Wilson v. KTG, Kruger USA, No. 2:2016cv02508 - Document 118 (W.D. Tenn. 2019)
Court Description: ORDER denying 107 Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial. Signed by Magistrate Judge Tu M. Pham on 08/06/2019. (jmd)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Wilson v. KTG, Kruger USA Doc. 118 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE WESTERN DIVISION ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) JOSEPH WILSON, Plaintiff, v. K.T.G. (USA), INC., Defendant. 16-cv-02508-TMP ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL Before the court is plaintiff Joseph Wilson’s Motion for New Trial, filed on December 27, 2018. (ECF No. 107.) Defendant K.T.G. (USA), Inc. (“K.T.G.”) responded on January 24, 2019. (ECF No. 115.) For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED. I. BACKGROUND On February 7, 2011, Wilson, who is African-American, started working as a Unitizer/Loader Operator for K.T.G. 1 On February 25, 2013, Anthony Dix, who is also African-American, became through Wilson’s Wilson’s Discipline Policy supervisor and remained termination. in place with K.T.G. his has escalating supervisor a up Progressive punishment for 1A more in-depth discussion of the facts surrounding this case can be found in this court’s summary judgment order. See Wilson v. K.T.G. (USA), Inc., No. 2:16-cv-2508, ECF No. 51, 2018 WL 4571604 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 24, 2018). Dockets.Justia.com employee misconduct: for the first instance of misconduct, the employee is orally reprimanded; for the second, the employee receives a written warning; for the third, the employee receives a final written warning and a suspension; and for the fourth, the employee is terminated. Dix has the sole discretion to discipline an employee who is under his supervision for that employee’s first three acts of misconduct. able to suspend an employee without K.T.G.’s Human Resource department. Dix is therefore involving anyone from Utilizing his discretion, Dix first disciplined Wilson on September 30, 2013, for failing to clean up a product spill and placing pallets in front of the area of the spill. On November 5, 2013, Dix disciplined Wilson for talking on his cell phone at work. incidents, Wilson filed internal Dix’s “harassing” behavior. After each of these grievances complaining about For example, on October 22, 2013, Wilson filed a grievance in which he stated that Dix had been bullying and harassing him and “has made my job a hostile work environment” based on “my ethic [sic] age.” 78-79.) On discrimination November with the 6, 2013, EEOC, Wilson Charge No. (ECF No. 32-3 at filed a charge 490-2014-00128 “Charge”), in which he alleged as follows: Since Anthony Dix became my supervisor he consistently harasses and scrutinizes my work. On October 2, 2013, I received a write up from Dix. On or about October 29, 2013, I filed a grievance concerning Dix’s harassing behavior. On November 5, 2013, I received a -2- of (the written-up [sic] from Dix. I believe I have been discriminated against because of my race (Black) and retaliated against in violation of Title VII[.] (ECF No. 37-4 at 20.) Sometime in December 2017, Dix suspended Wilson for allegedly failing to complete a Receiving Report, which loaders, such as Wilson, were required to complete. Wilson contended that completing the Receiving Report was not required and that Dix actually suspended protected activity. him in retaliation for engaging in Dix’s decision to suspend Wilson was made without input from or involvement of any other K.T.G. supervisor or Human Resources’ employee. At the time Dix suspended Wilson, Dix had was aware that Wilson filed internal grievances; however, Dix had no knowledge that Wilson had filed the Charge. Ann Fleck, K.T.G’s Human Resources Manager, had no knowledge of Wilson’s internal grievances when Dix suspended Wilson. Fleck did not know that Wilson had filed the internal grievances until January 2014, which was after Dix suspended Wilson. 111 at 44.) (ECF No. In addition, Fleck did not know that Wilson had filed the Charge until late December 2013 or early January 2014 (after Dix suspended Wilson). This case proceeded to a jury trial in November 2018 to resolve a single issue - whether -3- Dix suspended Wilson in retaliation for the grievances Wilson filed. 