Malone et al v. Russell et al, No. 3:2023cv00001 - Document 42 (N.D. Tex. 2023)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 14 Motion to Remand. This case is REMANDED to the 192nd Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas. (Ordered by Judge Karen Gren Scholer on 6/6/2023) (Attachments: # 1 Remand Letter) (axm)
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Malone et al v. Russell et al Doc. 42 Case 3:23-cv-00001-S Document 42 Filed 06/06/23 Page 1 of 9 PageID 546 United States District Court NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS MOLLIE MALONE and DIDRAIL DIVISION § § § § § JENNINGS V . BRIAN LOUIS RUSSELL, RUSSELL TRUCKING, LLC, DM TRANS, LLC d/b/a ARRIVE LOGISTICS, LUIS CIVIL ACTIONNO. 3:23-CV-0001-S § ALBERTO LOVO, Individually and d/b/a LOVO TRANSPORTS, ARMSTRONG TRANSPORT GROUP, LLC, NAVISTAR, INC, and SOUTHWEST INTERNATIONAL TRUCKS, INC. MEMORANDUM § § § OPINION AND ORDER This Memorandum Opinion and Order addresses Plaintiffs Molile Malone and Didrail Jennings’s Motion to Remand (“Motion”) (ECL No. 14]. The Court has reviewed and considei'ed the Motion, Defendant Arrive Logistics, LLC’s Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand) (“Response”) [ECP No. 20], the arguments of counsel at the March 21, 2023, hearing on the Motion, and the applicable law. Lor the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion. B A C K G R O U N D This case arises out of aJuly 19, 2022, motor vehicle crash. See Pis.’ rst Am. Pet. [ECL No. 1-11] 21, 25. Malone stopped on the highway due to traf c caused by acrash involving Defendant Luis Alberto Lovo. Id. 22-23, 70. Defendant Brian Louis Russell, an employee of Russell Trucking, was driving atractor-trailer behind Malone on the same highway, failed to stop. 'Defendant Armstrong Transport Group, LLC (“Annstrong”) also requests that tire Couit deny the Motion for the reasons set forth in the Response. See Def. Armstrong Transport Group, LLC’s Mem. Concenring Suppl. Jurisdiction ECF No. 34] 3. The Court will refer to DM Trans d/b/a Arrive Logistics, LLC (“Arrive Logistics”), and Armstrong Transport Group, LLC, collectively as “Broker Defendants” througliout tills O r d e r. fi fi Dockets.Justia.com Case 3:23-cv-00001-S Document 42 Filed 06/06/23 Page 2 of 9 PageID 547 and crashed into Malone’s vehicle. Id. 24-25, 43. As aresult of tire crash, Malone is paralyzed from the waist down. Id. 32. Malone aird her husband, Jennings, sued multiple individuals and entities, including Broker Defendairts, for their alleged roles in the crash. See, e.g., id. 50-52, 76-78. According to Plaintiffs, Anive logistics “acted as abroker to anange the transportation of the goods being transported by Defendant Russell,” id. 50, and Armstrong “acted as abroker to arrange the transportation of the goods being tmsported by Defendant Lovo,” id. 76. Plaintiffs assert Texas state-law negligence and/or negligent hiring claims against Broker Defendants. Id. .76-78 ,50-52 Plaintiffs led suit in the 192nd Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas. Arrive Togistics removed the case, asserting that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction because: (1) the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, 49 U.S.C. §14501, preempts Plaintiffs' claims; and (2) Plaintiffs’ claims raise signi cant federal issues.2 See Notice of Removal by DM Trans, LLC d/b/a Arrive Togistics ECF No. 1] 6-11. Anustrong later consented to removal. 3 See Consent to Removal by Carlos A. Balido [ECF No. 6-1]. II. LEGAL S TA N D A R D Any civil action brought in astate court of which the district courts have original jurisdiction may be removed to the district court embracing the place where such action is pending. 28 U.S.C. §1441(a). “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Gunn V. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (internal 2In its Response, Anlve Logistics no longer argues that Plaintiffs’ claims raise signi cant federal issues. Instead, Arrive Logistics ai-gues only that removal was proper based on the complete preemption doctrine. Nonetheless, the Court will address botli arguments below. 