Goich v. Wood et al, No. 2:2018cv00731 - Document 12 (D. Utah 2019)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER to Cure Deficient Amended Complaint. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff must within thirty days cure the Complaints deficiencies noted above by filing a document entitled, Second Amended Complaint. If Pl aintiff fails to timely cure the above deficiencies according to this Order's instructions, this action will be dismissed without further notice. Plaintiff shall not try to serve a Second Amended Complaint on Defendants; instead the court will p erform its screening function and determine itself whether the amended complaint warrants service. No further motion for service of process is needed. Plaintiff's motions for appointed counsel 59 and 9 are DENIED. Plaintiffs motion for service of process 10 is DENIED. Signed by Judge Jill N. Parrish on 5/29/2019. (jds)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH ELI ALAN GOICH, Plaintiff, v. DR. JOHN WOOD et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER TO CURE DEFICIENT AMENDED COMPLAINT Case No. 2:18-CV-731-JNP District Judge Jill N. Parrish Pro se plaintiff, inmate Eli Alan Goich, brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,1 in forma pauperis, see 28 id. § 1915. Having now screened the Amended Complaint, (Doc. No. 7), under its statutory review function,2 the court orders plaintiff to file an amended complaint to cure deficiencies before further pursuing claims. The federal statute creating a “civil action for deprivation of rights” reads, in pertinent part: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . ., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 2 The screening statute reads: (a) Screening.—The court shall review . . . a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. (b) Grounds for dismissal.—On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint— (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 1 AMENDED COMPLAINT’S DEFICIENCIES Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint: (a) does not affirmatively link Defendants to civil rights violations. (b) improperly names Weber County “medical staff” as § 1983 defendants, when each staff member must be named individually and affirmatively linked to each alleged constitutional violation (c) possibly tries to state § 1983 claims in violation of municipal-liability doctrine (see below). (d) names some possible defendants only in the text, not in Complaint’s heading. (e) needs clarification regarding claims of inadequate medical treatment (see below). (f) is not on the form complaint required by the court. (g) needs clarification regarding what constitutes a cause of action under the American with Disabilities Act (ADA) (see below). (h) names State of Utah entity as a defendant which violates governmental-immunity principles (see below). (i) asserts claims appearing to be based on conditions of current confinement; however, the complaint was apparently not submitted using the legal help plaintiff is entitled to by his institution under the Constitution. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 356 (1996) (requiring prisoners be given "'adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law' . . . to ensure that inmates . . . have a reasonably adequate opportunity to file nonfrivolous legal claims challenging their convictions or conditions of confinement") (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (emphasis added)). GUIDANCE FOR PLAINTIFF Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to contain "(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction . . .; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought." Rule 8's requirements ensure "that defendants enjoy fair notice of what the claims against them are and the grounds upon which they rest." TV Commc'ns Network, Inc. v ESPN, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1062, 1069 (D. Colo. 1991). Pro se litigants are not excused from complying with these minimal pleading demands. "This is so because a pro se plaintiff requires no special legal training to recount the facts surrounding his alleged injury, and he must provide such facts if the court is to determine whether he makes out a claim on which relief can be granted." Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Moreover, it is improper for the court "to assume the role of advocate for a pro se litigant." Id. Thus, the court cannot "supply additional facts, [or] construct a legal theory for plaintiff that assumes facts that have not been pleaded." Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff should consider these general points before filing an amended complaint: (1) The revised complaint must stand entirely on its own and shall not refer to, or incorporate by reference, any portion of the original complaint. See Murray v. Archambo, 132 F.3d 609, 612 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating amended complaint supersedes original). The amended complaint may also not be added to after it is filed without moving for amendment.3 3 The rule on amending a pleading reads: (a) Amendments Before Trial. (1) Amending as a Matter of Course. A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within: (A) 21 days after serving it, or (B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier. (2) Other Amendments. In all other cases, a party may amend its pleadings only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. (2) The complaint must clearly state what each defendant--typically, a named government employee--did to violate Plaintiff's civil rights. See Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 1976) (stating personal participation of each named defendant is essential allegation in civil-rights action). "To state a claim, a complaint must 'make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom.'" Stone v. Albert, 338 F. App’x 757, (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (emphasis in original) (quoting Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008)). Plaintiff should also include, as much as possible, specific dates or at least estimates of when alleged constitutional violations occurred. (3) Each cause of action, together with the facts and citations that directly support it, should be stated separately. Plaintiff should be as brief as possible while still using enough words to fully explain the “who,” “what,” “where,” “when,” and “why” of each claim. (4) Plaintiff may not name an individual as a defendant based solely on his or her supervisory position. See Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.2d 1433, 1441 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating supervisory status alone does not support § 1983 liability). (5) Grievance denial alone with no connection to “violation of constitutional rights alleged by plaintiff, does not establish personal participation under § 1983." Gallagher v. Shelton, No. 09-3113, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 25787, at *11 (10th Cir. Nov. 24, 2009). (6) “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under . . . Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). However, Plaintiff need not include grievance details in his complaint. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is an affirmative defense that must be raised by Defendants. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). • Municipal Liability To establish liability of municipal entities, such as Weber County, under § 1983, "a plaintiff must show (1) the existence of a municipal custom or policy and (2) a direct causal link between the custom or policy and the violation alleged." Jenkins v. Wood, 81 F.3d 988, 993-94 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)). Municipal entities may not be held liable under § 1983 based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. See Cannon v. City and Cty. of Denver, 998 F.2d 867, 877 (10th Cir. 1993); see also Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Plaintiff has not so far established a direct causal link between his alleged injuries and any custom or policy of Weber County. Thus, the court concludes that Plaintiff's complaint, as it stands, appears to fail to state claims against Weber County. • Inadequate Medical Treatment The Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment requires prison officials to “provide humane conditions of confinement” including “adequate . . . medical care.” Craig v. Eberly, 164 F.3d 490, 495 (10th Cir. 1998)) (quoting Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1310 (10th Cir. 1998)). To state a cognizable claim under the Eighth Amendment for failure to provide proper medical care, “a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Olson v. Stotts, 9 F.3d 1475, 1477 (10th Cir. 1993) (emphasis in original) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Any Eighth Amendment claim must be evaluated under objective and subjective prongs: (1) “Was the deprivation sufficiently serious?” And, if so, (2) “Did the officials act with a sufficiently culpable state of mind?” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). Under the objective prong, a medical need is “sufficiently serious . . . if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Sealock, 218 F.3d at 1209 (citations & quotation marks omitted). The subjective component requires the plaintiff to show that prison officials were consciously aware that the prisoner faced a substantial risk of harm and wantonly disregarded the risk “by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994). “[T]he ‘inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care’ tantamount to negligence does not satisfy the deliberate indifference standard.” Sparks v. Singh, 690 F. App’x 598, 604 (10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105–06 (1976)). Furthermore, “a prisoner who merely disagrees with a diagnosis or a prescribed course of treatment does not state a constitutional violation.” Perkins v. Kan. Dep’t of Corrs., 165 F.3d 803, 811 10th Cir. 1999); see also Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1192 (10th Cir. 2010) (“Disagreement with a doctor’s particular method of treatment, without more, does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation.”). • ADA Plaintiff should also consider this information in