Alipui v. Byerson et al, No. 1:2014cv00103 - Document 52 (E.D. Va. 2015)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Claude M. Hilton on 6/2/15. (c/s)(gwalk, )
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Alipui v. Byerson et al Doc. 52 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Alexandria Division Christopher Alipui, Plaintiff, I:14cvl03 (GBL/JFA) V. Brian Byerson, et aL, Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION This Matter comes before the Court upon a review of defendant Brian Byerson's First Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Christopher Alipui, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,alleging that he is entitledto damages for an illegal search and seizureby members of the Fairfax County Police Department. Plaintiffhas named Byerson and four unnamed Fairfax County police officers as defendants. Defendant Byerson was served with process on December 15,2014, and has filed an answerto the complaintand a Motion to Dismiss, accompanied by a supporting memorandum. Dkt. 40,41,42. Defendant also filed the Notice required by Local Rule 7(K) and Roseboro v. Garrison. 528 F.2d309 (4th Cir. 1975). Plaintiff has filed a response to defendant's Motion, and defendant has filed a reply to plaintiffs response. Dkt. 48,49. Plaintiffhas also filed an "Ex Parte Motion for Continuance to Obtain Counsel or be Appointed One by the Court." Dkt. 51. For the reasons that follow, defendant's Motion to Dismiss will be granted, and plaintiffs Motion will be denied, as moot. As the reasons below apply to plaintiffs claims against defendant Byerson as well as the unnamed police officers, the remaining defendants will not be served with process, and the case will bedismissed inits entirety. Dockets.Justia.com 1. Background Plaintiffs complaint arises out of his January 18, 2012 arrest. On that day, plaintiff received a call from his fiiend Brianna, whom he had sold airline tickets to in the past, and asked himto selltickets to her friend. Compl. 10. At approximately 9:30 p.m., plaintiffvisited Brianna andher friend in theirhotel room in Alexandria, anddiscussed the airline purchase with Brianna's friend. Id. Plaintiffthen heard a knock at the door. Brianna opened the door, and three Fairfax county police officers, including defendant Byerson, entered the room. Id.111. Theofficers told Brianna that they had received a call about someone smoking marijuana in the hotel room, and gained consent to search the room. Id; Def.'s Answer K11. The officers asked plaintifffor identification and asked plaintiffwhy he was present in the room withthe two women. Compl. ^12. When plaintiffexplained thathe was selling an airline ticket, the defendants requested proof of this fact. Id 113. The officers then askedto search plaintiffs phone, butherefused to consent to such a search. The officers then searched plaintiffs personand seizedhis two cell phones, bankcard, gift cards, and car keys. Id The officers then searched plaintiffs carandseized additional electronic devices. Id T[ 14. Plaintiff was arrested and brought to theFairfax County Police station. Id UK 14-15.' OnJanuary 19,2012, plaintiffwas charged with five counts ofcredit card theft, pursuant to Virginia Code § 18.2-192, as well as one count of unauthorized possession of two or more credit cards, pursuant to Virginia Code § 18.2-194. Def's Answer 117; Ex. 1. Plaintiffwas held without bond on these charges until March 14,2012, when the charges were nolle prossed by the Commonwealth's Attorney. Compl. T[ 18. Plaintiffs case was then transferred to this Court, where hewas indicted for five counts of bank fraud, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1344; three counts of ^Plaintiffsays that the officers threatened him with pepper spray and ataser ifhe refused to be taken to the station. aggravated identity theft, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1028A; one count of passport fraud, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1542; and three counts of unlawful use of a social security number, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 408(a)(8). Def.'s Answer f 18; Ex. 2-3. On January 22,2013, plaintiffplead guilty in this Court to one count of bank fraud and one count of aggravatedidentity theft. Def's Answer, Ex. 4. Plaintiff filed this action on January 8,2014, alleging that the defendants violated his Fourth Amendmentrights during the events ofJanuary 18,2012. He also alleged that the defendants engagedin a conspiracy to violatehis FourthAmendment rights. 11. Standard of Review Defendant's Motion is filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), which permits a partyto moveforjudgmenton the pleadings. When analyzing a Rule 12(c) motion, courtsapplythe same standard as applied to a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). S^ Edwards v. Citv of Goldsboro. 178 F.3d231,243 (4thCir. 1999). Under this standard, a courtmustpresume that all factual allegations in the complaint are true, and must draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. See, e.g.. Burbach Broad. Co.of Del, v. Elkins Radio Corp., 278 F.3d 401,406 (4thCir. 2002). Therefore, a court maynotdismiss a complaint if theplaintiffpleads anyplausible set of facts that would entitle him to relief See, e.g.. Conlev v. Gibson. 