3 Because tire asserted bases for federal jurisdiction only apply to -eight brokers, none of the othei" defendants Irave joined in the notice of removal. However, some of the defendants have requested that the Court exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims against them should the Court deny the Motion. See ECF Nos. 32,33. fi fi fi fi 2 Case 3:23-cv-00001-S Document 42 Filed 06/06/23 Page 3 of 9 PageID 548 quotation marks and citation omitted). Afederal court must presume that acase lies outside its limited jurisdiction, and the party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing the contrary. Energy Mgmt. Servs., LLC V. City of Alexandria, 739 F.3d 255, 257 (5th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Because removal raises signi cant federalism concerns, the removal statute is strictly construed, and any doubt about the propriety of removal jurisdiction is resolved in favor of remand. Gasch V. Hartford Accident &Indem. Co., 491 F.3d 278, 281-82 (5th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). Fhe two principal bases upon which adistrict court may exercise removal jurisdiction are: (1) the existence of afederal question, see 28 U.S.C. §1331 and (2) complete diversity of citizenship among the parties, see 28 U.S.C. §1332. III. A . ANALYSIS Complete Preemption Broker Defendants argue that the Court has federal question jurisdiction because Section 14501 completely preempts Plaintiffs’ state-law claims. Notice of Removal 6-8. nder the well-pleaded complaint rule, “[a] defendant cannot remove an action to federal court unless the plaintiff pleaded afederal question on tlie face of his complaint.” Manyweather V. Woodlawn Manor, Inc., 40 F.4th 237, 242 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). “Fhe complete preemption doctrine is an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule.” New Orleans &Gulf Coast Ry. Co. V. Barrois, 533 F.3d 321, 330 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing McAteer V. Silverleaf Resorts, Inc., 514 F.3d 411,416 (5th Cir. 2008)). The complete preemption doctrine provides abasis for federal question jurisdiction if “a federal statute so completely preempts aparticular area that any civil complaint raising the select group of claims is necessarily federal in character.” La. Indep. Pharmacies Ass ’n V. Express Scripts, Inc., 41 F.4th 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). Here, Broker Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiffs only bring state-law claims but contend that the Court has jurisdiction because federal law completely preempts those claims. In fi fi 3 Case 3:23-cv-00001-S Document 42 Filed 06/06/23 Page 4 of 9 PageID 549 arguing that the Court should nd complete preemption. Broker Defendants cite two provisions of Section 14501: “[N]o State 01' political subdivision thereof and no intrastate agency 01' other political agency of 2or more States shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law relating to intrastate rates, intrastate routes, or intrastate services of any freight forwarder or broker. 49 u.s.c.g 14501(b)(1). “[A] state, political subdivision of aState, or political authority of 2or more States may not enact or enforce alaw, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to aprice, route, or service of any motor cander ...or any motor private carrier, broker, or eight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property. Id. §14501(c)(1). According to Broker Defendants, each of these provisions “provide for preemption of Plaintiffs’ claims.” Resp. 11. Broker Defendants rely Ireavily on the “plain language” of each provision to argue in favor of preemption, but their arguments miss the mark because they focus on the wrong form of preemption. Id. | 14. Although Broker Defendants’ opposition to the Motion is ostensibly based on tire complete preemption doctrine, they fail to cite the Fifth Circuit’s standard for complete preemption. “The Fifth Circuit has developed astringent tripartite test to determiire whether astatute is among the few falling within the complete preemption exception.” Rogers V. Am. Airlines, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 2d 661, 665 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (citing Ñ V. Nat 7Union Fire Ins. Co., 876 F.2d 1157,1164 (5th Cir. 1989)). First, federal law must “create ) acause of action tlrat both replaces and protects the analogous area of state law.” Manyweather, 40 F.4th at 243 (citation onritted). Second, Congress must have “empowered federal courts to hear that cause of action.” Id. Third, Congress must have 'clearly intended that grant of jurisdiction to be exclusive.” Id. “Once those conditions are met. the party invoking federal jurisdiction must show that the plaintiff ‘could have brought his statelaw claims under thfat] federal cause of action. fi fi 4 Id. (alteration in original). This analysis is Case 3:23-cv-00001-S Document 42 Filed 06/06/23 Page 5 of 9 PageID 550 required under the Fifth CircuiFsJ precedents.” Bellfort Enters. Inc. V. PetroTex Fuels Inc., 339 F. Αρρ’χ 416, 418 (5th Cir. 2009). Broker Defendants confuse complete preemption with ordinary preemption.4 This enor is signiftcairt because “complete preemption is less common and more extraordinary than defensive or ordinaty preenrption.” Barrois, 533 F.3d at 331 (citation omitted) see also Meade V. Avant of