2, at 1. Based upon Ms. Sullivan's declaration giving an explanation for the September 22, 2016 date on each invoice, the Court accepts the billing invoices as contemporaneous records. ' Ms. Sullivan's hours are based upon 1,149.8 hours of litigation work billed while employed by Sullivan Legal Group and 23.4 hours of work billed while employed by the law firm of Crenshaw, Ware & Martin, PLC. Ms. Picco's hours are based upon 600 hours of litigation work billed while employed by the Sullivan Legal Group and 21.8 hours of work billed while employed by the law firm of Crenshaw, Ware & Martin, PLC. " Ms. Collins's hours are based upon 109.30 hours of work on the supplemental motion for attorney's fees and 6.5 hours supplemental motion for attorney's fees. 30 of work on the reply to the Pl.'s Opening Br. for Att'y Fees 16-17; Suppl. 2; Att'y Fees ECF No. 376. Pl.'s Reply Br. Pl.'s Opening Br, for Suppl. for Att'y Fees 7, The Navy's primary criticism regarding Plaintiff's calculation of the lodestar figure is its assertion that many of the hours for inadequately which Plaintiff documented and seeks are compensation duplicative or are excessive. Def.'s Resp. Br. 15-23. In analyzing challenges to factor one, 226 n.28. the the Plaintiff's hours fee expended, time and request the and labor expended. Navy's considers Court the Johnson Barber, In order to properly determine the 577 F.2d at reasonable time and labor expended in light of the case's time restrictions, the Court and reduces reduces hours hours unnecessary." that where are documentation "excessive, redundant, submitted over five hundred documenting the hours billed in this case. Fees, ECF No. Opening Br. Supp. Suppl. for Mot Plaintiff "inadequate" or otherwise See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. Plaintiff for is has 341; Suppl. Fees, submitted Reply Br. Mot. ECF Mot. for Fees, No. 376. sufficient pages of exhibits See Opening Br. Mot. for Fees, ECF No, The evidence ECF No. 373; Court to 370; Reply Br. finds demonstrate that that a fee award is appropriate as to all counsel who worked on this 31 case, as well as the three paralegals." However, a review of the billing records submitted by Plaintiff reveals that, the fact that Plaintiff has the records are generally thorough and detailed, failed to demonstrate hours are "reasonable." various tasks attorneys performed Court finds certain hours despite and by all paralegals, and the the claimed individuals, as explanation documentation that was duplication of efforts. there some of the below, the provided for explained inadequate and of In considering the hours billed by the such that that was degree of unnecessary Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. i. Johnson Factor One: Vagueness and Billing Errors In analyzing the Johnson factor one, time billed directly for related time and expended the vast majority of attorney's to labor the fees litigation, according Plaintiff's appears and reasonable. However, sufficient detail Court and determine reasonable because that the the time billing entries labor were requested well-documented, some billing entries do not provide to to for expended vague, the were contained block entries, or contained mathematical errors. " Work completed by paralegals is compensable as part of an attorney's fee award. Missouri v. it a was Jenkins by Agyei, "self-evident proposition 491 U.S. that the 274, 285 (1989) 'reasonable (finding that attorney's provided for by statute should compensate the work of paralegals, that of attorneys"). 32 fee' as well as A number of Plaintiff's billing entries are vague and lack sufficient facts to identify the nature of the work performed." While such entries might be sufficient on a client bill where the client is familiar with the progress of the work, sufficient for an attorney's example, on April 3, fee request such as it is not this. 2014, Ms. Sullivan billed for a "conference regarding response to statute of limitations defense." 341-1, at 10. However, the entry does person involved in this conference. Sullivan billed 0.9 hours for a not ECF No. specify any other On February 4, "review For [of] 2015, Navy's Ms. document production," but the entry fails to indicate what documents were reviewed. Id. at 14. On February 3, 2016, Ms. Collins begins her entry with "Prepare for hearing" for 0.6 hours, but fails to delineate what the topic of the hearing was or what she did to prepare. ECF No. 341-10, at 25. Entries for May 28-29, 2015 " The Navy also argues that Plaintiff billed a total of sixty-eight hours for two attorneys and three paralegals to prepare a "chronology," but failed to specify any details regarding what the chronology included, how it was used, why it was necessary, or why it took sixty-eight hours to complete. See Buckius Decl. 6 (detailing the hours spent on the "chronology" as follows: Ms. Mastin - 4.5 hours, Ms. Collins - 26.3 hours, Mr. Reed - 1 hour, Ms. Gallagher - 33.3 hours, Ms. Sullivan 3.2 hours). Declarations by Plaintiff clarify that this "chronology" was a master document for use in trial preparation and trial strategy which included citations to deposition testimony, deposition exhibits, and trial exhibits. Plaintiff asserts that this master organizational document "was essential to the management of the thousands of documents produced by [the] Navy." Gallagher Suppl. Decl. 1 8, ECF No. 370-7, at 3. The Court observes that the factual complexity of this case is reflected in the Court's September 22, 2015 Opinion and Order in which the "factual and procedural history" of the case spans thirty-two pages. Sept. 2015 Op. at 2-34. Therefore, the Court finds that spending a substantial amount of time to organize the discovery is reasonable in a complex case such as this. 33 state that Ms. Gallagher (paralegal) spent 12 hours revising the opposition to the Navy's motion for summary judgment, not provide any contribution billing motion as entailed. records revising detail and for ECF reflect what No. that finalizing summary to at Gallagher brief judgment, Gallagher's 341-13, Ms. the Ms. in but 19. to editing Similarly, spent support fails but does 16.5 of hours Plaintiff's specify what Ms. Gallagher did beyond what the experienced attorneys writing the brief already entry for had October Settlement done. 1, Id. 2015, Conference and at 20. states Ms. that [took] two Gallaher's she she "prepare[d] "prepare [d] trips regarding same," and the entry for October 2, billing for to courthouse 2015, states that for Final Pretrial Conference and [took] trips to courthouse regarding same," but does not explain what she did to prepare for the final pretrial conference or separate out the time for preparation and time for travel. is unable detail, when to adequately review the and the Court litigation cannot activity is fee Id. at 25. The Court requested without more parse the mixed with proper billing amount travel in a single billing entry. Some of Plaintiff's billing entries are "block billing" entries which list multiple activities without delineating the time spent disfavored on in each fee activity. award cases. 34 Block See billing Faircloth v. entries are Colvin, No. 2;13CV156, it was 2014 WL 5488809, improper compensable to use 2015, "Identify issues and {E.D. Ms. with 2014) (holding that because work). it For commingles example, on Sullivan billed 3.2 hours under the entry; and questions hearing and prepare confer Va. "block billing" work with non-compensable August 24, judgment at *8 judge might for argument associate." ECF No. pose at summary on summary judgment 341-1, at 38. It is unclear from the entry whether the entire 3.2 hours constituted a conference some with the associate shorter period. hours under the associate." On April entry: ECF No. or 6, whether 2016, "Finalize 341-5, at Ms. brief 38. the conference Picco and was billed 3.5 confer Unfortunately, with it is impossible for the Court to determine how much of the 3.5 hours was devoted to brief writing and how much to conferring with an associate. of the about. the brief or what On January 14, entry: granted same, Additionally, the entry fails to specify the topic the conference 2016, Ms. "draft correspondence testimony, revise same." itself is cryptic, attend to ECF No. with the associate was Collins billed 0.9 hours with ... strategy 341-10, to expand the with at 23. partner While scope of regarding the entry i t is also unclear how much of this time was spent conferring with the partner and how much time was drafting correspondence. 35 spent Additionally, there appear contained in some entries. Ms. Sullivan billed specific tasks February 4, 2016, January 8, Ms. a total of 5.8 9, Ms. Ms. total of Ms. Ms. hours. Gallagher totaling 3.6 hours, billed 5.2 hours, at 24. 2016, but only 341-1, listed at 45. On 3.6 hours. Collins Collins ECF No. billed 8.5 341-5, hours at but only ECF No. 341-10, at 22. billed 14.3 Id. hours at 26. 34. but On only On April 16, Gallagher billed 3.6 hours but only documented tasks totaling 2.6 2015, on January 13, hours documented tasks totaling 13.3 hours. 2015, errors Picco billed 3.9 hours but only provided 2016, 2016, mathematical ECF No. documented tasks totaling 7.9 hours, February be For example, totaling 4.8 hours. documentation for On a to ECF No. 341-13, billed 4.6 and September on at 15. hours, but 22, On September 15, only 2015, listed Ms. tasks Gallagher but only listed tasks totaling 2.6 hours. On January 28, 2016, Mr. listed tasks totaling 8 hours. Id. Reed billed 8.5 hours but only ECF No. 341-15, at 8." ii. Johnson Factor One: Duplicative and Excessive Work The case Court such that next work considers was whether excessive at Plaintiff times, overstaffed and whether the some " The Court notes that errors in billing also occurred to the disadvantage of Plaintiff, such as on February 8, 2016 when Ms. Collins documented tasks totaling 6.8 hours of work but only billed 6.5 hours, ECF No. 341-10, at 26, or May 8, 2015 when Ms. Gallagher documented tasks totaling 8 hours of work but only billed 7.4 hours, or on May 12, 2015, when Ms. Gallagher documented tasks totaling 11.6 hours of work but only billed 3.5 hours, at 18. 