Juarez v. Webb, No. 6:2020cv00113 - Document 22 (N.D. Tex. 2022)
Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER: For the foregoing reasons and those stated in Respondent's amended answer, the Court concludes that Juarez has failed to demonstrate that the TCCA's adjudication of his claims resulted in a decision that was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The Court therefore orders: (1) The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied and dismissed with prejudice. (2) All relief not granted is denied, and any pending motions are denied. (3) Under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), this Court concludes that a certificate of appealability should be denied. The Court will enter judgment accordingly. (Ordered by Judge James Wesley Hendrix on 11/15/2022) (dsr)
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Juarez v. Webb Doc. 22 Case 6:20-cv-00113-H Document 22 Filed 11/15/22 Page 1 of 16 PageID 1490 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS SAN ANGELO DIVISION SAMUEL JUAREZ, JR,, Petitioner, No. 6:20-CV-00113-H DIRECTOR. TDCJ-CID, Respondent OPINION AND ORDER Petitioner Samuel Juarez, Jr., a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a federal writ ofhabeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. $ 2254 to challenge a state-court conviction and sentence. (Sae Dkt. No. 1.) Respondent filed an amended answer with brief in support and relevant records. (See Dkt. Nos. 15, 16.) Jtarez f,led several pleadings in reply. (See Dkt. Nos. 19, 20, 21 .) As explained below, the Court concludes that Juarez's petition should be denied and dismissed with prejudice. l. Background This case stems from a vehicle-pedestrian collision that resulted in the death of D.F., an eight-year-old boy who, at the time, was playing outside with his brother. It is undisputed that, on December l7 ,2016, Juarez, while driving his vehicle down a neighborhood street in Brownwood, Texas, sffuck D.F. with his vehicle, causing his death. In September 2017, a Brown County, Texas grand jury indicted Juarez for two counts of felony murder. (Sae Dkt. No. 15-1 at 3.) During a bench trial, the State presented evidence that Juarez was under the influence of alcohol when his vehicle struck D.F. On october lg, 2ol7 , the 35th Judicial District court Judge of Brown County, Texas, Stephen Ellis, found Juarez gurlty of manslaughter, a lesser-included offense that required the State Dockets.Justia.com Case 6:20-cv-00113-H Document 22 Filed 11/15/22 Page 2 of 16 PageID 1491 to prove that Jrarcz had "recklessly" caused D.F.'s death.' Judge Ellis sentenced Juarez to 20 years' imprisonment. (Sea Dkt. No. 15-1 at 4-5.) Jrarez appealed his conviction on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he acted recklessly and that his recklessness was the cause ofD.F.'s death. He argued that the D.F.'s death was an unavoidable accident because D.F. ran into the sffeet. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh District of Texas (COA) affirmed Juarez's conviction, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) refused his petition for discretionary review (PDR). (.9ee Dkt. No. 15-1 at 88-95.) See also Juarez v. Srrzre, No. 11-17- 00317-CR, 2019WL3023520 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2019, pet. ref d). Juarez then filed a state habeas application in the uial court, challenging the valtdiry ofhis conviction on nine grounds, all of which concem the alleged ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. (,!ee Dkt. No. 15-1 at 19-7 4.) Based on the Court's review of the administrative record, it appears that the State declined to f,le an answer. Judge Ellis did not hold an evidentiary hearing or entel any findings of fact or conclusions of law . (Id. at 16.) While Juarez's state application was strll pending before the TCCA, he f,rled this federal petition, challenging his conviction on ten grounds. Respondent originally answered that the Court should dismiss Juarez's petition for lack ofexhaustion because, at the time, his claims were still pending before the TCCA. (Sae Dkt. No. 7.) Juarez then f,led a motion to stay this case pending a ruiing on his claims by the TCCA, which the Court granted on February 1,2021. (SeeDkt. No. 11.) Nine days later, the TCCA denied Juarez's application without written order. (See Dkt.No. 15-l at 101.) This Court then lifted the the stay and ordered Respondent to file an amended answer, which is now pending before 1A person commits manslaughter if hc recklessly causcs the death of an individual Code Ann. 5 19.04 (a) 2 Sce Tex. Penal Case 6:20-cv-00113-H Document 22 Filed 11/15/22 Page 3 of 16 PageID 1492 Court. Respondent answers that nine of Juarez's claims are conclusory and without merit and one is procedurally baled. Itarez disagrees, insisting that his grounds for reliefhave ment After carefully reviewing the parties' pleadings, relevant state-court records, and applicable law, the Court, for the following reasons, agrees, in part, with Respondent and conciudes that an evidentiary hearing is not necessary to resolve Juarez's claims. The Court will address the merits of Juarez's claims below. 