Mack v. Wilson, No. 1:2014cv00259 - Document 14 (E.D. Va. 2015)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Anthony J Trenga on 3/4/15. (gwalk, )
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Mack v. Wilson Doc. 14 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Alexandria Division Haywood Mack, Petitioner, I:14cv259 (AJT/JFA) V. Eric D. Wilson, Respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION Haywood Mack, a federal inmatehousedin the Eastern Districtof Virginia and proceedingpro has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the Bureau of Prisons' ("BOP's") decision not to granthim earlyrelease upon successful completion of the Residential Drug Abuse Program ("RDAP"). On June 30,2014, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, or inthe Alternative, a Motion for Summary Judgment.' Petitioner was given the opportunityto file responsive materials, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison. 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), and he filed a response on July 16,2014. Respondent then filed a reply to petitioner's response on July 23, 2014. For the reasonsthat follow. Respondent's Motion must be granted and petitioner's claims must be dismissed. I. Background Petitioner is currently servinga 57-month sentence, enteredon June 10,2013 in the District ofVermont, for conspiracy to distribute cocaine base. S^ Memorandum in Support of Respondent's Motion to Dismiss or, intheAlternative, Motion for Summary Judgment ("Resp.'s Mem.") [Dkt. 9], Ex. 1 (Baker Decl.) H5; Att. 1. Petitioner is currently held at FCC Petersburg, Because respondent's Motion contained supporting exhibits, which the Court considered, this Motion will be construed as one for Summary Judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d). Dockets.Justia.com and is projected to be released from confinement on August 10,2016, through the accrual of good-time credit. Resp.'s Mem., Ex. 1H5. OnJuly 15,2013, petitioner was approved to participate in RDAP. Id. f 6. RDAP is a residential drug treatment program thatthe BOP created to exercise its congressionally-mandated duty to provide residential drug treatment for offenders with drug addiction. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(1) ("[T]he Bureau of Prisons shall, subjectto the availability of appropriations, provide residential substance abuse treatment [to specified offenders] "). To qualify for admission, an inmate must "have a verifiable substance abuse disorder," must sign an agreement acknowledging his responsibility to complete the program, andmustbe ableto complete all aspects of the program. 28 C.F.R. § 550.53(b). After petitioner was found qualified for RDAP, BOP legal staff conducted an "offense review" to determine whether he would qualify for early release upon successful completion of the program. ^ Resp.'s Mem., Ex. 11?;^ also id. Att. 5, at 1,6. Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 550.55, inmates who were sentenced for a "nonviolent offense" are entitled to early release upon successful completion of RDAP. See 28 C.F.R. § 550.55(a)(l)(i)-(ii). Inmates witha current felony conviction for crimesinvolving the use of force, the use of a firearm, serious harmto another, or sexual abuse of minors are ineligible for early release. Id § 550.55(b)(5). Also ineligible for early release are inmates with a "prior felony or misdemeanor conviction for... (i) homicide ...; (ii) forcible rape; (iii) robbery; (iv) aggravated assauh; (v) arson; (vi) kidnaping; or (vii) an offense that by its nature orconduct involves sexual abuse offenses committed upon minors." Id § 550.55(b)(4). Under the regulations, the age ofthe past offense is irrelevant to the early-release eligibility calculation. Resp.'s Mem., Ex. 1 ^ 13. After a review of petitioner's Judgment and Commitment Order, presentence investigation report, and other sentencing information, BOP legal staff concluded that petitioner was not eligible for early release upon completion of RDAP. id. H9. BOP legal staff came to this conclusion upon learning that petitioner pled guilty to robbery in the first degree in 1991 in a New York state court. id. BOP legal staff concluded that the elements of robbery in the first degree under New York law were sufficiently similar to the elements of robbery defined in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reporting Program, which the BOP uses as a uniform definition of robbery governing all early release decisions. id. tH 14-15. Accordingly, petitioner was found ineligible for early release, pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b)(4). Petitioner appealed his denial of early release to the Warden. He then filed appeals to the BOP's regional office and the BOP's central office. Resp.'s Mem., Ex. 2 (Coll DecL), Att. 2, at unnumbered pages 1-6. Accordingly, it is uncontested that petitioner exhausted all of his claims and that this matter is ripe for review on the merits. In the instant petition, petitioner claimsthat the BOP's decisionto not grant him early release violates his constitutional rights. He also claims that 28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b), as implemented, violates the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). 11. Standard of Review Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, andadmissions on file, together withthe affidavits, if any, show thatthere is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movingparty is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Themoving partybears the burden of proving thatjudgment as a matter of law is appropriate. