Fulton v. Muse, No. 1:2011cv01214 - Document 31 (E.D. Va. 2012)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Claude M. Hilton on 08/14/2012. (jlan)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
p 0 L E 1 AUG I 4 2012 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA Alexandria Division Joseph M. Fulton, Plaintiff, v. William W. Muse, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 1:1] l:llcvl214(JCC/JFA) MEMORANDUM OPINION Joseph M. Fulton, a Virginia inmate acting pro se, has filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his right to due process was violated when his request for geriatric parole release was denied by the Virginia Parole Board ("VPB"). The sole defendant in the lawsuit is William W. Muse, Chairman of the VPB. The matter is now before the Court on defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment as to both theinitial and supplemental complaints. Plaintiff was provided with the notice required by Local Civil Rule 7(K) and Roseboro v. Garrison. 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975) as to both motions, and he has filed an objection to defendant's summary judgment motions and a supporting declaration. After careful consideration, defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment will be granted, and summary final judgment will be entered in his favor. Also pending before the Court are plaintiffs Renewed Motion to Set Aside Court's Order Granting Respondent's Motion for Enlargement of Time and Motion for Default Judgment, and defendant's Motion for Protective Order, all of which will be denied, as moot. I. Background The following material facts are uncontested. On January 26, 1999, plaintiff Joseph 1 Fulton was convictedof aggravated sexual batteryand sodomy in the Hampton Circuit Court. Plaintiffwas sentenced to serve 76 years in prisonwith 60 years suspended, for a total active term of 16 years. Compl., Ex. 3, "Overall Facts." On March 23,2011, plaintiff submitted a petition for geriatric conditional release to the VPB. Compl., Ex. 3. On April 5,2011, the VPB, through defendant Muse, notifiedplaintiffthat his petitionhad been reviewed, and that "[a]fter a careful study and evaluation of all available information pertaining to [his] case, the Virginia Parole Board's decision in April 1,2011 [was] not to grant [him] Conditional Release ...." The VPB cited as the reason for its decision the serious nature of plaintiffs offense and the risk he wouldpose to the community. Plaintiffwas informed that he could resubmit his petition annually. Compl., Ex. 2; Muse Aff., Att. B. Plaintiffappealedthe VPB's decision on April 7, 2011, arguing that his application was not reviewed in accordance Virginia Parole Board Administrative Procedure § 1.226, because it was summarily denied and was not advanced to the "AssessmentInterview" level of review. Compl., Ex. 1; Muse Aff., Att. C. On June 10,2011, plaintiffs request for appeal was denied, on the ground that "[s]erious nature of offense is a valid reason to deny geriatric consideration based on your crime." Compl., Ex. 1; Muse Aff., Ex. C. Plaintifffiled the initial complaint in this action on October28,2011,' alleging that the VPB failed to follow its own writtenprocedures in denying his petition for geriatric release, and that his right to dueprocess thereby wasviolated. The solenamed defendant was William Muse, and as relief, plaintiffsought declaratory and injunctive reliefin the form of an order requiring the VPB "to stop ignoring its own writtenprocedures and ... to conductthe personal interviews 'Apleading submitted byan incarcerated person isdeemed filed when the prisoner delivers it to prisonofficials for mailing. Lewisv. Citv of Richmond Police Dep't. 947 F.2d 733 (4th Cir. 1991); seealsoHouston v. Lack.487U.S. 266 (1988). Here, Fultonsignedthe initialcomplaint on October 28,2011, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary it is assumed that he delivered it to prison authorities for mailing on that same date. the policy requires." On February 6,2012, defendant filed an Answer and a Motion to Dismiss, along with a supporting memorandum and exhibits. On February 10,2012, plaintiff filed a supplemental complaint, in which he refined his formerly general claim into four specific allegations: (1) defendant failed to follow the mandatory procedures adopted by the VPB regarding review of petitions for geriatric conditional release; (2) defendant's actions were arbitrary and capricious; (3) defendant failed to ensure that plaintiff receivea personal assessment interview; and (4) defendant failed to providea written assessment of plaintiff s suitability for release on geriatric parole. On February 22,2012, defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment as to the supplemental complaint, with an accompanyingMemorandum of Law. Plaintiffsubsequently submitted his objection to defendant's summary judgmentrequests along with a supporting declaration. Accordingly, this matter is now ripe for disposition. II. Standard of Review Summaryjudgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden ofproving that judgment on the pleadings is appropriate. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (moving party bears the burden ofpersuasion on all relevant issues). To meet that burden, the moving party must demonstrate that no genuine issues ofmaterial fact are present for resolution. Id. at 322. Once a moving party has met its burden to show that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to point out the specific facts which create disputed factual issues. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc.. 477 U.S. 242,248 (1986); Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.. 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In evaluating a motion for summaryjudgment, a district court should consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of that party. UnitedStates v. Diebold. Inc.. 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). Those facts which the moving party bears the burden of proving are facts which are material. " [T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts which might affect the outcome of the suit underthe governing law will properlypreclude the entryof summary judgment." Anderson. 