2, Legal Standard A. A Exhaustion state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief under section 2254 is required to exhaust all claims in state court prior to requesting federal collateral rel,:lef. Texas, 169 F .3d 295,302 (5rh cir. 1998)); see also 28 Cn. 1,999) (citing witehead y. Johnson, 157 See Fisher v. F.3d 384, 387 (5th U.S.C. $ 2254(b). A prisoner sarisfies the exhauslion requirement when he has fairly presented the factual and legal basis for a federal claim to the highest state court for review in a procedurally corect manner. See Sattetwhbe t. Lynaugh,886 F.2d g0,92-92 (5th Cir. 1989). In Texas, this means that a prisoner must present his claims to the TCCA either on direct appeal by a PDR or in an application for state post-conviction relief. See Richardson y. Procunier, 7 62 F .2d 429 , 430 (5th CiI. 7985); see also Bautista !. McCouer,793F.2d 109, 110 (5th Cir. 1986). The exhaustion doctrine is designed to protect the state courts' role in the judicial proceedings, as rt gives enforcement of federal law and prevent disruption of state state courts the fust opportunity to review and Rose erot' See t. Lundy,455 U.S, 509, 518-19 (1982). However, the exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional but merely a matter of comity. ct. corect all claims of constirutional See 1984) (citations omitted). This means that a 3 McGee v Estelle,722F.2d 1206' l2l0 (5th distlict court may deny habeas relief on the Case 6:20-cv-00113-H Document 22 Filed 11/15/22 Page 4 of 16 PageID 1493 merits, regardless olwhether the applicant has exhausted state remedies. 163 F.3d 28s,299 B. See Jonesv. Jones, (sthCir. 1998) (citing28 U.S.C. S22s4b)QD. AEDPA The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalry Act of 1996 (AEDPA) provides that "[a]n application for a writ ofhabeas corpus on behalfofa person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication ofthe claim- (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United Statest2 or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination ofthe facts in light ofthe evidence presented in the State court proceeding."l 28 U.S.C. | 2254(d)(t)-(2). Relief may not be granted under either subsection of Section 2254(d) unless the petitioner can show that the state court's ultimate decision that a claim lacks merit was unreasonable. See Harrington tt. Richtet,562 U.S.86, 101 (2011). It is not enough to show that the state court's decision was incofrect; federal habeas relief is "not a substitute for ordinary A state-court decision is contrary to clearly established federal Iaw if "it relies on legal rules that than directly conflict with prior holdings ofthe Supreme Court or ifit reachcs a different conclusion 708, 713_(5th F.3d v. Dretke,359 Busby facts," tfr. Supr... Court on materially indistinguishable if Ci.. zdoa). A decision consritutes an unriasonable application ofclearly established fedcral law ,'the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions v T'aylor,529 Uut un.easonably applies that pnnciplc to the iacts ofthe prisoner's case." Williams u.s.:oz,+r:tzbooj; srralsoiienei.vornoy,89tF.3d224,227(5thCir.2018)(explaining-thata ground for habeas rclief "ends Ihisl f"t,tlon"i'r U& of 'lSupr"-. Couft precedcnt to support" a 2 case" as to that ground). ,,[A] state-court factual determination is nol unreasonable merely because the federal]rabeas court *o'rii iruu. reached a different conclusion in the first instance." I ood v. Allen,558 U.S. 290,is 301 court's factual determination iioiii.-r"a.i"L rrabeas relief is precluded even when the state to a "presumption of entitled detatiUte. Id. at 303. State-court factual determinations are correctness,,thatapetitionermayrebutonlybyclearandconvincingevidcnce.28U.S.C. . findings offact, but to thc implicrt flindings S)ZSat.Xll. This,ideference eriends not onlyto express lf th" rtii.'"our,." Fortl tt Davis,gl0F 3d232,234-35 (5th Cn 2018) 3 4 Case 6:20-cv-00113-H Document 22 Filed 11/15/22 eror coflection through dtect appeal." 2019) (citing Richter, 562 U .5. at See Sanchez v. Page 5 of 16 PageID 1494 Davis,936 F.3d 300, 304-05 (5th Ctr. 102-03). Rather, the petitioner must demonsffate that the state court's ultimate decision "was so lacking in justification that there was an error so well understood and comptehended ia existing iaw beyond any possibiliry for fairminded disagreement." Richter,562 U.S. at 103. In other words, if there is any room for principled judicial disagreement on how a given claim should be adjudicated, then the petitioner is not entitled to rclief. See Sanchez,936 F.3d at 304. This standard is intentionally " diflicult to meet" and "stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings." Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. AEDPA "modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state pdsoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bellv. Cone,535 U.S. 685,693 (2002). section 2254(d) was designed to confum that state courts-not federal courts-are the principal forum for asselting constitutional challenges to state convictions justice system. and guard against only exffeme malfunctions in the state criminal ,Sse Richter,562 U.S. at 102-04. when analyzing the reasonableness of a state court's ultimate decision that a claim panicuiat reasons for lacks merit, the federal habeas court must (1) look to the state court's the state coult rejecting the claim; and (2) only considel the factuai record that was before 1188' 1192 when it adjudicated the ciaim on its merits. see wilsonv. sellers,l38 S.Ct. (2018);seealsoEvansl.Dalis,875F.3d2o1,2l7(5thCiI.2017)(citneCullenv.Pinholster, s63 U.S. 170,181-82 (2011). Thisisastraightforwardinquirywhenthemostlecentstatecoutorejecttheclaim In that situation, a explains its decision in a reasoned opinion. witson,738 S.Ct. at 1192. 5 Case 6:20-cv-00113-H Document 22 Filed 11/15/22 Page 6 of 16 PageID 1495 federal habeas court simply reviews the specific reasons given by the state court and defers to those reasons if they are reasonabie. 1d The rnquiry can be more exacting when the most recent state court to reject the claim does not explain its reasons for doing so.a Under those circumstances, a federal habeas court must "look through" the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide reasons, ifthere is one. Id. atIl92. If an earlier decision exists, the federal habeas court should presume that the unexplained state-court decision adopted the same reasoning, and then proceed with analyzing whether it was unreasonable-s Id. However, when there is no earlier state-cout opinion to look to, the federal habeas court: (1) assumes that the state court applied the proper federal law to the facts; and (2) then determines whether its ultimate decision was contrary to or an objectively unreasonable application ofthat law. SeeJordanv. Dretke,4l6E.3d363,368 (5th CiI.2005) (crttngCatatanv. Cockrell,315 F.3d 491,493 &n.3 (5th Cn.2002));seealsoThomasv. Vannoy' 898 F.3d 561, 569 (5th Cn. 2018) (quoting Evans, 87 5 F .3d at 217)' In making this determination, the federal habeas court may infer findings offact necessary to support the stare court's ultimate decision. Any such implied findings See Pondexter v. Dretke,346 are presumed conect unless the convincing evidence that demonstrates otherwise. F.3d 142, 148 (5thCiI.2003)' petitionel presents cleal and See Young v. Dretke, 356 F 3d 616 629 ' (5th Cir. 2004). can be deemed to Section 2254(d) doesnot require a state court to give reasons before its decision h;;;;.;r;";jraicated on the mer\ts." Richter,562 U.S. at 100. Even summary denials of relief are entitled to substantial deference. /d at 100-01' a court's unexplained The State may rebut this presumption by showing that the most recent state court's decision, state lower affumance relied or most likely dii rely on different grounds than the by the record that the sute ,u.f., u, ult"rnutlre grounds foi aff,mance that were irgued or suppofied court reviewed. See Sellers,138 S.Ct. at 1192' 5 6 Case 6:20-cv-00113-H Document 22 Filed 11/15/22 3. Page 7 of 16 PageID 1496 Analysis In his federal petition, Juarez challenges the validity of his conviction on ten grounds. Respondent argues that the Court should deny Grounds One through Nine as conclusory and without merit and dismiss Ground Ten for lack of exhaustion. The Court will address Respondent's exhaustion defense fust. A. Exhaustion In Ground Ten, Juarez challenges the sufficiency ofthe evidence to support his conviction. In one sentence , Jtarez contends that the blood sample taken Iiom him afiet the incident occurred-which, when tested, showed that his blood-alcohol content was 0.276' more than three times the 1ega1 limit-is insufficient to prove that he was intoxicated and, therefore, "reckless" when his vehicle struck D.F. (Ser Dk. No. 1 at l1') Respondent answers that this Court is barred from reviewing the merits of Ground Ten because Juarez farled to exhaust it in state court. Specifically, Respondent contends that Ground Ten is unexhausted because Juarez didnot present it to the TCCA in his state habeas application' (See Dkt. No. 15 at 15.) Juarez admits that he did not present this claim in his state habeas application. However, in his reply, Juarez points out that his appellate counsel, Tim Copeland, raised this claim on direct appeal. (.!ae Dkt. No. 19 at 39.) And in his federal petltion, Juarez appeal, he declares under penalty of perjury that, after his conviction was affirmed on direct raised an ,,insuffrcient evidence" ground in a PDR, which the TCCA refused without comment. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) Because harez's PDR is not included in the state-court records provided by Respondent, the coult is unable to decipher the plecise nature ofthe did not file a surinsufficiency claim that he presented to the TCCA. However, Respondent he did present this reply and has not otherwise attempted to refute Juarcz's contention that 1 Case 6:20-cv-00113-H Document 22 Filed 11/15/22 claim to the TCCA in his PDR, which, as Page 8 of 16 PageID 1497 noted above, is one of two available vehicles that a state prisoner may use to present and "exhaust" his claims in the TCCA. Under these circumstances, the Court concludes that Juarez did exhaust his statecourt remedies for Ground Ten. However, even if Juarez did not, the Court concludes that it nevertheless has jurisdiction to review it under Section 2254(b)(2). Thus, the Court will address the merits of this claim in rurn. B. Merits i. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (Grounds One through Nine) In Grounds one through Nine, Juarez contends that his trial counsel, Lynn Ingalsbe, was ineffective ofhis by: (1) not meeting with him a sufficient number of times to discuss the facts case; (2) not arranging for him to meet with a private investigator to discuss the case; (3) not caling his own expert witnesses or cross-examining the State's expert wimesses; (4) failing ro prepare for and present mitigating evidence at sentencing; (5) failing to investigate and present charactel wimesses at sentencing; (6) giving Juarez erroneous iegal advice; (7) not flling a motion to change venue; (8) not filing a motion to suppless evidence; (see Dkt. No. and (9) not objecting to the state's expert witness's "speculative" testimony. at 6-11.) Because there is no TCCA or earlier state-court opinion that provides any reasonlng assume for denying Juarez's ineffecttve-assistance-of-counsel (IAC) claims, this Court must as pointed that rhe TCCA applied the proper federal law when adjudicating them, which, out by Respond ent, is Strickland t. Washington, 466 U 'S' 668 (i984)' (1) "counsel's To prevail on an IAC claim under stickland, a petitioner must show " performance was deficient," and (2) "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense Meja l' Davis,906 F.3d 307.314 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Stickland,466 U.S, at 687). 8 1 Case 6:20-cv-00113-H Document 22 Filed 11/15/22 Page 9 of 16 PageID 1498 To establish deficient performance, a person challenging a conviction must show that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Richter,562 U.S. at 104 (quoting Stickland,466 U.S. at 688). A court considering an IAC claim must apply a "strong presumption" that counsel's representation was within the "wide range" of reasonable professional assistance. Id. The challenger's burden is to show "that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' gualanteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." 1d With respect to prejudice, a challenger must demonstlate "a leasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errols, the result ofthe proceeding would have been different." 1d. A reasonable probabiliry is a probabiliry sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. Counsel's erors must be "so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fat tria1, a trial whose result is reliable." Id. "llnreiabiliry or unfaimess does not result if the ineffectiveness ofcounsel does not deprive the defendant ofany substantive or procedural right to which the law entitles him." Lockhart v. Fretwell,506 U.S.364'372 (1993). This is a heary burden that requiles a "substantial," and notjust a "conceivable," .S ' at ..Surmounting Sticktand'shigh bar is never an easy task.,, Richter,562 U.S. at 105 likelihood ofa different re sult. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 112; see also Pinholster, 563 U 189. (cittnEPaditlav. Kentucky,559 U.S. 356,371(2010)). Even under de novo review, the standard for judging counsel's representation is a most deferential one. Id. Unlike a later- reviewingcout,theattomeyobservedtherelevantproceedings,knewofmaterialsoutside the the record, and interacted with the client, with opposing counsel, and with is "a11 judge too tempting" to "second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence.,'1d'Thequestioniswhetheranattomey,srepresentationamountedto c) l/ lt Case 6:20-cv-00113-H Document 22 Filed 11/15/22 Page 10 of 16 PageID 1499 incompetence under "preva ing professionai norms, " not whether it deviated fiom best practices or most common custom." 