Penton v. Davis, No. 4:2018cv02262 - Document 29 (S.D. Tex. 2019)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM AND OPINION denying as moot 21 MOTION for Appointment of Counsel, denying as moot 19 MOTION for Evidentiary Hearing, granting 16 MOTION for Summary Judgment with Brief in Support. COA is denied. (Signed by Judge Vanessa D Gilmore) Parties notified.(gclair, 4)
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Penton v. Davis Doc. 29 United States District Court Southern District of Texas ENTERED IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FO R TH E SO U TH ER N D ISTR IC T O F TE XA S H O U ST O N D IVISIO N July 26, 2019 David J. Bradley, Clerk FO REST PEN TON ,JR ., (TDCJ-CID #1929674) Petitioner, CIVIL A CTION N O .11-18-2262 V S. LORIE D AV IS, Respondent. M EM O R AN DU M A ND O PINIO N Petitioner,ForestPenton,lr.,seekshabeascorpusreliefunder28U.S.C.j2254,challenging aconviction in the 185th JudicialDistrictCourtofH arrisCounty,Texas.Respondentfiled am otion forsummaryjudgment,(DocketEntryNo.16),andcopiesofthestatecourtrecord.Pentonhasfiled hisresponse.(DocketEntryNo.18).ThethreshholdissueiswhetherthisCoul' tshouldgrantthe respondent'smotionforsummaryjudgment. Background AjuryfoundPentonguiltyofthefelonyoffenseofpossessionofmethamphetamine.(Cause Numberl384434).OnMay 15,2014,thecourtsentencedPentontothirty-twoyearsimprisomnent. The Fourteenth CourtofAppealsofTexasaffinned Penton'sconviction on M arch 22,2016.The TexasCourtofCrim inalA ppealsre/ sedpenton'spetitionfordiscretional review onluly27,2016. Penton filed an application forstate habeas corpusreliefon July 13,2017,w hich the Texas Court O :hItA O hVD G h2018h18-2262.d01.m 7d Dockets.Justia.com ofCriminalAppealsdenied withoutwritten order,on findingsofthetrialcourt, w ithouta hearing on M ay 2,2018. Exparte Penton,A pplication N o.87,503-02 atcover. On June 28,20l8,thisCourtreceived Penton'sfederalpetition. Penton contendsthathis conviction isvoid forthe follow ing reasons: (1) HisFourthAmendmentrightwasviolatedbecausetherewasinsufficientevidencetoshow that1aw enforcem enthad probable cause to stop hisnephew 's vehicle' , (2) Thepolicestoppedhisnephew'svehiclewithoutprobablecauseandconductedanillegal search and seizure,violating hisFourth Am endmentright; Trialattorney,RandallJ.A yers,rendered ineffective assistance by failing to fully address, argue,and preservehisclaim ofan illegalsearch and seizure;and Hisrighttodueprocesswasviolatedduringthestatehabeasproceedingsàecausethehabeas courtcreatednew factualfindingsthatsupplantedthoseofthetrialjudge. (DocketEntryNo.1,PetitionforW ritofHabeasCorpus,pp.6-7). II. The Applicable L egalStandards ThisCourtreviews Penton's petition forwritofhabeas corpusunderthe federalhabeas statutes,asamendedbytheAntiterrorism andEffectiveDeathPenaltyActof1996(AEDPA).28 U.S.C.j2254;Woodsv.Cockvell,307F.3d353,356(5thCir.2002);Noblesv.Johnson,127F.3d 409,413(5thCir.1997),citingfindhv.M urphy,521U.S.320 (1997). Sections2254(d)(1)and(2)ofAEDPA setoutthestandardsofreview forquestionsoffact, questionsoflaw,andmixedquestionsoffactandlaw thatresultin anadjudicationonthemerits. Anadjudicationonthemeritsisisaterm ofal'tthatreferstowhetheracourt'sdispositionofthecase issubstantive,asopposedtoprocedural.''M illerv.Johnson,200F.3d274,281(5thCir.2000).A O :yM OyVD G h2018h18-2262.d01.w pd state-courtdeterm ination ofquestionsoflaw andmixed questionsoflaw andfactisreviewedunder 28 U.S.C.j 2254(d)(1) and receives deference unless itt'was contrary to,or involved an unreasonableapplication ofclearly establishedFederallaw,asdeterm inedbytheSupremeCourtof theUnited States.''Hillv.Johnson,210F.3d481,485(5th Cir.2000).A state-courtdecisionis k%contraryto''SupremeCourtprecedentif:(l)thestatecourt'sconclusionis'koppositetothatreached