Boudreaux v. Mehls et al, No. 4:2015cv00283 - Document 21 (S.D. Tex. 2016)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 19 MOTION for Summary Judgment . This action is dismissed with prejudice. (Signed by Judge Sim Lake) Parties notified. (aboyd, 4)
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Boudreaux v. Mehls et al Doc. 21 United States District Court Southern District of Texas ENTERED IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION ALBERT BOUDREAUX III, § § § § § § § § § § Plaintiff, v. SHERIFF TROY E. NEHLS, et al., Defendants. January 27, 2016 David J. Bradley, Clerk CIVIL ACTION NO. H-15-0283 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER The plaintiff, Albert Boudreaux III (Inmate No. 00182409), has filed a Complaint ("Complaint") , Under 42 U.S.C. alleging violations Fort Bend County Jail. § of 1983, his Civil civil Rights rights at the The court requested an answer from two defendants, Corporal Edwin Williams and Deputy Diego Leal, (Order Service for Act of Process, Docket Entry No. 11) . Jr. These defendants have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment ( "MSJ") (Docket Entry No. 19), arguing Boudreaux has not expired. that filed a this case should response and his be dismissed. time to do so has After considering all of the pleadings, the exhibits, and the applicable law, the court will grant the Defendants' Motion and will dismiss this case for the reasons explained below. I. Background At the time the Complaint was filed, custody of the Fort Bend County Boudreaux was in the Sheriff's Department at the Dockets.Justia.com (the "Jail") as a pretrial detainee. 1 The Corporal Edwin Williams and Deputy Diego Leal, Jr., Fort Bend County Jail defendants, were employed by the Fort Bend County Sheriff's Department at the Jail. 2 On July 18, 2014, Boudreaux was moved from a "step down unit for mental health offenders" at the Jail and placed in cell block 2-A. 3 On October 17, 2014, there was a fight involving two inmates in the 2-A cell block. 4 Corporal Williams investigated the fight, questioning Boudreaux and other inmates who were present in an attempt to identify the aggressor. 5 questioned would provide any None of the inmates who were information about the fight. 6 Subsequently, Boudreaux was moved from the 2-A cell block to the 2-H cell block at the Jail. 7 1 Complaint, Docket Entry No. 1, p. 3; Plaintiff's More Definite Statement ("More Definite Statement"), Docket Entry No. 10, p. 3. Boudreaux has been released and is no longer in custody. Change of Address, Docket Entry No. 20. Defendants' Original Answer, Docket Entry No. 18, p. 1. Deputy Leal is now retired. Affidavit of Diego Leal, Jr. ("Leal Affidavit"), Exhibit C to MSJ, Docket Entry No. 19-3, p. 2. 2 10, p. 9; More Definite Statement, Docket Entry No. Classification Record, Exhibit A to MSJ, Docket Entry No. 19-1, p. 11. 3 4 Affidavit of Edwin Williams ("Williams Affidavit"), Exhibit B to MSJ, Docket Entry No. 19-2, p. 3. 5 Id. 6 Id. 7 Affidavit of Kim Pokluda ("Pokluda Affidavit"), Exhibit A to MSJ, Docket Entry No. 19-1, p. 3. -2- On November 5, 2014, Boudreaux was attacked by three offenders in the 2-H cell block. 8 The assault took place after the evening meal was served, during a period of time when the cell doors are unlocked to allow inmates access to the TV area and showers. 9 Boudreaux sustained a broken jaw that required oral surgery as a result of the assault. 10 Boudreaux contends that Corporal Williams retaliated against him by transferring him to cell block 2-H, which Boudreaux describes as a "trouble dorm," because Boudreaux would not give Williams information about the fight other offenders on October 17. 11 that occurred between two Boudreaux also contends that Deputy Leal failed to protect him from harm when he was assaulted in the 2-H cell block on November 5, 2014, because Leal left the door to his cell open and left his post for an extended period of time. 12 Boudreaux seeks $150,000.00 in compensatory damages for the violation of his civil rights. 13 The rights 8 defendants and move Statement No. 1-1, p . 2 . deny for of summary Facts Leal Affidavit, pp. 4, 5. 9 violating I Boudreaux's judgment, attached to constitutional arguing Complaint Exhibit C to MSJ, that they are Docket Entry Docket Entry No. 19-3, I 10 More Definite Statement, Docket Entry No. 10, pp. 2, 6. 11 Correction of Statement of Facts, Docket Entry No. 16, p. 1. 12 More Definite Statement, Docket Entry No. 10, p. 1. 13 Complaint, Docket Entry No. 1, p. 4. -3- entitled to qualified immunity from Boudreaux's claims against them in their individual capacities . 14 The defendants argue further that Boudreaux fails to establish liability against them in their official capacities . 15 II. The Defendants' Standard of Review Motion for Summary Judgment is governed by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under this rule, a reviewing court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). A fact is "material" if its resolution in favor of one party might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). An issue is "genuine" if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. In deciding a summary judgment motion, Id. the reviewing court must "construe all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Cir. 2010) However, (internal Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 266 (5th citation and quotation marks omitted). the non-movant cannot avoid summary judgment simply by 14 MSJ, Docket Entry No. 19, pp. 7-9. 15 Id. at 15. -4- presenting "conclusory allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation." Jones v. 