Colo., LLC, 307 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1140 (D. Colo. 2018) (“The doctrine of complete preemption should not be conftised with ordinary preemption, which occurs when there is the defense of express preemption,’ ‘con ict preemption,’ or ‘ eld preemption’ to state law claims.”). Unlike complete preemption, “[d]efensive preemption does not create federal jurisdiction and simply declares the primacy of federal law, regardless of the forum or the claim.” Elam V. Kan. City s. Ry. Co., 635 F.3d 796, 803 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The ordinary preemption analysis asks “the more common question of whether agiven federal law preempts acon icting state cause of action.” Rogers, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 665. By contrast, “[t]he complete preemption doctrine applies only when Congress intends not merely to preenrpt a eld in state law, but also intends to transfer jurisdiction of the subject matter from state to federal courts.” Id. at 671 (citation omitted). “Complete preenrption is rare,” aird the Supreme Court has only found complete preemption three times. Woodard-Hall V. STP Nuclear Operating Co., 473 F. Supp. 3d 740, 747 (S.D. Tex. 2020) (citation omitted); see also Lopez V. Amazon Logistics, Inc. 458 F. Supp. 3d 505, 510 (N.D. Tex. 2020) (setting forth contexts in which Supreme Court has found complete preemption). There are three categories of ordinary preemption: (1) express, (2) eld, and (3) con ict. See Washington V. Fred’s Stores of Tenn., Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d 725, 728 (S.D. Miss. 2006) (citation omitted). Broker Defendants' arguments primarily go to tlie issue of express preemption. fi fl fi fi fl fl 5 Case 3:23-cv-00001-S Document 42 Filed 06/06/23 Page 6 of 9 PageID 551 Broker Defendants’ misunderstanding of the difference between complete and ordinary preemption is evident in the cases they cite, many of which do not coirtain the Fifth Circuit’s complete preemption standard. For example. Broker Defendants rely on Gillum V. High Standard, LLC, No. SA-19-CV-1378-XR, 2020 WL 444371 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2020). But as otlrer district courts have noted, the Gillum court did not undertake the Fifth Circuit’s complete preemption analysis and instead appeared to evaluate ordinary preemption. See, e.g., Moyer V. SimbadLLC, No. 2:20-CV-5405, 2021 WL 1215818, at *6 (S.D. Ohio .Ian. 12, 2021) (citatioir omitted), report and recommendation adopted by 2021 WL 1209469 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2021). Other cases cited by Broker Defendants explicitly involve only ordinary preemption. See, e.g., Aspen Am. Ins. Co. V. Landstar Ranger, Inc., 65 F.4th 1261, 1272 (llth Cir. 2023) (dismissing the plaintiffs claims as “barred by [Section 14501’s] express preemption provision”); McCarter V. Ziyar Express, Inc. No. 3:21-CV-2390, 2023 WL 144844, at *1-2 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 10, 2023) (conducting ordinary preemption analysis at motion to dismiss stage where jurisdiction was not disputed); Ga. Nut Co. V. . . Robinson Co., No. 17-C-3018, 2017 WT 4864857, at *2 (N.D. 111. Oct. 26, 2017) (analyzing the defendairt’s argument that Section 14501 “expressly preempts [the plaintiffs] negligent hiriirg and negligent supervision claim”). Because “[o]nly complete preemption would give this Court federal question jurisdiction over [Plaintiffs’] claim[s],” Broker Defendants .arguments applying the [ordinary] preemption standard are erroneous.” Caulley V. Interprise/Sw Interior &Space Design, Inc., No. 3:20-CV-03077-X, 2021 WL 2376720, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 10, 2021). For this reason alone. Broker Defendants have not carried their burden to justify removal. Even if the Court conducted the complete preemption analysis, however. Broker Defendants’ argument would fail at the rst step. As noted above, for afederal statute to completely preempt a fi 6 Case 3:23-cv-00001-S Document 42 Filed 06/06/23 Page 7 of 9 PageID 552 state-law cause of action, the federal law must “create ] acause of action tliat both replaces and protects the analogous area of state law.” Manyweather, 40 F.4th at 243 (citatioir omitted). But [Section] 14501 doesn’t contain cause of action.” Gulf Winds Int ’1 Inc. V. Almanzar, No. 4:20- CV-04136, 2021 WL 4481340, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2021); see also M, G, &BServs., Inc. V. Buras, No. 04-1512, 04-1509, 2004 WT 1872718, at *4 (E.D. La. Aug. 19, 2004) (“ Section 14501] does not contain acivil enforcement provision that creates api'ivate cause of action. ... Without acivil enforcement provision, [Section 14501] cannot completely preempt [the plaintiffs] state law claims.”) Lyles