by gthe Supreme Courtlon a question oflaw''or(2)the Csstate courtconfrontsfactsthatare m aterially indistinguishable from a relevantSuprem e Courtprecedent''and anives atan opposite result. Williamsv.Taylor,120 S.Ct.1495(2000).A statecourtunreasonably appliesSupreme Courtprecedentifitunreasonably applies the correctlegalrule to the facts ofa particularcase,or itddunreasonablyextendsalegalprinciplefrom gsupremeCourt)precedenttoanew contextwhere itshould notapply orunreasonably refusesto extend thatprinciple to a new contextwhere itshould apply.''1d.at1495.Questionsoffactfoundbythestatecourtarettpresumedtobecorrect...and (receive)deference...unlessitSwasbasedonanunreasonabledetermination ofthefactsin light oftheevidencepresentedintheStatecoul'tproceeding.'''Hill,210F.3dat485(quoting28U.S.C. j2254(d)(2)). A statecourt'sfactualfindingsareentitledtodeferenceonfederalhabeascorpusreview and arepresumedcorrectundersection2254(e)(1)unlessthepetitionerrebutsthosefindingswithççclear andconvincingevidence.''Garciav.Quarterman,454F.3d441,444(5thCir.2006)(citingHughes v.Dretke,412F.3d 582,589(5th Cir.2005)and28U.S.C.j2254(e)(1)).Thisdeferenceextends notonly to express findings offact,butto the im plicitfindings ofthe state courtasw ell. G arcia, 454F.3dat444-45(citingSummersv.Dretke,431F.3d 861,876(5thCir.2005);Youngv.Dretke, 356F.3d616,629(5th Cir.2004)). O :hRAO W DG Q OI8hI8-2262.d01.m 7d W hile,tlralsageneralprinciple,Rule56oftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedure,relatingto summaryjudgment,applieswith equalforce in the contextofhabeascorpuscases,''Clark v. Johnson,202F.3d760,764(5thCir.),cert.denieJ 531U.S.831(2000),theruleappliesonlytothe extentthatitdoesnotconflictwith thehabeasrules. Section 2254(e)(1)- which mandatesthat findingsoffactm adebyastatecourtareClpresumedto becorrect''- overridestheordinaryrulethat, inasummaryjudgmentproceeding,a1ldisputedfactsmustbeconstruedinthelightmostfavorable tothenonmovingparty.UnlessthepetitionercanSkrebutg)thepresumptionofcorrectnessbyclear and convincing evidence''asto the state court'stindingsoffact,those tindingsm ustbeaccepted as correct.Smithv.Cockrell,311F.3d661,668(5thCir.2002). Penton isproceeding pro se.A pro sehabeaspetition isconstrued liberallyandnotheld to the same stringentand rigorousstandardsaspleadingsfiled by lawyers. See M artin v.M axey,98 F.3d844,847n.4(5thCir.1996);Guidrozv.Lynaugh,852F.2d832,834(5thCir.1988);Woodall v.Foti,648F.2d268,271(5thCir.UnitA June1981).ThisCourtbroadlyintepretsPenton'sstate andfederalhabeaspetitions.Bledsuev.Johnson,188F.3d250,255(5thCir.1999). 111. Statem entofFacts The appellate coul' tsum m arized the evidence attrialasfollow s: A ppellantw asapassengerin hisnephew 'scarw hen D eputy M ichael Santos noticed the traffic light turn yellow and the car attem ptto speed through the light.The lighttunw d red before the car pasked underneath it.D eputy Santos initiated a traffic stop and approached appellant while his partner approached the driver.D eputy Santos testified that as he approached the car,appellant began to squirm around, so he restrained appellant using handcuffs and placed appellantin theback ofapatrolcar.Deputy Santosrecovered two baggies containing a crystal-like substance from the car,and as he w as placing the baggies in the patrolcar,appellant stated that fhe ûkstuff'belonged to him ,notto his nephew . O :yllA OW D Gh2018ï18-2262.d01.wpd Appellantwascharged by indictmentwith possessionw ith intentto deliver m etham phetam ine w eighing m ore than fourgram s and less than tw o hundred gram s.The indictm entincluded tw o enhancem ent paragraphs, each alleging a prior felony conviction. Appellant pleaded, tdnot guilty,''to the charge but pleaded Cttrue'' to the enhancement paragraphs. Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence ofhis oralstatements to police oftk ers.The trialcourt denied themotion to suppress.Thejury convicted appellantofthe lesser-included offense of possession of m ethmnphetnm ine and assessed punishmentatthirty-two years'confinem ent. Pentonv.State,No.14-14-00406-CR,489S.W .3d578(Tex.App.--Houston (14thDist.l2016, pet.ref'd). lV. The C laim s Based on a Violation ofthe Fourth A m endm ent (Grounds1& 2) ln hisfirstground forfederalhabeasrelief,Penton arguesthatnothing in Texaslaw indicates thatitisa traftic violation ifa vehicle entersan intersection w hile atraffic lightissignaling yellow , butfailsto cleartheintersection before the lighttunzsto red. Since thisisnota traffic violation, officerslackedanyCûprobablecause''topullthevehicleoverforatrafficstop.(DocketEntryNo. 4,p.5). In his second ground,Penton argues thatprobable cause did not existto supportthe wanuntlesssearchandseizureofthevehicleinwhichhewasapassenger.(DocketEntryNo.4,pp. 6-8). The United StatesSupreme Courthassignificantly narrowed the scope offederalhabeas review ofFourth A m endm entclaim s based on principlesof com ity and respectforthe finality of statecourtjudgments.InStonev.Powell,428U.S.465(1976),theSupremeCourtstated:islW lhere theStat:hasprovided an opportunityforfulland fairlitigation ofaFourth Am endm entclaim ,astate O :yM O hV DG h2018h18-2262.d01.N d prisonermay notbegrantedfederalhabeascorpusreliefon the ground thatevidenceobtained in an unconstitutionalsearch or seizure wasintroducèd athistrial.''1d.,428 U.S.at494. The barto federalhabeasreliefsetforth in Stone v.Powellapplies even ifthepetitionerhasfailed to avail himselfofthestatecourtprocessesinplacetochallengeanunlawfulsearchand seizure.Seelanecka v.Cockrell,301F.3d316,320(5thCir.2002).Theiopportunityforfullandfairlitigation'means justthat:$an opportunity.'Caverv.Alabama,577 F.2d 1188,1192 (5th Cir.1978). Ifastate provides the processes whereby a defendant can obtain full and fair litigation of a Fourth Am endm entclaim ,Stone v.Powellbarsfederalhabeascorpusconsideration ofthatclaim whether ornotthe defendantem ploysthoseprocesses. Penton had am ple opportunity to raise a Fourth Am endm ent claim during pre-trial proceedingsbeforethestatetrialcourt.Thetrialcourtconducted asuppression hearingon M ay 13, (Reporter'sRecord,Vol.111,pp.1-72).TheStateofTexasprovidedanopportunityforfull and fair litigation ofpetitioner'sFourth A m endm entclaim ofan illegalarrestboth atthe trialand habeasreview levels. Consequently,even ifthere w ere som e unspecified evidence resulting from an illegalarrest,thisground alleginga Fourth Am endmentviolation isbarred from federalhabeas collateralreviiw byStonev.Powelland isdenied. V. The C laim of IneffectiveA ssistance ofTrialCounsel (Ground 3) Penton contendsthathistrialattorney rendered ineffediveassistancebyfailingtoproperly address,argue,and preserve his claim thatthe traffic stop w asillegal. H e contendsthatthere w as analmostabsoluteabsenceoftrueadvocacyduringthesuppressionhearing.(DocketEntryNo.4, p.14). O :yM O yV DG y2018ï18-2262.d01.N d To establish an ineffective assistance of counselclaim ,a petitionerm ust show thathis counsel'sperformancewasdeticientandthathewasactuallyprejudicedasaresult.Stricklandv. Washington,466U.S.668,68(1984).W hethercounsel'sperfonnancewasdeficientisdetermined byanobjectivestandardofreasonableness.Kitchensv.Johnson,190F.3d698,701(5thCir.1999). ççgslcrutiny ofcounsel'sperformancemustbehighly deferential.''Strickland,466 U.S.at689. ksgcjounselis strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and to have made a11 significantdecisionsintheexerciseofreasonableprofessionaljudgment.''1d.at690.iélsltrategic choicesm ade afterthorough investigation oflaw and factsrelevantto plausibleoptionsarevirtually unchallengeable.''1d.at 690-91;see also United States v.Jones,287 F.3d 325, 331 (5th Cir.ltstlnformed strategicdecisionsofcounselaregivenaheavymeasureofdeferenceandshould notbesecondguessed,''),cert.denied,537U.S.1018(2002);Lockettv.Anderson,230F.3d695, 714(5thCir.2000)(Stricklandrequiresdeferencetocounsel'sçkinformedstrategicchoices'').