Schomburg v. Commissioner of Social Security, No. 3:2007cv01258 - Document 26 (N.D. Tex. 2009)
Court Description: Memorandum Opinion and Order: The hearing decision is reversed, and this case is remanded to the Commissioner of Social Security for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. (see order) (Ordered by Magistrate Judge Jeff Kaplan on 11/9/2009) (axm)
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COURT DISTRICT IN THE TINITEDSTATES OF DISTRICT TEXAS NORTHERN DALLASDIVISION MARK SCHOMBURG Plaintiff. NO.3-07-CV-r2s8-BD VS. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, of SecuriW Commissioner Social Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff Mark Schomburg seeks judicial review of a final adverse decision of the statedherein,the to Commissionerof Social Securitypursuant 42 U.S.C. $ a05G). For the reasons hearingdecisionis reversed. I. Plaintiff allegesthat he is disabled as a result of multiple injuries sustainedin a 2003 automobile accident. After his application for disability benefits was denied initially and on law plaintiff requested hearingbeforean administrative judge. That hearingwas a reconsideration, held on August 2,2006. At the time of the hearing,plaintiff was 46 yearsold. He is a high school graduate,attendedcollege for two years,and has past work experienceas a fire alarm installer/ gainful activity sincethe accidenton November 17, in servicer.Plaintiff hasnot engaged substantial 2003. The ALJ found that plaintiff was disabledfrom November 17,2003 until January31,2006, due to multiple fracturesof the cervical spine and left arm, head trauma, and other injuries that reduced his residual functional capacity to less than a full range of sedentarywork. However, the medicalimprovement that as of January3l,2006,plaintiff had experienced ALJ further determined directly relatedto his ability to work and had regainedthe residualfunctional capacityto perform a limited rangeof light work. Relying on the testimonyof a vocationalexpert,thejudge found that plaintiff was capableof working as a machinetender,an entry level security guard,and a gateguard --jobs that exist in significant numbersin the national economy. Thus, the ALJ concludedthat plaintiff was no longer disabled and not entitled to disability benefits as of January 31, 2006. that decisionto the AppealsCouncil. The Council affirmed. Plaintiff then filed Plaintiff appealed this action in federal court. u. In a single ground for relief, plaintiff contendsthat the ALJ failed to apply the correct medicalimprovementrelatedto his ability to work in legalstandard determiningthat he experienced as of January 31,2006, and that the decisionterminatinghis disability benefits is not supported evidence. by substantial A. whetherthe Commissioner's is Judicialreview in socialsecuritycases limited to determining were usedto evidenceand whetherthe proper legal standards decisionis supportedby substantial the evaluate evidence.See42 U.S.C.$ a05(g);Ripleyv. Chater,67F.3d 552,555(5th Cir. 1995). mind might acceptto Substantialevidenceis defined as "such relevantevidenceas a reasonable .4. s u p p o r t a c o n c l u s i o nR" c h a r d s o n v . P e r a l e s , 4 O 2 U . S . 3 8 9 , 4 0 l , 9 l S 1C t2 0 , 1 4 2 7 , 2 8 L . E d . z d .i 542 (1971);Austin v. Shalala,994F.2d 1170,1174(5th Cir. 1993). It is more than a scintillabut Richardson,9l S.Ct. at 1427. The district court may not reweigh the less than a preponderance. evidenceor substituteits judgment for that of the Commissioner,but must scrutinizethe entire record to ascertainwhether substantialevidencesupportsthe hearingdecision. Hollis v. Bowen,837 ( F . 2 d 1 3 7 8 , 1 3 8 35 t hC i r . 1 9 8 8 ) . A disabledworker is entitledto monthly socialsecuritybenefitsif certainconditionsaremet. 42 U,S.C. $ a23(a). The Act defines "disability" as the inability to engagein substantialgainful physicalor mentalimpairmentthat canbe expected activity by reason anymedicallydeterminable of to result in deathor last for a continuedperiod of l2 months. 1d, $ 423(d)(lXA); Cookv. Heckler, promulgated five-step sequential a 750F.2d 391,393 (5th Cir. 1985). The Commissionerhas evaluationprocessthat must be followed in making a disability determination: l. whetherthe claimant The hearineofficer must first ascertain gainful activity. A claimantwho is is engagedlnsubstantial of working is not disabledregardless the medical findings. 