Sweetin et al v. Texas City et al, No. 3:2019cv00233 - Document 25 (S.D. Tex. 2020)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granted 16 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM (Signed by Judge Jeffrey V Brown) Parties notified.(GeorgeCardenas, 4)
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Sweetin et al v. Texas City et al Doc. 25 United States District Court Southern District of Texas ENTERED October 19, 2020 IN TH E U N ITED STATES D ISTRICT COU RTDavid J. Bradley, Clerk FOR TH E SOU TH ERN D ISTRICT OF TEXAS GALVESTON D IVISION No. 3:19-cv-233 ZANE SWEETIN AND M ICHAEL STEFEK, PLAINTIFFS , v. CITY OF TEXAS CITY AND W ENDELL W YLIE , DEFENDANTS . MEMORAN D U M OPIN ION AN D ORD ER J EFFREY VINCENT BROWN , U NITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE . Zane Sweetin and Michael Stefek work for a private am bulance service. 1 They allege that while transporting a patient in Texas City, Wendell Wylie, the city’s EMS adm inistrator, illegally detained them . 2 They have sued the defendants, Texas City and Wylie, asserting claim s under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and for false im prisonm ent. 3 The defendants m ove under Rule 12(b)(6) to dism iss the falseim prisonm ent claim . 4 Because Texas has not waived governm ental imm unity for that intentional tort, the city is im m une from it. 5 As for Wylie, the defendants argue 1 Dkt. 1 at 1. Id. at 1-2. 3 Id. at 2-3, 5-6. 4 Dkt. 16. 5 Id. at 3; see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem . Code § 10 1.0 57(2); Goodm an v. Harris Cnty ., 571 F.3d 388 , 394 (5th Cir. 20 0 9); Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Petta, 44 S.W.3d 575, 580 (Tex. 20 0 1). 2 1 Dockets.Justia.com the claim against him fails under the Texas Tort Claim s Act’s election-of-remedies m andate. 6 Under that provision, a plaintiff m ust elect to sue either a governm ental unit or an em ployee of that unit. 7 When a plaintiff sues a governmental unit, it “constitutes an irrevocable election,” barring suit against or recovery from “any individual em ployee of the governm ental unit regarding the sam e subject m atter.”8 Moreover, when a plaintiff fails to elect and sues both the unit and an em ployee, the em ployee m ust be dismissed from the action “im m ediately” upon the unit’s m otion. 9 The city and Wylie m aintain that by nam ing both defendants in the original com plaint, the plaintiffs effectively elected to proceed against only the city for false im prisonm ent. 10 In response, the plaintiffs contend they intended to assert the false-im prisonment claim against only Wylie, not the city, 11 a fact they m ade clear in their first am ended complaint: “Plaintiffs sue only Wendell Wylie for false im prisonm ent and not The City of Texas City, Texas.”12 They also lean heavily on the standard of review: 13 courts should liberally construe the com plaint in favor of the plaintiff, taking as true all the pleaded facts. 14 6 Dkt. 16 at 4; see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem . Code § 10 1.10 6(a). See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem . Code § 10 1.10 6; Bustos v. Martini Club, Inc., 599 F.3d 458 , 462 (5th Cir. 20 10 ). 8 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem . Code § 10 1.10 6(a). 9 Id. at § 10 1.10 6(e); see also Thom as v. Texas, 294 F. Supp. 3d 576, 591-92 (N.D. Tex. 20 18). 10 Dkt. 16 at 4. 11 Dkt. 18 at 1-2. 12 Dkt. 15 ¶ 20 . 13 Dkt. 18 at 3. 14 See Cam pbell v. W ells Fargo Bank, N.A., 781 F.2d 440 , 442 (5th Cir. 1986). “The question therefore is whether in the light m ost favorable to the plaintiff and with every doubt 7 2 The original com plaint is just seven pages long; nam es just two defendants, the city and Wylie; and pleads just two counts—one under section 1983 for constitutional offenses and one for false im prisonm ent, a state-law intentional tort. Even construing liberally in favor of the plaintiffs, the com plaint reads just one way: it’s a lawsuit with two claim s, each m ade against both defendants. Two sentences compose the entirety of the plaintiffs’ false-im prisonment claim in their original com plaint. 15 The first m erely lists the elem ents of the cause of action: “(1) willful detention; (2) without consent; and (3) without authority of law.”16 The second avers that “Wylie was not a peace officer nor was there any other reason to legally detain the plaintiffs.”17 The plaintiffs argue this second sentence signals they are suing only Wylie for this tort. 18 But it looks m ore like factual backup for the claim ’s third elem ent—“without authority of law.” The sentence does not express that the claim is asserted only against Wylie and not the city. Moreover, throughout the com plaint, the plaintiffs stress that Wylie was acting on behalf of the city. 19 Paragraph 5 is the m ost explicit: Defendant, Captain Wendell Wylie is the EMS adm inistrator for Texas City. At all tim es m aterial herein, Wylie acted pursuant to his authority as Texas City EMS Administrator and is responsible for carrying out the decisions, policies, and ordinances m ade by City resolved in his behalf, the com plaint states any valid claim for relief.” Shipp v. McMahon, 234 F.3d 90 7, 911 (5th Cir. 20 0 0 ). 15 Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 19-20 . 16 Id. at ¶ 19 (first citing W al-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 92 S.W.3d 50 2, 50 6 (Tex. 20 0 2); and then citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Castillo, 693 S.W.2d 374, 375 (Tex. 1985)). 17 Id. at ¶ 20 . Interestingly, this statem ent com es just sentences after this sentence: “Wylie was a licensed peace officer.” Id. at ¶ 18. 