$ûSo long ascounselmade an adequate investigation,any strategic decisions made asa resultofthat investigationfallwithinthewiderangeofobjectivelyreasonableprofessionalassistance.''Smithv. Cockrell,311F.3d661,668(5thCir.2002)(internalquotation marksandcitationomitted). $(A conscious and informed decision on trialtactics and strategy cannotbe the basis for constitutionally ineffective assistanceofcounselunlessitisso i1lchosen thatitperm eatesthe entire trial with obvious unfainw ss.'' Jones,287 F.3d at 331. To overcom e the deference given to inform ed strategic decisions,a petitioner m ust show that his counsel tûblundered through trial, attem pted to puton an unsupported defense,abandoned atrialtactic,failed to pursue a reasonable alternativecourse,orsun-enderedhisclient.''1d.;seealsoM oorev.Johnson,194F.3d586,615(5th Cir.1999)(çûstricklanddocsnotrequiredeferencetothosedecisionsofcounselthat,viewedinlight O 2hItA OhV D Gy20l8h18-2262.d01.m 7d ofthe factsknown atthe time ofthe purported decision,do notserve any conceivable strategic Purpose.''). Even ifapetitionerestablishesthathiscounsel'sperform ancewasdeficient,hem ustalso cstablishthatdtprejudicecausedbythedeficiency issuchthalthereisareasonableprobabilitythat theresultoftheproceedingswouldhavebeendifferent.''dtzns't??pv.Johnson,126F.3d716,721(5th Cir.1997).A petitionermustshow thattheprejudicemadethetrialoutcometkfundamentallyunfair orunreliable.''1d.(quotingLockhartv.Fretwell,506U.S.364(1993:. The state habeas courtfound thatthe affidavit of A yers w as credible and that,::23.The totality ofrepresentation was sufficientto afford Applicanta reasonably effective assistance of counselintrial.''(DocketEntryNo.17-37,p.51). U nderA ED PA ,thiscourt m ustgiveproperdeference to the state court'sdeterm ination that trialcounselrenderedeffectiveassistance.SeeLaddv.Cockrell,311F.3d349,351(5thCir.2002). Because the state coul' t properly identified Strickland as the governing legal principle, the tlunreasonable application''prong ofsection 2254(d)(1)providesthe standard thatgovernsthis court'sreview ofthe state court'sdecision on Penton'sineffectivecounselclaim s.Bellv.Cone,535 U.S.685,694-695 (2002). ThisCourt mustdeterminewhetherthestatecourt'sapplicationof Stricklandwasobjectivelyunreasonable.1d.;Nealv.Puckett,286F.3d230,236(5thCir.2002)(en banc),cert.denied,537U.S.l104(2003).Undersection 2254(d)(1),çlgwlehavenoauthorityto granthabeascorpusreliefsimplybecauseweconclude,in ourindependentjudgment,thatastate suprem ecourt'sapplication ofStrickland iserroneousorincorrect.'' Catalan v.Cockrell,315 F.3d 491,493 (5th Cir.2002)(quotingNeal,286 F.3d at236). ûsf'he federal-habeasschemeleaves primary responsibility with the state courts for these judgments,and authorizes federal-court O :yItA O hV DG hZOI8h18-2262.d01.w 17d interventiononlywhenastatecourtdecisionisobjectivelyunreasonable.''Woodfordv.Visciotti,537 U.S.19,27(2002). In hisaffidavitto thestatehabeascourt,counselstated: M y nam e isRandallJ.A yers.1am an attorney licensed in the State of Texas,and m y Bar Card N um ber is 01465950. The follow ing statem ent is based upon a review of m y case file as w ell as the reporter'srecord regarding thism atter: On April19,2013,the 185th D istrictCourtofH arrisCounty,Texas, appointed m e to represent M r. Forest Penton, Jr. in Cause N o. 1384434inwhich