2. whetherthe claimed The hearingofficer must then determine impairment is "severe." A "severe impairment" must physicalor mental ability to significantlylimit the claimant's do basic work activities. This determinationmust be made solely on the basisof the medical evidence. 3. The hearing officer must then determine if the impairment meets or equals in severity certain impairments described in Appendix I of the regulations. This determination is madeusing only medical evidence. 4. If the claimant has a "severe impairment" covered by the regulations, the hearing officer must determine whether the claimant can perform his pastwork despiteany limitations. 5. If the claimant doesnot have the residual functional capacity to perform pastwork, the hearingofficer must decidewhether the claimant can perform any other gainful and substantial work in the economy. This determinationis made on the and work experience, basisof the claimant'sage,education, residualfunctional capacity. a Seegenerally,20 C.F.R. $ 404.1520(b)-(0.The claimanthasthe initial burdenof establishing U.S. 137,146n.5, 107S.Ct. Bowenv. Yuckert,482 of disabilityin the first four steps this analysis. 2287,2294n.5,96L.E,d.zd119 (1987). The burdenthen shiftsto the Commissioner show that to the claimant is capableofperforming work in the national economy. Id. A finding that the claimant is disabledor not disabled at any point in the five-step review is conclusiveand terminatesthe analysis. Lovelace Bowen,8l3 F.2d55, 58 (5th Cir. 1987). v. In reviewing the propriety of a decisionthat a claimantis not disabled,the court'sfunction is to ascertain whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the Commissioner'sfinal decision. The court weighs four elementsto determinewhether there is and of substantial evidence disability: (l) objectivemedicalfacts;(2) diagnoses opinionsoftreating (3) of and examiningphysicians; subjectiveevidence pain and disability; and (4) the claimant'sage, education,and work history. Martinez v. Chater,64 F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1995),citing Wrenv. Sullivan,g2s F .2d 123 126(5th Cir. I 99I ). The ALJ hasa duty to fully and fairly developthe facts , relating to a claim for disability benefits. Ripley, 67 F .3d at 557. If the ALJ does not satis$ this duty, the resulting decision is not substantiallyjustified. Id. However, proceduralperfection is not required. The court will reversean administrativeruling only if the claimant shows that his rights were prejudiced. Smith v. Chater,962 F.Supp.980, 984 (N.D. Tex. 1997). substantive B. Plaintiff challenges decisionterminatinghis disability benefitsas of January31,2006, the dueto a medicalimprovementrelatedto his ability to work. "When the ALJ finds a claimantentitled to a closed period of disability, the ALJ must apply the medical improvement standardto articulate WL 2708108at * I (5th Cir. v, when the closedperiodends." Teague Astrue,No. 09-10075,2009 Aug. 28, 2009),citing Watersv. Barnhart,276 F.3d 716,719 (5th Cir. 2002). Disability benefits evidencethat: (1) therehasbeena medical improvement may be terminatedif there is substantial related to the ability to work; and (2) the claimant is now able to engagein substantialgainful activity. Teague,2009 WL 2708108 * l, citing 42 U.S.C.$ 423(0(1);seealsoJosephv.Astrue, at 231 Fed.Appx. 327,329,2007WL 1455924 *2 (5th Cir. May 18,2007),cert.denied,128S.Ct. at in 900 (2008). A "medical improvement"is any decrease the medical severityof an impairment which was presentat the time of the most recentfavorabledisability determination.See20 C.F.R. in $ 416.994a(c). A finding that there has been a decrease medical severity must be basedon with the impairment. Id. Medical in signs,or laboratoryfindingsassociated changes the symptoms, in improvementis relatedto a claimant'sability to work if therehasbeena decrease the severityof the impairment and an increasein the claimant'sfunctional capacityto do basic work activities. The Commissioner the has WL 2708108at*1, citing 20 C.F.R.