Renfro v. Davis, No. 4:2016cv02221 - Document 3 (S.D. Tex. 2016)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER dismissing with prejudice 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. A Certificate of Appealability is denied. (Signed by Judge Sim Lake) Parties notified. (aboyd, 4)
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Renfro v. Davis Doc. 3 United States District Court Southern District of Texas IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION RASHARD ESAW RENFRO, TDCJ #01463328, Petitioner, v. LORIE DAVIS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent. 1 § § § § § § § § § § § § § ENTERED July 28, 2016 David J. Bradley, Clerk CIVIL ACTION NO. H-16-2221 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER The petitioner, Rashard Esaw Renfro (TDCJ #014 63328), has filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus By a Person in State Custody ("Petition") (Docket Entry No. 1) seeking relief from a prison disciplinary conviction for failure to turn out for work. After considering the pleadings and the applicable law, the court will dismiss this action for the reasons explained below. I . Background Renfro is currently incarcerated at the Stiles Unit as the result of a conviction for aggravated robbery that was entered 1 The Petition names "D. H. 0. D. Miller" as the respondent. Because the petitioner is in custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division ("TDCJ"), Director Lorie Davis is substituted as the proper respondent pursuant to Rule 2(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. Dockets.Justia.com against him on September 9, 2007, in Harris County cause number Renfro received a 25-year prison sentence in that case. 3 1073122. 2 In the pending Petition Renfro seeks relief from a prison disciplinary case that were entered against him at the Jester III Unit on April 2016. 4 7, In particular, Renfro challenges his conviction for violating prison rules by refusing or failing to turn out for work in disciplinary case #20160212287. 5 As a result of 30 this disciplinary conviction, previously earned good-time privileges, among other things, reprimanded and reduced in Renfro credit forfeited and he for 30 days. 6 classification lost days of commissary Renfro was also status to Line 3. 7 Renfro filed grievances to challenge the conviction, but his appeal was unsuccessful. 8 Renfro now contends that he is entitled to relief because the challenged disciplinary conviction was "violation of due process. " 9 entered against him For reasons explained below, 2 in the See Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Offender Information, at https://offender.tdcj.texas.gov/Offender Search (last visited July 27, 2016). 4 Petition, Docket Entry No. 1, p. 5. 5 Id. 6 Id. 8 Id. at 5-6. 9 Id. at 6-7. -2- court concludes that Renfro fails to state an actionable claim under the legal standard that governs disciplinary proceedings in the prison context. II. An inmate's Prison Disciplinary Proceedings rights in the prison disciplinary setting are governed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 2963, 2974-75 (1974). See Wolff v. McDonnell, 94 S. Ct. Prisoners charged with institutional rules violations are entitled to rights under the Due Process Clause only when the disciplinary action may result in a sanction that will infringe upon a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2302 (1995). See Liberty interests emanate from either the Due Process Clause itself or from state law. See Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 1904, 1908 the (1989) (citation omitted). To 109 S. Ct. extent that the disciplinary conviction may affect the petitioner's eligibility for early release from prison, the Due Process Clause does not include a right to conditional release before the expiration of a valid sentence. See Greenholtz v. Correctional Complex, 99 S. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979). Under these circumstances, the petitioner's claims depend on the existence of a constitutionally protected liberty interest created by state law. The Supreme Court has decided that only those state-created substantive interests that "inevitably affect the duration of -3- [a prisoner's] sentence" may qualify for constitutional protection under the Due Process Clause. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2302. also Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31-32 (5th Cir. 1995). In Texas only those inmates who are eligible for the form of parole known as mandatory supervision have a constitutional expectancy of early release. See Malchi v. Thaler, 211 F.3d 953, 956 (5th Cir. 2000) (addressing the mandatory supervision scheme in place prior to September 1, (5th Cir. 1996); 2007) see also Teague v. Quarterman, (addressing the mandatory supervision scheme in place before and after September 1, 1996). prisoner cannot 482 F.3d 769 demonstrate a As a result, a Texas constitutional violation in the prison disciplinary context without first satisfying the following criteria: (1) he must be eligible for early release on mandatory supervision; and (2) the disciplinary conviction at issue must have resulted in a Malchi, 211 loss of previously earned good-time credit. F. 3d at 957-58 (explaining that only those See Texas inmates who are eligible for early release on mandatory supervision have a protected liberty interest in their previously earned goodtime credit). Renfro cannot demonstrate a constitutional violation in this case. Although Renfro lost good-time credit as the result of the challenged mandatory disciplinary supervision conviction, because aggravated robbery. See (excluding prisoners of convicted Tex. -4- he his Gov' t of is not Code § aggravated for conviction prior eligible for 508.14 9 (a) ( 12) robbery from eligibility for mandatory supervision). Likewise, Renfro concedes that the judgment in connection with that conviction included an affirmative finding that a deadly weapon was used or exhibited during the offense, which also excludes him from eligibility for mandatory supervision. 10 See Tex. Gov't Code 508.149(a) (1) § (excluding from mandatory supervision prisoners convicted of an offense with an affirmative finding that a deadly weapon was used to commit the offense) . claims. This is fatal to Renfro's due process See Malchi, 211 F.3d at 957-58. Although the disciplinary convictions at issue also resulted in a loss of privileges and affected his classification status, the Fifth Circuit has recognized that sanctions such as these, which are "merely changes in the conditions of [an confinement," do not implicate due process concerns. Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 1997). inmate's] Madison v. Limitations imposed on privileges are the type of sanctions that do not pose an atypical or significant hardship beyond the ordinary incidents of prison life. See id. Likewise, reductions in a prisoner's custodial classification and the potential impact on good-time credit earning ability are too attenuated to be protected by the Clause. Due Process See Malchi, 211 F.3d at 958; Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1995); Neals v. Norwood, 59 F. 3d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1995). 10 Under these circumstances, Renfro cannot demonstrate a Peti tion, Docket Entry No. 1, p. 5, -5- CJ[ 15. violation of the Due Process Clause, and his pending federal habeas corpus Petition will be denied. III. Certificate of Appealability Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases now requires a district court to issue or deny a certificate of appealability when entering a final order that is adverse to the petitioner. A certificate of appealability will not issue unless the petitioner makes "a substantial showing of the denial of a right," 28 U.S.C. demonstrate "that § 2253(c) (2), reasonable jurists would the wrong." Tennard v. Dretke, 124 S. Ct. 2562, 2565 (2004) controlling 120 standard S. this constitutional find assessment McDaniel, the which requires a petitioner to court's Slack v. of constitutional Ct. 1595, requires 1604 a claims debatable (2000)). petitioner district to or (quoting Under show the "that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were encouragement to proceed further.'" Where denial of relief is based 'adequate to deserve Miller-El, 123 S. Ct. at 1039. on procedural grounds the petitioner must show not only that "jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right," but -6- also that they "would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling." Slack, 120 S. Ct. at 1604. A district court may deny a certificate of appealability, sua sponte, without requiring further briefing or argument. See Alexander v. For Johnson, 211 F.3d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 2000). reasons set forth above, the court concludes that jurists of reason would not debate whether the petitioner states a valid claim or that the Petition should be resolved in a different manner. Therefore, a certificate of appealability will not issue. IV. Conclusion and Order Based on the foregoing, the court ORDERS as follows: 1. The Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus By a Person in State Custody filed by Rashard Esaw Renfro (Docket Entry No. 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice. 2. A certificate of appealability is DENIED. The Clerk shall provide a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to the parties. SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this~h day of ~~\y, 2016. UNITED -7- DISTRICT JUDGE
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