Davis v. City of Fort Worth et al, No. 4:2014cv00491 - Document 112 (N.D. Tex. 2015)
Court Description: Memorandum Opinion and Order...the motions of Officers Halmagean and Olson for summary judgment granted; plaintiff take nothing on claims against said defendants and claims dismissed. (Ordered by Judge John McBryde on 8/4/2015) (wrb)
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Davis v. City of Fort Worth et al Doc. 112 ( f ) hl t f 1 .).'. .1i, !(--(((ïj 7' ç - )' ) i (1 1l E1I 1l?j) x )) -l )N ) j-1 . - j 5' 'I1)T;A ' 11 FJr(,((s j J1 I- r ) (. ' ' . j IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT .yy j , yyuy . OURT NORTHERN WORTH DIVISION DISTRI OF TEXA CT FORT ussoa oavzs, .!4 2 g g J T z clllx, , lsyll lcotR, ,rk t- l tc- l s.l . By PiZ iRV iff ; î VS . Ieptt l ly NO . 4 ;14 -CV -491-A T HE CITY O F FORT WORTH , ET AL ., Defendants . MEM ORAND UM O P IN ION AND ORD ER Came on for consideration the motions of defendants Dacian Halmagean ( uHalmagean' and Amy Olson (u ') olson' for summary ') judgment. The court, having considered the motions, responses of plaintiff, Nelda Davis, the record, the summary judgment evidence , and applicable authorities, finds that the motions should be granted . Plaintiff's Claims Plaintiff 's claims arise out of an incident that occurred on January 1 , 2013, at Westchester Plaza Assisted Living Facility in Fort Worth , Texas, where plaintiff was the executive director . Plaintiff called 911 and requested that a Fort Worth police officer come to the Westchester Plaza to issue a trespass warning and escort a v isitor named Roderick Miles off the premises . Miles had been told by the ch ief executive officer of the facility the day before that he was no longer welcome at the facility . The Dockets.Justia.com chief executive officer instructed plaintiff not to allow Miles on the property . When Miles appeared on January plaintiff called for assistance and defendants Halmagean and Olson , Fort Worth police officers, were dispatched . After a discussion with plaintiff, the officers and Miles went outside . Instead of comp lying with plaintiff's request to issue a trespass warning and escort Miles off the premises, Officers Halmagean and Olson told Miles that he was free to enter the facility and to visit with his brother-in-law who resided there . Miles went back inside , where plaintiff again told him he was not welcome . Plaintiff escorted Miles out the door and the officers approached to determine what was happening . The officers told Miles that he cou ld go up the elevators to his brother-in -law 's residence , but plaintiff insisted that he could not . As the group moved back through the doors into the facility , Officer Olson grabbed plaintiff's right hand and told her that she was arresting plaintiff for assaulting a police officer . officer Halmagean twisted plaintiff's left arm behind her back with such force that it shattered her arm bone into pieces, then pushed plaintiff down to the ground . Both officers knelt on plaintiff 's back while they handcuffed her . Plaintiff was placed in a police car . Plaintiff realized that she could not feel her left arm and so advised Officer Halmagean , but he left her alone in the car . Eventually , after plaintiff heard Officer Olson ask Officer Halmagean if plaintiff had learned her lesson yet, the officers 1et plaintiff go and did not charge her with any crime . On April 4 , 2014 , p laintiff filed her original petition in County Court at Law No . 1 of Dallas County , Texas . Defendant City of Fort Worth filed a notice of removal and , by order signed June 2014 , the action was transferred to the Fort Worth Division of this court . Plaintiff has twice amended her complaint, once at the court's direction and once by leave of court . A s the court noted in its October 2014 , memorandum opinion and order, plaintiff 's theories of recovery against Officers Halmagean and Olson were : excessive force under the Fourth Amendment and 42 U .S .C . 5 1983, unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment and 42 U .S .C . 1983, ( assault and 3) battery, and ( failure to render medical care to plaintiff. By 4) memorandum opinion and order signed october 30, 2014 , the court dismissed plaintiff 's official capacity claims against Officer Halmagean and Olson as they were redundant of the claims against City of Fort Worth , and also dism issed the state law claims of assault and battery . The court suggested that an appropriate method of seeking summary disposition of the remaining claims against these defendants would be by motion for summary judgment. II . Applicable Summarv Judqment Principles Rule 56 ( of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a) that the court shall grant summary judgment on a claim or defense if there no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56( a) Anderson v . Liberty Lobby , Incw 477 U . 