Muhammad v. Newell et al, No. 3:2008cv01426 - Document 53 (N.D. Tex. 2009)
Court Description: Memorandum Order granting 47 Motion to Dismiss filed by W.K. Newell, City of Terrell, TX. The claims against Newell in his official capacity are dismissed as redundant. (see order) (Ordered by Magistrate Judge Jeff Kaplan on 3/4/09) (klm)
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Muhammad v. Newell et al Doc. 53 IN THE UNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURT NORTHERN DISTRICTOFTEXAS DALLASDIVISION HERBERTAMEEN MUHAMMAD Plaintiff, V S. W.K. NEWELL,ET AL. Defendants. $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ MEMORANDUM NO.3-08-CV-r426-BD ORDER DefendantsCity of Tenell, Texas("the City") andW.K. Newell ("Newell") havefiled a Rule 12(bX6) motion for partial dismissalof certainclaims in this civil rights action brought under federal and Texas law. As grounds for their motion, defendantscontendthat plaintiff has failed to statea federal civil rights claim againstthe City and that the TexasTort Claims Act ("TTCA") bars all state law claims against Newell in his individual capacity. Defendants further argue that the claims againstNewell in his official capacityare redundantof thoseagainstthe City. The issueshave been briefed by the parties and the motion is ripe for determination. A district court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim "only if it appearsthat no relief could be grantedunderany setof factsthat could be provenconsistentwith the allegations." Jacl$on v. City of BeaumontPolice Dept.,958 F.2d 616,618 (5th Cir. 1992),quoting Barrientosv. RelianceStandardLife Ins. Co.,9llF.2d 1115,l116 (5th Cir. 1990),cert.denied111 S.Ct.795 ( 1991). In orderto survivedismissal,the plaintiff must plead "enoughfactsto statea claim to relief that is plausibleon its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,550 U.S. 544,727S.Ct. 1955,1974, 167 L.F,d.zd 929 (2007). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the Dockets.Justia.com speculativelevel." Id., 127 S.Ct. at 1965. While a complaint need not contain detailedfactual allegations,the plaintiff must allegemore than labelsand conclusions.Id. at 1964-65. The court must acceptall well-pleaded facts as true and view the allegationsin the light most favorable to the plaintiff. SeeIn re Katrina Canal BreachesLitig.,495 F.3d 191,205 (5th Cir. 2007),cert. denied subnom.,XavierUniv.ofLouisianav.TravelersCasualtyPropertyCo.ofAmerica,l2S S.Ct.1230 (2008). Judged againstthis standard,the court determinesthat plaintiff has failed to statea federal civil rights claim againstthe City. A municipalityis not vicariouslyliable for the constitutionaltorts of its employeesunderthe theoryof respondeatsuperior. Instead,municipal liability undersection (2) an official policy; and (3) a violation 1983requiresproof of threeelements:(l) a policymaker1' of constitutionalrights whose "moving force" is the policy or custom. SeeHampton Co. National Surety,LLC v. Tunica County,543 F.3d 221,227 (5th Cir.2008), citing Piotrowski v. City of cert.denied,l22S.Ct.53(2001).Anofficialpolicymaybe Houston,z37F.3d567,578(5thCir.), either a written policy or a "persistentwidespreadpractice . . . which, although not authorizedby offrcially adoptedand promulgatedpolicy, is so common and well settledas to constitute a custom that fairly representsmunicipal policy." Lswson v. Dallss County,286 F.3d 257,263 (5th Cir. 2002),quoting Websterv. City of Houston,735 F .2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984). Where,as here,the challengedconductrelatesto an informal policy or a customof behavioramongmunicipal police officers,theplaintiffmust pleadsufficientfactswhich, ifproved, show "a patternof similar incidents by intentionalor negligentpolice misconductand/or in which citizenswere injured and endangered that seriousincompetenceor misbehaviorwas generalor widespreadthroughoutthe police force." denied,ll3 S.Ct.462(1992).The Frairev. CilyofArlington,957F.2d1268,1278(5thCir.),cert. critical inquiry is whether the governing body or official policymaker had constructive or actual knowledgeof the persistentandwidespreadviolationsof constitutionalrights. Seeid. at 1278-79; (5thCir. 1984),cert.denied,l05S.Ct.3476 seealsoBennettv. Cityof Slidell,728F.2d762,768 (1e8s). The only allegationsin plaintiffs amendedcomplaintthat evenremotelyimplicatethe City are: Defendant Newell had a custom and practice of unfairly targeting Plaintiff in an attempt to run Plaintiff out of town. Policymakers within the City of Terrell and its police department actually or constructively knew of DefendantNewell's custom of targeting and deprivingPlaintiff of his rights underboth the Constitutionand laws of Texas. This is evidencedby DefendantNewell's many arrestsand interactions with Plaintiff as well as Defendant Newell's comment expresslystatingthat the peopleof Tenell did not like "[Plaintiffs] kind." However,evenhavingsuchactualor constructiveknowledge, the City of Terrell acted with deliberate indifference regarding the ongoingviolation of Plaintiffs constitutionalrights. As a result,this practice or custom led to the deprivation of Plaintiffs state and constitutionalrights at issuein this case. (Plf. First Am. Compl. at 4-5, fl 12). Not only doesplaintiff fail to identify the policymakerswho allegedly condoned Newell's conduct, but nothing in the complaint suggeststhat