1d. Establishing that a state court's application of Strickland was unreasonable under Section 2254(d) is a1l the more difficult. Id. The standards created by Strickland and Section 2254(d) are both "highiy deferential," and when the two apply in tandem, review is "doubly" so. 1d. The Strickland standard is a general one, so the range of reasonable applications is substantial. Id. F ederal habeas courts must guard against the danger of equating unreasonableness under Strickland with unreasonableness under Section 2254(d). Id. When Section 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel's actions were reasonable. Id. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Stickland's deferential standard. Id. Additionally, if a petitioner farls to satisfu either the deficienry or prejudice prong of the Stickland test, then the Court need not consider the other prong. See Strickland, 466 U .5. at 697 . Respondent argues that Juarez's IAC claims are wholly conclusory and without merit because they fail to satisry AEDPA. The Court aglees. In denying each of Jualez's iAC claims, the TCCA implicitly found that he failed to demonstrate either one or both his elements of the Strickland standard-that Ingalsbe's performance was deficient or that carefuily defense was prejudiced by Ingalsbe's deficient performance. The Court has reviewed the parties'pleadings, applicable law, and the relevant state-coult records, trial including the trial transcript and exhibits that wele admitted into evidence at Juarez's claims, and sentencing. The TCCA reasonably concluded that ltarez, for each of his IAC failed to satisry the prejudice prong of Strickland' TCCA's Juarez is entirled to federal reiief only if he can demonsrrate that the to do so here. In his application of strickland to his claims was unreasonable. He has failed 10 Case 6:20-cv-00113-H Document 22 Filed 11/15/22 Page 11 of 16 PageID 1500 federal petition, Juarez makes the same conclusory, bald assertions that he presented to the TCCA. In essence, Juarez alleges that Ingalsbe should have done more to prepare for trial and advocate on his behalfat trial and sentencing. As examples, Juarez contends that Ingalsbe should have consulted with him more, conducted a more thorough prerrial investigation, filed certain pretrial motions, cross-examined certain witnesses, and called additional expert and character wimesses on his behalf. But Juarez does not plead any specific facts or present evidence to demonstrate that, had Ingalsbe taken these additional measures, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial or sentence would have been different.6 In other words, he fails to explain what exculpatory evidence, if any, these additional measures would have uncovered or how these measures, iftaken, would have changed or impacted the trial court's credibility assessments or weighing ofthe evidence at trial and sentencing. Instead, Juarez merely speculates that more vigorous attention and representation by Ingalsbe could have poss ibly changed the outcome. But it is not enough to show that errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome ofthe proceeding. See Richtet, 562 U.S. at 104 Moreover, Juatez does not point to any "clear and convincing" evidence to rebut the TCCA's implicit findings, which are presumptively corect. NoI does he explain how the 6In his "Traverse to Response to Order to Show Cause," which Juarez filed in response to of Respondent's amended inswer, Juarez attempts to raise new factual allegations in support the court ll,2020' November on Howevet, (seeDkt. 19.) No. Grounds one through Nine. answet "must bc spccihcally instructe? Juarez tirat any plcading he filed in response to Respondent's offact or new allegations any include ii'.i"i t"ifr. arguments raised by Respondent and shall not the address or consider n.* grorna, for"relief. " (See Dki. No. 4 at 2.) Thus, the Coun will not that he relief grounds for merits of Juarez,s response, to rhe extent it raises any factual allegations or JiJnot.uir. rn his original federal habeas petition. In addition, in his other "supplemental" prescnt ne'6' pleadings filed in response to Respondent's amended answer, Juarcz attcmpts to (SeeDkt. Nos 20,21.) TCCA. presented the to lrfr6iiii. rrpport oihis claims tirat were not state court when the before Be"uuse the Court may only consider the factual record that was here. See Evans, exhibits tlr" merits of Juarez's claim, the Coun will not consider these "ijrJi*t*g 875 F.3d at 217 (citations omitted). l1 Case 6:20-cv-00113-H Document 22 Filed 11/15/22 Page 12 of 16 PageID 1501 TCCA's application of St/ickland to his claims was unreasonable or that its denial of them was based on an unreasonable determination ofthe facts in light ofthe evidence presented to lt Because Juarez has failed to overcome the double deference afforded to IAC claims under Section 2254(d), the Court concludes that he is not entitled to federal habeas reliefon Grounds One through Nine. ii. Sufficiency ofthe Evidence (Ground Ten) In Ground Ten, Juarez claims that the evidence adduced at trial was