2 Prior to trial, on November 12, 2018, K.T.G. filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence regarding the Charge. (ECF No. 61.) The next day, the court held a pretrial conference and when Wilson was asked about K.T.G.’s motion in limine, he asserted that filing a response in opposition to the motion was unnecessary because he did not oppose the motion. unopposed motion. trial Wilson’s representation, The court therefore granted the (ECF No. 65.) position Wilson changed. argued that However, on the morning of Contrary while to the his Charge earlier itself should not be admitted, evidence referencing the Charge should be admitted. As one example, Wilson argued that statements where Wilson references that he filed the Charge, within his Exhibit 13, should be admitted. Copy of Wilson’s Exhibit 13.) (See ECF No. 107-1, Unredacted The court disagreed with Wilson and again ordered that evidence regarding the Charge would not be admitted. (ECF No. 96.) After the parties presented closing arguments, the court instructed the jury. the following During its deliberations, the jury asked question: “For Mr. Wilson’s Grievances to be protected activities under Title VII, do the grievances have to allege prohibited discrimination.” 2Wilson (ECF No. 103 at 2.) After raised several other claims that the court dismissed at the summary judgment stage. (ECF No. 51.) -4- discussing that question with the parties, the court took a lengthy recess to consider the parties’ arguments and to review Sixth Circuit case law. that it would give the The court then notified the parties jury the following supplemental instruction: To come within the protection of Title VII, the plaintiff must prove that he challenged an employment practice that he reasonably believed was unlawful. Title VII does not restrict the manner or means by which an employee may oppose an unlawful employment practice. The manner of opposition must be reasonable, and that opposition must be based on a reasonable and good faith belief that the opposed practice was unlawful. In other words, a violation of Title VII’s retaliation provision can be found whether or not the challenged practice ultimately is found to be unlawful. Title VII does not protect an employee if his opposition is merely a vague charge of discrimination. Although vague complaints do not constitute opposition, the law does not require that the plaintiff’s complaint be lodged with absolute formality, clarity, or precision. (ECF No. 104.) The court explained to the parties the bases for this supplemental instruction: And, then, second, this supplemental instruction, let me explain to you what I've done. First of all, I've taken the first sentence from the protected activity section of the Yazdian opinion. The only change I made in Yazdian, it says, "Yazdian must establish," and that was a summary judgment issue at trial, so I substituted that by saying that, "The plaintiff must prove that he challenged an employment practice that he believed was unlawful." The second sentence, which Plaintiff asked to include, says, "Title VII does not restrict the manner or means by which an employee may oppose an unlawful employment practice." -5- The third sentence of Yazdian, I'm not including, the one that read, "Indeed, a demand that the supervisor cease his or her harassing conduct constituted protected activity covered under Title VII." I think that would be misleading to the jury because the way it reads, it sounds like I'm telling them what would be found - what they should find, excuse me, and that's confusing and misleading and inappropriate as part of the jury instruction. So that sentence of Yazdian that begins with the demand that a supervisor cease, I am not including in the instruction. The next sentence of my instruction, “The manner of opposition must be reasonable and that opposition must be based on a reasonable and good-faith belief that the opposed practice was unlawful," comes partly from Yazdian on page 646, and that's actually consistent with the existing instruction about a good-faith belief that we have in instruction No. 10, good-faith belief. That quote is from - is taken from Yazdian quoting Johnson, and Johnson – that language - and I have a copy of the Johnson opinion at the podium if anyone wants to look at that, but it's taken from the 6th Circuit opinion in Johnson. The next two sentences, actually, “The manner of opposition must be reasonable and the opposition must be based on a reasonable and good-faith belief that the opposed practice was unlawful. In other words, a violation of Title VII's retaliation provision can be found whether or not the challenge practice ultimately is found to be unlawful." Again, that's taken from Johnson. And the last two sentences, "Title VII does not protect an employee" - I did leave out the word "however" to not highlight this sentence, but "Title VII does not protect an employee if his opposition is merely a vague charge of discrimination and, although vague complaints do not constitute opposition, the law does not require that the plaintiff's complaint be lodged with absolute formality, clarity, or precision." -6- Ms. Collins, instruction? do you wish to be heard on this (ECF No. 113 at 26:7-28:18.) Wilson objected instruction. to the last two sentences at the The court overruled Wilson’s objection and gave the jury the above-quoted supplemental instruction. 