36 EOF No. 341-13, billed hours were duplicative of other work performed. 656 F. App'x at 656 See Doe, (affirming the district court's twenty-five percent reduction in attorney billable hours for excessiveness); Faircloth, 2014 WL 5488809, at *9 (refusing to compensate attorney for editing and reviewing another attorney's work). an In evaluating whether some of Plaintiff's work was duplicative and excessive, the Court considers the Johnson factors analyzing the difficulty of the questions raised in the litigation, the skill required the to perform the services rendered, and time limitations imposed by the circumstances of the case. (1) Litigation Hours The Navy argues that Plaintiff overstaffed the case during litigation in the number of attorneys and prepared for and attended court proceedings. 18. paralegals that Def.'s Resp. Br. The Navy specifically points to the July 17, 2015 discovery hearing and the summary overstaffing hearings. judgment hearing According to the Navy, as examples of it was excessive for Plaintiff to bill over sixteen attorney hours and twenty-one paralegal hours in preparation for the July 17, 2015 hearing on seven motions that had already been fully briefed. Resp. Br. hearing, 20 Ms. (noting that hours, in preparation for the July 17, Sullivan billed at least seven hours, billed over nine hours, See Def.'s Mr. 2015 Pearline paralegal Gallagher billed over fourteen and paralegal Mastin billed over seven hours). 37 The July 17, 2015 discovery hearing lasted two hours different motions on different topics, and covered seven including Plaintiff's motions for sanctions due to discovery disputes and to exclude testimony of two of the Navy's expert witnesses and the Navy's motions to compel answers to Plaintiff's expert witness. hearing, Plaintiff's two paralegals—an amount reduction in ECF No. average approximately hours interrogatories attorneys time hours, Plaintiff's that, the to exclude To prepare for this preparation by of 147. and time and per was hours by three subject Court motion to the finds overall reasonable in relation to the complexity of the legal issues. The Navy reasonable" summary hearing, also argues it was not "necessary or for three attorneys and two paralegals to attend the judgment hearing on Plaintiff's behalf. the Court heard from counsel on a judgment filed summary judgment by the Navy against specifically addressing the defense that of and the filed exhaustion, claim." calculated by Mr. Buckius, cross-motion Navy Sept. 2015 At motion for for by joint employer doctrine, administrative constructive discharge a Id. and Op. the summary partial Plaintiff, the Navy's Plaintiff's at 128. As Plaintiff billed 15.9 paralegal hours Then-CO-defendant TCA also filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of reasonable accommodation, which the Court heard argument on at the summary judgment hearing. ECF No. 85. The Navy argued first that the Navy was not a joint employer of Plaintiff, but also argued alongside TCA that TTY was a reasonable accommodation. 38 and 13.7 attorney hours judgment hearing. was also to prepare Buckius Decl. represented attorney representing by three for 3. and attend At the hearing, attorneys, co-defendant TCA. the in summary the Navy addition ECF No. to 176. Due the to the complexity and potentially dispositive nature of the issues, and the Navy deeming that three attorneys were necessary for its own representation, hours were the Court concludes that most of Plaintiff's reasonably expended to prepare for and attend the hearing. The Navy excessive: eight twenty-four hours statement; for 200 and trial most challenges hours paralegals over depositions exhibits, additionally of for to hours Rule revise for exhibits; which were the following 26(a)(3) Ms. paralegal hours disclosures; Sullivan's Reed opening to over-identification not as review trial and a ultimately used; of final pretrial conference that lasted three days with time billed by two attorneys and two paralegals. Def.'s Resp. Br. While the Navy argues that these hours are excessive, does not propose to the Court a for each documented task. the Court issues, itself first observes the case worked collaboratively. the Navy specific hour-by-hour reduction In considering the Navy's arguments, that this case involved complex legal was vigorously litigated