hewasindicted fortheoffenseofPossession with IntenttoDeliveraControlled Substance.IcontinuedtorepresentM r. Penton from April19,013,untilM ay 15,2014,whenM r.Pentonwas foundguiltyafterajurytrial. AsM r.Penton'scasewasconcludedoverthreeand ahalfyearsago, and aslhavehandled numerouscasesandtrialssincethen,lactually have very little presentm em ory ofM r.Penton'scase orhistrial,and the information contained herein isbasedon m yreview ofmy notes and otherdocum entscontained in m y case file regarding thism atter, aswellasm yreview oftheofficialcourtreporter'srecord from M r. Penton's trial,w hich retlectthe follow ing: M r.Penton w as charged w ith possession w ith intent to deliver a quantityofmethamphetaninethatwasfoundinsideacarinwhichM r. Penton wasapassenger.A spartofthe discovery process,lrequested and received a copy of the police incident report,in which the arresting officer indicated that the car was stopped for a traffic violation afterthe officerobserved thatithad Stfailedto stop atthered light at lnterstate 10 and Sheldon ...'', and that after the m etham phetam ine w as subsequently discovered inside the car,M r. Penton m ade an oral statem ent at the scene to the effect that fhe m etham phetam inebelonged to him .1filed a m otion to suppressthis alleged incrim inating oral statem entby M r.Penton,w hich m otion wasdenied by thetrialcourtaflera hearing outsidethepresence of thejuryatwhichboththearrestingofficerandM r.Pentontestified. A t the suppression hearing, the arresting officer testitied that the reason hestopped the carw asthatdtthe lightturned yellow andthecar tried tospeedthrough thelightanddidn'tm akeit;ran thered lighf', and that the traffic light w as kschanging from yellow to red - they didn'tm ake it.'' W hile I w as certainly aw are atthe tim e of the suppression hearing thatthere w ould be an issue w ith the validity ofa traffic violation if O :yRAO hV DG ï2018hl8-2262.d01.w pd 9 the car adually entered the intersedion while the lightwas siill yellow,my notesand therecordclearlyindicatethatldidnotpursue a m ore detailed line of questioning w ith the arresting officer regardingthatspecificissue,andfurtherdid notraise,develop,argue nor preserve that specific issue for appeal.I believe that since m y focusw ason the suppression ofM r.Penton's alleged incrim inating statem entfrom theverybeginning ofthe case,and continued to beso at the hearing,l sim ply failed to realize thatthe arresting oftk er's testim ony arguably raised the factual issue of w hether or not the traffic light w as actually still yellow when the car entered the intersection,thusraisingtheseparatelegalissueofthevalidity ofthe traftic stop. In response to the specific questions ofthe Honorable Couriof Crim inalA ppeals aspropounded in theirorderin thism atter,1state thatIdid notconsiderarguing thatthe traffic lightw asyellow when the vehicle in w hich M r. Penton w as a passenger entered the intersection,thatno traffic violation had actually occurred,northat theofficersthereforelacked reasonablesuspicion,andthusprobable cause,to conductthe traffic stop. (DocketEntryNo.17-37,pp.35-37). The state habeas courtfound: The CourtofCrim inalAppealsissued arem and N ovem ber 8, 2017 to addressthe issue ofw hethertrialcounselconsidered arguing the traftk lightwasyellow w hen the vehicle entered theintersection,thatno trafficviolation had occurred and that officers lacked reasonable suspicion forthe stop. 8. OnD ecem ber12,2017thecourtorderedtrialcounselR andall Ayersto filean affidavitaddressingtheissueson rem and. 9. On Decem ber 18,2017,RandallAyers filed an affidaviton rem and. 10. The court finds the affidavit of Randall J. Ayerstobe credible. Ayers has very little m em ory of the case, and bases his affidaviton the information in his case file.Ajhdavitof RandallJ Ayers at l-2. O :hR AOW D Gh2018h18-2262.d01.m )d 12. AyerswasawaretheoffensereportstatedthevehicleCtfailed tostopattheredlightatInterstate10andSheldon''.Ay davit ofRandallJ Ayersat2. 