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317,323 (1986). To meet that burden, the moving party must demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact are present for resolution. Id at 322. Once a moving party has met its burden to show that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to point out the specific facts that create disputed factual issues. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc.. 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, a district court should consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of that party. United States v. Diebold. Inc.. 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). Those facts which the moving party bears the burden of proving are facts which are material. "[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts which might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson. 477 U.S. at 248; also Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera. 249 F.3d 259,265 (4th Cir. 2001). An issue of material fact is genuine when, "the evidence ... create[s] [a] fair doubt; wholly speculative assertions will not suffice." Ross v. Commc'ns Satellite Corp.. 759 F.2d 355,364 (4th Cir. 1985\ abrogated on other groimds bv Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). Thus, summary judgment is appropriate only where no material facts are genuinely disputed and the evidence as a whole could not lead a rational fact finder to rule for the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.. 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). III. Analysis A. BOP's Decision did not Violate Petitioner's Constitutional Rights Petitioneralleges that the BOP's decision to deny him early release violated his constitutional rights. Specifically, he asserts that the decision violated his Fifth Amendment right against Double Jeopardy, his Due Process rights, his Equal Protection rights, and his Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. However, the decision to denypetitioner early release does not violate any of petitioner's constitutional rights. First, petitioner states thatthedecision to deny himearly release "violated [his] rightto be [free] from Double Jeopardy since [he] is beingpunished twice for the same offense." Memorandum of Lawin Support of Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Pet.'s Mem.") [Dtk. 12], at 4. However, the Double Jeopardy Clause protects onlyagainst a second prosecution for the same offense aftereithera conviction or acquittal and multiple punishments for the same offense. See United Statesv. Haloen 490 U.S. 435,400 (1989), abrogated on other grounds bv Hudson V. United States. 522U.S. 93 (1997). Although petitioner seems to imply thatthe useof hispast conviction for robbery to disqualify him for early release constitutes multiple punishments forhis pastconviction, s^ Pet.'s Mem., at 3-4, petitioner has not been subject to any additional punishment for this offense. This past offensemerelyprecludes him from the benefit of being released early from his current sentence. Second,petitioneralleges that the denial of his early release violates his Due Process rights. The protections of the Due Process Clause, however, only attach to vested liberty interests. SeeBd. of Regents of State Colls, v. Roth. 408 U.S. 564, 569(1972) ("The requirements of procedural dueprocess apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property."). Petitioner has no constitutionally-protected liberty interest in early release from his federal sentence. See Greenholtz v. Inmates ofNeb. Penal & Corr. Complex. 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Accordingly, BOP did notdeny him any Due Process protections byits refusal to grant his early release. Third, petitioner states that his Equal Protection rights were violated because, "prior to 1997, the BOP was allowing inmates with prior offenses to receive the time off [due to a previous policy]." Petitioner's Response to Government's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Pet.'s Resp.") [Dkt. 10], at 3. He seems to state that, because he was convicted of robbery in 1991, he should be treated the same as other offenders convicted of robbery in 1991. To state an Equal Protection violation, however, petitioner must show that he "has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful deliberation." Morrison v. Garraghtv. 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001). Petitioner is currently "similarly situated" to other inmates in federal custody who have completed the RDAP program and have a past conviction of robbery. There is no indication that he has been treated any differently than these individuals. Thus, his Equal Protection claim has no merit. Last, petitioner states that the denial of his early release constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. To establish a claim for cruel and unusual punishment due to conditions of confinement, however, petitioner must allege facts sufficient to show (1) an objectively serious deprivation of a basic human need causing serious physical or emotional injury, and (2) that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to that need. Farmer v. Brennan. 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Wilson v. Seiter. 