Sales v. Taylor, No. 4:2014cv00058 - Document 19 (E.D. Tenn. 2015)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Harry S Mattice, Jr on 7/23/15. (KFB, ) Modified on 7/23/2015 (KFB, ). This Order serviced via US Mail to Antwain T Sales.
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Sales v. Taylor Doc. 19 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE at WINCHESTER ANTWAIN T. SALES, Petitioner, v. SHARON TAYLOR, Warden, Respondent. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Nos. 4:14-CV-58-HSM-SKL MEMORAN D U M OPIN ION Before the Court now is Petitioner, Antwain Sales’ pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1). Petitioner, a prisoner at Northeast Correctional Com plex in Mountain City, Tennessee, is challenging the legality of his confinem ent under second degree m urder and attem pted second degree m urder convictions in the Circuit Court for Bedford County, Tennessee on April 23, 20 0 7 (Doc. 1-12 p. 2). Before the Court are Respondent’s m otion to dism iss (Doc. 14), Petitioner’s response in opposition to the m otion to dism iss (Doc. 17), and Petitioner’s m otion for an evidentiary hearing (Doc. 16). For the reasons stated herein, Petitioner’s m otion for an evidentiary hearing (Id.) will be D EN IED and Respondent’s m otion to dism iss (Doc. 14) will be GRAN TED . I. BACKGROU N D On April 23, 20 0 7, Petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of second degree m urder (Doc. 1-12 p. 3) and one count of attem pted second degree m urder (Id. at 2) in the Bedford County Circuit Court. He received an effective sentence of forty years’ im prisonm ent (Id. at 2– 3). Petitioner did not file a direct appeal (Doc. 1 p. 2). Dockets.Justia.com On May 23, 20 11, m ore than four years after his original conviction, Petitioner filed a petition for state post-conviction relief. Sales v. State, No. M20 11-0 20 0 1-CCAR3-PC, 20 12 Tenn. Crim . App. LEXIS 80 1, at *2 (Tenn. Crim . App. Sept. 27, 20 12). In an attem pt to avoid sum m ary dism issal based on expiration of the state statute of lim itations, Petitioner argued for equitable tolling based on the assertion he was unable to seek tim ely relief because of m ental incom petence and the effect of the psychotropic drugs proscribed for such m ental condition. Id. Specifically, Petitioner cited an October 17, 20 0 5 pre-offense diagnosis for “Schitzoaffective Bipolar/ Schizofrantic Paranoia.” Id. at 3. “The [post-conviction] court dism issed the petition after finding [Petitioner] failed to file the petition within the one year statute of limitation and . . . failed to establish grounds for m andating a tolling of the statute of lim itations.” Id. The Tennessee Court of Crim inal Appeals affirm ed on Septem ber 27, 20 12, id. at 6, and Tennessee Suprem e Court denied further review on J anuary 10 , 20 13. Sales v. State, No. M20 11-0 20 0 1-SCR11-PC, 20 13 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (Tenn. J an. 10 , 20 13). Earlier that sam e year, Petitioner filed a petition for state habeas relief on J anuary 20 , 20 13 (Notice of Filing, Add. 3, Vol. 1 p. 19– 23). On April 27, 20 12, the state habeas court sum m arily dism issed the petition stating the Petitioner had failed to show that he was entitled to habeas corpus relief by virtue of his claim s of m ental illness (Id. at 3). On February 10 , 20 14, Petitioner filed the current pro se petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1). Petitioner signed and delivered the petition to prison m ailing authorities on February 5, 20 14 (Id. at 14). Respondent filed a m otion to dism iss on October 13, 20 14 (Doc. 14) and Petitioner filed a m otion for an evidentiary 2 hearing on October 22, 20 14 (Doc. 16). Two days later, Petitioner filed a response in opposition to Respondent’s m otion to dism iss (Doc. 17). I. RESOLU TION OF RESPON D EN T’S MOTION TO D ISMISS Respondent has m oved to dism iss Petitioner’s application for habeas relief, arguing it is tim e-barred under the 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s statute of lim itations (Doc. 14). Petitioner responds arguing m ental incom petence from the date of conviction to present equitably tolled the applicable lim itations period (Doc. 17 p. 2– 3, 6– 8). Specifically, he asserts: (1) he was m entally incom petent at the tim e of his plea; (2) he rem ains m entally incom petent; (3) his m ental illness prevented him from tim ely filing his federal habeas petition; and (4) he is actually innocent (Id.). The AEDPA contains a one-year statute of lim itations governing the filing of an application for a federal writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The lim itations period starts to run when one of four circum stances occurs: (1) the conclusion of direct review; (2) upon the rem oval of an im pedim ent which prevented a petitioner from filling a habeas corpus petition; (3) when a petition alleges a constitutional right, newly recognized by the Suprem e Court and m ade retroactive on collateral review; or (4) when a claim depends upon factual predicates which could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of due diligence. Id. The tim e is statutorily tolled during pendency of “a properly filed application for State post-conviction relief or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgm ent or claim .” Id. Petitioner took no direct appeal after pleading guilty to all offenses on April 23, 20 0 7 (Doc. 1-12 p. 3). As a result, Petitioner’s lim itations period began to run on May 3 23, 20 0 7.1 Thus, absent statutory or equitable tolling, Petitioner’s one-year statute of lim itations expired on May 23, 20 0 8, five and a half years before he filed the current 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. A. Statu to ry To llin g First, the Court finds neither Petitioner’s May 23, 20 11 state petition for postconviction relief nor J anuary 20 , 20 12 state petition for habeas relief triggered 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)’s statutory tolling provision. An application is “‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance are in com pliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filing.” Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (20 0 8). Relevant rules include those laws prescribing “tim e lim its upon [the application’s] delivery.” Id. Petitioner’s filed his first m otion for post-conviction relief with the Circuit Court for Bedford County over four years after his conviction becam e final. Petitioner’s petition for state habeas relief was even m ore belatedly filed and both petitions were dism issed as barred by the relevant statutes of lim itation. Because both state petitions were dism issed for failure to com ply with the “tim e lim its [set] upon [their] delivery,” neither was “properly filed” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) and neither can serve as the basis for statutorily tolling the AEDPA’s one-year statute of lim itations. Further, even if Petitioner’s state petitions for post-conviction relief were properly filed, a petition filed m ore than three years after expiration of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s lim itations period has no tolling effect because there is no running statute of lim itations left to be tolled. See Vrom an v. Brigano, 346 F.3d 598, 60 2 (6th Cir. 20 0 3) 1 Because Petitioner did not actually seek review, his direct appeal would have concluded when the time for filing such an appeal lapsed. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The time for filing his appeal expired thirty days after April 23, 2007, when his order of judgment was entered. Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a). Thus, Petitioner’s conviction became final for purposes of the one-year statute of limitations on May 23, 2007. 4 (“The tolling provision does not . . . ‘revive’ the lim itations period (i.e., restart the clock at zero); it can only serve to pause a clock that has not yet fully run.”). B. Equ itable To llin g Despite failure to trigger 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), the one-year AEDPA statute is not jurisdictional and rem ains subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (20 10 ). A petitioner is “entitled to equitable tolling’ only if he shows ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that som e extraordinary circumstance . . . prevented tim ely filing.’” Id. at 649 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielm o, 544 U.S. 40 8, 418 (20 0 5)). This doctrine “is applied sparingly,” however, and is typically used “only when a litigant’s failure to m eet a legally-m andated deadline unavoidably arose from circum stances beyond that litigant’s control.” Vrom an, 346 F.3d at 60 4. Petitioner bears the burden of dem onstrating cause for equitable tolling. McClendon v. Sherm an, 329 F.3d 490 , 494 (6th Cir. 20 0 3); see also Griffin v. Rogers, 30 8 F.3d 647, 653 (6th Cir. 20 0 2) (sam e). “A petitioner’s m ental incom petence, which prevents the tim ely filing of a habeas petition, is an extraordinary circum stances [capable] . . . of equitably toll[ing] [the] AEDPA’s one-year statute of lim itations.” Ata v. Scutt, 662 F.3d 736, 742 (6th Cir. 20 11); see also McSw ain v. Davis, 287 F. App’x 450 , 456 (6th Cir. 20 0 8) (noting “m ental incapacity of the petitioner can warrant equitable tolling of the statute of lim itations”). To obtain such tolling, the petitioner m ust dem onstrate (1) he is m entally incom petent and (2) his m ental incom petence caused his failure to com ply with the AEDPA’s lim itations period. Ata, 662 F.3d at 742; see also McSw ain, 287 F. App’x at 456 (“In order to be entitled to equitable tolling the petitioner must m ake a threshold 5 showing of incom petence and m ust also dem onstrate that the alleged incom petence affected [his] ability to file a timely habeas petition”). “Blanket assertion[s] of m ental incom petence [are] insufficient [as a m atter of law].” Ata, 662 F.3d at 742. The Court finds Petitioner has not established that his alleged m ental-health problem s caused his failure to tim ely pursue federal rem edies. Aside from generalized claim s of m ental incom petence spanning from conviction to present, Petitioner has failed to point to a single instance, occurrence, or manifestation that precluded him from seeking tim ely post-conviction relief before 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s lim itation period expired on May 23, 20 0 8. Com pare Ata, 662 F.3d at 740 (finding petitioner’s m ental incom petence tolled the statute of lim itations where petitioner presented specific evidence of hospitalization on num erous occasions for paranoid schizophrenia during the one year period after his conviction becam e final); w ith Sloane v. Morgan, No. at *40 – 42 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 2, 20 14) (finding petitioner’s allegations of m ental incom petence failed to toll the statute of lim itations where he relied solely on generalized or “blanket” claim s of incom petence during the lim itations period). Vague references to “loss of contact with reality” and “disrupted concentration” being sym ptom s of Petitioner’s disorder (Doc. 17 p. 7) do not suffice as substitutes for identification of specific