$ 404.1594(bX3). Teague,2009 burdento prove that the claimantis no longer disabledas of the cessationdate. Id., citing Waters, . 2 7 6 F . 3 da t 7 1 7 In this case, ALJ foundthat plaintiffwas disabledfrom November 17,2003until January the 31, 2006,dueto multiple fracturesofthe head,cewical spine,and left arm, cervicalfusionsand skin radial neuropathy, and radial tunnel superficialsensory grafts,vertigo, chronic pain, radiculopathy, syndrome. (SeeTr. at 19,22). However, the ALJ further determinedthat plaintiff experienced medical improvementbeginningJanuary31, 2006, suchthat he no longer was disabledas of that date. (Id. atZI). According to the judge: specialistin November At a follow-up visit with a pain management 2005, the claimant reportedthat he was doing better after he started seeinga chiropractor.He reportedthat he got "rid of the headaches" that he had for two years. In January2006,the claimant reportedthat he was doing better. In February 2006, the claimant reported that no has Methadone beenhelpinghis backpain andhe reported adverse side effectsfrom the medication. by (ld. at l9). This perfunctoryexplanationof medical improvementis not supported substantial that he was "doing better" and that the Methadone evidence. First, plaintiffs genericstatements treatmentwas "helping" do not constituteevidenceof an improvementin the symptoms,signs,or laboratoryfindingsassociated with any specificimpairment,especially view of similar statements in period of disability. (Tr. at madeby plaintiff in November 2005,which was during the recognized in 483, 484). SeeJoseph,2007WL 1455924at*3 (genericstatement follow-up reportthat plaintiff was doing "well" or "better"doesnot constituteevidenceof an improvementin symptomsor signs where samephrase appearedin note written during the period of disability); see also l(illiams v. statements physicianthat his to Apfel,65 F.Supp.2d1223, 1232 [N.D. Okla. 1999)(claimant's shoulderwas "much better"and that he thought "the injectionhe receivedhad really improved" his evidenceof medicalimprovement). Further,to the extentthe shoulderdid not provide substantial ALJ based decisionon informationrelatingto plaintiff s daily activities,includingtestimonythat his the activities,preparelunch, straighten his plaintiff is ableto drive a car, superyise son'srecreation (seeTr. at exercises, house,wash dishes,fold towels, do someshopping,and completetherapeutic evidenceis insufficientto supporta finding of medicalimprovementrelatedto 2l), suchanecdotal the ability to work. Spannv. Barnharl, No. 3-00-CV-2769-BD(N.D. Tex. Jan. 8,2002) (Kaplan, J.). Nor is there any evidence,much less substantialevidence,in the record to establishthat plaintiff s disability endedasof January 2006. To the contrary,the selectionof that dateappears 31, entirely arbitrary. SeeFifer v. Astrue,No. 08-0372,2008WL 4922114(E.D. Pa.Nov. 10, 2008) (remanding case where court found no significance to date selected by ALJ for medical that anyofplaintiff s treatingphysiciansordereda change improvement). Thereis nothing to suggest in treatment or revised any restrictions based on an improvement associatedwith any of his impairmentsas of January31,2006. Rather,the medicalevidenceshowsthat doctorscontinuedto treat plaintiff for the same impairments that had plagued him during the period of disability, including limitedrange motionin hisneckandupper pain, a of muscle spasms, chronic extremities, plaintiffs headaches, vertigo. (SeeTr. at 502, 505-06). Because decision terminating and the mustbe this is by evidence, case 31,2006 not supported substantial disability benefits of January as No. 1proceedings.t Vicknair Astrue, v. for remanded the Commissioner fuitheradministrative to -C,2009WL2949764 (remanding where case evidence 08-CV-052 at*6 (N.D.Tex.Sept.15,2009) improvement). failedto specifically demonstrate medical CONCLUSION is of to Thehearing is and decision reversed, this case remanded the Commissioner Social consistent this opinion. with for Security furtherproceedings 9. DATED: November 2009. STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE I By remandingthis case,the couft doesnot suggest that plaintiff is or shouldbe found disabledafter January 31.2006.
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