242, 247 S. ( 1986). The movant bears the initial burden of pointing out to the court that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. Celotex Corp . v . Catrett, 477 U . 317, 323, 325 ( S. 1986). The movant can discharge this burden by pointing out the absence of evidence supporting one or more essential elements of the nonmoving party 's claim , nsince a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party 's case necessarily renders a1l other facts immaterial .' Id . at 323. ' Once the movant has carried its burden under Rule 56 ( a), the nonmoving party must identify evidence in the record that creates a genuine dispute as to each of the challenged elements of its case . Id . at 324 ; see also Fed . R . asserting that a fact 56 ( c) (' party 'A is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by . citing to particular parts of materials in the record If the evidence identified could not lead a rational trier of fact to find in favor of the nonmoving party as to each essential element of the nonmoving party 's case , there is no genuine dispute for trial and summary judgment is appropriate . Matsushita Elec . Indus . Co . v . Zenith Radio Corp ., 475 U . 574, 587, 597 ( S. 1986) In Mississippi Prot . & Advocacy Sys . v . Cotten , the Fifth Circuit explained : Where the record , including affidavits , interrogatories, admissions , and depositions could not, as a whole , lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmov ing party , there is no issue for trial . 929 F. 2d 1054, 1058 ( 5th Cir. 1991). The standard for granting a motion for summary judgment is the same as the standard for rendering judgment as a matter of law x Celotex CorD ., 477 U .S . at 323 . If the record taken as a wholez could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non -moving party , there Matsushita , 475 Advocacv Sys w at no genuine issue for trial . see also Mississippi Prot . & 929 F .2d at 1058 . 'n Boei Co. v.S pma 41lF. 365 37 7 ( t Ci.1 9)( nba c , h Fit Cic t l ng hi n, 2d , 4- 5 5 h r 96 e n ) t e fh rui e pli dt sa dadt bea idi d tr ni whehe t c r s ul e e j dg nto moins x ane he tn r o pple n eemi ng t r he ou tho d ntr u me n to f rdie tdve dc o f rj gme tno wihsa di tev r c. o r ce r it r o ud n t t t n ng h e dit 2 c ur no e t tplitf h fld o j ci st a moi t srke t de e nt' The o t t s ha an if as ie b e ton o, nd tons o ti ,he fnda s s ummayj g n e d nc . c r i no g a tn t moi s b ,a i isc t gvigt r ud me t vie e The ou ts t r n ig he ton , ut s s t usom, i n he s ummayj g n e d nc whae rweg ti ma de e v . r ud me t vie e tve ih t y s r e 111 . Grounds of the Motions Defendants Halmagean and Olson assert that plaintiff cannot establish the elements of any of her claims against them , and that, even if she could, they are entitled to qualified immunity . IV . Analvsis A. Qualified Immunity Qualified immunity insulates a government official from civil damages liability when the official ' actions do not s ' iolate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights ' v of which a reasonable person would have known .' Harlow v . ' Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 ( 1982). For a right to be 'clearly ' established z' the right 's contours must be 'sufficiently clear ' ' that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing v iolates that right .' Anderson v . Creiqhton , 483 U .S . 635 , 640 ' (1987) Indiv idual liability thus turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the defendant ' actions assessed in light of s clearly established law at the time . Hunter v . Bryant, 502 U .S . 228 ( 1991)7 Anderson, 483 U . . at 639-40. In Harlow, the S court explained that a key question is u whether that law was clearly established at the time an action occurred' because uE ' ilf the 1aw at that time was not clearly established , an official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be said to ' know ' that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlaw ful .' 