Garcia v. Colvin, No. 3:2016cv00145 - Document 23 (W.D. Tex. 2018)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. Signed by Judge Miguel A. Torres. (ar)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Garciav.Colvin Doc.23 fi IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF EL PASO DIVISION ij. JCT ALFREDO SANTOS GARCIA, iEX Plaintiff, NO. EP-16-CV-145-MAT V. NANCY A. BERRYHILL,' ACTING COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER This is a civil action seeking judicial review of an administrativ decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff Alfredo Santos Garcia ("Garcia") appeals from the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner") denying his claims for Disabilfty Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act ("the Act") and S.upplemental Security Income ("S SI") under Title XVI of the Act. The parties consented to the transfer of the case to this Court for determination and entry of jidgment. § See 28 U.S.C. 636(c); Local Court Rule CV-72. For the reasons set forth below, the commissioner's decision will be AFFIRMED. I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Garcia was fifty-five years old at the time of his second hearing lefore the Administrative Law Judge ("AL'). (R. 37)2 He had a commercial driver's license ("CDL") at the time of both 'Nancy A. Berryhill is now the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Adminstration. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Nancy A. Berryhill is substituted for Acting Commisskner Carolyn W. Colvin as the defendant in this case. 2 Reference to the record of administrative proceedings is designated by (R. [page numiDer(s)]). 1 Dockets.Justia.com his hearings, and his job experience included working as a commeria1 truck driver, clerical worker, delivery driver, security guard, and parking lot attendant. (R. 44, 64, 65-66, 74). Garcia filed applications for DIB and SSI on February 18, 2011, in which he alleged disability beginning on November 1, 2010, due to hypertension, dyslexia, insorinia, hip problems, heel problems, and a left rotator cuff impairment. (R. 243-53, 283). Aftr denied initially and upon reconsideration, Garcia requested a hearing. (1k. his applications were 135-38, 141-43, 144- 49). On August 8, 2012, a hearing was conducted before the AL (R., 57-81). The AU issued an initial written decision finding that Garcia was capable of performiiig work as a parking lot cashier and as a clerical worker. (R. 113-25). However, the Appeals Council remanded this matter to the AU on December 20, 2013, because an opinion for the state agency consultant was not included in the exhibits and did not appear to have been considered in the decision, and to allow the AU to have a more comprehensive discussion on the impact of Garcia's mental limitations on his residual functional capacity ("RFC"). (R. 40, 13 A second hearing was 1_33?. held on September 10, 2014. (R. 34-56). On December 9, 2014, th AU issued a written decision denying benefits on the ground that Garcia was capable of performing past relevant work as a clerical worker. (R. 12-27). On March 1, 2016, the Appeals Council denied Garcia's request for review, thereby making the AU' s decision the Commissioiier' s final administrative decision. (R. 1-4). In his written decision, the AU found that Garcia had the follo'ing severe impairments: hypertension; right shoulder dislocation; obesity; back disorder; inomnia; hyperlipidemia; gastro esophageal reflux disease ("GERD"); chronic pain syndrome; anxiety/depression; and organic mental disorder. (R. 14). The AU determined that Garcia had th RFC to: 2 perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416. p67(b). However, he can frequently climb ramps and stairs and occasionally dir ib ladders, ropes and scaffolds. He can frequently crawl, stoop, kneel, and crouch. He can frequently balance with the use of a hand held assistive device He is limited to occasional overhead reaching with the left upper extremity. Hie should avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, wetness, vibratio i, and hazards. Additionally, the claimant can understand, remember, and carryout simple instructions. He can make decisions, attend and concentrate fc r two hours at a time. He can interact adequately with coworkers and supervis rs and responds appropriately to changes in the work setting. (R. 18). Garcia argues that the AU's RFC finding is not supported by II. evidence. DISCUSSION A. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court's review is limited to a determination of whether tie Commissioner's final decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a vhole, and whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards. Myers 2001) (quoting Greenspan v. v. Apfel, 238F.3d 617, 619 (5th Cir. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994)). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance, and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d $52, 555 (5th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). A finding of "no substantial evidence" will be ma4e only where there is a "conspicuous absence of credible choices" or "no contrary medical evidnce." Abshire 848 F.2d 638, 640 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting Hames v. v. Bowen, Heckler, 707 '.2d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1983)). In determining whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the Commissioner, the Court must carefully examine the entire record, evidence or try the issues de novo. Newton v. bt may not reweigh the Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000). The Court may not substitute its own judgment "even if the evidence piteponderates against the [Commissioner's] decision." Harrell v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 471, 475 (3 (th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). "Conflicts in evidence are for the [Commissioner] and no the courts to resolve." Speliman v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 357, 360 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting Selders v Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 1990)). If the Commissioner's findings are supported by evidence, "they are conclusive and must be affirmed." Id. B. THE AU's RFC FINDING IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL E Garcia argues that the AU's RFC finding is not supported because it does not reflect all of the limitations relating to his substantial evidence (Pl.'s Br., ECF No. i 20, at 3-4). Specifically, Garcia claims that he is unable to perform requirements of light work and that his mental functional abilities are significantly more limIted than accommodated by the AU. Id. at 4. In support of his physical and mental functional linliitations, Garcia cites his f testimony and reports, medical records, the third-party reports Stephanie Martinez ("Martinez"), and the mental evaluation of Mark D. Beale, M.D. Id. at 4-5. Garcia also contends that the AU incorrectly assessed the weight given to the medical opinior of Dr. Beale. Id. at 6. Through his numerous citations to the record without accompanying analysis, Garcia essentially asks the Court to reweigh the evidence.3 However, the Court is prohibited from doing so. Newton, 209 F.3d at 452. The Court must only determine whether si4bstantial evidence exists in the record as a whole to support the AU's decision. Myers, Court only considers Garcia's specific challenges to the 238 F.d at 619. Therefore, the AU's decision. Garcia contends that he has testified and reported that his ability to reach and lift is limited by pain in his left shoulder from rotator cuff surgery, that he "has right foot, knee, left hip, and neck problems," and that he has problems standing, walking, aid lifting. (Pl.'s Br., ECF See, P1.'s Br., ECF No. 20, at 5 ("The medical evidence in the record indicates obesity, schizo-affective disorder, anxiety, bipolar/depression, mood problems, memory problems, insomnia, chronic pain, bilateral shoulder pain, back pain, right heel and ankle pain, knee pain, and GERD. (Tr. 389, 392, 394, 397, 40, 404-08, 419, 421-23, 425-27, 454-57, 487-9 1, 517-1 8, 522, 526-27, 564-66, 568-70, 587)."). ri No. 20, at 4). The AU explicitly considered the inconsistencies of 's statements made in his testimony, function reports, and application for a CDL and deterntiined that Garcia lacked credibility. (R. 18-19). In coming to this conclusion, the AU state disability was "severely undermined" by the fact that he possessed that Garcia's claim of valid CDL, passed the medical exam, and reported hypertension as his only medical conditioi in his application for a CDL, dated April 9, 2014. (R. 19). Garcia also asserts that the evidence supports his use of a cane for ambulation and that such use would interfere with his ability to lift and carry. (Pl.'s Br., EC1 No. 20, at 5). However, the AU found no evidence in the record of a prescription for a cane atid noted that Garcia has worked many jobs since he started using a cane. (R. 24). Furthermqre, in a May 14, 2011, consultative examination, Carlos Pastrana, M.D., described Garcia's gat as "good without cane, crutch, or assistive device." (R. 25, 456). The AU also considered other medical examinations that suppot his finding that Garcia has the residual functional capacity to perform light work. An examinalion from November 19, 2013, shows normal strength and range of motion, and a December 5, 013, report indicates he had normal reflexes, gait and stance, and musculoskeletal system. (R. 23, 528, 544). The AU concluded that, with some exception, Garcia "is most consistently noted throughout the treatment record to have full range of motion, normal strength, normal gait, with ro neurological deficits." (R. 25). Conflicts in evidence are for the Commissioner to resolve, Spelman, the Court finds substantial evidence exists to support the AU's finding 1 F.3d at 360, and f a RFC to perform light work with certain limitations. Garcia's signed Medical Examination Report in support of his CDL application also reflects that he denied having conditions such as impaired vision, digestive problems, nervous or psychiatric disorders, impaired hand, arm, foot, leg, finger, and toe, and chronic lower back pain. (R. 19, 579). 