113 of 28-29.) Ultimately, the jury returned a (ECF No. verdict in K.T.G.’s favor and the court subsequently entered judgment in conformity with the verdict. present motion, Wilson (ECF Nos. 105; 106.) argues that a new trial is In the warranted because (1) the court improperly excluded evidence regarding the Charge; and (2) the supplemental jury instruction was erroneous. (ECF No. 107.) II. ANALYSIS After a jury trial, a court may grant a new trial “for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States.” Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). Fed. R. “A new trial is appropriate when the jury reaches a ‘seriously erroneous result as evidenced by (1) the verdict being against the [clear] weight of the evidence; (2) the damages being excessive; or (3) the trial being unfair to the moving party in some fashion, i.e., the proceedings being influenced by prejudice or bias.’” Cummins v. BIC USA, Inc., 727 F.3d 506, 509–10 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Static Control -7- Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 697 F.3d 387, 414 (6th Cir. 2012)). Furthermore, “a motion for a new trial will not be granted unless the moving party suffered prejudice.” Tompkin v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 362 F.3d 882, 891 (6th Cir. 2004). “The burden of showing harmful prejudice rests on the party seeking the new trial.” Simmons v. Napier, 626 F. App'x 129, 132 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Tobin v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 993 F.2d 528, 541 (6th Cir. 1993)). The Sixth Circuit has explained that “the governing principle in the district court's consideration of a motion for a new trial is whether, in the judgment of the trial judge, such course is required in order to prevent an injustice[.]” Park W. Galleries, Inc. v. Hochman, 692 F.3d 539, 544 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Davis v. Jellico Cmty. Hosp. Inc., 912 F.2d 129, 133 (6th Cir. 1990)). trial thus bears “a heavy burden.” The party seeking a new Miller v. Am. President Lines, Ltd., 989 F.2d 1450, 1466 (6th Cir. 1993). A. Wilson’s Exhibit 13 – Reference to the EEOC Charge Relevant evidence is generally admissible. 402. a Fed. R. Evid. “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401(a-b). However, relevant evidence is excludable “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, -8- confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Evid. 403. “[I]f a mistake has been made Fed. R. regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence, a new trial will not be granted unless the outcome at trial.” evidence would have caused a different Tompkin, 362 F.3d at 891 (quoting Morales v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 151 F.3d 500, 514 (6th Cir. 1998)); Decker v. GE Healthcare Inc., 770 F.3d 378, 391 (6th Cir. 2014) (“An erroneous evidentiary ruling amounts to reversible error, justifying a new trial, only if it was not harmless; that is, only if citation it affected and quotation the outcome omitted)). of “To the trial.” (internal demonstrate prejudice stemming from evidentiary error, it is not sufficient merely to show that the district court made a mistake in admitting or excluding certain evidence.” Simmons, 626 F. App’x at 132. Wilson argues that he is entitled to a new trial because “the blanket exclusion of any reference to Plaintiff’s protected conduct with the EEOC likely swayed the jury.” 5.) (ECF No. 107 at Specifically, Wilson contends that the court improperly redacted his Exhibit 13 by removing statements stating that he “filed a charge of racial discrimination with the EEOC.” at 4.) (Id. On November 12, 2018, K.T.G. filed a motion to exclude Wilson’s Charge and any references to the Charge. (ECF No. 61.) The next day, the court held a pretrial conference. -9- At this conference, Wilson was asked about K.T.G.’s motion seeking to exclude evidence regarding the Charge. Wilson asserted that it was unnecessary for him to respond to the motion because he did not oppose the motion. Accordingly, the court orally granted K.T.G.’s motion. (ECF No. however, Wilson attempted 65.) to On the relitigate morning this of trial, issue. After hearing further arguments, the court again ruled that evidence regarding the Charge, including references to the Charge made within Wilson’s Exhibit 13, would be excluded, and subsequently entered a written order to that effect. (ECF No. 96; ECF No. 114 at 32-34.) Assuming, arguendo, that Wilson has not waived his objection to the court’s evidentiary ruling, see K.C. ex rel. Calaway v. Schucker, No. 02-2715-STA, 2013 WL 5972192, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. merits. Wilson in The Nov. only 8, 2013), issue retaliation for at Wilson’s trial filing was argument whether grievances. fails Dix As on suspended this court previously stated: [E]vidence relating to the November 6, 2013 EEOC Charge is irrelevant to the present retaliation claim. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. The court has previously ruled that, based on the record submitted with the summary judgment briefing, no reasonable juror could find that either Wilson’s supervisor or K.T.G.’s Human Resources Manager knew about the November 6, 2018 EEOC Charge prior to the suspension. Because the court has already determined that, as a matter of law, the EEOC Charge was not a basis for the alleged retaliation, the EEOC -10- the Charge is irrelevant to determining unlawfully retaliated against Wilson. whether K.T.G. Second, to the extent that evidence regarding the EEOC Charge is relevant, any probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice, confusing the issue, misleading the jury, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. The EEOC Charge referred to two prior written disciplinary notices that Wilson received, and asserted that K.T.G. discriminated against Wilson on the basis of race. Evidence regarding the disciplinary notices and grievances Wilson filed in response is otherwise admissible, so introducing additional evidence in the form of the EEOC Charge is needlessly cumulative. Furthermore, allowing references to the EEOC Charge presents a significant threat of confusing the issue, misleading the jury, and subjecting K.T.G. to undue prejudice. (ECF No. 96 at 2-3.) Wilson has again failed to provide the court to with any basis references to the Charge. conclude that it disturb the above order excluding Moreover, even if the court were to erroneously excluded evidence Charge, a new trial would not be warranted. regarding the Wilson has not established that a verdict would have been returned in his favor if Exhibit 13 would have been admitted in its entirety. For these reasons, Wilson is not entitled to a new trial on these grounds. B. Supplemental Jury Instruction #24 – Protected Activity Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51(d) recognizes that a litigant may object to a proposed jury instruction he or she finds erroneous and object if instruction he or she requested. a court fails The rule provides: -11- to give an (1) Assigning Error. A party may assign as error: (A) an error in an instruction actually given, if that party properly objected; or (B) a failure to give an instruction, if that party properly requested it and - unless the court rejected the request in a definitive ruling on the record - also properly objected. Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(d)(1)(A-B). “The Court considers jury instructions as a whole ‘to determine whether they fairly and adequately jury.’” submitted the issues and applicable law to the Cone v. Hankook Tire Co., No. 14-1122, 2017 WL 3611756, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 22, 2017) (quoting Nolan v. Memphis City Schs., 589 F.3d 257, 264 (6th Cir. 2009)); Pivnick v. White, Getgey & Meyer Co., 552 F.3d 479, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Our inquiry into jury instructions is limited to whether, taken as a whole, the instructions adequately inform the jury of the relevant considerations and provide the jury with a sound basis in law with which to reach a conclusion.” (quoting United States v. Wells, 211 F.3d 988, 1002 (6th Cir. 2000))). “A party is not entitled to a new trial based upon alleged deficiencies in the jury instructions unless the instructions, taken as a whole, are misleading or give an inadequate understanding of the law.” Tannenbaum v. Fed. Ins. Co., 608 F. App’x 316, 319 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Arban v. West Publ’g Corp., 345 F.3d 390, 404 (6th discretion Cir. in 2003)). wording its “[A] trial court is jury instructions and -12- given will broad not be reversed as long as the charge correctly states the substance of the law.” Mengelkamp v. Lake Metro. Hous. Auth., 549 F. App’x 323, 331 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 805 (5th Cir. 1980)). Wilson argues that a new trial is warranted because the court’s supplemental jury instruction was erroneous. 107 at 5-6.) Wilson’s During its deliberations, the jury asked whether grievances must allege prohibited discrimination qualify as protected activity under Title VII. 2.) (ECF No. to (ECF No. 103 at Wilson initially requested that the court simply answer the question “no.” (ECF No. 113 at 6:19-6:24.) Subsequently, utilizing the Sixth Circuit’s decisions in Yazdian v. ConMed Endoscopic Techs., Inc., 793 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2015) and E.E.O.C. v. New Breed Logistics, 783 F.3d 1057 (6th Cir. 2015), Wilson asked that the jury be instructed as follows: Title VII does not restrict the manner or means by which and employee may oppose and unlawful employment practice. . . . Indeed, a demand that a supervisor cease his or her harassing conduct constitutes protected activity covered by Title VII. (Id. at 14.) the following The court ultimately proposed, and later utilized, jury instruction, which was based on language taken from Sixth Circuit cases: To come within the