477 U.S. at 248. An issue of material fact is genuine when, "the evidence ... create[s] [a] fair doubt; wholly speculative assertions will not suffice." Rossv. Communications Satellite Corp.. 759 F.2d 355,364 (4th Cir. 1985). Thus, summary judgment is appropriate only whereno material facts are genuinely disputed and the evidence as a whole could not lead a rational fact finder to rule for the non-moving party. Matsushita. 475 U.S. at 587. III. Analysis Defendant Muse is plainly entitled to the summary judgment he seeks. A convicted person has no constitutional right to be released before the expiration of a valid sentence. Greenholtz v. NebraskaPenal Inmates. 442 U.S. 1 (1979); Meachum v. Fano. 427 U.S. 215,224 (1976). While a liberty interest can be created by a parole system that mandates an inmate's release upon the occurrence of certain conditions, Board of Pardons v. Allen. 482 U.S. 369 (1976), Virginiainmates are released on discretionary parole only if and when they are deemed suitable for release, and under Virginia law the VPB has absolute discretion in such decisions. Garrett v. Commonwealth. 14Va. App. 154 (1992). Because the decision to grant discretionary parole thus is dependent upon "subjective evaluations and predictions of future behavior," it does not create a liberty interest in inmates' parole release. Gaston v. Tavlor. 946 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1991) (en banc); Sumner v. Tucker. 9 F. Supp. 2d 641,642 (E.D. Va. 1998). Moreover, because inmates have no liberty interest in discretionary parole release under Virginia law, "neithercan they have any libertyinterest in the underlying procedures governing parole determination, so long as the procedures themselves satisfy due process." Hill v. Jackson. 64 F.3d 163, 171 (4th Cir. 1995). quoting Ewell v. Murray. 11 F.3d 482,488 (4th Cir. 1993), cert, denied. 511 U.S. 1111 (1994). Due process in this contextrequires that, "at most," parole authorities must "furnish to the prisonera statement of its reasons for denial of parole." Franklin v. Shields. 569 F.2d 784, 800 (4th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert, denied. 435 U.S. 1003 (1978). The Fourth Circuit recognizes that, "in sum... federal courts must defer to state agencies applying state law and thus their oversightof state parole proceedings has been extremelylimited." Vann v. Aneelone. 73 F.3d 519,522 (4th Cir. 1996). The VPB has established an administrative procedure to assess inmaterequests for geriatric conditional release. MuseAff. U5, Att. A. Pursuant to that procedure, when plaintiff submitted his application for release on geriatric parole, the VPB reviewed the petition, denied it by majority vote, and provided plaintiffwith written notice of that decision. Muse Aff. U6, Att. B. Plaintiff sought an appeal of that result, his request wasreviewed, and again he was provided with written notice that the appeal was not granted. Muse Aff. H7, Att. C. Under these circumstances, the limited amount of processdue to plaintiff was satisfied. Franklin. 569 F.2d at 800. It is well established that the failure of prison officials to follow their own established procedures, without more, does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Riccio v. Countyof Fairfax. 907 F.2d 1459,1469 (4th Cir. 1990). Nonetheless, plaintiffargues in both the initial and supplemental complaints that he is entitled to relief because the initial review of a request for geriatric parole is confined to determining whether the threshold criteria of the applicant's offenses, time served, and age are met, and that if they are, the applicant is automatically entitled to have his petition proceed to the next level ofreview, which includes a personal interview. In this, he is simply mistaken. The relevant VPB policy provides that a petition is to be reviewed, along with the "Virginia Department of Corrections' central file and any other pertinent information" regarding the inmate. Muse Aff., Att. A. Following the initial review, "[t]he petition may be denied upon such review by majority vote of the Board." At that juncture, "if the petition is not denied, it will automatically be advanced to the next level of review." Id., emphasis added. In plaintiffs case,becausehis application for geriatric parole was denied upon initial review by a majority vote of the VPB, his alleged entitlement to a assessment interview did not arise. Sinceplaintiffhas no constitutional right to conditional release or to the procedure by which such a decision is made, and since due process was satisfiedwhen plaintiffreceived writtennoticeof the VPB's decision in his case, defendant is entitled to the summary final judgment he seeks. Becausedefendanthas established his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiffs claim, it is unnecessary for the Courtto address his arguments on the question of qualified immunity. IV. Pending Motions On January 9,2012, defendant moved for an extension of time to respond to the complaint, and themotion was granted fora period of twenty (20) days by Order dated January 17,2012. Now pending before the Court are plaintiffs motions to set aside that Order and to enterdefault judgment against defendant. Because defendant timely filed meritorious responses to the complaint and supplemental complaint, plaintiffs motions will be denied, as moot. In addition, defendant's Motion for Protective Order seeking relief from plaintiffs premature discovery requests also is moot at this juncture, and will be denied on that basis. V. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment will be granted, and summary judgment will be entered in his favor. Plaintiffs renewed Motion to Set Aside Court's Order, his Motion for Default Judgment, and defendant's Motion for Protective Order will be denied, as moot. An appropriate Order shall issue. Entered this /^-"^day of LM<^ru^ Alexandria, Virginia 2012. /s/_ Claude M. Hilton United States District Judge
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
