Vivint v., No. 2:2015cv00392 - Document 242 (D. Utah 2018)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER-denying 230 Motion to Compel; Motions terminated: 230 MOTION to Compel to Appear for 30(b)(6) Depositions and Memorandum in Support filed by Vivint. See Order for details. Signed by Magistrate Judge Brooke C. Wells on 11/15/18. (jmr)
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Vivint v. Doc. 242 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION VIVINT, INC., Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING VIVINT, INC.’S MOTION TO COMPEL v. Case No. 2:15-cv-392 CW ALARM.COM INC., District Judge Clark Waddoups Defendant. Magistrate Judge Brooke Wells This matter is referred to the undersigned from Judge Waddoups in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 636 (b)(1)(A). Pending before the court is Plaintiff Vivint, Inc.’s Motion to Compel to Appear for 30(b)(6) Depositions. 1 The court will resolve the motion without hearing oral argument. 2 This dispute centers on the interpretation of the scheduling order. The scheduling order provides in relevant part: 2. DISCOVERY LIMITATIONS A. NUMBER Maximum Number of party and non-party Deposition hours 120, of which at By Plaintiff, absent good cause shown most 50 for 30(b)(6) witnesses 3 Vivint states it needs “18 hours to complete its 30(b)(6) deposition of ADC’s three remaining designees on 24 topics.” 4 Vivint points to the scheduling order arguing that it 1 ECF No. 230. 2 See DUCivR 7-1(f) (2018). 3 Patent Case Scheduling Order p. 2, ECF No. 39. 4 Motion p. 1. “believes it has expended 32 of its 50 allotted 30(b)(6) deposition hours.” 5 Vivint argues the scheduling order and report “afforded each party 120 hours for party and non-party depositions. Of those hours, up to 50 may be allotted towards 30(b)(6) witnesses.” 6 Vivint claims the 50-hour limitation is directed at party depositions and not all 30(b)(6) depositions in order to protect the parties. In contrast, calculates that there are only 4 hours of the allotted 30(b)(6) hours left for Vivint. points to the plain language of the scheduling order arguing the use of “Maximum number of party and non-party Deposition hours by Plaintiff” in the sentence supports an agreement to a 50-hour limit on all 30(b)(6) depositions and does not distinguish between party and non-party hours. The court agrees with’s interpretation of the scheduling order. The plain language does not support Vivint’s reading that the 50-hour limitation is directed at only party depositions. Further, the court is not persuaded by Vivint’s arguments concerning the alleged purposes of the time limit or the parties’ agreement to consult regarding the 7-hour limit per deposition. The court therefore DENIES Vivint’s motion. 7 Vivint’s Motion to Compel is DENIED. 8 5 Id. p. 2. 6 Id. 7 The court notes that currently pending is a motion to stay this case which may have had an impact on the instant motion. See ECF No. 235. 8 Even if the court were to construe Vivint’s motion as an attempt to modify the scheduling order, Vivint has failed to make the requisite showing of good cause to modify the scheduling order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. 2 DATED this 15 November 2018. Brooke C. Wells United States Magistrate Judge 3