Edwards v. Virginia Department of Corrections, No. 1:2014cv00171 - Document 20 (E.D. Va. 2015)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION - For the foregoing reasons, petitioner's petition was filed beyond the one-year limitations period of § 2244(d)(2), and no equitable tolling is available. Accordingly, this petition will be dismissed. An appropriate Judgment and Order will issue. Signed by District Judge Gerald Bruce Lee on 03/23/2015. (dvanm, )
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Edwards v. Virginia Department of Corrections Doc. 20 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Alexandria Division Vincent Lee Edwards, Petitioner, I:14cvl71 (GBL/IDD) v. Virginia Dep't of Corn, Respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION This Matter comes before the Court upon review of respondent's Motion to Dismiss. Vincent Lee Edwards, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se,has filed a petition for a writof habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the validity of his conviction in the Circuit Courtfor the County of Williamsburg/James City, Virginia of abduction with intentto defile, attempted rape, and assault and battery. Respondent has filed a Motion to Dismiss and a Rule 5 Answer, with a supporting briefandnumerous exhibits. Petitioner was given the opportunity to file responsive materials, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison. 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), and he has filed a reply. For the reasons that follow, petitioner's claimsmust be dismissed. I. Background OnAugust 2,2010, petitioner was found guilty in a bench trial of assault andbattery. The trialjudge reserved ruling on petitioner's attempted rape and abduction with intentto defile charges. Commonwealth v. Edwards. CaseNos. CR10019257-00, CR10019188-00, CR10019189-00. On September 17, 2010, the court found petitioner guilty of abduction with intent to defile and attempted rape, and sentenced him to ten years in prison. Petitioner pursued a direct appeal to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, arguing thatthe evidence was insufficient to Dockets.Justia.com support his conviction. The Court of Appeals denied thepetition for appeal and affirmed the conviction onMay 6,2011. Edwards v. Commonwealth. R. No. 2108-10-1 (Va. Ct. App. 2011). OnOctober 8,2011 the Supreme Court ofVirginia refused the petition for appeal. Edwards v. Commonwealth. R. No. 111025 (Va. 2011). OnMay 30,2012,petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court ofVirginia, arguing that (1) the prosecutor improperly commented onpetitioner's prior assault conviction; and (2) his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance ofcounsel for failing to objectto the prosecutor's comments. The court dismissed the petition on December 19,2012. Edwards v. Dir. of the Dep't of Corr.. R. No. 120915 (Va. 2012). Petitioner statesthat he attempted to mail a petition for rehearing to the Supreme Court of Virginia onJanuary 15,2013. However, the Supreme Court ofVirginia never received the petition for rehearing, apparently due to the fact that the petition was mailed to anincorrect address. See Petitioner's Responsive Pleading ("Pet's Resp.") [Dkt. 5], at unnumbered page 6 (mail log of the St. Bride's Correctional Center prison logshowing mail to the Supreme Court of Virginia, addressed to 900 East Main Street, Richmond, VA 23219); http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/home.html (listing the address of the Supreme Court of Virginia as P.O. Box 1315, North Ninth Street, 5th Floor, Richmond, VA 23219-1315). This petition for rehearing was never adjudicated by the Supreme Court of Virginia. OnApril 1,2013, petitioner requested an extension of time to file a petition for rehearing. Thecourt denied his request on April 23, 2013. On orabout February 12, 2014, petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition,1 arguing that (1) the evidence presented attrial was insufficient to support his conviction; and (2) | For purposes ofcalculating the statute oflimitations, apetition is deemed filed when the prisoner delivers his pleading to prison officials. Houston v. Lack. 487 U.S. 266 (1988). Petitioner did not include adate on his original petition, and did not certify when he placed itin the prison mail system. The court received his petition on February 12,2014. theprosecutor improperly mentioned petitioner's past conviction during trial. OnAugust 27, 2014, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss petitioner's claims. Petitioner filed a response on September 15,2014. Based on the pleadings and record beforethis Court, it is uncontested that petitioner exhausted all of his claims asrequired under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. However, this petition must