5 Garcia also contends that he testified and reported that he has finding words, experiences depression, and has problems with "social functioning, sleping due to insomnia, difficulty with focus and concentration, lacking motivationlneeding encuragement to do things, difficulty with personal care and feeling scared." (Pl.'s Br., ECF *To. 20, at 4-5). Garcia references the third-party reports of Martinez in support of these 1imitatins. Id. at 5. As noted supra, finding that Garcia lacked credibility, the AU gave little weight to Garcia's subjective claims and the medical opinions that relied on Garcia's reporting. (R. 18-19, 25-26). Furthermore, the AU noted that Garcia had "sought no speciaUzed mental health care," and that indications that Garcia could not afford specialized care were inconsistent with the fact that he sought specialized care for conditions for which he is not claiming disability. (R. 20, 22, 24). The AU also considered the third-party reports of Martinez. However, third-party statements: cannot establish the existence of a medically determinable imjairment. Instead, there must be evidence from an "acceptable medical source" br this purpose. However, information from such "other sources" may be based on special knowledge of the individual and may provide insight into th severity of the impairment(s) and how it affects the individua1s ability to functiQn. SSR 06-03P, 2006 WL 2329939, at *2. "Ultimately, SSR O6-03p requires only that the AU 'explain the weight given to opinions from these 'other sources,' or otherwise ensure that the discussion of the evidence in the determination or decision allows a claimant or subsequent reviewer to follow the adjudicator's reasoning, when such opinions outcome of the case." Smith v. Co/yin, No. my have 5396687, at *9 (S.D. l:15-CV-173-JCG, 2016 Miss. Sept. 27, 2016) (citing SSR 06-03P, 2006 WL 2329939, at an effect on the *). The AU sufficiently addressed Martinez's statements, noting contradictions with Garcia's own statements, and considered them within the context of the record as a whole. (R. 25-26). gave significant weight to the "State agency The AU and psychological consultants whom [sic], in combination, determined the claimant understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions, make decisions, attend and for two hours at a time, interact adequately with coworkers and supervisors and respond a y to changes in a work setting."5 (R. 25, 86-97, 98-109, 43 5-3 8). Finally, Garcia contends that the AU erred by giving little weig]it to Dr. Beale's opinion of Garcia's mental impairments after determining that they seemed to b based on Garcia's own reporting. (Pl.'s Br., ECF No. 20, at 6). Dr. Beale's evaluation dbscribes several mental limitations and assigns Garcia a Global Assessment of Functioning ("GF")6 score of 30 down from 60. (R. 425-27). In deciding the weight to give a medical opinioI, the AU may consider the evidence used to support the opinion and the consistency of the opiIiion with the record as a whole. 20 CFR § 404.1527(c)(3), (4), 416.927(c)(3), (4). As noted bi the AU, much of Dr. Beale's assessments of Garcia's mental limitations appear to be based or Garcia's own reporting, (R. 26, 425-27), and Garcia does not identify any particular portion of tle opinion that he claims is not based on his own reporting. (Pl.'s Br., ECF No. 20, at 6). Moreover, the AU did include some limitations in the RFC thtt were contained in Dr. Beale's report and that were consistent with opinions in other medical reords, such as the ability to understand, remember, and carryout only simple instructions. (R. 18, 86-97, 98-109, 427, The AU gave little weight to the opinion of these consultants regarding Garcia's scia1 limitations because they were based in part on Garcia's own reporting, which the AU found to be unreliable. (R 16, 25). "The GAF Scale assesses an individual's 'psychological, social, and occupational unctioning on a hypothetical continuum of mental-health-illness." Vaughn v. Colvin, 589 F. App'x 238, 240, iL2 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL ItISORDERS at 34 (4th ed, Text Revision 2000) (DSM-IV-TR)). The GAF Scale ranges from 0 to 100, with 100 indicating "superior functioning." ANERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, Text Rvision 1994)). A GAF score of 30 indicates: "Behavior is considerably influenced by delusions or hallucinations OR serious impairment in communication or judgment (e.g., sometimes incoherent, acts grossly inappropriately suicidal preoccupation) OR inability to function in almost all areas (e.g., stays in bed all day; no job, home, or friends)." Id. DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS at 34 (4th ed. 7 435-5 1). Further, the AU is under no obligation to give controlling Jackson v. to a GAF score. See Colvin, No. 4:14-CV-756-A, 2015 WL 7681262, at *3 (NLD. Tex. Nov. 5, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:14-CV-756-A, 2015 WL 782339 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 2015) ("Instead of viewing GAF scores as absolute determiners of the ability to work, ALJs should make disability determinations on a case-by-case basis, considering the entire record") (collecting cases). Thus, the Court finds that the AU did not err in his treatment of Dr. Beale's evaluation. Accordingly, the Court finds that the AU's mental RFC finding is supported by substantial evidence. III. CONCLUSION IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner will be AFFIRMED. SIGNED and ENTERED this / day of September, 201. MIGUEL A. S UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 8
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