m anifestations, hospitalizations, or incapacity arising during the lim itations period. Even assum ing Petitioner did suffer from som e degree of im paired intellectual or m ental functioning, not all cognitive deficiencies are sufficiently pervasive or debilitating that they prevent com pliance with 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Starks v. Easterling, 20 14 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124395, 20 14 WL 4347593, at *7 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 2, 20 14) (finding m ild m ental im pairm ent was not grounds for equitably 6 tolling the lim itations period in the absence of any indication that such im pairm ent rendered the petitioner incapable of m anaging his court filings). In fact, several of Petitioner’s own assertions directly cut against any claim his m ental condition was so severe that it prevented com pliance with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitioner claim s he was m entally incom petent at the tim e of his conviction, this condition prevented any m eaningful participation in the judicial process, and he continues to suffer from this sam e level of m ental incapacity to this very day (Doc. 1; Doc. 17 p. 6– 8). Despite the forgoing claim s of m ental incom petence, the record illustrates Petitioner was capable of seeking out the assistance of other inm ates with drafting and subm ission of pleadings on m ultiple occasions including: (1) the May 23, 20 11 state petition for post-conviction relief (Doc. 1-1 ¶¶ 4, 8), (2) the J anuary 20 , 20 12 state petition for habeas relief (Doc. 1-1 ¶¶ 10 – 13), and (3) his current 28 U.S.C. § 2254 m otion for habeas relief (Doc. 1-1 ¶¶ 1– 3, 23). Even if Petitioner’s ability to coordinate m ultiple state court filings beginning on May 23, 20 11 is not sufficient evidence of capacity to participate in the judicial process during the prior four year period between that date and the date his prior conviction becam e final, Petitioner’s failure to file the current 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for an additional two years, eight m onths, and twenty eight days conclusively precludes the current case from being saved by the doctrine of equitable tolling. Thus, the fact Petitioner was able to file two state petitions under the sam e alleged condition of m ental incom petence as early as May 23, 20 11 is conclusive proof that his cognitive disability was not so incapacitating that it caused his failure to com ply with 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 7 Finally, while it is true that a petitioner who m akes a “credible showing of innocence” m ay be allow to pursue his constitutional claim s on the m erits notwithstanding the untim eliness of his habeas corpus petition, McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931 (20 13), this exception to the general applicability of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) is “severely confined” and requires the petitioner show that it is m ore likely than not no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of som e new evidence. Id. at 1933 (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). Petitioner’s citation to his claim s for relief on the m erits and reliance on the absence of DNA evidence at the tim e of his guilty plea fall far short of satisfying the stringent test set forth in McQuiggin. Id. at 1935 (noting the post-AEDPA “actual innocence” exception requires citation new evidence m aking it m ore likely than not that no reasonable juror could convict petitioner). II. RESOLU TION OF PETITION ER’S N ON -D ISPOSITIVE MOTION A. Mo tio n fo r an Evid e n tiary H e arin g Under Rule 8 of the rules governing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 cases in the United States District Courts, the court is to determ ine, after a review of the answer and records of the case, whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted. See Schriro v . Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (20 0 7) (noting decisions about whether to grant evidentiary hearings is generally left to the discretion of district courts). “In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court m ust consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.” Id. at 474. 8 Because his petition for habeas relief is untim ely and barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one-year statute of lim itations, the Court finds Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the m erits of his claim . Petitioner’s m otions for evidentiary hearing (Doc. 16) will be D EN IED accordingly. III. CON CLU SION Based on the forgoing, the Court finds Petitioner’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition is tim e-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). For that reason, the Petitioner’s m otion for an evidentiary hearing on the m erits of his petition (Doc. 16) will be D EN IED and Respondent’s m otion to dism iss (Doc. 14) will be GRAN TED . The Court will CERTIFY that any appeal from this action would not be taken in good faith and would be totally frivolous. Therefore, this Court will D EN Y Petitioner leave to proceed in form a pauperis on appeal. See Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Petitioner having failed to m ake a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, a certificate of appealability SH ALL N OT ISSU E. 28 U.S.C. § 2253; Rule 22(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. EN TER. /s/ Harry S. Mattice, Jr._______ HARRY S. MATTICE, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 9
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