be dismissed as barred by the applicable statute of limitations. II. Timeliness A § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be dismissed if filed more than one year after (1) thejudgment of conviction becomes final; (2) the removal of any state-created impediment to the filing of the petition; (3) recognition bythe United States Supreme Court of the constitutional right asserted; or (4) the factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered with due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(l)(A)-(D). Based on the records of the stateproceedings, petitioner's conviction became final on January 16,2012, thelast day on which he could have petitioned theUnited States Supreme Court for awrit ofcertiorari.2 In calculating the one-year statute oflimitations period, however, a federal court must toll any time during which "a properly filed application for State post conviction or other collateral review... is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Whether a state post-conviction proceeding is "properly filed" is determined by applicable state law, as interpreted by state courts. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo. 544 U.S. 408,413 (2005); Artuzv. Bennett. 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000). Petitioner filed his petition for a writ ofhabeas corpus inthe Supreme Court ofVirginia on May 30, 2012. At thattime, 135 days of the one-year limitations period had run. The court denied his petition on December 19, 2012. Accordingly, the period between May 30, 2012 and 2See U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13(1) (petitions for awrit ofcertiorari are timely iffiled within 90 days ofthe entry of final judgment by a state court oflast resort). December 19,2012 tolledthe running of the statute of limitations. Between December 19,2012, and February 12,2014, when this Court received this federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus, an additional 421 days passed. Added together, 556 days passed between the date petitioner's conviction became final and the date on which he filed his federal petition. Accordingly, petitioner filed his petition 191 days beyond the one-year statute of limitations. Petitioner's attempt to file a petition for rehearing of the Supreme Court of Virginia's denial of his state petition for a writ of habeas corpus did not toll the running of the statuteof limitations, as his petition for rehearing was notproperly filed. Virginia Supreme Court Rule 5:20(b) provides that, when the court denies a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a petitioner has thirty days after the entry ofjudgment to file a motion forrehearing. Accordingly, petitioner haduntil January 19,2013 to file a petition for rehearing withthe Virginia Supreme Court. Rule 5:5(a) provides that, for good cause shown, twojudges of the court may grant an additional thirty-day extension of time to file any pleading with the court. Thus,the court could have provided petitioner an additional thirty days, until February 19,2013, to submit hispetition for rehearing. Aspetitioner did not submit his request for anextension oftime to file a petition for rehearing until April 1,2013, his request was not "properly filed," and did nottoll therunning of the statute of limitations.3 III. Equitable Tolling Petitioner argues that, although his petition was not timely filed, the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled due tothe fact that the Supreme Court ofVirginia "actively misled Even if the petition forrehearing had tolled the running of the statute of limitations, this federal petition would still be time-barred. In this scenario, the period between May 30,2012 and April 23, 2013 would have been tolled. However, 296 days elapsed between April 23,2013 and February 12,2014, when petitioner filed his federal petition. Added tothe 135 days that passed before petitioner filed his state petition for a writ ofhabeas corpus, 431 days would have passed. Accordingly, the petition would still have been filed 66 days beyond the one-year limitations period. [petitioner]... about [a] cause of action." Pet's Resp., at unnumbered page 2 (quoting Coleman v. Johnson. 184 F.3d 398,402 (5th Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds bv Richards v. Thaler. 710 F.3d 573 (5th Cir. 2013)). The United States Supreme Court has held that "§ 2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases." Holland v. Florida. 560 U.S. 631, 634 (2010). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has also held that thelimitations may beequitably tolled in limited circumstances. See, e^ Rouse v. Lee. 246 (4th Cir. 2003). However, the Fourth Circuit and several other courts have heldthat "any resort to equity must be reserved for those instances where - due to circumstances external to the party's own conduct - it would be unconscionable to enforce the limitation period against theparty and gross injustice would result." Id. at 246. Therefore, for equitable tolling to apply, a petitioner must establish that (1) he has been diligently pursuing his rights, and that (2) some "extraordinary circumstance," beyond his control and external to hisown conduct, interfered with his ability to timely file hispetition. Holland. 560 U.S. at 649 (quoting Pace. 544 U.S. at 418). Court should equitably toll the statute of limitations only in rare situations, "lest circumstances of individualized hardship supplantthe rules of clearlydrafted statutes." Harris v. Hutchinson. 209 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2000). Petitioner argues that the information he received from the Supreme Court of Virginia informing him of thepossibility of moving for an extension of time to file a petition for rehearing was misleading, asthe court then "arbitrarily denied" hisrequest for an extensionof time. Pet's Resp., at unnumbered pages 3-4. Petitioner's argument has no merit, however. Petitioner wrote a letter to the Supreme Court ofVirginia on March 1, 2013, inquiring about the status ofhis petition for rehearing. He was informed by letter dated March 4,2013 that no petition for rehearing had been received. See Pet's Resp., at unnumbered page 7. Areview ofthe Supreme Court of Virginia's docket reflects that no petition for rehearing was received or adjudicated by the courtin petitioner's case. Petitioner apparently wrote two more letters to the Supreme Court of Virginia inquiring about an extension of time to file a petition forrehearing. See id. at unnumbered page 8. In response, petitioner received another letter from the Supreme Court of Virginia informing himthat, if he "wish[ed] to file an extension of time to file [his] petition for rehearing[J the greatest extension oftime this office can give is 30days beyond the date inwhich the petition for rehearing was due."4 Id. As petitioner's petition for rehearing was due no later than January 19,2013, this letter clearly gave petitioner notice thatthe latest date on which he could have filed a petition for rehearing was February 19,2013, a date which had already passed. Asthese letters accurately reflected the Rules ofthe Supreme Court ofVirginia, the court did not actively mislead petitioner as to a cause of action. Evenwithout active misdirection by the state court, however, a petitioner's lack of knowledge thata state court has reached a decision onhiscase canconstitute ground for equitable tolling ofthe statute of limitations. See, e^g,, Woodward v. Williams. 263 F.3d 1135, 1143 (10th Cir. 2001); Phillips v. Donnelly. 216 F.2d 508, 511 (5th Cir. 2000), amended. 233 F.3d 797 (5th Cir. 2000). However, a petitioner with such lack ofknowledge can only take advantage of equitable tolling if he "has acted diligently in the matter." Williams. 263 F.3d at 1143. Although petitioner mailed his motion for rehearing on January 15,2013, he apparently sent his motion to an incorrect address. He did not follow up to ensure that the Supreme Court of Virginia received his motion, and didnotmail a letter asking about thestatus of his motion until March 1,2013, nearly two months after he mailed the motion. Thus, petitioner has not shown 4This letter is also dated March 4, 2013. This date appears to be in error, as it clearly references letters received from petitioner dated March 11,2013 and March 21 2013. that he was diligently pursuing his rightsduring the time in whichhe attempted to file a motion for rehearing in the Supreme Court of Virginia. In addition, petitioner waited an additional ten months after learning that the Supreme Court of Virginia denied his petition for rehearing before filing his petition in this Court. As stated above, his petition was filed 191 days beyond the one-year time limit. Petitioner offers no explanation as to why he waitedfor such a longperiodof time to file his federal petition. A prisoner who fails to diligently protect his rights cannot takeadvantage of equitable tolling. See, e.g.. Pace. 544 U.S. at 419 (internal citations omitted); Spencer v. Sutton. 239 F.3d 626,630-31 (4th Cir. 2001). Therefore, equitable tolling is not applicable to this case. Because the petition must be dismissedas time-barred, the Court need not analyze other procedural defenses or the merits of petitioner's claims. IV. Conclusion Forthe foregoing reasons, petitioner's petition was filed beyond the one-year limitations period of § 2244(d)(2), and no equitable tolling is available. Accordingly, this petition will be dismissed. An appropriate Judgment and Order will issue. Entered this Igfl day of M#{f,\ 2015. hL Gerald Bruce Lee Alexandria, Virginia United States District Judge
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