Johnson v. Methodist Healthcare Memphis Hospitals, No. 2:2013cv02336 - Document 18 (W.D. Tenn. 2014)
Court Description: ORDER granting in part and denying in part 9 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Samuel H. Mays, Jr on 2/5/2013.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE WESTERN DIVISION Calenthe Eugenia Johnson, as ) Administratrix, o/b/o Lashandra ) Marie Mayfield, deceased, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) ) Methodist Healthcare Memphis ) Hospitals d/b/a Methodist ) University Hospital, ) Defendant. ) ) ) No. 13-2336 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS Before the Court is Defendant Methodist Healthcare Memphis’s (“Methodist”) July 13, 2013 Motion to Dismiss (the “Motion”). (Mot., (“Johnson”) ECF responded (Resp., ECF No. 15.) No. on 9.) August Calenthe 21, 2013 Eugenia (the Johnson “Response”). For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Background1 I. The death. Complaint LaShandra alleges medical Mayfield malpractice (“Mayfield”) was Methodist University Hospital on January 15, 2012. No 1.) 1 and wrongful admitted to (Compl., ECF On admission, Mayfield was preliminarily diagnosed with The facts are taken from the Complaint unless otherwise stated. bronchitis. (Id. ¶ 15.) She underwent a chest x-ray that showed bilateral patchy interstitial and alveolar infiltrates. (Id. ¶ 16.) Mayfield was in no apparent distress and rested comfortably. (Id.) antibiotics, including (Id.) Medical staff vancomycin, started her ciprofloxacin, Mayfield was also started on Mucinex. (Id.) Mayfield’s pulmonologist, consulted on her treatment. After experiencing prescribed admission, generalized various Mayfield body pain aches. (Id. medications Dilaudid IV, and Percocet by mouth. Xanax to counter her anxiety. complained that ¶ 17.) including (Id.) on various and Zosyn. Dr. Mable, (Id.) she She was was Ibuprofen, She was prescribed (Id.) On January 18, 2012, a Methodist nurse administered the following to Mayfield: 00:15 am Dilaudid 1mg IV; 02:25 am Percocet two tablets by mouth; 04:14 am Dilaudid 1mg IV; 06:45 am Percocet two tablets by mouth; 08:44 am Dilaudid 1mg IV; 11:19 am Xanax 0.5mg/2 tablets by mouth; 12:56 pm Dilaudid 1mg IV; 3:16 pm Percocet two tablets by mouth; 5:37 pm Dilaudid 1 mg IV; 7:34 pm Xanax 0.5mg/2 tablets by mouth; 7:47 pm Percocet 2 tablets by mouth; and 10:41 pm Dilaudid 1mg IV. (Id. ¶ 18.) On January 19, 2012, Mayfield’s blood pressure was 98/43. (Id. ¶ 19.) At 12:37 am on the morning of January 19, 2012, a 2 Methodist (Id.) nurse At administered 3:30 Mayfield, Sr. unresponsive. am that two Percocet tablets by mouth. Samuel Mayfield’s husband, Mayfield”), (“Samuel morning, awoke find (Id. ¶ 20.) to Mayfield Samuel Mayfield notified a Methodist nurse that Mayfield was unresponsive, and the nurse examined Mayfield and determined that respiratory rate of 5. she (Id.) Narcan with no response. was unresponsive and had a The nurse administered the drug (Id.) The nurse called the exchange for Dr. Rassoul, Mayfield’s physician, and then “called a code.” (Id.) Mayfield was administered additional Narcan. (Id. ¶ 21.) She was subsequently evaluated by Neurology, which noted that following “the arrest” Mayfield had encephalopathy due to hypoxic brain injury. hypoxic (Id. ¶ 22.) was done, which showed marked encephalopathy. remained unresponsive January 31, 2012. Johnson and deteriorated ischemic (Id.) until her 23, An EEG Mayfield death on 2013. She is (Id. ¶¶ 21-24.) filed the Complaint on May Mayfield’s mother and the administrator of Mayfield’s estate. (Id. at 1.) Johnson negligently in damages $4,000,000 of its care for has of alleged Mayfield Mayfield’s that and Methodist seeks severe acted compensatory physical injury, extreme pain and suffering, “loss of the normal enjoyment of the pleasures Johnson of seeks life,” and $2,000,000 wrongful in damages 3 death. for (Id. loss of ¶¶ 26-29.) consortium, prejudgment and postjudgment nondiscretionary costs. interest, and discretionary (Id. ¶¶ 27, 29, 39.) and Johnson complied with the notice requirements for a malpractice case under Tenn. Code. Ann. § 29-26-121(a). II. (Id. ¶ 8.) Jurisdiction and Choice of Law This Court has original jurisdiction of all civil actions between citizens of different states “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs”. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). resident of Arkansas. (Compl ¶ 2.) was a resident of Arkansas. corporation. damages. (Id. ¶ 3.) (Id. ¶ 29.) Johnson is a Before her death, Mayfield (Id.) Methodist is a Tennessee Johnson has alleged $6,000,000 in The parties are completely diverse, and the amount-in-controversy requirement is satisfied. In a diversity action, state substantive law governs. See Brocklehurst v. PPG Indus., Inc., 123 F.3d 890, 894 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing (1938)). Erie When the R.R. Co. parties v. Tompkins, agree that 304 a U.S. certain 64, 78 state’s substantive law applies, the court need not conduct a “choice of law” analysis sua sponte. GBJ Corp. v. Eastern Ohio Paving Co., 139 F.3d 1080, 1085 (6th Cir. 1998). Tennessee substantive law applies. 9-1 at 3; Resp., ECF No. 15 at 5.) III. Standard of Review 4 The parties agree that (Mot. Mem. of Law, ECF No. In addressing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all well-pled factual allegations as true. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007). A plaintiff can support a claim “by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” (2007). Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 This standard requires more than bare assertions of legal conclusions. Bovee v. Coopers & Lybrand C.P.A., 272 F.3d 356, 361 (6th Cir. 2001). “[A] formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” at 555. Twombly, 550 U.S. Any claim for relief must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” curiam). Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per “Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Nonetheless, a complaint must contain sufficient facts “to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face’” to survive a motion to dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). plausibility standard is not 5 akin to a “The ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” U.S. at 556). of action, Id. (citing Twombly, 550 “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 1949 (citation omitted). A plaintiff with no facts “armed conclusions” and with nothing more “unlock the doors of discovery.” IV. than cannot Id. at 1950. Analysis Methodist argues that Johnson’s claims are time barred and that hedonic damages and prejudgment interest are not available in wrongful death cases. Johnson during responds that Mayfield’s (Mot. Mem. of Law, ECF No. 9-1 at 3.) the statute incapacity and of limitations that hedonic was tolled damages are available for Mayfield’s loss of enjoyment of life until her death, but available. makes no argument that prejudgment interest is (Resp., ECF No. 15 at 5, 7.) A. Statute of Limitations In a wrongful death case, the statute of limitations is one year from the date of injury. Tenn. Code. Ann. § 29-26-116; Holliman v. McGrew, 343 S.W.3d 68, 74 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). additional limitations one hundred period in and a twenty medical days is malpractice An added to the case if the plaintiff provides notice of the claims as required by statute. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c). If the deceased is “of unsound 6 mind” after the injury but prior to death, the limitations period is tolled until the “disability is removed.” ex. Rel. Wrongful Death Beneficiaries Sullivan of Charlie Sullivan v. Chattanooga Medical Investors, LP, et al., 221 S.W.3d 506, 509 (Tenn. 2007). A person is “of unsound mind” if “incapable of attending to any business, or of taking care of [herself].” R.T. Wynne, Beneficiary of Life Insurance of Joyce M. Wynne, Deceased v. Stonebridge Life Insurance Company, 694 F.Supp.2d 871,876 (W.D. Tenn. 2010). Johnson complied with the notice requirements under the Tennessee statute, entitling her to a limitations period of one year plus one hundred and twenty days. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c). (Compl. ¶ 8.) Tenn. Johnson alleges that Mayfield was injured by the defendant’s negligent treatment on January 19, 2012. became (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 19.) “unresponsive” and was On January 19, 2012, Mayfield “incapable of herself” until her death on January 31, 2012. taking care of (Id. ¶¶ 21-24.) See Stonebridge, 694 F.Supp.2d at 876. Because Mayfield was of “unsound January mind” after her injury on 19, 2012, the limitations period was tolled until her death on January 31, 2012. See Sullivan, 221 S.W.3d at 509. Methodist does not account for the tolling period during Mayfield’s disability, arguing that the limitations period began on January 19, 2012, and ended on May 20, 2013, three days 7 before the Complaint was filed on May 23, 2013. Law, ECF No. 9-1 at 5.) limitation period (Mot. Mem. of Taking into account the twelve days the was tolled while Mayfield was “of unsound mind,” the Complaint was timely and is not barred by the statute of limitations. B. Hedonic Damages and Prejudgment Interest Johnson has alleged damages for Mayfield’s “loss of the normal enjoyment of the pleasures of life,” or “hedonic damages,” between Mayfield’s injuries on January 19, 2012, and her death on January 31, 2012. at 7.) (Compl. ¶ 26; Resp., ECF No. 15 Hedonic damages “are not viable in Tennessee in wrongful death cases.” Jordan v. Baptist Three Rivers Hospital, 984 S.W.2d 593, 596 n. 2 (Tenn. 1999) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 205-113). be “Damages under [Tennessee’s] wrongful death statute can delineated into two distinct classifications”: arising before death and those arising afterward. damages Id. at 600. Section 20-5-113 of the Tennessee Code specifies the types of damages recoverable for the period before death. Ann. § 20-5-113. Hedonic damages Tenn. Code Hedonic damages are not among them. are not recoverable under the See id. second “classification,” the period after death, because those damages are intended to compensate decedent’s next of kin.” for the “suffer[ing] See Jordan, 984 S.W.2d at 600. 8 by the Johnson seeks (Compl. ¶ 39.) for an award prejudgment interest on awarded damages. Section 47-14-123 of the Tennessee Code “allows of prejudgment interest if such an award permitted under the statutory caselaw on April 1, 1979.” v. Doerflinger, (citing Tenn. 137 Code S.W.3d Ann. § 625, 630 47-14-123 (Tenn. Ct. (2001)). Hollis App. “An was 2004) award of prejudgment interest, however, is not permitted in a personal injury lawsuit such as a wrongful death action.” omitted). Id. Johnson brings a wrongful death action. (citation Prejudgment interest is not permitted. V. Conclusion For Complaint the as foregoing untimely reasons, is the DENIED, and Motion the to Motion Dismiss to the Dismiss Johnson’s claims for hedonic damages and prejudgment interest is GRANTED. So ordered this 5th day of February, 2014. s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr. _____ SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 9
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