355 U.S. 41,45-46 (1957). A claim has plausibility if the plaintiffalleges sufficient facts by whicha court could reasonably inferthe defendant's liability. Ashcroft v. labal. 556U.S. 662, 678(2009 (citing Bell Atlantic v. Twomblv. 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). To meet this standard, however, the plaintiff mustdo more than simply allege "threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements " Id (citing Twomblv. 550 U.S. at 555)). Thus, the plaintiffmust allege facts that show more than a "mere possibility of misconduct" by the defendant. Id at 679. While pro se prisoners must meetthe plausibility standard to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,courtsmust also hold complaints filedby prisoners "to lessstringentstandards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers " Haines v. Kemer. 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Liberal construction of a pro ^ prisoner's complaint is particularly appropriate when a prisoner brings a lawsuitunder § 1983 challenging the denial of his civil rights. See Loe v. Armistead. 582 F.2d 1291,1295 (4th Cir. 1978). III. Analysis A. Plaintiffs Constitutional Claims are Foreclosed bv Heck v. Humphrey Plaintifffails to state a claimon whichreliefcan be grantedbecause the doctrine ofHeckv. Humphrey. 512 U.S. 477 (1994) prevents this Courtfrom considering the merits of his constitutional claims. Under Heck, a plaintiffcannot bring a § 1983 action based on anallegedly unconstitutional conviction andimprisonment if reliefin the action would necessarily call into question the validity of the underlying conviction. Id at 486. The Heck doctrine "precludes a prisoner fi-om a collateral attack thatmay result in two inconsistent results - for example, a valid criminal conviction anda valid civil judgment imder § 1983 formonetary damages dueto unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment." Wilson v. Johnson. 535 F.3d 262,265 (4th Cir. 2008). Therefore, a § 1983 damages claim for unconstitutional imprisonment is not appropriate unless and until plaintiffs conviction or sentence "has been reversed ondirect appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ ofhabeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254." Heck. 512 U.S. at 486-87. Plaintiffs § 1983 action arises directly out ofthe legality ofhis arrest and subsequent interrogation. This search, arrest, and interrogationled directly to his indictment in Virginia circuit court and eventual guilty plea in this Court. In Heck, the Court recognized that a § 1983 actionbasedon an allegedly unreasonable search"may lie evenifthe challenged searchproduced evidence that was introduced in a state criminal trial resulting in the § 1983 plaintiffs still-outstanding conviction. Because of doctrines like independent source and inevitable discovery, and especially harmless error, such a § 1983 action, even if successful, would not necessarily imply that the plaintiffs conviction was unlawful." Heck. 512 U.S. at 487 n.7 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). Here, however, plaintiffhas not provided any indication that he would have been convicted absent the challengedsearch, arrest, and interrogation.^ As the Fourth Circuit explained in acase involving achallenge to a search for and seizure of cocaine leading directly to a conviction for drug trafficking: When evidence derived from an illegal search would have to be suppressed in a criminal caseif thejudgment in the § 1983 claimwereto be applied to the criminal case and the suppression would necessarilv invalidate the criminal conviction, the stated principle of Heck would apply, and the § 1983 claim would have to be dismissed; there would be no cause of action under § 1983. It is only when the suppressionofthe evidencerequired by the logical applicationofthe § 1983 action would not necessarilvinvalidatethe underlying convictionthat the § 1983 case can proceed. In this case, the suppression of the evidence seized pursuant to the challenged search . . . would necessarilv imply invalidity of the criminal conviction because the doctrines of independent source, inevitable discovery, harmless error, and other similar doctrines would not save the criminal conviction. The cocaine seized was umquely available fi*om the alleged illegal search, and if it were suppressed as evidence, there would be no evidence to convict Ballenger for drug trafficking. Ballenger v. Owens. 352 F.3d 842,846-47 (4th Cir. 2003) (emphasis in original) (citing Heck. 512 2 • • In addition, the Court also held that, to recover compensatory damages for an allegedly unreasonable search, a plaintiff"must provenot only that the search was unlawful, but tiiat it caused him actual, compensable injury, which, we hold today does not encompass the 'injury' of being convicted and imprisoned (until his conviction has been overturned)." Heck. 512 U.S. at 487 n.7 (citing Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura. 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986) (emphasis in original). Plaintiff cannot meet this standard. U.S. at 487 n.7). Similarly, the evidence seized in this case was "uniquely available" from the challenged search. Thus, were this Court to determine the validity of the defendants' actions under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment, it would directly implicate the validity of plaintiff's underlying conviction.