501 U.S. 294,198 (1991). Petitionerhas not provided any facts supporting his allegations of cruel and unusual punishment. Accordingly, his Eighth Amendment claim must be dismissed. B. BOP's Policv does not Violate the Administrative Procedure Act Petitioner also alleges that 28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b)(4), disqualifying him from earlyrelease due to his priorconviction, violates the APA. He specifically states thatthe categorical exclusion of inmates withhis priorconviction from early release is an arbitrary and capricious interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e). Petitioner argues that, under an individualized analysis, he would not be excluded from early release, due to the age and nonviolent nature of his conviction. Petitioner's arguments haveno merit. Determining whether an agency has validly interpreted its own statute under the APA is governed by the familiar two-step process laid out in Chevron. U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def Council. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). "First, always, is the question whetherCongress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;... [but] if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specificissue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible interpretation of the statute." Id at 842-43. Reviewunder the APA is deferential, see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.. 463 U.S. 29,43 (1983), and agency action only be overturned if the agency action is, as relevant here, "arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;" in excess of the agency's legal authority; or in violation of required procedure." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(D). Here, although Congress clearly intended, in § 3621(e), for the BOPto implement substance abuse treatment programs, the statute is silentas to the "specific issue" of which individual inmates may be entitled to early release. Section 3621(e)(2)(B) statesthat the BOP "may" reduce the term of imprisonment of any individual convicted of a "nonviolent offense." The law does not, however, specifically define the term. This lackof a specific definition thus gives the BOP discretion to define the term, s^ Chevron. 467 U.S. at 843-44, and the BOP has done so several times smce 1995, in the provisions of 28 C.F.R. §§ 550.50-.55. The specific history of these definitions is not relevant to this litigation. However, the BOP's discretion to determine which inmates qualify for early release is broad. ^ Lopez v. Davis. 531 U.S. 230, 239-40 (2001). This discretion extends, contrary to petitioner's representation, to the categorical exclusion of specific classes of inmates. In Lopez, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the BOP, in implementing the provisions of 28 C.F.R. § 550.55, had the power to make both individualized and categorical decisions. Lopez. 531 U.S. at 243-44 (quoting Am. Hosp. Ass'n. v. NLRB. 499 U.S. 606, 612 (1991)) ("'[E]ven if a statutory scheme requires individualized determinations,' which this scheme does not, 'the decisionmaker has the authority to rely on rulemaking to resolve certain issues of general applicability unless Congress clearly expresses an intent to withhold that authority.'"). The Ninth Circuit applied this same logic to the specific provision here, 28 C.F.R. § 550.555(b)(4), finding that BOP had the authority to categorically exclude inmates with certain types of past convictions, including robbery, fi-om early release. Peck V. Thomas. 697 F.3d 767, 773-74 (9th Cir. 2012). The Ninth Circuit also found that the BOP's decision to categorically exclude certain classes of inmates was supported by the administrative record. This Court agrees. In 2004, the BOP expanded the list of disqualifying past convictions to include homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, arson, and kidnapping. The BOP stated that: In exercising the Director's statutory discretion, we considered [these crimes], as identified in the Uniform Crime Reporting Program (UCR), which is a collective effort of city, county, state, tribal, and federal law enforcement agencies to present a nationwide view on crime. [These crimes] are identified in the UCR due to their inherently violent nature and particular danger to the public. The Direct of the Bureau exercises discretion to deny early release eligibility to inmates who have a prior felony or misdemeanor conviction for these offenses because commission of such offenses rationally reflects the view that such inmates displayed readiness to endanger the public. Drug Abuse Treatment Program: Subpart Revision and Clarification, 74 Fed. Reg. 1892,1894 (Jan. 14, 2009). The BOP's justification for its decision was rational and based on a reasonable exercise of the agency's discretion. Accordingly, this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n.. 463 U.S. at 29. The BOP's decision to categorically exclude a certain class of inmates from early release therefore does not violate the APA, and it was not required to make an individualized determination of petitioner's status. IV. Conclusion For the above stated reasons, respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted. An appropriate Judgment and Order shall issue. Entered this Alexandria, Virginia day of 2015. Anthony J. Trenga , United States Distrif (judge
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