King-White et al v. Humble Independent School District et al, No. 4:2013cv03551 - Document 63 (S.D. Tex. 2015)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 59 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings, denying as moot 58 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment , dismissing with prejudice all Federal Law Claims against Defendant Amanda Michelle Feenstra, dismissing without prejudice all State Law Claims against Defendant Amanda Michelle Feenstra. (Signed by Judge Sim Lake) Parties notified. (aboyd, 4)

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'J King-White et al v. Humble Independent School District et al Doc. 63 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION A.W. and HER MOTHER MARY KING-WHITE, § § § § § Plaintiffs, v. CIVIL ACTION NO. H-13-3551 § § § § § AMANDA MICHELLE FEENSTRA, Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiffs, White"), A.W. brought Independent this School and her mother, action District Mary against ("HISD" ), King-White defendants, ("King- the Amanda Michelle Humble Feenstra ("Feenstra"), Guy Sconzo, Charles Ned, Juan Melendez, Tammy McHale, Craig Stowers, and Alicia Narcisse, for violation of civil rights guaranteed by §§ the 1983 and 1988 United ("§ States 1983" and Education Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. Constitution "§ § 1988"), under 42 U. S. C. and Title IX of the 1681 ("Title IX"). Plaintiffs also asserted claims against all defendants under the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and the common law of the State of Texas for the failure employees, negligence, distress. to adequately train, sexual assault bystander and recovery, supervise, battery, and and discipline negligence infliction of and gross emotional Plaintiffs seek compensatory and exemplary damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, costs of court, attorney's fees, and Dockets.Justia.com other relief available at law and in equity to which they might be entitled. In a Memorandum Opinion and Order issued on June 11, 2014 (Docket Entry No. 35), the court dismissed the claims asserted against HISD and all the individual defendants except Feenstra. Pending before the court are Defendant Amanda Michelle Feenstra's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket Entry No. 58), and Defendant Amanda Michelle Feenstra's Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry No. 59). below, For the reasons set forth Feenstra's motion for judgment on the pleadings will be granted as to all of the federal law claims that plaintiffs have asserted against her, the court will decline supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' against Feenstra, and Feenstra's motion for to exercise state law claims partial summary judgment will be denied as moot. I. Plaintiffs' Factual Allegations King-White is the mother of A.W. who was a minor during most of the events giving rise to this action. between 2009 and 2011 while A.W. School, A.W. was a Plaintiffs allege that student at Humble High was sexually molested on multiple occasions by her same-sex dance teacher, defendant Feenstra. Plaintiffs allege that the abuse began in the spring of 2009 when A.W. was 16 years old, and continued until School. 2011 when A. W. Plaintiffs allege graduated from Humble High that when the abuse began Feenstra -2- instructed A.W. to remain quiet, and A.W. remained quiet. Plaintiffs allege that while the abuse was occurring, A.W.'s grades changed, A.W. withdrew from her classmates and dance teammates, and that with King-White's consent, A.W. home. went to live in Feenstra's Plaintiffs allege that Feenstra spent excessive amounts of time with A.W. behind closed doors, and that Feenstra took A.W. on personal trips during the during which she and A.W. school day and on out-of-town trips shared a room and a bed. Plaintiffs allege that after A.W. graduated from Humble High School Feenstra called A.W. on the phone and stalked A.W.l Eventually told A.W. Feenstra's actions. a former dance instructor about After the dance instructor reported A.W.'s story to authorities, Feenstra was arrested. On October 13, 2013, Feenstra pleaded guilty to an improper relationship with a student and was sentenced to 10 years deferred adjudication and probation. 2 II. Feenstra's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings motion for judgment on the pleadings seeks dismissal of all the claims asserted against for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted. ~~ lPlaintiffs' Original Complaint, Docket Entry No. I, pp. 1-15 1-82, esp. ~~ 2, 8, 19, 29, 41, 43, 46, 50, 55, 57-62, and 79. 2Id. at 15 ~~ 80-82. -3- A. Standard of Review Once a responsive pleading has been filed, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is properly filed as a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999) pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) Jones v. Greninger, (per curiam). "'A motion brought is designed to dispose of cases where the material facts are not in dispute and a judgment on the merits can be rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts.'" In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative & "ERISA" Litigation, 439 F.Supp.2d 692, 695 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (quoting Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2002) and Herbert Abstract Co. v. Touchstone Properties, Ltd., 914 F.2d 74,76 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) ). "A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12 (c) is subject to the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6)." Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413,417 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 529 (5th Cir. Accepting the plaintiff's factual allegations as true, considers relief. whether the complaint states a plausible 2004)). the court claim for See Young v. City of Houston, 599 F. App'x 553, 554 (5th Cir. 2015). -4- B. Analysis of Plaintiffs' Federal Law Claims Plaintiffs assert federal law claims against Feenstra for violations of Title IX of the Education Act of 1972, and violations of constitutional rights actionable under 42 U.S.C. 1. § 1983. 3 Plaintiffs' Title IX Claims will Be Dismissed Count 1 of Plaintiffs' Complaint asserts a claim pursuant to Title IX based upon sexual harassment, rape, and abuse. Feenstra argues that plaintiffs' Title IX claims should be dismissed because (1) Title IX claims are not actionable against individuals, (2) King-White lacks standing to assert Title IX claims on her own behalf, and (3) time-barred. 4 the Title IX claims asserted in this action are Plaintiffs have not responded to any of Feenstra's arguments that plaintiffs' Title IX claims should be dismissed. (a) Applicable Law Title IX of the Education Act Amendments of 1972 provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 3Id. at 16-36 ~~ 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). The 83-176. 4Defendant Amanda Michelle Feenstra's Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Docket Entry No. 59, pp. 3-4. -5- Supreme Court has held that Title IX is enforceable through an implied right of private action against federal funding recipients, Cannon v. University of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1946, 1968 (1979), and that monetary damages are available in such actions. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1038 (1992). also Gebser v. Lago Vista I.S.D., 118 S. Ct. 1989, 1994 See (1998) (recognizing that Title IX is enforceable through an implied right of private action against federal funding recipients) The Court's holding in Franklin established that a federal funding recipient can be held liable for damages in cases involving a teacher's sexual harassment of a student. The Court explained that "when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[sl' on the basis of sex." Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2404, 91 L.Ed. 49 (1986). We believe the same rule should apply when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student. Congress surely did not intend for federal moneys to be expended to support the intentional actions it sought by statute to proscribe. Id. at 1037. (5th Cir. See Rosa H. v. San Elizario I.S.D., 106 F.3d 648, 653 1997) (acknowledging that under Title IX "[mlinor students who have been subj ected to a sexual relationship with their of teachers have a private cause action for monetary damages"); Doe on Behalf of Doe v. Dallas I.S.D., 153 F.3d 211, 219 (5th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that same - sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title IX) . -6- (b) Application of the Law to the Alleged Facts (1) Plaintiffs' Title IX Claims Are Not Actionable Citing Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, 129 S. Ct. 788 (2009), Feenstra argues that she is entitled to dismissal of the Title IX claims asserted against her because claims based on Title IX are not cognizable against individual school employees. s In Fitzgerald the Supreme Court acknowledged that Title IX applies to "institutions and programs that receive federal funds, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) , but [Title IX] has consistently been interpreted as not authorizing suit against school officials, other individuals." Id. at teachers, See also Rowinsky' v. 796. and Bryan I.S.D., 80 F.3d 1006, 1012-13 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996) Congress's ("The fact spending that power title IX was enacted evidence is that discriminatory acts only by grant recipients. Congress's spending power, pursuant it to prohibits As an exercise of title IX makes funds available to a recipient in return for the recipient's adherence to the conditions of the grant. While it is plausible that the condition imposed could encompass ending discriminatory behavior by third parties, the more probable inference is that the condition prohibits certain behavior by the grant recipients themselves.") State University, 820 F. Supp. 2d 772, ("Title IX permits actions only against -7- 778 i Chestang v. Alcorn (S.D. Miss. 2011) 'programs or activities that receive federal financial assistance' and not against individuals."). Plaintiffs do not dispute defendants' contention that claims Title IX actionable. asserted against individuals are not Therefore, Feenstra is entitled to dismissal of the Title IX claims asserted against her in this action. (2) King-White's Title IX Claims Are Not Actionable Citing Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1006, Feenstra argues that KingWhi te' s Title IX claims are not actionable for the additional reason that she "has no standing to assert an individual claim under Title IX.,,6 King-White's attempt to assert a Title IX claim against Feenstra is foreclosed by the Fifth Circuit's holding in Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1010 n.4, that nothing in the statutory language provides [a parent] with a personal claim under title IX. Even assuming that title IX protects persons other than students and employees, [the