insufftcient to support his conviction for one reason-the blood sample taken fiom him after the incident occuned is insufficient to prove that he was intoxicated and, thelefore, "reckless" when his vehicle struck D.F. (See Dk. No. 1 at 11.) He contends that D.F.'s death was an unavoidable accident. Assuming Juarez raised this claim in his PDR, the TCCA, in refusing it, did not provide any reasoning for rejecting this claim.T Under these circumstances, Wilson mandates that this Court presume that the TCCA adopted the COA's reasoning for doing so and then analyze whether that reasoning was unreasonable. Here, the COA reviewed Juarez's claim under Jackson v' Virginia,443 U'S 307 (1979), which establishes the 1egal standard lor reviewing the sufficiency ofthe evidence to , Although challenges to the sufficiency ofthe evidence are not cognizable in a Texas applicatron Juarez's claims^on therr a writ of"habeas co-rpus, the Court conlludes that thc TCCA adjudicated for meritsinrefusinghisPDR.SeeExparteGrigsby'|37S.w'3d673,674(Tex.Crim.App.2004).Itis is on not necessary foithe state court to indicate affirmatively that its disposition oflederal clarms '120 F .3d 309, 316 (5th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted) The . ih" *.ritr. iee Dorsey v, Stephens, only presumption that a state-court decision was on thc merits is a stlong one that may be_ rebutted (1991) ("[w]hcrc thcre has in unusuul ci."umstances, Id.; see Ylst v. Nunnemaker,50l US. 197'803 orders upholding that later unexplained been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, his suffrciency raiscd Juarez grouad."). Here, ,.i"cting the cliim rest upon ih" same irJgrr"* '.tui, in ti,"i counsele"d direct appeal and then, to some degree, in his PDR, whrch the TCCA refused on There is no indication in the record that the TCCA refused Juarez's PDR *i,t oui.o.."nt, procedural grounds. 12 Case 6:20-cv-00113-H Document 22 Filed 11/15/22 Page 13 of 16 PageID 1502 support a criminal conviction. (See Dkt. No. 15-1 at 89.) Under./ackson, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution-/?0, the defendant-any rational tier of fact could have found the essential elements ofthe crime beyond a reasonable doubt based on the record evidence presented at uial. Jackson,443 U.S. at 319 (citations omitted). This standard gives full play to the responsibility ofthe trier of lact to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts. Id. Once a defendant has been found guilty ofthe crime charged, the factfinder's role as weigher ofthe evidence is preserved through a legal conclusion that, upon judicial review, all ofthe evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the plosecution. 1d. This means a reviewing court "faced with a record of historical facts that suppolts conflicting inferences must presume-even if it does not affumatively appear in the record-that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor ofthe prosecution, and must defer to that resolution." 1, 6 See Cavazos v. Snith'565U.5. (201i) (cittngJackson,443 U.S. at 319)' In its eight-page opinion, the coA conducted a thoughtful review of the evidence admitted at Bial in conjunction with the applicable criminal statute and caselaw interpreting it. (See Dkt. No' 15-1 at 88_95.) Specifica11y, the CoA defined .,recklessness,, and of concluded that, under Texas law, evidence that Juarez was driving under the influence alcohol could be used to demonstrate that he acted recklessly: As we have said, [Juarez] does not dispute that he was intoxicated when he struck D.F. with his vehicle Although [Juarez's] blood alcohol content was 0.276 when the officer later found him, McGinry testified that Uuarez's] blood alcohol content could have been higher at the time oithe accident. As a reasonable factfinder, the trial court could have inferred from this evidence alone that [Juarez] was aware of but acted with a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk and that he, therefore, was reckless ' See Moya v' State' pet), Rubio r' 426 S.W .3d25g,267 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2013, no State,203 S.W.3d 4458, 452 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 2006, pet ref d) t2 Case 6:20-cv-00113-H Document 22 Filed 11/15/22 Page 14 of 16 PageID 1503 ("[T]he actions oldriving under the influence ofalcohol can be used to show a conscious disregard ofa substantial risk."). (td. at 93-94.) Further, after acknowledging that the evidence arguably could have supported the conflicting inference that the incident was unavoidable, the COA explained as follows: The trial court was Iiee to resolve any conflicting testimony, and as a rational factf,rnder, it apparently chose not to believe testimony that the incident was unavoidable given fJuarez's] intoxicated condition, actions, omissions, and words just before and after the incident. The trier of fact may believe