^ Such a determination isnot cognizable under § 1983. To be cognizable under § 1983, plaintiff must show that his conviction has been reversed, expunged, or declared invalid. Plaintiff cannot make this showing. Although plaintiff correctly states that his original charges were dismissed on March 14,2012, he incorrectly states that the dismissal was with prejudice. S^ Compl. 118. The Commonwealth's Attorney dismissed the charges in order to transferthem to this Court, whereplaintiffplead guilty on January22,2013. Plaintiffs convictionhas not been overturned or otherwise called into question, and he remains incarcerated for this conviction. Therefore, his claims are not cognizable in a § 1983 action, and this Court cannot consider the merits of his constitutional claims. B. Plaintiff Has Failed to State a Claim for Conspiracv Plaintiffhas also alleged that the defendants engaged in a conspiracy to violate his Fourth Amendment rights. Defendant construed these allegations as arising under42 U.S.C. § 1985, which allows plaintiffs to recover monetary damages against defendants who"conspire... for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities imder the laws " 42 U.S.C. § 1983(3). S^ Defendant Brian Byerson's Memorandum m Support of Motion to Dismiss ("Def.'s Mem.") [Dkt. 42], at 8-9. Plaintiff states, however, that his claim was not based in To theextent thatplaintiffattempts to state a free-standing violation of his Miranda rights, unconnected from any impact this violation had on his criminal conviction, he has also failed to state a claim. A Miranda violation is nota cognizable § 1983 claim, as the only remedy fora Miranda violation is the exclusion of the coerced statement at trial. U.S. 760, 772 (2003). Chavez v. Martinez. 538 § 1985 liability, but in a "[s]ection 1983 general conspiracytheory." Plaintiffs Response to Defendant Brian Byerson's Motion to Dismiss ("PL's Resp.") [Dkt. 48], at 6. As the allegations must be construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the Court construes his allegations as stating a general conspiracyimder § 1983. Under this standard, however, plaintiff has failed to state a claim. It is well settled in this circuit that litigants "have a weighty burden to establish a civil rights conspiracy." Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg. 81 F.3d 416,421 (4th Cir. 1996). To state a plausible claimfor conspiracy under§ 1983, plaintiff"must present evidence that the [defendants] actedjointly and in concert and that someovert act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy whichresulted in [plaintiffs] deprivation of a constitutional right " Id. (citingHafiier v. Brown, 983 F.2d 570,577 (4th Cir. 1992). Therefore, the plaintiff must provide some evidence of a "meeting of the minds." The plaintiffdoes not need to provide direct proof of such an agreement, but "must come forward with specific circumstantial evidence that each member ofthe alleged conspiracy shared the same conspiratorial objective." Id at 421 (internal citations omitted): seealsoBrown v. Aneelone. 938 F. Supp. 340,346(W.D. Va. 1996) ("The plaintiffmust allege facts which so that the defendants shared 'a unity of purpose or common design' to injure plaintiff.") (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, if a plaintiff relies only on conclusory allegations that an agreement exists, the complaint fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), and must be dismissed. Gooden v. Howard Cntv.. 954 F.2d960, 970 (4th Cir. 1992); Brown. 938 F. Supp. at 346. Even assuming that plaintiff could show that the defendants conmiitted overt acts which violated his constitutional rights, he cannot state a claim for conspiracy, as he has not alleged any facts showing anagreement between the defendants to violate his civil rights. He states only that the defendants "knowingly, intentionally, and willfully conspired and agreed with each other on a single plan and a single objective," and "agreed on the plan to search, seize, interrogate, arrest, threaten, harass, intimidate, and charge plaintiff without consent, without probable cause, without a search warrant, and without arrest warrant " Compl. 124. He has not alleged any facts to support his allegations, however. Such conclusory statements are not sufficient to draw the reasonable inference that the defendants had any agreement to violate plaintiffs civil rights. See Hinkle. 81 F.3d at 422 (holding that a plaintiff offering only evidence of the "act itself failed to establish that the defendants possessed the requisite conspiratorial intent); Cooper v. Lippa. No. 3:1 l-cv-712,2012 WL 1410077, at *6 (E.D. Va. Apr. 23,20122) (fmding that allegations of malicious prosecution, without any supporting facts, failed to state a claim). He has therefore failed to state a claim for conspiracy. IV. For the above-stated reasons, defendant's Motion to Dismiss will be granted. An appropriate judgment and Order shall issue. Entered this day of 2015. 0 S-C J
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