Jackson v. Davis, Director TDCJ-CID, No. 4:2016cv00128 - Document 41 (N.D. Tex. 2017)

Court Description: Memorandum Opinion and Order... The court ORDERS that petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be, and is hereby, denied. The court further ORDERS that a certificate of appealability be, and is hereby, denied, as petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. (Ordered by Judge John McBryde on 9/21/2017) (wxc)
Download PDF
Jackson v. Davis, Director TDCJ-CID Doc. 41 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRIC FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FORT WORTH DIVISION CHARLES ALFRED JACKSON, § § Petitioner, § § v. § No. 4:16-CV-128-A § LORIE DAVIS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, § § § § § Respondent. § MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by petitioner, Charles Alfred Jackson, a state prisoner incarcerated in the Correctional Institutions Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ), against Lorie Davis, director of TDCJ, respondent. After having considered the pleadings, state court records, and relief sought by petitioner, the court has concluded that the petition should be denied. I. Procedural History In September 2001 petitioner was indicted in Tarrant County, Texas, Case No. 0810273D, for aggravated sexual assault of a child younger than 14 years of age (count one) and indecency with Dockets.Justia.com concluded that counsel raised the one issue he believed was supported by the record and that counsel's decision on which issues to raise in appellant's brief was the result of reasonable trial strategy. (Id. at 255-57, 263-66.) The state court's decision is a reasonable application of Strickland. The Constitution does not require appellate counsel to raise every nonfrivolous ground that might be raised on appeal. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). Here it appears that appellate counsel chose to raise the strongest point of error on appeal; that is a reasonable tactic. See Ellis v. Lynaugh, 873 F.2d 830, 840 (5th Cir. 1989) . Nor has petitioner raised any issues that counsel failed to raise upon which he was likely to prevail on appeal. Id. A petitioner shoulders a heavy burden to refute the premise that "an attorney's actions are strongly presumed to have fallen within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Messer v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1080, 1090 (11th Cir. 1985). Petitioner presents no evidentiary, factual, or legal basis in this federal habeas action that could lead the court to conclude that the state courts unreasonably applied the standards set forth in Strickland based on the evidence presented in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Petitioner is not entitled to relief. 33 For the reasons discussed herein, The court ORDERS that petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be, and is hereby, denied. The court further ORDERS that a certificate of appealability be, and is hereby, denied, as petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. SIGNED September __,_)=-->(<---- ' 2017 . / 34 /