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2012) Lowndes County, Mississippi, 67 8 F. 3d (quoting TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James of Washington, 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002)); see also Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en bane) (a non-movant cannot demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact with conclusory allegations, scintilla of evidence) . a genuine issue of unsubstantiated assertions, or only a If the movant demonstrates the absence of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-movant to provide "specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986). As noted above, the plaintiff has not filed a response to the MSJ. Notwithstanding the plaintiff's failure to respond, summary judgment may not be awarded by default "simply because there is no opposition, even if the failure to oppose violated a local rule." Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. Administracion Central Sociedad Anonima, 776 F.2d 1277, 1279 (5th Cir. 1985). "However, a court may grant an unopposed summary judgment motion if the undisputed facts show that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Wells Fargo Bank Nat'l Ass'n, (citation omitted); 768 F.3d 435, see also Eversley v. 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1988) -5- 435 Day v. (5th Cir. MBank Dallas, 2014) 843 F.2d III. A. Discussion Qualified Immunity Public officials acting within the scope of their authority generally are shielded from civil liability by the doctrine of qualified immunity. 2738 (1982). See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2727, "Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages liability unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct." (2015) Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012)). In doing so, "[q] ualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions." (2011). Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 Thus, the doctrine of qualified immunity "protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Id. (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 106 S. Ct. 1092, 1096 (1986)). To determine qualified whether immunity for a an public official alleged 129 S. Ct. 808, analysis asks whether, party asserting official's the conduct 815 (2009). of the to violation, See Pearson v. The first prong of the taken in the light most favorable to the injury, violated the a analysis asks facts alleged constitutional "clearly established" at that time. prong entitled constitutional reviewing courts engage in a two-prong inquiry. Callahan, is right Id. at 815-16. whether -6- show qualified that the that was The second immunity is appropriate, defendant's notwithstanding an alleged violation, actions were objectively reasonable because "in light the of clearly established law at the time of the conduct in question." Hampton Company National Surety, LLC v. Tunica County, Mississippi, 543 F.3d 221, 225 (5th Cir. 2008) F.3d 404, 410-11 (5th Cir. 2007)). these prongs in any sequence. also Tolan v. Cotton, 134 (quoting Freeman v. Gore, 483 A reviewing court may consider See Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818; see S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014). In this instance the court begins and ends its qualified immunity analysis with the first prong because Boudreaux does not demonstrate that either defendant violated the Constitution. B. Retaliation Boudreaux contends that Corporal Williams retaliated against him in violation of his constitutional rights by transferring him from cell block 2-A to cell block 2-H on October 17, 2014, because of Boudreaux's failure to provide information about a fight between two other inmates. 16 Williams denies taking any action to retaliate against Boudreaux and notes that he had no involvement in the decision to transfer Boudreaux from cell block 2-A to another cell block. 17 Williams provides records confirming that the decision to move Boudreaux from the 2-A cell block to the 2-H cell block was 16 Correction of Statement of Facts, Docket Entry No. 16, p. 1. 17 Williams Affidavit, Exhibit B to MSJ, Docket Entry No. 19-2, pp. 3-4. -7- made by Deputy D. Hedrick of the Classification and Release Unit at the Jail. 18 Williams adds that, without "extensive documentation and support," he had no authority to override decisions made by the Classification and Release Unit and that he had "no reason or desire to select the location of any housing" for Boudreaux on this occasion. 19 "To prevail on a claim of retaliation, establish (1) a specific constitutional right, a prisoner must (2) the defendant's intent to retaliate against the prisoner for his or her exercise of that right, ( 3) a retaliatory adverse act, McDonald v. Steward, 132 F.3d 225, Morris v. Powell, 449 F.3d 682, 231 684 and ( 4) causation." (5th Cir. 1998); see also (5th Cir. 2006) A prisoner must allege more than his personal belief that he is the victim of retaliation. 1997) . enough See Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 310 (5th Cir. Mere conclusory allegations of retaliation will not be to judgment. withstand a properly supported motion for summary See Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir. 1995). Boudreaux has not filed a response to the motion for summary judgment and he does not refute the evidence showing that Williams had no involvement in the decision to transfer Boudreaux to the 2-H cell block. Boudreaux's conclusory allegations of retaliation are 18 Pokluda Affidavit, Exhibit A to MSJ, Docket Entry No. 19-1, p.3; Classification Record, Exhibit 1 to Pokluda Affidavit, Docket Entry No. 19-1, p. 12. 19 Williams Affidavit, Exhibit B to MSJ, Docket Entry No. 19-2, p. 4. -8- not sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166. See Absent a showing that Corporal Williams had any involvement in the decision to transfer Boudreaux to the 2-H cell block, Boudreaux fails to make a claim of retaliation or to demonstrate a constitutional violation. Accordingly, Corporal Williams is entitled to qualified immunity. C. Failure to Protect Boudreaux contends that Deputy Leal failed to protect him from harm when he was assaulted on November 5, 2014, because Leal left the door to his cell open and left his post for an extended time. 20 Pretrial detainees have a constitutional right under the Due Process Clause to protection from harm during their confinement. See Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 2008) Hare v. City of Corinth, Mississippi, 1996) (en bane)). 