18 Dkt. 18 at 2. 19 Id. at ¶¶ 1, 5, 8, 18. 3 Com m issioners. In the alternative[,] Wendell was acting outside his governm ental authority. 20 As the defendants note in their reply brief, when plaintiffs assert claims against governm ental em ployees for “conduct occurring during the course of their official responsibilities,” courts assum e those claims are against the em ployees in their official capacity. 21 And the Fifth Circuit has held, “We treat suits against m unicipal officials in their official capacities as suits against the m unicipality itself.”22 The defendants also note, 23 correctly, that the plaintiffs cannot undo their election of rem edies by amending their pleadings. 24 Once the election is m ade in the original com plaint, it is irrevocable. 25 The plaintiffs’ final argument is that the Tort Claim s Act’s election-ofrem edies provision in general, and its irrevocability in particular, sim ply cannot apply in federal court. 26 For one thing, they insist, “[t]he Suprem acy Clause dictates that state law bow to federal law.”27 But the plaintiffs are forgetting the Eleventh Am endm ent. The Suprem e Court has plainly, and for over a century, held that the Eleventh Am endm ent stands for this presupposition: “first, that each State is a sovereign entity in our federal system ; and second, that ‘[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be am enable to the suit of an individual without its 20 Id. at ¶ 5. Dkt. 19 at 3 (quoting Quinn v. Guerrero, 863 F.3d 353, 361 n.2 (5th Cir. 20 17)). 22 Jones v. City of Houston, 756 F. App’x 341, 346 n.2 (5th Cir. 20 18). 23 Dkt. 19 at 2. 24 See Alcala v. Tex. W ebb Cnty ., 620 F. Supp. 2d 795, 80 8 (S.D. Tex. 20 0 9). 25 Id. 26 Dkt. 18 at 5-6. 27 Id. at 5. 21 4 consent.’”28 From that presupposition, the Court has long m aintained “that federal jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting States ‘was not contem plated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United States.’”29 So how do we know whether Texas has consented to be sued? Like the other States, “Texas is inviolably sovereign.”30 Nevertheless, in 1969, its Legislature enacted the Tort Claim s Act to consent to be sued, but “only in certain circum stances.”31 As the Texas Suprem e Court has held, “The Act did not abolish sovereign im m unity, and we m ust look to the term s of the Act to determ ine the scope of its waiver.”32 And because of the Eleventh Am endm ent, that’s as true for federal courts as it is for state courts. The Fifth Circuit has readily and frequently adhered to the boundaries of Texas’s sovereign im m unity as laid out in its Tort Claim s Act. 33 The idea that the Suprem acy Clause forecloses federal courts’ recognition of the Act is unfounded. Beyond the Suprem acy Clause, the plaintiffs also argue that the election-ofrem edies provision is m erely procedural, “certainly not substantive,” and so should be “disregarded in the federal courts.”34 A similar argum ent, under Erie R. Co. v. 28 Sem inole Tribe of Fla. v . Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (alteration in original) (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890 ) (quoting THE F EDERALIST N O. 81, at 48 7 (Alexander Ham ilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961))). 29 Id. at 54 (quoting Hans, 134 U.S. at 15). 30 W asson Interests, Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville, 489 S.W.3d 427, 429 (Tex. 20 16). 31 Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galv eston v. York, 871 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. 1994) (citing Tort Claim s Act, 61st Leg., R.S., ch. 292, 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws 874, 874). 32 Kerrville State Hosp. v. Clark, 923 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex. 1996). 33 See, e.g., W ilkerson v. Univ. of N. Tex., 878 F.3d 147, 158-62 (5th Cir. 20 17); Bustos v. Martini Club, Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 462– 64 (5th Cir. 20 10 ); Goodm an v. Harris Cnty ., 571 F.3d 388, 394 (5th Cir. 20 0 9). 34 Dkt. 18 at 5. 5 Tom pkins, 35 was addressed in Alcala. 36 In that case, the court determ ined that the election-of-rem edies provision am ounts to a substantive policy advancing the purposes of governm ental im m unity, not m erely a procedural rule, and so it neither runs afoul of Erie nor conflicts with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 37 Moreover, the court also held federal law would not countenance allowing the plaintiffs to circum vent the election-of-rem edies m andate. “Put simply,” the court stated, Defendants have a statutory right to obtain im m ediate dismissal upon the filing of a m otion by the [governm ent unit], and allowing Plaintiffs to am end their pleading in contravention of the election[-]of [-]rem edies provision of Section 10 1.10 6(e) would result in undue prejudice to Defendants and severely underm ine the State’s substantive policy. 38 This court adopts Alcala’s reasoning in its entirety. *** The court grants the defendants’ partial m otion to dismiss. The plaintiffs’ false-im prisonment claim is dism issed. The only claim rem aining in this case is the plaintiff’s section-1983 claim. Signed on Galveston Island this 19th day of October, 20 20 . ______________________________ J EFFREY VINCENT BROWN U NITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 35 30 4 U.S. 64 (1938). Alcala v. Tex. W ebb Cnty ., 620 F. Supp. 2d 795, 80 5– 0 9 (S.D. Tex. 20 0 9). 37 See id. at 8 0 6-0 7. 38 Id. at 80 8. 36 6
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