parent] has failed [to] assert that she was excluded from participation, denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity. Absent such a claim, the plain language of title IX does not support a cause of action by [the parent] . King-White's Title IX claims are therefore foreclosed. Nor is King-White able to assert claims as next friend of A.W. because the facts alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint show that A.W. was not a minor when this action was filed. Plaintiffs allege that when the abuse began in the spring of 2009, 6Id. -8- A.W. was 16 years old. Therefore, A.W. must have reached the age of majority in the spring of 2011, and could not have been a minor when this action was filed over two years later on December 4, 2013. Accordingly, the court concludes that any Title IX claims that King-White has asserted or attempted to assert individually on her own behalf are not actionable under the alleged facts. (3) Plaintiffs' Title IX Claims Are Time-Barred Asserting that " [p]laintiffs brought suit on December 4,2013, more than 2 years after the accrual of any claim under Title IX,"7 and citing Owens v. Okure, 109 S. Ct. 573 (1989), Feenstra argues that plaintiffs' Title IX claims are subject to dismissal because they are barred by Texas's two-year statute of limitations for general personal injury claims Practices & Remedies Code § established by 16.003. B the Texas Civil Plaintiffs have not responded to Feenstra's argument that their Title IX claims are time-barred, but have responded to Feenstra's argument plaintiffs' are time-barred by asserting that the § applicable 1983 claims statute of limitations is not the general two-year statute cited by defendants but, instead, Texas's five-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims arising from conduct 7Id. at 4. BId. -9- that violates Texas law prohibiting sexual assault, Texas Civil Practices & Remedies Code § 16.0045(a).9 In Owens, 109 S. claims arising under governed by that Ct. § the Supreme Court held that 1983 within a particular state should be state's statute of limitations." at 573, "residual or general Id. at 574. personal inj ury See also Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 515 n.5 (5th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that in light of the fact that Congress has not provided a statute of limitations in § 1983 cases, federal courts borrow state's general personal injury limitations period, Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code). forum and that in Texas that period is the two-year period established by the the § 16.003 of Congre s s has similarly not provided a statute of limitations for claims brought under Title IX. Every appellate court to consider the issue has held that Title IX claims should be treated like § 1983 claims and governed by state statutes of limitations for personal injury claims. Walker v. Barrett, 650 F.3d 1198, 1205 (8th Cir. 2011) See ("this court has held that Title IX claims are also governed by the state's personal injury statute of limitations"); Wilmink v. Kanawha County Board of Education, 214 F. App'x 294, 296 n.3 (4th Cir. 2007) curiam) (per ("every circuit to consider the issue has held that Title 9Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant Amanda Feenstra's Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings ("Plaintiffs' Response to Rule 12(c) Motion"), Docket Entry No. 61, pp. 5-7. -10- IX also borrows the relevant state's statute of limitations for personal injury") i Stanley v. Trustees of California University, 433 F.3d 1129, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2006) State ("we join every other federal circuit to consider this issue and hold that Title IX claims are subject to the applicable state statute of limitations for personal injury actions") 504 (2d Cir. (2005) 2004) i Curto v. Edmundson, (per curiam), cert. denied, 392 F.3d 502, 125 S. Ct. 2944 (applying New York's personal injury statute of limitations to claims asserted under Title IX) i M.H.D. v. Westminster Schools, 172 F.3d 797, 803 & n.14 (11th Cir. 1999) specific five-year statute of ("Although Georgia has a limitations for childhood sexual abuse, we disagree with appellant that this statute, not the twoyear personal injury statute of limitations, applies to her [Title IX] claims.") i Lillard v. Shelby County Board of Education, 76 F.3d 716, 729 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that the applicable limitations period for Title IX claims "should be the one-year period provided under Tennessee law for personal injury actions") University of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 78 i and Bougher v. (3d Cir. conclude that the most analogous statute of 1989) limitations, ("we as in is Pennsylvania's two year section 1983 and 1985 claims statute of limitations"). Thus, for the reasons stated below in the plaintiffs' § § II.B.2 with respect to 1983 claims, the court concludes that plaintiffs' Title IX claims are time-barred because they, too, are subject to -11- Texas's two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries. See Maltbia v. Coffie, Civil Action No. H-06-843, * 2 (S.D. Tex. governs January 5, Maltbia's 2007) federal 2007 WL 43793, ("A two-year statute of limitations claims under Title IX and Section 1983. ") . 2. Plaintiffs' § 1983 Claims Are Time-Barred Counts 2 and 3 of Plaintiffs' Original Complaint assert claims under 42 U.S.C. rights to § equal 1983 for violations of A.W.'s constitutional protection and due process, respectively. 