by both parties, staffed 18-21. with See, three e.g., 39 attorneys and the Navy who Excerpt Trial Tr. themselves (Rule 50 Motion) you 48-49, all ECF No. on the SYLVERTOOTH: 331 ("THE COURT: summary 'It was a judgment 'Who wrote the brief for on this collaborative issue?' MR. effort.'"). Having reviewed the records sxibmitted by Plaintiff and the declarations from each outside attorney, time that was reasonably the Navy Plaintiff spent the Court finds that some amount of by Plaintiff challenged. appeared somewhat on However, the at disorganized, specific various such tasks hearings as having inordinate trouble locating documents or not having scrutinized exhibits ahead of discovery dispute proceedings. of Plaintiff's hours September 30, designations, appear duplicative. 2015 Plaintiff proceeding failed to Moreover, For example, to address provide the at some the deposition Magistrate Judge an advance copy of Plaintiff's deposition designations, and when the Court to that apparent began the objections. review the parties designations, had not it quickly became conferred about the The Magistrate Judge directed the parties to work to resolve the objections before the final pretrial conference. However, with the the final pretrial conference extraordinary length being lasted over three days, significantly due Plaintiff not having scrutinized exhibits ahead of time. result. to As a Plaintiff ultimately withdrew dozens of exhibits at the conference. 40 In addition Plaintiff, the Mr. Reed examination of Plaintiff's 2015 to disorganization evidenced at times by some hours billed appear to be for repetitive work. For example, cross to lead billed numerous Jennifer attorney, prepare the hours Taylor. billed preparing However, 4.2 examination for hours of Ms. on the Sullivan, September "Jennifer 13, Taylor and Plaintiff" and billed 0.4 hours on September 14, 2015 to "review depositions of Jennifer Taylor and summarize." at 39. The duplicative Court work considers in Plaintiff's considering the ECF No. preparation Johnson 341-1, level factors and analyzing counsel's skill in performing the services rendered and the time limitations imposed by the case. the Court concludes that some duplicative or excessive, For all of the above reasons, of counsel's billed hours were and will reduce Plaintiff's litigation hours as an overall percentage accordingly. (2) The Navy argues Fee Petition Hours that Plaintiff's "fees-on-fees" duplicative because attorneys and paralegals one another's work. Def.'s Resp. Br. 23. hours are repeatedly rewrote It is "well settled that the time spent defending entitlement to attorney's fees is properly compensable" under a fee-shifting statute. Trimper, F.3d if at attorneys 77 (internal bill for citation completing omitted). the same However, work product 58 multiple and the contribution of each attorney is not justified, the billed hours 41 should be reduced F.3d at 180 use of billing excessiveness. See Rum Creek Coal, 31 ("[W]e have also been sensitive to the need to avoid multiple justified for by counsel the for tasks contributions by multiple attorneys unacceptable duplication." of where each on a such use attorney. large case is not Generalized often produces (citing Spell, 852 F.2d at 762)). In evaluating the time and labor reasonably expended under Johnson factor one, to the Navy's the Court concludes that there is some merit concerns efforts in preparing records reflect regarding the petition. without example, Mr. declaration declaration (April 13, 13, 2016). and ECF No. affidavit in "telephone ECF No. (March 2016), 2016), each reviewer uniquely contributed. Pearline {April billed 31, 6, 2016), 2016), drafting 341-2. Ms. of 32 drafting Mastin's Ms. Ms. fees" 2016) . Collins's declaration declaration Collins (April (April billed to and For Sullivan's declaration Pearline 9, Ms. Picco's Gallagher's attorney's (Sept. drafting drafting Ms. However, conference with Mr. at for drafting Ms. support 341-10, reviewing billing affidavits in support of the motion for attorney's fees, what spent Plaintiff's of editing for hours duplication and explanation numerous fee Plaintiff's then "draft have Overall, in addition to the 105.58 hours that Mr. 42 a regarding affidavits." Ms. Collins billed 52.6 hours of work related to Plaintiff's attorney's petition, 13, fee Pearline is requesting for the same. by the drafting of Ms. drafted Ms. attorney, Picco's billed declaration petition, spent declaration, hours preparing for Picco, work information Mastin billed of pleadings, 0.2 and 40. for editing hours docket to Picco Ms. (Sept. and After "revising" attorney's the Ms. "review" files 15, for Mr. her fee had writing at done experienced Ms. Affidavit 341-5, an Pearline and hours No. Ms. After Mr. both attorneys with multiple decades of experience, Picco, ECF Picco's declaration. 