74 F.3d 633, 650 (citing (5th Cir. The duty to protect pretrial detainees from harm under the Due Process Clause is the same as the one afforded under the Eighth Amendment. See Hare, 74 F.3d at 650 ("[T]he State owes the same duty under the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment to provide both pretrial detainees and convicted inmates with basic human needs, including . protection from harm, during their confinement . . . "). Because the Complaint against Leal concerns an isolated Boudreaux 20 episode, "is required to prove intent More Definite Statement, Docket Entry No. 10, p. 1. -9- specifically, that one or more jail officials 'acted or failed to act with deliberate indifference to [his] needs.'" Dallas County, 591 F.3d 445, 452 (5th Cir. 2009) Shepherd v. (quoting Hare, 74 F.3d at 648). The deliberate indifference standard is an "extremely high" one to meet. 752, 756 Domino v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d (5th Cir. 2001). Mere negligent failure to protect an inmate from attack does not justify liability under Neals v. Norwood, acts 59 F.3d 530, 533 with deliberate indifference (5th Cir. 1995). "only if he 1983. § See An official knows that the inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it." Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1984 (1994). Deputy Leal acknowledges that he was assigned to work in the "Pickett" and provide supervision Boudreaux was assigned on November 5, for the 2014. 21 cell block where On the evening of November 5 Leal conducted regular security checks by periodically leaving the Pickett and walking through the "Pod" or cell block. 22 Leal states that each inspection took no more than five minutes and that he did not leave the Pickett for any longer period of time. 23 Likewise, Leal did not observe any behavior among the inmates that 21 Leal Affidavit, 22 Id. Exhibit C to MSJ, p. 3. at 4. 23Id. -10- Docket Entry No. 19-3, indicated a problem. 24 When Leal returned to the Pickett at one point, Boudreaux advised Leal that he had been assaulted. 25 Leal immediately called for assistance and numerous staff responded. 26 Prior to the incident Leal was not aware of any problems between any of the inmates housed in either of the Pods adjacent to the Pickett where he was assigned. 27 Boudreaux does not allege or show that Leal knew of but disregarded a serious risk to his health or safety on the night he was attacked in cell block 2-H. he had "no problems" with In fact, Boudreaux concedes that his assailants before occurred and that he had "absolutely no idea that would happen. " 28 the assault [the attack] Based on this record, Boudreaux does not establish that Leal was subjectively aware of an excessive risk of harm but deliberately indifferent to that risk. Because Boudreaux does not demonstrate a constitutional violation on Deputy Leal's part, Leal is entitled to qualified immunity. D. Official Capacity Claims Boudreaux does not indicate whether he sues the defendants in their individual capacities only or if he also sues them in their 24Id. 25 Id. at 5. 26Id. 27Id. 28 More Definite Statement, Docket Entry No. 10, pp. 3-4. -11- official capacities as Fort Bend County employees. Defendants argue that they are also entitled to summary judgment on any claim against them employees in their because official Boudreaux capacity does not as allege Fort or Bend show County that an official policy or custom caused any of the alleged constitutional violations in this case. 29 Assuming that a constitutional violation has occurred, municipality such as Fort Bend County is only liable under for acts that are "directly attributable official action or imprimatur.'" 612, 617 (5th Cir. 2009) to it a § 1983 'through some James v. Harris County, 577 F.3d (quoting Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001)) For liability to attach "the municipality must cause the constitutional tort, which occurs 'when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.'" Bolton v. City of Dallas, Texas, 541 F.3d 545, 548 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Social Services of City of New York, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2037-38 (1978)) For reasons set forth above, Boudreaux has not demonstrated that a constitutional violation occurred in this case. He does not otherwise attempt to establish that he was harmed as the result of 29 MSJ, Docket Entry No. 19, p. 15. -12- any deficient policy or custom of the Fort Bend County Sheriff's Department. Accordingly, the defendants cannot be held liable in their official capacities and they are entitled to summary judgment on this issue. E. Remaining Defendants In addition to the claims against Corporal Williams and Deputy Leal, the Complaint lists Fort Bend County Sheriff Troy E. Nehls, Lieutenant J. Cardenas, and Sergeant D. Marin as defendants. 30 court did not request an answer from The these defendants because Boudreaux has not alleged facts showing that these defendants had any personal involvement with a constitutional violation. Personal involvement is an essential element of a civil rights cause of action. See Murphy v. Kellar, 950 F.2d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 1992). Because Boudreaux has not specified any personal involvement on the part of Sheriff Nehls, Lieutenant Cardenas, or Sergeant Marin, the Complaint against these defendants is dismissed for failure to state a claim. IV. Conclusion and Order Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry No. 19) is GRANTED, and this action will be dismissed with prejudice. 3 °Complaint, Docket Entry No. 1, pp. 1, 3. -13- The Clerk shall provide a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to the parties. SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this 27th day of January, 2016. SIM LAKE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE -14-
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