457 U . . ' S at 818 . In assessing whether the law Was clearly established at the time , the court is to consider a1l relevant legal authority , whether cited by the parties or not . Elder v . Holloway , 510 U .S . 510, 512 ( 1994). If public officials of reasonable competence could differ on the lawfulness of defendant 's actions , the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity . Mallev v . Briqqs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 ( 1986) Fraire V . City of Arlinqton, 957 F. 2d 126 8 , 12 73 1992). ' A)n allegation of malice is not '( sufficient to defeat immunity if the defendant acted in an objectively reasonable manner.' Malley, 475 U. at 341. ' S. analyzing whether an indiv idual defendant is entitled to qualified immunity , the court considers whether plaintiff has alleged any violation of a clearly established right , and , if so , whether the individual defendant' conduct was objectively s reasonable. Sieqert v . Gilley, 500 U . 226, 231 ( S. 1991); Duckett v . Citv of Cedar Park, 950 F. 272, 276-80 ( 2d 5th Cir. 1992). In so doing , the court should not assume that plaintiff has stated a claim , i . ., asserted a violation of a constitutional right . e Sieqert , 5Oo U .s. at 232 . Rather , the court must be certain that, if the facts alleged by plaintiff are true , a v iolation has clearly occurred . Connelly v . Comptroller , 876 F .2d 1209, ( 5th Cir. 1989). A mistake in judgment does not cause an officer to lose his qualified immunity defense . In Hunter , the Supreme Court exp lained : The qualified immunity standard ' ' gives ample room for mistaken j udgments' by protecti ' ' ng ' a1l but the plai y nl incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law .' ' Malley, ( 475 U . S.I at 343. . . . This accommodation for reasonable error exists because 'officials should not err ' always on the side of caution ' because they fear being sued . ' 502 U .S . at 22 9 . When a defendant relies on qualified immunity , the burden is on the plaintiff to negate the defense . Kovacic v . Villarreal, 628 F. 209, 211 ( 3d 5th Cir. 2010)7 Foster v . City of Lake Jackson, 28 F . 425, 428 3d B. Cir . 1994). Unreasonable Seizure The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable searches and seizures. Devenpeck v . Alford, 543 U . 146, 152 ( S. 2004). The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that a person will not be arrested without probable cause . Sanders v . Enqlish , 95O F .2d 11S2, 1159 ( 5th Cir. 1992). There is no cause of action for false or unlawful arrest unless the arresting officer lacked probable cause . Fields v . Citv of South Houston , 922 F. 2d 1183, 1189 ( 5th Cir . 1991) Probable cause exists when the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the moment of arrest are sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had committed or was comm itting an offense . Mesa v . Predean, 543 F.3d 264, 269 ( 5th Cir. 2008). A mistake reasonably made justifies qualified immunity . Id . And , a defendant' acts s are held to be objectively reasonable unless a1l reasonable officers in the defendant ' circumstances would have then known s that the defendant 's conduct violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights . Thomp son v . Upshur Cntv w 245 F .3d 447, 457 ( 5th Cir. 2001). In other words, if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether there was probable cause for arrest , immunity should be recognized . Babb v . Dorman , 33 F . 3d ( 5th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff alleges that the individual officers did not have probable cause to arrest her , because she did not touch Officer Olson and because the officers were not performing a duty or exercising authority granted by law at the time plaintiff allegedly interfered with them . Here, the summary judgment evidence shows that each officer had a different understanding of what they were entitled to do . Officer Halmagean did not believe that the officers could escort Miles back onto the property after he had been asked to leave by plaintiff ; Officer Olson believed that Miles had an absolute right to visit his brother-in-law and that policy of the City of Fort Worth was for police officers to facilitate such visits. ( Plaintiff has not established that no reasonable officer could believe as Olson did.) Consequently, Officer Olson escorted Miles toward the elevator , at which time plaintiff tried to b lock the path . Plaintiff was adamant that Miles not be allowed back into the facility . Whether plaintiff actually touched Officer Olson is