12.5 and The redundancy of work is illustrated Pearline Picco's and 2.7 2016), edits and declaration, hours 4 hours to to citations" Ms. "revise" "review for Ms. Picco's affidavit (Sept. 16, 2016), 1 hour to "edit" Ms. Picco's affidavit 19, cites" 0.5 (Sept. to Ms. hours to 2016), Picco's make 0.3 affidavit "final hours (Sept. completing 20, 2016), revisions" to (Sept. 2016) . and and another attorney affidavits including that of Ms. Picco at 28-30. the Court concludes that Plaintiff billed hours that petition, overall Therefore, appear excessive and will reduce percentage in 21, "edits the Plaintiff's accordingly. See preparation a project when a different responsible" for the project). 43 of 341-14, the fee fee petition hours as an Daly, (reducing as duplicative an attorney's hours on ECF No. 790 P. 2d at 1080 for work performed attorney was "primarily iii. Johnson Factor One: Billing Judgment In determining the reasonableness of the time and labor expended under Johnson factor one, counsel's "'billing judgment' is an important Copeland v. component." Marshall, 641 Hens ley, F.2d 461 880, 891 U.S. at 434 (1980)}. {quoting The Court notes that Plaintiff utilized and paid for the services of Karen Paige Thomas, licensed hours) a law attorney, who and Leslie provided and H 18, graduate provided Crocker, redacting Sullivan Decl. school an document experienced other ECF No. at trial 341-1, the time, review services legal support at 5. and assistant work (71 now (149 who hours). Plaintiff does not request any reimbursement for the work performed by either Ms. Thomas or Ms. Crocker. Id. In addition. Plaintiff represents that $111,354.00 was written off prior to submission of the fee petition for entries that "might have been construed as clerical time for the paralegals which totaled in excess of 300 hours for each paralegal." Sullivan Suppl. Decl. H 21, ECF No. 370-2. Plaintiff also represents that she segregated out the work that was solely related to TCA, at a value of $238, 010.00, did not include it within the fee petition. Id. H 18. and Such omitted work included time spent preparing witness outlines for TCA witnesses, attending depositions settlement negotiations with TCA, for TCA witnesses, responding to TCA's motion for summary judgment, and preparation of the portion of responses to 44 the joint arguments pleadings raised by with the Navy TCA. Id. t that 17. addressed Plaintiff only the specifically omitted any time editing responses to TCA's motions and omitted time spent responding to case law cited only by TCA. Id. H 19. iv. Reasonable Hours Summary As of the Court Plaintiff's vigorously concludes hours, the litigated discovery disputes its evaluation of Court observes case. In that resolving that arose during this the reasonableness this one has of case, been a the many the Magistrate Judge wrote that Plaintiff's "counsel's actions were deliberate. More troubling, of zealous the tactic reflects a history pushing the limits advocacy which has unnecessarily process of preparing this case for trial." However, the case According to Ms. did not make a than were also vigorously months than after Plaintiff's excluding attorney's fees, Plaintiff's perspective. district litigated Plaintiff's court 'has the 299, at 5. the Navy. by Sullivan's Supplemental Declaration, Sullivan Supp. Decl. H 21. less ECF No. settlement offer until September 30, twenty-one filed. was complicated the Navy 2015, complaint was more first The Navy's settlement offers out-of-pocket litigation costs, making it impossible to settle from Id.; see McAfee, discretion to 738 F.3d at 90 consider ("[A] settlement negotiations in determining the reasonableness of fees but it is not required to do so.'" (quoting 45 Thomas v. Nat'l Football League Players 2001))). The Plaintiff to Ass'n, Navy's expend 273 F.3d actions 1124, during unnecessary 1130 n.9 litigation additional (D.C. also time, Cir. required such as by requiring motions to compel discovery and requiring the issuance and service of subpoenas through Washington D.C., when counsel the Sullivan Supp. witnesses. command Decl. in accepted service could have headquarters for H 23. Thus, the Court notes that the vigorous litigation of the case by both parties drove up the hours expended on the case. Having reviewed Plaintiff's considered Johnson factor one, submitted documents and the time and labor expended, the Court makes the following adjustments to the hours requested in order to eliminate hours that Plaintiff has demonstrate were reasonably billed to this case. adjustments, entries it the Court objects to, notes but that did not the Navy tally the failed to In making such has identified total hours it believes to be improper in order to suggest a specific reduction to the Court. of the 2006) See McDonald ex rel NYSA-IIA Pension Trust Fund, Prendergast v. 450 F.3d 91, Pension Plan 96 {2d Cir. {"A district court may exercise its discretion and use a percentage deduction as a practical means of trimming fat from a fee application.")