13. Ayers filed his m otion to suppressregarding an alleged incriminatingoralstatementmadebyApplicant.Aihdavitof RandallJ Ayers at2. 14. Ayers w as aw are of the possibility thatan issue w ith the traffic stop m ay arise ifthe carhad entered the intersection whilethelightwasstillyellow.AffidavitofRandallJ Ayers at3. 15. Ayersg's)focusduringthehearingwasontheincriminating statementmadebyApplicant.Ay davitofRandall.lAyersat 3. 16. Ayersl's)focuswasnotonthepotentialfactualissueraised byDeputySantos'phrasing.AfhdavitofRandallJ Ayersat 3. 17. A yers does not recall his specific thoughtprocess and believesthatbecausehisfocusw asonApplicant'sstatem ents he did notconsiderarguing thatthe traffic lightw as actuqlly yellow , that no violation occurred, or that oftk ers lacked reasonablesuspiciontostopthevehicle.Ay davitofRandall J Ayers at3. Deputy Santos testified during the suppression hearing that thekdlightturnedyellow andthecartriedto speed throughthe lightanddidn'tmakeit;rantheredlight(111R.R.at7).57And the lightw asûschanging from yellow to red -they didn'tm ake it''.Ay davitofRandallJ Ayersat2-3. 19. A yers cross-exam ined deputy Santos during the suppression hearing which included the follow ing exchange: Q.Assoonasyousaw it,itbasicallyrolledastoplight? A .Itdid. Q.W entthrough aredlight? O :hM OhVD Gh2018h18-2262.d01.N d A.Changing from yellow to red.They didn'tmakeit.(111 R.R.23). During trial,Deputy Santostestified:St-l-he cartried to beata red light--tried to beatthatwasturning yellow,didn'tbeat thelightandranaredlight.''(IV R.R.20). The offense reportstatesthatthe vehicle Ssfailed to stop atthe redlight.''SeeState: 5'WritExhibitAlj/Offensereportblcl3- 5076. The courtfinds that itis apparentbased on a reading of the offense report and the reporter's record from both the suppression hearing and trialthatthe vehicle A pplicantw as in attem pted to accelerate in order to enter the intersection while the lightwasyellow,butfailed to do so,and instead entered the intersection while the light was red,creating probable cause forthe traftic stop. 23. The totality of representation w as sufficient to afford Applicantareasonably effective assistanceofcounselin trial. A pplicantfailsto show Ayer'sfailure to argue there w as no traffic code violation w as harm ful. 25. Applicantfailstoshow counsel'srepresentationfellbelow an objectivestandardofreasonablenessinanywayandthat,but for counsel's alleged deficiencies, there is a reasonable probablyrsic)thattheresultofthe proceeding would have been different. 26. Applicantfails to show thathis conviction w as im properly obtained. (DocketEntryNo.17-37,pp.48-51). The state habeascourtconcluded: Applieant fails to show a reasonable probability that,but for counsel's om ission of an argum ent, the result of the proceeding w ould have been different.Strickland v.W ashington,466 U .S.668, 694(1984). O :àM OïVD Gï2018ï18-2262.d01.N d ln reviewing trial counsel's condud ,there is a strong presum ption thatthe attorney'sactionsw erereasonable and based on sound trialstrategy.Jackson v.State,877 5.W .2d 768,771(Tex. Crim.App.1994). 3. Reasonably effective assistance does notrequire error-free cotmsel,or eounselwhose competenc,y is judged by hindsight. Mercadov.State,6155.W .2d225,228(Tex.Crim.App.l981). 4. Courts w ill not ûtsecond-guess through hindsight''counsel's strategy,norw illthe factthatanotherattorney m ighthave pursued a differentcourse supporta finding ofineffectiveness.Blottv.State, 5885.W .2d 588,592(Tex.Crim .App.1979). 