protection of Title VII, the plaintiff must prove that he challenged an employment practice that he reasonably believed was unlawful. Title VII does not restrict the manner or means by which an employee may oppose an unlawful employment -13- practice. The manner of opposition must be reasonable, and that opposition must be based on a reasonable and good faith belief that the opposed practice was unlawful. In other words, a violation of Title VII’s retaliation provision can be found whether or not the challenged practice ultimately is found to be unlawful. Title VII does not protect an employee if his opposition is merely a vague charge of discrimination. Although vague complaints do not constitute opposition, the law does not require that the plaintiff’s complaint be lodged with absolute formality, clarity, or precision. (ECF No. 104.) of this Wilson objected to only the last two sentences instruction, and the court overruled the objection. (ECF No. 113 at 28-29.) In his motion for a new trial, Wilson again argues that the last two sentences of the supplemental instruction, reference “vague complaints,” are contrary to law. at 6.) which (ECF No. 107 Wilson specifically argues that “[w]hile a Court or attorneys reviewing the statement that a ‘vague complaint does not constitute opposition’ has the benefit of the context and explanations provided by the multiple cases that followed Booker, this jury did not, and to have that statement about ‘vague’ complaints reiterated twice, to a lay person, it is not difficult to see how they rendered the verdict they did.” (Id.) The court rejects this argument and finds that Wilson “has not discharged instructions his were heavy burden erroneous Cone, 2017 WL 3611756, at *2. to or that show they that misled the the Court's jury.” Out of the twenty-seven pages of -14- jury instructions, Wilson only challenges the sentences of the supplemental jury instruction. final two The court finds that the jury instructions were proper because “as a whole, they ‘fairly and adequately submitted the issues and applicable law to the jury.’” Troyer v. T.John.E. Prods., 526 F. App’x 522, 525 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Arban, 345 F.3d at 404). Further, the court finds that the last two sentences of the supplemental jury instruction, which Wilson challenges, accurately describe the governing legal standard and neither misled nor confused the jury. Wilson argues supplemental jury that the instruction challenged comes from portion the Sixth of the Circuit’s decision in Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 131 (6th Cir. 1989), which has been “clarified distinguished by the Sixth Circuit many times since 1989.” No. 107 at 5.) While the Sixth Circuit has and (ECF factually distinguished Booker in subsequent cases, it has, on numerous occasions, reaffirmed that “Title VII does not protect an employee . . . if his opposition is merely a ‘vague charge of discrimination.’” has also Yazdian, 793 F.3d at 645. clarified that “[a]lthough vague The Sixth Circuit complaints do not constitute opposition, ‘Booker does not . . . require that the plaintiff's complaint clarity, or precision.’” be lodged with absolute formality, Id. at 645 (quoting Stevens v. Saint -15- Elizabeth Med. Ctr., Inc., 533 F. App’x 624, 631 (6th Cir. 2013)); see also Mumm v. Charter Twp. of Superior, 727 F. App’x 110, 112-13 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[W]hile a complaint need not be lodged with absolute formality, clarity, or precision, a vague charge of opposition discrimination to an unlawful is insufficient employment to constitute practice.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); Braun v. Ultimate Jetcharters, LLC, 828 F.3d 501, 511 (6th Cir. 2016) (“As UJC notes, however, a vague charge of discrimination . . . is insufficient to constitute opposition to an unlawful employment practice. . . . Still, these complaint be holdings do lodged with not require absolute that the formality, plaintiff's clarity, or precision.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); Stevens, 533 F. App’x at 631 (“We have held, [in Booker,] that a vague charge of discrimination in an internal letter or memorandum is insufficient to constitute opposition to an unlawful employment practice. Booker does not, however, require that the plaintiff's complaint be lodged with absolute formality, clarity, precision.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)). or The two sentences of jury instructions that Wilson now challenges trace the exact wording used by the Sixth Circuit in those decisions. Accordingly, the court concludes that the jury instructions were proper. III. CONCLUSION -16- For these reasons, Wilson’s Motion for New Trial is DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED. s/ Tu M. Pham TU M. PHAM United States Magistrate Judge August 6, 2019 Date -17-
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