the City had a persistentand widespreadpracticeof depriving plaintiff ofhis constitutional rights. To the contrary, plaintiff alleges only two encounterswith Newell--one on November 26, 2007, when Newell threatenedto arrestplaintiff if he did not sign a criminal trespasscitation,(seeid. at2,fl7), and one 'lJ on November 28,2007, when Newell arrestedplaintiff for attemptedburglary (seeid. at 3, 8). Theseallegations,even if viewed in the light most favorableto plaintiff, fall short of establishing a"patternofsimilarincidents"necessarytogiverisetomunicipalliabilityunder42U.S.C. $ 1983. SeeWinegarnerv.City ofCoppel/,No. 3-05-CV-1757-L,2007WL 1040877at*6-7 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 5,2007), affd,275 Fed.Appx.359,2008WL 1817825(5th Cir. Apr. 23,2008) (dismissingcivil rights claim againstcity where plaintiff failed to identiff specific policymaker responsiblefor promulgating policy); Pivonkav. Collins,No.3-02-CV-0742-G,2002 or rati8/ingunconstitutional WL 1477455at*4 (N.D.Tex.Jul.5,2002)(same).SeealsoReyesv. Cityof MiamiBeach,No.0722680-C1V,2008 civil rightsclaim WL 686958at *13-14(S.D.Fla.Mar. 13,2008)(dismissing againstcity wherethe only factsallegedrelatedto a singlearrestandtherewasnothingto suggest that a final policymakerratifiedthe misconduct);Mott v. OfficerJohn Does/, No. 07-CV-00280REB-CBS,2008 WL 648993at *4 (D. Colo.Mar.4,2008)(same). Nor canplaintiff sueNewellfor falsearrest,wrongfulimprisonment,maliciousprosecution, assault,andintentionalinflictionof emotionaldistress.Underthe TTCA: (a) The filing of a suit under this chapteragainsta governmental unit constitutes an irrevocable election by the plaintiff and immediately and forever bars any suit or recovery by the plaintiff againstany individual employeeof the governmentalunit regarding the samesubjectmatter. (b) The filing of a suit againstany employeeof a governmental unit constitutes an irrevocable election by the plaintiff and immediately and forever bars any suit or recovery by the plaintiff against the governmental unit regarding the same subject matter unlessthe sovernmentalunit consents. :1.*t * (e) If a suit is filed underthis chapteragainstboth a governmental unit and any of its employees,the employeesshall immediately be dismissedon the filing of a motion by the governmentalunit. Tex. Cry. PRAC.& Rerra.Copn AI.IN.$ 101.106(a),(b) & (e) (Vernon 2005). Texas courts have interpretedthis statuteto requirethe plaintiffto make an irrevocableelection, at the time suit is filed, between suing the govemmental unit under the TTCA, or proceedingagainstthe employee alone. SeeSingletonv. Casteel,267 S.W.3d 547,550-52(Tex. App.--Houston[14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied);Brown v. Xie,260 S.W.3d 118, 12I-23 (Tex. App.--Houston[1st Dist.] 2008,no pet.). "Becausethe Tort Claims Act is the only, albeit limited, avenuefor common-lawrecoveryagainst the government, all tort theories alleged against a govemmental unit, whether it is sued alone or togetherwith its employees,areassumedto be 'under[the Tort Claims Act]' for pu{posesof section 101.106." SeeMission ConsolidatedIndependentSchoolDist. v. Garcia,253 S.W.3d 653,659 (Tex. 2008). In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that he "brings causes of action against Defendants Newell and the City of Terrell for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution,assault,and intentionalinfliction of emotionaldistress[.]" (SeePlf. First Am. Compl. at 2,16). Although plaintiff now arguesthat his claims for assaultand intentional infliction of emotionaldistressaremadeonlyagainstNewell,(SeePlf. Resp.at6), nowhereinhiscomplaintdoes plaintiff distinguish between the two defendantswhen requesting damageswith respectto those claims. Moreover, plaintiff doesnot abandonhis claims againstthe City for false arrest,wrongful detention,and malicious prosecution. By assertingthesetort claims againstthe City, plaintiff is barred from suing Newell under any theory of recovery "regarding the same subject matter." See Garcia,253 S,W.3d at 659,citing Tnx. Cry. Pne,c.& Rnrvr.CooB ArvN.$ 10 1. 106.' Finally, plaintiff cannot sue Newell in his official capacity. Such claims are redundant of those brought againstthe City. SeeBeall Legacy Partners, L.P, v. City of Waxahachie,No. 3-05at*2(N.D.Tex.Feb.16,2006),citingKentuclryv.Graham,473U.S. CV-1942-D,2006WL353471 7 5 9 ,1 6 6 , 1 0 5S . C t .3 0 9 9 , 3 1 0 58, 7 L . E d . z dI 1 4 ( 1 9 8 5 ) . CONCLUSION For these reasons,defendants'Rule 12(b)(6) motion for partial dismissal [Doc. #471 is granted. Plaintiffs federalcivil rights claim againstthe City of Terrell is dismissedfor failure to ' Ordinarily, the court would allow plaintiff to amendhis complaint in order to cure this pleading defect. However, Texascourtshave held that a plaintiff cannotavoid the statutoryright of dismissalunder section l0 I . 106(e) by filing an amendedcomplaint. See Villasanv. O'Rourke, 166 S.W.3d 752,762 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2005, pet. denied). pleada basisfor municipalliability under42 U.S.C.$ 1983. The statelaw claimsagainstW. K. Newell in his individual capacityare dismissedunderTex. Civ. Prac.& Rem. CodeAnn. $ asredundant. l0l . 106(e).TheclaimsagainstNewellin his official capacityaredismissed SO ORDERED. DATED: March4.2009. STATES}"{AGISTRATEJUDGE
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