10 Feenstra argues that "[f]or the same reasons that Plaintiffs' Title IX claims are time barred, claims (Counts II respond that their applicable and III) § their 42 U. S. C. are § 1983 civil rights likewise barred. 1111 Plaintiffs 1983 claims are not time barred because the statute of limitations is not the general two-year statute cited by defendants but, instead, Texas's five-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims arising from conduct that violates Texas law prohibiting Practices & Remedies Code 26, § sexual 16.0045(a) .12 assault, Texas Civil Plaintiffs cite a number l°Plaintiffs' Original Complaint, Docket Entry No. I, pp. 1996-134. ~~ 11Defendant Amanda Michelle Feenstra's Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Docket Entry No. 59, p. 5. 12Plaintiffs' No. 61, pp. 5-7 Response to Rule -12- 12 (c) Motion, Docket Entry of cases that have applied Texas's five-year statute of limitations to state law claims, but have not cited any case that has applied the five-year limitations period to federal law claims asserted under 1983.13 § Congress has not provided a statute of limitations for civil rights claims brought under 42 U.S.C. that their § 1983 § 1983. Plaintiffs' argument claims are not governed by Texas's limitations period for personal injury claims but, two-year instead, by Texas's five-year limitations period for sexual assault claims, is foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decisions in Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 28 U.S.C. 1938, § 1941-49 (1985), superseded on other grounds by 1658(a), as recognized in Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 124 S. Ct. 1836 (2004), and in Owens, 109 S. Ct. at 573. In Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1941-49, the Supreme Court held that civil rights claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 within a particular state should be governed by that state's statute of limitations for personal injury claims. In reaching this holding the Court reasoned that [i]f the choice of the statute of limitations were to depend upon the particular facts or the precise legal theory of each claim, counsel could almost always argue, DId. at 6-7 (citing Stephanie M. v. Coptic Orthodox Patriarchate Diocese of the Southern United States, 362 S.W.3d 656, 659-60 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th dist.] 2011, no pet.) i C.R. v. American Institute for Foreign Study, Inc., Civil Action No. SA-12CA-1046-XR, 2013 WL 5157699 (W.D. Tex. September 12, 2013) i Doe v. Catholic Society of Religious and Literary Education, Civil Action No. H-09-1059, 2010 WL 345926 at * 8 (S.D. Tex. January 22, 2010)). -13- with considerable force, that two or more periods of limitations should apply to each § 1983 claim. Moreover, under such an approach different statutes of limitations would be applied to the various § 1983 claims arising in the same State, and multiple periods of limitations would often apply to the same case. There is no reason to believe that Congress would have sanctioned this interpretation of its statute. Id. at 1944-46. Cir. 2008) § See also Walker v. Epps, 550 F.3d 407, 411 (5th (recognizing that in Wilson "the Supreme Court held that 1983 actions are best characterized as personal injury actions and, as such, should be subject to state statutes of limitations for general personal limitations periods problematic," and injury to that actions," separate applying actions considerations' 'simple, broad characterization of all In Owens, 109 S. Ct. at 582, 1983 § '" practical "that § various had been supported a 1983 claims'''). the Supreme Court specifically rejected the argument that the statute of limitations applicable to any given § 1983 claim should depend on the particular facts or precise legal theories alleged. that claims arising under § Instead, the Supreme Court held 1983 within a particular state should be governed by that state's "residual or general personal injury statute of limitations." Id. at 574. See also Piotrowski, 51 F.3d at 514 n.5 (holding that in light of the fact that Congress has not provided a statute of limitations in borrow period) the forum Thus, state's general merely because predicated on sexual abuse § 1983 cases, federal courts personal plaintiffs' does -14 - not mean injury § that 1983 the limitations claims are applicable statute of limitations is Texas's special limitations statute for sexual assault claims. See Nunley v. Pioneer Pleasant Vale School District No. 56, 190 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1265 n.1 (W.D. Okla. 2002) (rejecting a similar argument regarding asserted in Oklahoma which, § 1983 and Title IX claims like Texas, has a special statute of limitations for sexual assault claims). See also Maltbia, 2007 WL * 2 ("A two-year statute of limitations governs Maltbia's 43793, federal claims under Title IX and Section 1983."). Because plaintiffs have not cited any case that has applied Texas's special statute of limitations for sexual assault claims, as opposed to Texas's general statute of limitations for personal injury claims, to claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. the § § 1983, the court concludes that 1983 claims asserted here are governed by Texas's two-year limitations period for general personal injury claims. Plaintiffs filed their Original Complaint on December 4, 2013. Applying the Texas general statute of injury claims, Texas Civil Practices plaintiffs cannot prevail on their § limitations & for personal Remedies Code § 16.003, 1983 claims if those claims accrued more than two years earlier, i.e., before December 4,2011. The question of when a cause of action accrues is a question of federal law. The Fifth Circuit has held that in civil rights cases a cause of action accrues, and the limitations period begins to run, "'the moment the plaintiff becomes aware that he has suffered an injury or has sufficient information to know that he has been -15- injured.'" Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 576 (quoting Russell v. Board of Trustees of Firemen, Policemen and Fire Alarm Operators' Pension Fund of Dallas, 968 F.2d 489, 493 (5th Cir. 1992)). A plaintiff's awareness encompasses both knowledge of the injury and knowledge of the causal link between the injury and the defendant. The plaintiff need not know that a legal cause of action exists; he need only know facts that would support a claim. rd. When the claim accrues, the limitations period begins to run unless tolling applies. Under Texas law, however, plaintiffs who are younger than eighteen when their claim accrues are considered to be under a legal disability. The statute of limitations is tolled until such a plaintiff turns eighteen, when the disability ends. Prac. & Rem. Code Plaintiffs § Tex. Civ. 16.001. allege that the abuse underlying asserted in this action occurred from 2009 to 2011. the claims Plaintiffs allege that A.W. was a freshman during the 2007-2008 school year, that A.W. was 16 years old when Feenstra began abusing her in the spring of 2009, and that the abuse continued until A.W. graduated in 2011.14 Asserting that "[p]laintiffs do not dispute that the abuse described in the complaint occurred more than two years before suit was filed,"15 Feenstra argues that "since A.W. turned 14See Plaintiffs' pp. 5-6 ~~ 22, 25-29. Original Complaint, Docket Entry No.1, 15Defendant Amanda Michelle Feenstra's Rule 12(c) Motion for (continued ... ) -16- 18 in the spring of 2011, more than two years passed before suit was filed."16 Even though the limitations period on A.W.'s claims could not have started to run before A. W. reached the age of majority, since plaintiffs allege that A.W. was 16 years old in the spring of 2009, A.W. must have been 18 in the spring of 2011, which was more than two years before this action was filed on December 4, 2013. 17 C. Therefore plaintiffs' 1983 claims are time-barred. § The Court Declines to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs' State Law Claims Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this court pursuant to the statutes governing federal question jurisdiction, 28 U. S. C. and 28 U. S. C. § 1343 governing jurisdiction for federal § 1331, civil rights claims arising from actions taken under color of state law. 18 In addition to § 1983, including the plaintiffs Feenstra, federal claims asserted under Title asserted based on claims state against law for all failure IX and defendants, to train, supervise, and discipline, sexual assault and battery, negligence 15 ( ... continued) Judgment on the Pleadings, Docket Entry No. 59, p. 4 (citing A.W. v. Humble Independent School District, 25 F.Supp.3d 973, 989 (S.D. Tex. 2014)) ~ 17See Plaintiffs' Original Complaint, Docket Entry No.1, p. 6 25-29. 18Id. at 2 ~ 5. -17- and gross negligence, emotional distress. asserted against bystander recovery, Feenstra argues her by A.W.'s and infliction of that the bystander claims mother, King-White are not actionable, and that the remaining state law claims are all barred by Texas' two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries. 19 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They adjudicate claims arising from violations of federal law, including the United States Constitution, claims in which diversity of the parties is present, and pendent state law claims over which the court supplemental § may 1367 (a) exercise ("Except as jurisdiction. [otherwise] See provided 28 U. S. C. the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy Since the under Article III of the United States Constitution.") court has concluded that the plaintiff's only federal claims are subject to dismissal, no federal question remains before the court. Although this fact alone does not divest the court of jurisdiction, the court must decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over § the remaining, 1367 (c) (3) ("The pendent district state law claims. courts may See decline to 28 U. S. C. exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . . 19Defendant Amanda Michelle Feenstra's Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Docket Entry No. 59, pp. 5-7. -18- · (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction."). In Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. 614, 619 n.7 (1988), the Supreme Court recognized that "in the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine -- judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity -will point toward declining to remaining state-law claims." Gibbs, exercise jurisdiction over the See also United Mine Workers v. 86 S. Ct. 1130, 1139 (1966) (recognizing that ordinarily, when the federal claims are dismissed before trial, state claims should be dismissed as well). the pendent Moreover, the general rule in the Fifth Circuit is to dismiss state law claims when the federal claims they supplement are dismissed. Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Industries, 1992) (citing Wong v. 1989) ) See also Products, Inc., Stripling, Brookshire 554 F.3d 595, 972 F.2d 580, 881 F.2d Brothers 602 See Parker & Parsley 200, 204 Holding, (5th Cir. 585 (5th Cir. Inc. 2009) (5th Cir. v. Dayco ("The general rule is that a court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims eliminated before trial . . . ") law claims when all federal law claims are The dismissal of the pendent state should expressly be without prejudice so that the plaintiff may refile those claims in the appropriate state court. See Bass v. Parkwood Hospital, 180 F.3d 234, 246 (5th Cir. 1999). -19- See also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) ("The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a) . shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tOlling period."). In Parker & Parsley, 972 F.2d at 582, the Fifth Circuit held that a district court abused its discretion in failing relinquish jurisdiction over pendent state law claims. to In that case, which like this case was originally filed in federal court, the sole federal claim was dismissed after nine months of trial preparation and one month before the scheduled trial date. district court contract, and retained tort additional months. jurisdiction claims, and over continued state the law case for The fraud, three Before the dismissal of the federal claim, there had been "'a serious attack upon the propriety of venue,' 'rigorous deposition schedules,' 'ungodly amounts documents,' and a hearing on discovery disputes." refusing to surrender jurisdiction over the of discovery Id. at 584. pendent state In law claims, the district court had concluded that "'the equities weigh heavily in favor of maintenance of the case, '" and went on to hold a full trial and render judgment on the state law claims. Id. at 584-85. "After considering and weighing all the factors present in th[e] case," id. at 590, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court, finding that the failure to relinquish the state law claims -20- was an abuse of discretion. The Fifth Circuit carefully analyzed the Carnegie-Mellon factors, expressly stating that "[n]o single factor is dispositive." Id. at 587. In its consideration, the court noted a number of facts and circumstances weighing in favor of relinquishing jurisdiction: "only nine months" old; (ii) (i) the case was trial was "still a few weeks away;" (iii) "discovery had not been completed;" (iv) "the case was at an earlier stage than the parties and the court previously might have thought" due to an amended complaint that changed the theories of the (v) case; the district judge did not have "substantial familiarity with the merits of the case;" (vi) the remaining state law issues were "difficult ones;" did not "prevent [ (vii) remaining in federal court redundancy [or] conserve [ substantial judicial resources;" (viii) there would be no "undue inconvenience" such as a "tremendous financial drain" or a necessity for new legal research; (ix) the already completed discovery "was largely usable in the state proceeding;" by remand; and (xi) the (x) the parties would not be prejudiced "important interests of federalism and comity" heavily favored remand. Id. at 587-89. Careful examination shows that the circumstances in this case are similar to those in Parker & Parsley. two years old. This case is less than Although discovery was completed three months ago in April of 2015, no hearings or trial dates have been scheduled, this court has not yet familiarized itself with any of the state -21- law issues, the already completed discovery should be largely usable in the state proceeding, the remaining state law issues are difficult ones, and no prejudice will be suffered by either party if the state law claims are dismissed without prejudice to refiling in state court. Because the court has concluded that the federal claims in asserted this action are subj ect to dismissal, and because this action is still at an early stage, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining, pendent state law claims. Accordingly, the court concludes that the state law claims asserted in this action are subject to dismissal without prejudice to refiling in a state court of appropriate jurisdiction. III. Conclusions and Order For the reasons stated in § II.B above, the court concludes that the claims plaintiffs have asserted against defendant Amanda Michelle Feenstra based on Title IX are subject to dismissal with prejudice because they are not actionable and are time-barred, and that the claims plaintiffs have asserted against Amanda Michelle Feenstra based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to dismissal with prejudice because they are time-barred. § II.C above, the court declines For the reasons stated in to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims which will be dismissed without prejudice appropriate jurisdiction. to refiling in a state court of Accordingly, Defendant Amanda Michelle Feenstra's Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket -22- Entry No. 59) is GRANTED in PART and DENIED in PART, and Defendant Amanda Michelle Feenstra's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket Entry No. 58) is DENIED as MOOT. on federal All of the claims based law that plaintiffs have asserted against defendant Amanda Michelle Feenstra will be dismissed with prejudice, and all of the claims based on state law that plaintiffs have asserted against Amanda Michelle Feenstra will be dismissed without prejudice. SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this 2015. , SIM LAKE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE -23-

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