(internal citations omitted). however, find that the Navy's objections, The Court does, coupled with the Court's obligation to allow an attorney's fee award only to the 46 extent it is "reasonable," warrants some degree of adjustment to the hours 373 claimed. (4th Cir. 1996) In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 86 F.3d 364, ("A court abuses its discretion i f i t allows a fee without carefully considering the factors relevant to fair compensation." (citing Barber, 577 F.2d at 226)). To account for work that was not adequately documented such that a paying client would likely have reasonably disputed same upon receiving reduced by also to adversary and bill, the ten percent. Hens ley, billed a 461 one's U.S. client pursuant citation to requested See at supra Requested Hours 434 also ("Hours are statutory omitted). "litigation" not that are hours at not properly billed authority.") Additionally, the 30; are see properly to one's (quotation marks hours attributed to the "fee petition" are reduced by twenty-five percent to reflect the duplication of efforts among attorneys and paralegals. supra Requested Hours at 30; McAfee, 738 F.3d at 90 the district court reduced the hours ten percent each because of how Cope land, 641 F.2d at 903 of two they (noting that lead attorneys billed See their by time); (holding that i t was reasonable for a district court to reduce a fee award without performing an item- by-item accounting of the attorney's hours). Finally, supplemental the fee Court notes petition renewed motion for that resulted judgment as a 47 the hours primarily matter of expended from the on the Navy's law made after the Court previously had carefully considered and denied motion. In doing so, significant additional the Navy required Plaintiff the to time responding to such motion, increasing Plaintiff's attorney's fees. same expend thereby The Court easily finds the hours Plaintiff billed to respond to the Navy's motion to be reasonable. to Additionally, Plaintiff's considerable responsive detailed, fee time due to the Navy's specific objections petition. siibmitting declarations. thorough, Plaintiff forty These was eight required additional declarations by to spend pages Plaintiff of are and helpful to the Court in evaluating each contention raised by the Navy. As such, time spent to assemble these responses the Court finds to be reasonable. the Thus, the Court makes no reduction to the hours requested by Plaintiff in the supplemental fee petition for the time spent responding to the Navy's objections to post-trial the fee motion petition. and answering Accordingly, the the Navy's Court recognizes the following hours as reasonably spent by Plaintiff in this litigation: 48 , Name HOtTRS Fee Supplemental Total Petition Fee Petition Hoors Litigation Ann Sullivan 1,055.9 30.2 69.5 1,155.6 Melissa Picco 559. 6 9.2 49.1 617.9 Deborah Collins 568.2 34 .6 115.8 718.6 David Pearline 99.0 47.4 42.333 188.733 Angela Mastin (para) 538 .8 57.9 73 .7 670.4 Skylar Gallagher (para) 672.6 672.6 B. Thomas Reed (para) 330.5 330.5 c. Lodestar Summary Based analysis upon the outlined reasonable above, the Court's lodestar calculation, attorney's fee award prior hours following and reasonable table rate reflects the which is the starting point for an to any adjustments in step two or three of the required analysis. Hotos Hours Requested Awarded 1,259.6 1,155.6 $ 400 $ 462,240.00 Melissa Picco 661.3 617. 9 $ 315 $ 194,638.50 Deborah Collins 793.2 718.6 $ 235 $ 168,871.00 215.58 188.733 $ 375 $ 70,774.88 Angela Mastin (para) 749.6 670.4 $ 125 $ 83,800.00 Skylar Gallagher (para) 747.3 672.6 $ 100 $ 67,260.00 B. Thomas Reed (para) 367.2 330.5 $ 150 $ 49,575.00 Name Ann Sullivan David Pearline TOTAL Lodestar Figure Rate Total $ 1,097,159.38 49 2. Adjustment for Unsuccessful Unrelated Claims After a lodestar determine whether the figure fee is calculated, the Court must award should be reduced to reflect the time counsel spent on unsuccessful claims that are unrelated to the successful plaintiff's theories, claims, claims. claims Robinson, are based 560 on F.3d at and the legal and the plaintiff has prevailed on only some of those . . . these unrelated claims [must] they had been raised in separate lawsuits, may be awarded for 789 (1989). but not However, others and be treated as Garland Indep. when a the if and therefore no fee services on the unsuccessful claim." State Teachers Ass'n v. facts, "Where facts different 244. Sch. Dist., Texas 489 U.S. 782, plaintiff prevails on some issues claims arise "out of a common core of and involve related legal theories," a district court may exercise