V. Wren, No. 2:23-CV-00051-JM, 2023 WL 3318695, at *4 (E.D. Ark. May 9, 2023) ( nding that “the absence of’ areplacement cause of action for negligence claims in Section 14501 “creates an exceptionally strong presumption against complete preemption' (internal quotation marks omitted)). “The absence of afederal remedy makes it dif cult to conclude that Congress intended to displace state law.” Rio Grande Underwriters, Inc. V. Pitts Farms, 7„c. 276 F.3d 683, 686 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted) (af rming district court’s dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the federal statute at issue did not completely displace state-law remedies). In sum. Broker Defendants did not provide the Court with the correct standard by which to evaluate its jurisdiction. And even if they had, the Court concludes tlrat Section 14501 is not one of the rare statutes that completely preempts state law. “Fortifying the Court’s conclusion is the jurisdictional standard,” which requires the Court to resolve all doubts in favor of remand. Gerred V. FedEx Ground Packaging Sys., Inc., No. 4:21-cv-1026-p, 2021 WL 4398033, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2021) (citations omitted) (holding that Section 14501 did not completely preempt the plaintiffs state-law claims and remanding case). In reaching this conclusion, the Court expresses fi fi fi no opinion on tire merits of Broker Defendairts’ ordinary preeirrption arguments, which are more Case 3:23-cv-00001-S Document 42 Filed 06/06/23 Page 8 of 9 PageID 553 properly asserted in state court in support of adefense to Plaintiffs’ claims. See White V. Scotty’s Contracting &Stone, LLC, No. l:21-CV-00161-GNS, 2022 WL 4588417, at *9 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 29,2022). In other words. Plaintiffs’ claims implicate Section 14501 only to the extent that Broker Defendants ai'e likely to rely on it as adefense to Plaintiffs’ claims, and “the assertion of adefense of federal preemption of state law is insuf cient to invoke federal-question jurisdiction.” Beers V. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 836 F.2d 910, 913 (5th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by Bene cial Nat 7Bank V. Anderson, 539U.S. 1(2003). As such, the Court lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction over this case. B. Signijicant Federal Issue For largely the same reasons, the Court holds that Plaintiffs’ claims also are not removable on the ground that the claims raise asigni cant federal issue. “[E]ven when astate court petition pleads only state law causes of action,” afederal court has jurisdiction “if afederal issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.” Box V. PetroTel, Inc., 33 F.4tlr 195, 201 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). “The category of cases that satisfy these requirements is ‘special and small. Mitchell V. Advanced HCS, LLC.,lT.4l\v e\Ï.T TT) k wo w Bd. Of Conwi'rs of Se. La. Flood. Prot. Auth.-E. V. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 850 F.3d 714, 721 (5th Cir. 2017)). Broker Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims raise asigni cant federal issue because their right to relief necessarily depends on the resolution of asubstantial question of federal law. their allegations represent adispute as to the effect and breadth of federal law concerning freight brokers, and their argument that state law applies to their claims will Impact frelglrt brokers’ selection of federally licensed motor carriers. Notice of Removal 11 . All of these arguments go fi fi fi fi fi back to whether Section 14501 expressly preempts Plaintiffs’ claims, which, as stated above. Is a Case 3:23-cv-00001-S Document 42 Filed 06/06/23 Page 9 of 9 PageID 554 defense to Plaintiffs’ claims. Broker Defendants’ “af rmative defense of preemption] belongs in aresponsive pleading, which cannot itself support federal jurisdiction.” Box, 33 F.4th at 202. “That is true even for federal defenses that are ‘inevitable. Id. fdfa ow 0É.ted , see also Mitchell, 28 F.4th at 588-89 (holding that the plaintiffs claims did not raise asigni cant federal issue where preemption was raised as adefense because the federal issues “are neither raised nor disputed on the face of the complaint”) Lyles, 2023 WL 3318695, at *4 (concluding that the plaintiffs claims did not raise asigni cant federal issue and rejecting arguments nearly identical to those asserted in the instant case). I V. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand ECF No. 14]. This case is REMANDED to the 192nd Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas. SO ORDERED. SIGNED June 6, 2023. UNITED fi fi fi fi 9 S TAT E S DISTRICT JUDGE
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