all, some, or nonc of a witness's testimony because the trier of fact is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the witnesses. Sharp v. State,707 S.W.2d 6ll,614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986), Ishamv. State,258 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2008, pet. refd). After a review ofthe record in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold that the State presented suffrcient evidence lor the trial court to find beyond a reasonable doubt that [Juarez] acted recklessly and that he committed the oflense of manslaughter' We overrule [Juarez's] sole issue on appeal. (Id. at94.) Juarez is not entitled to relief unless he can demonstrate that the TCCA's presumed adoption of the COA's reasons for denying his claim was unreasonable. After reviewing ltarez's entire trial transcript and all exhibits that were admitted into evidence at his trial, in conjunction with the applicable law, the Court concludes that Juarez has failed to do so. Here, Juarez merely insists that his claim has merit. He points to other trial evidence, including the testimony ofJuan Sanchez, which he contends ploves that his sriking D.F. was an unavoidable accident.8 But, as acknowledged by the COA, the Court to ralse ncw Here again, in his "Traverse to Rcsponse to Order to Show _Causc," Juarez attempts D.F.'s death was fu"*ur uii"gir.ns in support of Ground Ten. (.iee Dkt. No, 19.) He contends that to prove that his an unavoid"able accideni ind the evidence, for various reasons, was insufficient (,see Dkt. No. t9 death. D.F.',s caused roadway) the entering recklessness (versus D,F. unexpectedly pleading he any that Juarez instructcd :S,af .l But, as previously noted, the Court specifically by raised "i niJ ior.rponr. to Respondcnt's answer "must bc limited to the argumcnts (seeDkt. Respondent No 4 at 2.) andshallnot include anynew allegatrons of fact or new grounds for relief." 8 l4 Case 6:20-cv-00113-H Document 22 Filed 11/15/22 does not dispute that the evidence adduced at Page 15 of 16 PageID 1504 trial could arguably support conflicting inferences-that D.F.'s death was either caused by Juarez's recklessness or entirely accidental. But AEDPA does not permit this Court to conduct a de novo review of Juarez's claim. In other words, on federal habeas review, this Court may not make its own credibiliry assessments, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its own opinion for that ofthe trial court or the TCCA. Rather, as explained by the COA, it is the sole province of the fact finder to assess the credibility ofthe testimony given at trial and weigh the evidence. And under Jackson, once a criminal defendant has been convicted, a reviewing colurl tnust presume that the fact finder resolved any conflicting inferences raised by the evidence in favor of the prosecurion and defer to that fesolution. This is precisely what the COA, and presumabiy the TCCA, did in denying Juarez's claim. Juarez makes no effort to explain how the TCCA's application of Jackson to his claim was unreasonable or that its denial of it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light ofthe evidence presented to rt Thus, the Court concludes that Juarez is not entitled to relief on Ground Ten. 4. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons and those stated in Respondent's amended answer, the Court concludes that Juarez has farled to demonsffate that the TCCA's adjudication of his claims resulted in a decision that was conuary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable proceedings' determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state-court Sea 28 U.S.C. 5 2254(d). to Ihe extent it raises Thus, the Court will not consider or address the merits ofJuarez's response, federal habeas any factual allegations or grounds for reliefthat he did not raise in his original petition. 15 Case 6:20-cv-00113-H Document 22 Filed 11/15/22 Page 16 of 16 PageID 1505 The Court therefore orders: (1) The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied and dismissed with prejudice (2) All reliefnot granted is denied, and any pending motions are denied. (3) Under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appeilate Procedure and 28 U.S.C. 0 2253(c), this Court concludes that a certificate of appealability should be denied. For the reasons set forth above and in Respondent's answer, Juarez has failed to show that reasonable jurists would find (1) this Court's "assessment of the constltutional claims debatable or wrong," or (2) "it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial ofa constitutional right" and "debatable whether [this Court] was corect in its procedural ruling." Slack r,. McDaniel,529 U.S, 473,484 (2000). The Court will enter judgment accordingly. DatedNovemb :- l{,zozz JAM WESLEY HENDRIX U d States District Judge t6
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