5. ln ahabeasproceeding,Applicantbearstheburden ofproving, byapreponderanceofthe evidence,thefactsthatwould entitle him torelief.ExparteRichardson,70S.W .3d865,870(Tex.Crim.App. 2002). 6. In allthings,A pplicantfailsto dem onstrate hisconvid ion w as im properly obtainedorthathe isbeing improperly contined. (DocketEntryNo.17-37,pp.51-52). Second-guessing isnotthetestforineffective assistanceofcounsel.King v.Lynaugh,868 F.2d1400,1405(5thCir.1989).lnStrickland,466U.S.at691,theSupremeCourtexplainedthat: The reasonableness of counsel's actions m ay be determ ined or substantially intluenced bythedefendant'sow n statem entsoractions. Counsel's actions are usually based, quite properly, on inform ed strategicchoicesm adebythedefendantand oninformation supplied by the defendant. In particular,what investigation decisions are reasonable depends critically on such infonnation. Id at691. Counsel'sfailureto challengethelegality ofthetraffic stop did notrenderhisrepresentation below thatofreasonably effective assistance. O :$M OhV D Gy2018h18-2262.d01.N d The state habeas coul' tfound the facts stated in trial counsel's aftidavitto be true and concluded that Penton had reeeived reasonably effedive assistance of counsel. The Court of CriminalAppeals expressly based its denialofhabeasreliefon this finding. These credibility determinationsare entitled to apresumption ofcorrectness.28 U.S.C.j 2254(e)(1);M oore v. Johnson,194 F.3d 586,604 (5th Cir.1999)(op.on reh'g). Penton hasnotproducedclearand convincingevidenceto rebutthistinding. Thestatecourt'sdecision asto the effectiveassistance ofcounselreasonablyappliedthe1aw to the facts,consistentw ith clearly established federallaw .Penton hasnotshown a basisforthe reliefheseeks.28U.S.C.j2254(d)(1). V I. The C laim sBased on Errorsin the State H abeas Proceedings (Ground 4) PentonassertsthatJudgeW ilkersonpresidedoverthetrialandthesuppressionhearing,while JudgeBrownpresided overthe habeascourt.Penton assertsthatthepositioning ofthevehicle when thelightchanged from yellow to red iscentraltohisargum entthathisconviction isillegal.Penton explainsthatJudge W ilkerson's findingsplace the car in the intersection w hen the lightchanged from yellow to red. This supports each of Penton's claim s. Penton statesthatJudge Brow n,the habeasjudge,made anew factualfindingregarding the position ofthecar. Although shewas requested to hold an evidentiary hearing,shechosenotto addressthecontlictingissuesand issued anothersetoffacts.Penton com plainsthatJudgeBrow n abused herdiscretion and violated Penton's righttodueprocess.(DocketEntryNo.4,pp.15-21). The infirm ities in state habeas proceedings on habeas review that Penton alleges do not constitutegroundsforhabeasreliefinfederalcourt.Trevinov.Johnson,168F.3dl73,180(5thCir. O :ï1tAO W D Gà2018ï18-2262.d01.w 1)d 1999);Hallmarkv.Johnson,118F.3d1073,1080(5thCir.),cert.denie4 118S.Ct.576(1997);see Nicholsv.Scott,69F.3d 1255,1275(5thCir.l995)($éAn attackonastatehabeasproceedingdoes notentitle thepetitionerto habeasreliefin respectto hisconviction,asitisan attack on aproceeding collateraltothedetentionandnotthedetentionitself'');Morrisv.Cain,l86F.3d581,585n.6(5th Cir.1999).Pentonhasnotassertedanerrorinthestatehabeasproceedingaffectingthedeference duethestatecourts'findingsinthehabeasproceedings.Penton hasnotshown abasisforgranting habeasrelief. VI1. Requestfor an Evidentiary H earing Pentonrequestsanevidentiaryhearinginthiscase.Section2254(e)(2)provides: Ifthe applicanthasfailed to develop the factualbasisofa claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiàry hearing on the claim unlessthe applicantshow sthat- (A)theclaim relieson(i)a new rule ofconstitutionallaw,maderetroactiveto caseson collateral review by the Suprem e Court, that w as