its discretion to arrive at a reasonable fee award, "either by attempting to identify specific hours that should be eliminated or by simply reducing the limited success of the plaintiff." Navy Plaintiff argues that "fruitless challenges" objections that denied. objections observes were Def.'s as that "fruitless" there upon ultimately Br. is Id. should based Resp. award to account 22 50 not a either to by the Here, the compensated for of and 789-90. be number {listing efforts merit at for motions fully or thirteen Plaintiff). the Navy's partially motions The argument and Court that Plaintiff spent time on issues that ultimately were of little or no significance at trial. hearing the before "eight material the second fact. For example, district delay" At court, of trial, TTY the at the summary judgment Plaintiff was Court a represented significant commented that that issue it of relied upon Plaintiff's representation of the importance of the eight second delay to, that moment ECF No. it 332, troubling" in part, had at deny summary judgment, but that as of heard 36. "not As a word noted on the about it record, in the trial." that was "really to the Court due to Plaintiff's prior representation of its significance.^® However, while Id. Plaintiff did not claims or each motion made throughout acknowledges that Plaintiff's claims prevail the arose upon all litigation, from of her the Navy "a common core of facts." Def.'s Resp. Br. 24. In light of the common core of facts, Navy would the agrees that it be more appropriate to consider Plaintiff's lack of success on specific claims within the " overall While this adjustment issue is due significant to to Plaintiff's note in the lack context of of success awarding plaintiff attorney's fees, as the Court previously ruled, it was not dispositive on the issue of whether a material fact remained for the jury. As the Court explained in ruling on the Navy's renewed Rule 50(b) motion: "[T]he Court stated that 'it may be' that the evidence, including the general evidence of delays, presented by Plaintiff in her case-in-chief 'creates a jury issue on whether or not a TTY would be sufficient to allow Ms. Crump to perform the essential functions of her job,' but i t was unfortunate that Plaintiff's summary judgment argument against co-defendant TCA specifically asserted an eight second delay and no witness had specifically referenced such eight second delay during the case-in-chief." Nov. 30, 3016 Mem. Op., ECF No. 368, at 7. 51 overall instead of a specific Navy does not for hours spent on unsuccessful ones] be can (noting civil that contend readily the rights Senate cases cited on "certain litigation). of Thus, analysis and [by Id. ("The subtracting fees claims unrelated to successful Report fees in hours. an adjustment calculated."); authorized attorney's losses that reduction Hensley, 461 U.S. authorizing attorney's numerous 430 fees in approvingly that to prevailing parties despite their minor cases at contentions" throughout the the Court makes no adjustment at this stage moves on to considering Plaintiff's overall success on the merits. 3. Adjustment for Degree of Success The final step in detennining a reasonable calculating a percentage of the lodestar figure account the Grissom, 549 F.3d at 321 described only "'degree in greater "partial or of success enjoyed by (quoting Johnson, detail limited above, success," award a as the plaintiff.'" plaintiff in this faith." Hensley, adjustment the to the Court notes "amount "interrelated, in 461 U.S. nonfrivolous, at lodestar figure 436. In case, controversy and the 52 results the that and raised in good concluding is appropriate that Johnson factor eight, As achieves lodestar figure may be excessive notwithstanding the fact all claims were is that takes into 278 F.3d at 337). when such fee that in this an case, which evaluates the obtained," not was subsumed figure, within but figure. is the considered McAfee, Farrar, 506 738 U.S. 114 30, discovery litigated Plaintiff and litigation. summary the the lodestar (emphasis added); see also adjustment overall judgment success case, Navy it of . . . goes to the is "one 206, readily succeeded of the most ever seen in this court." ECF No. on Plaintiff's in at 25. apparent certain constructive In this that aspects of both this demonstrated claim, that i t did so with the Sept. 2015 Op. at 128. Plaintiff was not substantial amount of damages that she sought. of discharge "no reasonable finder of fact could conclude that, intent to force Plaintiff to quit." recovery omitted) the Magistrate Judges if the Navy failed to accommodate Plaintiff, also marks The Navy succeeded when the Court granted the Navy holding that Navy to quotation disputes, 2015 Proceeding, intensely lodestar according to one resolving of Sept. the (internal thoroughly litigated ADA cases Tr. the determining fee award."). case was, in in the plaintiff's reasonableness of a involved analysis F.3d at 89-90 at ("[T]he degree of This prior substantial punitive, to the Plaintiff sought compensatory, damages for a variety of purported harms, substantial childcare expenses, entitled The and equitable including recovery for recovery for losses relating to two rental properties in the amount of $87,870.75, recovery for the sell loss of appreciation for stocks 53 she had to in the amount of $129,281.15, relating recovery for the loss of a to her 401k in the amount of "tax benefit" $2,594.00, and recovery for interest paid on a loan to pay her attorney in the amount of $3,166.67. 