subject to debate. The video ev idence is murky at best , but does clearly show plaintiff trying to block M iles from entering the building . And , plaintiff is using her hands and gesturing and apparently vocally protesting . Officer Halmagean testified that he saw plaintiff put her hands on Officer Olson and heard Olson say that p laintiff was being arrested for assault . Officer Halmagean came to the assistance of Officer Olson in making the arrest . Plaintiff has not established that no reasonable officer could have thought that what he was doing in assisting Officer Olson was right . Nor has she established that Officer Olson lacked probable cause for p laintiff 's arrest . Whether plaintiff touched Officer Olson or not , plaintiff was interfering with the conduct of police business by officer olson at the time . As stated , plaintiff has not established that every reasonable officer would have known that Miles was not allowed to visit his brother-in -law based on the facts known at the time . The evidence shows that although plaintiff told the officers that Miles had received a criminal trespass warning , the document plaintiff produced did not have Miles 's name on it . Further , plaintiff admitted that M iles was not causing trouble that day . And , the presence of Miles did not appear to threaten or endanger anyone at the facility . Thus , defendants Halmagean and Olson are entitled to qualified immunity as to the unreasonable seizure claim . Excessive Force To prevail on her excessive force claim , plaintiff must establish an injury that resulted directly and only from a use of force that was clearly excessive , and the excessiveness was clearly unreasonable . Tarver v . City of Edna , 410 F.3d 745, 751 ( 5th Cir. 2005). In assessing the claim, the court may consider the severity of the crime at issue, whether plaintiff posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others , and whether plaintiff was actively resisting arrest or attempting to flee. Graham v . Conner, 490 U . 386, 396 ( S. 1989). addition, the court may consider the seriousness of the injury to determine nwhether the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary , or instead evinced such wantonness w ith respect to the unjustified infliction as is tantamount to a know ing w illingness that it occur .' Brown v . Lippard , 472 F .3d ' 384, 386-87 ( 5th Cir. 2006). The reasonableness of the officer's conduct is judged from the officer's perspective rather than with 20/20 hindsight. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. The analysis must take into account that officers are often forced to make split-second judgments in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolv ing . Id . at 396-97 . Here , plaintiff relies on the fact that her arm was broken in mu ltiple pieces and the testimony of other police officers that broken arms seldom occur during arrests in order to urge that excessive force was used. Other summary judgment evidence estab lishes, however , that p laintiff's arm was made more brittle by ex isting medical conditions . And , plaintiff herself does not really know at what point her arm was broken . The v ideo evidence reflects that somewhat of a scrum took place and there was movement back and forth between a number of people before plaintiff went to the floor . The facts presented do not establish reason to believe that the officers intended or attempted to harm plaintiff . Rather , it appears that plaintiff and the officers piled on the floor together and that plaintiff 's arm was broken at some unknown time . Defendants Halmagean and Olson are entitled to qualified immunity as to the excessive force claim . D. Den ial of Medical Care In her response to the Officer Halmagean 's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff withdraws the claim that she was denied medical care . Order For the reasons discussed herein , The court ORDERS that the motions of Officers Halmagean and Olson for summary judgment be, and are hereby, granted; that plaintiff take nothing on her claims against said defendants; and that plaintiff's claims against them be , and are hereby , dismissed . The court determines that there is no just reason for, and hereby directs, entry of final judgment as to the dismissal of these claims . SIGNED August 4 , 2015 . y ' .' z, ' .' . - . J f f / / . . . ' / . z v' .' ' z d .' z ' / ' .' , , BRYD E it / , z. 'States Distr ' t Judge .
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