previously unavailable;or (ii)afactualpredicatethatcouldnothavebeenpreviouslydiscovered through the exercise ofdue diligence' ,and (B)thefactsunderlyingtheclaim wouldbesufticienttoestablishby clear and convincing evidence thatbut for constitutionalerror,no reasonable factfinder w ould have found the applicantguilty of the underlying offense. The decision w hether to conduct an evidentiary hearing is com m itted to this Court's discretion.SeeWilliamsv.Taylor,529U.S.420,436 (2000)(statingthatitwasCtcongress'intent to avoid unneeded evidentiary hearings in federal habeas com us''proceedingsl;Conner v. O :yR AOhV D Gy2018h18-2262.d01.w pd 15 Quarterman,477F.3d287,293(5thCir.2007)(citingRobertsv.Dretke,381F.3d491,497(5thCir. 2004)(citationomittedl);McDonaldv.Johnson,139F.3d 1056,1060(5thCir.1998). W herethere isa factualdisputethat,ifresolved in the petitioner'sfavor,wouldentitlehim torelief,and the statehasnotaffordedthepetitionerafulland fairhearing,afederalhabeascorpus petitionerisentitledtoanevidentiaryhearing.Clarkv.Johnson,202F.3d760,7(6(5thCir.2000); Perillov.Johnson,79F.3d441,444 (5th Cir.1996). However,apetitionerisnotentitled to an evidentiary hearing (tif his claim s are m erely conclusory allegations unsupported by specitics or contentionsthatin the face ofthe record are wholly incredible.''Young v.H erring,938 F.2d 543, 559(5th Cir.1991).ûûlfitappearsthatanevidentiaryhearingisnotrequired,thejudgeshallmake suchdispositionofthepetitionasjusticeshallrequire.''Rule8oftheRulesGoverningSection2254 Cases. This Courthas been able to resolve a11issuesraised in thiscase based on the pleadingsand state-courtrecords.Asalready discussed,thefactsand claimsPenton seekstodevelop lack merit. Penton has failed to provide a factual basis for granting an evidentiary hearing. This Court determ inesthatan evidentiary hearing isnotrequired because there are no relevantfactualdisputes thatw ould require developm entin orderto assessthe claim s.Robinson v.Johnson,151 F.3d 256, 268(5thCir.1998),ccr/.denied,526U.S.1100(1999).Penton'smotionforevidentiaryhearing, (DocketEntryNo.19),isDENIED. V lIl. C onclusion Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment,(DocketEntry No.16),is GRANTED. Penton's petition for a w rit ofhabeas corpus is DEN IED . This case is D ISM ISSED . Penton's motion foran evidentiary hearing,(DocketEntry No.19),and motion fortheappointmentof O :yR AO hV DGy2018h18-2262.d01.w pd 16 counsel,(DocketEntry No.21),are DENIED asmoot. Any remaining pending motions are DEN IED asm oot. The Suprem e Courthasstated thatthe show ing necessary fora Certitlcate ofAppealability isa substantialshow ing ofthedenialofa constitutionalright.H ernandezv.Johnson,213 F.3d 243, 248(5thCir.2000)(citingSlackv.M cDaniel,529U.S.473,483-84(2000)).Underthatstandard, anapplicantm akesasubstantialshowingwhenhedem onstratesthathisapplication involvesissues thataredebatableamongjuristsofreason,thatanothercourtcouldresolvetheissuesdifferently,or that the issues are suitable enough to deserve encouragem ent to proceed further. See Clark v. Johnson,202 F.3d 760,763 (5th Cir.2000). W here a districtcourthasrejected aprisoner's constitutionalclaimsonthemerits,theapplicantmustdemonstratethatreasonablejuristswouldtind thedistrictcourt'sassessm entoftheconstitutionalclaim sdebatableorwrong.Slack,529U.S.484. This Court denies Penton's petition after careful consideration of the m erits of his constitutionalclaim s.ThiscourtdeniesaC OA because Penton hasnotm ade the necessary showing forissuance. A ccordingly,a certificate ofappealability isD EN IED . SIG N ED atH ouston,Texas,on ,2019. VAN ESSA D .G ILM O RE UN ITED STA TES DISTRICT JU D GE O :h1tA OW DGh2018h18-2262.d01.w pd 17
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