Ramsey v. Shockley et al, No. 4:2015cv00013 - Document 7 (E.D. Tenn. 2015)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. All claims related to plaintiffs ongoing criminalprosecution are DISMISSED without prejudice. Plaintiff is ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00. Signed by District Judge Harry S Mattice, Jr on 4/23/2015. (AML, ) Copy of Memorandum Opinion served on Jimmie Ramsey, Sheriff of Lincoln County via US Mail and Court's financial deputy via email.
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Ramsey v. Shockley et al Doc. 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE at WINCHESTER J IMMIE L. RAMSEY, Plaintiff, v. DION SHOCKLEY, AFISOV KONSTANTIN, and PATRICK FITCH, Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. 4:15-CV-0 0 13 J udge Mattice Magistrate J udge Lee MEMORAN D U M OPIN ION Before the Court is a pro se prisoners’ civil rights com plaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and an application to proceed in form a pauperis. It appears from the application that Plaintiff lacks sufficient financial resources to pay the $ 350 .0 0 filing fee. Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, plaintiff is allowed to proceed in this action without the prepaym ent of costs or fees or security therefor. For the reasons stated below, however, process shall not issue and this action will be D ISMISSED . Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), district courts m ust screen prisoner com plaints and sua sponte dism iss those that are frivolous or m alicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or are against a defendant who is im m une. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915(A); Benson v. O'Brian, 179 F.3d 10 14 (6th Cir. 1999). Responding to a perceived deluge of frivolous lawsuits, and, in particular, frivolous prisoner suits, Congress directed the federal courts to review or "screen" certain com plaints sua sponte and to dism iss those that failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, that sought m onetary relief from a defendant im m une from such relief, or that were frivolous or m alicious. Dockets.Justia.com Id. at 10 15– 16 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A). The dism issal standard articulated by the Suprem e Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (20 0 9) and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. 554 (20 0 7) “governs dism issals for failure state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470 – 71 (6th Cir. 20 10 ). Thus, to survive an initial review under the PLRA, a com plaint “m ust contain sufficient factual m atter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 570 ). In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff m ust establish that he was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. Black v. Barberton Citizens Hosp., 134 F.3d 1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1998); O’Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990 , 995 (6th Cir. 1994); Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 10 36, 10 42 (6th Cir. 1992); see also Braley v. City of Pontiac, 90 6 F.2d 220 , 223 (6th Cir. 1990 ) (stating that “Section 1983 does not itself create any constitutional rights; it creates a right of action for the vindication of constitutional guarantees found elsewhere”). The com plaint states that on October 19, 20 13, defendant Konstantine cam e to plaintiff’s hom e to talk about som e stolen windows. Plaintiff asked defendant Konstantine if he had an arrest warrant for plaintiff, and defendant Konstantine said that he did not and asked to search plaintiff’s house. Plaintiff denied this request and told defendant Konstantine that he needed to get off plaintiff’s property because he was trespassing. Plaintiff started to walk away from defendant Konstantine, who then grabbed plaintiff, slam m ed him to the ground, handcuffed him , and put him in the police car. Defendant Konstantine told plaintiff that he was getting a search warrant, 2 but plaintiff sat in the police car for two hours and was never shown a search warrant even though defendant Konstantine entered plaintiff’s house. While plaintiff was in the police car, defendant Shockley approached him and asked him to sign a paper to allow defendant Shockley to enter the house. Plaintiff refused and told defendant Shockley that he was also trespassing, but defendant Shockley entered his house anyway. Defendant Fitch likewise entered plaintiff’s hom e after plaintiff told him that he was trespassing and without showing plaintiff any search warrant or arrest warrant. Plaintiff states that he is still going to court on this m atter, and that he had a scheduled court date on April 9, 20 15. In a supplem ent to the com plaint, plaintiff appears to allege that his arrest violated the Fourth Am endm ent due to lack of probable cause. Plaintiff does not specify what relief he seeks, but rather asks the Court to provide whatever relief the Court finds is appropriate. The doctrine established in Younger v. Harris, 40 1 U.S. 37 (1971), applies to plaintiff’s claim s that defendants violated his constitutional rights. Under this doctrine, federal courts m ust abstain from entertaining lawsuits by plaintiffs seeking to enjoin a crim inal prosecution against them in state court where those ongoing proceedings im plicate im portant state interests and the plaintiffs have an adequate opportunity to raise their challenges in that forum . See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499-50 4 (1974). All of the factors supporting abstention are present here. It appears from plaintiff’s com plaint that state crim inal proceedings are pending against him . In the state court, plaintiff m ay attack all alleged infringem ents on his rights, constitutional or otherwise, by these defendants, and plaintiff m ay seek dism issal of any charges he believes result from any unconstitutional arrest and/ or any evidence obtained from the 3 search(es) of his unconstitutional. hom e by these defendants, which plaintiff alleges were If this Court were to find in plaintiff’s favor with respect to the allegations in the com plaint, any such ruling would undoubtedly underm ine the state’s interest in conducting its crim inal judicial proceedings in accord with constitutional m andates and its entitlem ent to be the first to do so. The Court m ust, therefore. abstain from such interference. Accordingly, all claim s related to plaintiff’s ongoing criminal prosecution are D ISMISSED without prejudice. Because plaintiff is an inm ate in the Lincoln County J ail, he is herewith ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $ 350 .0 0 . Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)(A) and (B), the custodian of the plaintiff’s inm ate trust account at the institution where he now resides is directed to subm it to the Clerk, U.S. District Court, 80 0 Market Street, Suite 130 , Knoxville, Tennessee 3790 2, as an initial partial paym ent, whichever is greater of: (a) twenty percent (20 %) of the average m onthly deposits to the plaintiff’s inm ate trust account; or (b) twenty percent (20 %) of the average m onthly balance in the plaintiff’s inm ate trust account for the six-m onth period preceding the filing of the com plaint. Thereafter, the custodian shall subm it twenty percent (20 %) of the plaintiff’s preceding m onthly incom e (or incom e credited to the plaintiff’s trust account for the preceding m onth), but only when such m onthly incom e exceeds ten dollars ($ 10 .0 0 ), until the full filing fee of three hundred fifty dollars ($ 350 .0 0 ) as authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) has been paid to the Clerk. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Clerk is D IRECTED to send a copy of this Mem orandum and Order to the Sheriff of Lincoln County to ensure that the custodian of the plaintiff’s inm ate trust account com plies with that portion of the Prison Litigation Reform Act relating to 4 paym ent of the filing fee. The Clerk is further D IRECTED to forward a copy of this Mem orandum and Order to the Court’s financial deputy. The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in good faith and would be totally frivolous. See Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. A separate judgm ent will enter. SO ORD ERED . / s/ Harry S. Mattice, Jr._ _ _ _ _ _ _ HARRY S. MATTICE, J R. UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 5
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