79-3, Pl.'s at 16-18, 2d Supp. professional advancement for emotional reputation, due to the anguish, of standing, character life, Finally, Navy. returned emotional distress, inconvenience, self-esteem, stress, injury to reputation, injury to Following for a two-week Plaintiff loss of professional on the jury trial, failure to the jury accommodate her requested damages. Verdict 314. these matters the judgment regarding holding that where the Navy enjoyed it is clear from the record that Plaintiff "prevailing party." page opinion, of Id. significant success, the loss and Notwithstanding is period for credit verdict ECF No. opportunities unemployment, claim but awarded her none of Form, of damage Plaintiff also sought punitive damages against Id. a Plaintiff sought of anxiety, and ECF No. consequential damages and other injury." financial anxiety, the loss embarrassment, enjoyment at 19. Disclosures, pain and suffering, prolonged emotional pain and suffering, mental 26{1)(1) In addition to these damages. "compensatory damages to Rule In a one hundred and twenty-nine Court granted Plaintiff's motion for the "[f]or Navy's the status purposes 54 as of Plaintiff's summary employer, Rehabilitation Act liability, the Navy was employer doctrine," Plaintiff's employer under the joint and simultaneously denied the Navy's motion for summary judgment on the defense of administrative exhaustion because the Court determined that there was a genuine dispute of material fact. Sept. 2015 Op. at 128. Having established that the Navy was a joint employer, Plaintiff achieved a significant legal when found victory the provide Plaintiff a jury that the Navy failed to reasonable accommodation as required by the Rehabilitation Act. Verdict Form, ECF No. 314. Moreover, upon hearing additional evidence on Plaintiff's request for equitable relief, the Court awarded Plaintiff back pay damages $40,842.42, plus pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. of Sept. 2016 Op. at 337. Considering all of the above, 55% reduction in attorney's fees the Court concludes that a is appropriate in this case to reflect Plaintiff's tangible victory by prevailing on the merits before the jury and receiving a substantial award of back-pay by the Court, success while also taking into account in defending against Plaintiff's discharge and in persuading the jury to the Navy's claim of constructive award no compensatory damages on Plaintiff's reasonable accommodation claim. 461 U.S. at 436-37 formula" for reducing a court "may simply (noting that the award"); 55 Hensley, "[t]here is no precise rule or fee award for a reduce complete lack of success but the Deming v. Kanawha City Co., a 852 F.2d 565, 565 (4th Cir. 1988) (upholding under Hens ley district court's seventy-five percent reduction of attorney's fees due to appellants' limited success). fee award is to $493,721.72. in this case Such therefore total fee of $31,848.70 to Mr. Pearline, IV. Having performed the reduced figure $461,873.02 to Sullivan Legal Group, required a fee "lodestar analysis," adjusted success represents of and a Conclusion n.28, of $1,097,159.38 Plaintiff's co-counsel. the Johnson factors. "degree from Plaintiff's counsel, considered all of and having The total attorney's the Barber, lodestar achieved" by Plaintiff's motion for attorney's and Plaintiff's motion for No. 340; ECF No. 372. fees 577 F.2d at 226 to reflect the figure Plaintiff, and supplemental having the Court GRANTS litigation expenses attorney's fees. ECF After making a downward adjustment to the total hours requested by Plaintiff and adjusting for Plaintiff's overall success, Plaintiff in the the amount represents a Plaintiff's counsel, Plaintiff's Court fee of hereby of $493,721.72. $461,873.02 and a AWARDS fee of co-counsel. 56 to attorney's Such Sullivan $31,848.70 fees to total figure Legal Group, to Mr. Pearline, The Clerk is REQUESTED to send a copy of this Opinion and Order to all counsel of record. IT IS SO ORDERED. /S/ Mark S. Davis UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Norfolk, Virginia March , 2017 57

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.