amending his complaint: To state a failure-to-accommodate claim under [ADA], [Plaintiff] must show: (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he was "either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of some public entity's services, programs, or activities"; (3) such exclusion or denial was by reason of his disability; and (4) [Weber County] knew he was disabled and required an accommodation. Ingram v. Clements, 705 F. App’x 721, 725 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting J.V. v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 813 F.3d 1289, 1295, 1299 (10th Cir. 2016)). Further, "Courts have recognized three ways to establish a discrimination claim: (1) intentional discrimination (disparate treatment); (2) disparate impact; and (3) failure to make a reasonable accommodation." J.V., 813 F.3d at 1295. "The ADA requires more than physical access to public entities: it requires public entities to provide 'meaningful access' to their programs and services." Robertson v. Las Animas County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 500 F.3d 1185, 1195 (10th Cir. 2007). To effectuate this mandate, "the regulations require public entities to 'make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability.'" Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)). Villa v. Dep’t of Corrs., 664 F. App’x 731, 734 (10th Cir. 2016). • State Immunity Finally, the Eleventh Amendment prevents "suits against a state unless it has waived its immunity or consented to suit, or if Congress has validly abrogated the state's immunity." Ray v. McGill, No. CIV-06-0334-HE, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51632, at *8 (W.D. Okla. July 26, 2006) (unpublished) (citing Lujan v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 F.3d 1511, 1522 (10th Cir. 1995); Eastwood v. Dep't of Corrs., 846 F.2d 627, 631 (10th Cir. 1988)). Plaintiff asserts no basis for determining that the State has waived its immunity or that it has been abrogated by Congress. Because any claims against the State appear to be precluded by Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Court believes it has no subject-matter jurisdiction to consider them. See id. at *9. MOTIONS TO APPOINT COUNSEL The Court now addresses Plaintiff's motions for the Court to ask pro bono counsel to represent him. Plaintiff has no constitutional right to counsel. See Carper v. Deland, 54 F.3d 613, 616 (10th Cir. 1995); Bee v. Utah State Prison, 823 F.2d 397, 399 (10th Cir. 1987). However, the Court may in its discretion appoint counsel for indigent plaintiffs. See 28 U.S.C.S. § 1915(e)(1) (2018); Carper, 54 F.3d at 617; Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 996 (10th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff bears the burden of convincing the court that his claim has enough merit to warrant appointment of counsel. McCarthy v. Weinberg, 753 F.2d 836, 838 (10th Cir. 1985). In deciding whether to ask counsel to represent plaintiff free of charge, this court considers a variety of factors, like “'the merits of the litigant's claims, the nature of the factual issues raised in the claims, the litigant's ability to present his claims, and the complexity of the legal issues raised by the claims.'" Rucks v. Boergermann, 57 F.3d 978, 979 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Williams, 926 F.2d at 996); accord McCarthy, 753 F.2d at 838-39. Considering the above factors, the court concludes that, at this time, plaintiff's claims may not be colorable, the issues in this case are not complex, and plaintiff is not incapacitated or unable to adequately function in pursuing this matter. Thus, the court denies for now plaintiff's motions for appointed counsel. ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: (1) Plaintiff must within thirty days cure the Complaint’s deficiencies noted above by filing a document entitled, “Second Amended Complaint.” (2) The Clerk's Office shall mail Plaintiff the Pro Se Litigant Guide with a blank-form civilrights complaint which Plaintiff must use if he wishes to pursue an amended complaint. (3) If Plaintiff fails to timely cure the above deficiencies according to this Order's instructions, this action will be dismissed without further notice. (4) Plaintiff shall not try to serve a Second Amended Complaint on Defendants; instead the court will perform its screening function and determine itself whether the amended complaint warrants service. No further motion for service of process is needed. See 28 U.S.C.S. § 1915(d) (2019) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in [in forma pauperis] cases.”). (5) Plaintiff's motions for appointed counsel are DENIED, (see Doc. Nos. 5 & 9); however, if, after the case develops further, it appears that counsel may be needed or of specific help, the court will ask an attorney to appear pro bono on Plaintiff's behalf. (6) Plaintiff’s motion for service of process is DENIED. (Doc. No. 10.) There is no valid complaint on file as of this Order. Signed May 29, 2019 BY THE COURT ______________________________ Jill N. Parrish United States District Court Judge
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