Stearns v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of, No. 1:2015cv00343 - Document 20 (E.D. Tenn. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER denying 12 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; granting 14 Motion for Summary Judgment; accepting and adopting 17 Report and Recommendations. Signed by District Judge Harry S Mattice, Jr on 3/21/2017. (AML, )
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Stearns v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of Doc. 20 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE at CHATTANOOGA SAMANTHA J OHNSON STEARNS, Plaintiff, v. NANCY BERRYHILL Acting Com m issioner of Social Security, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. 1:15-cv-343 J udge Mattice Magistrate J udge Steger ORD ER On February 13, 20 17, United States Magistrate J udge Christopher H. Steger filed his Report and Recom m endation, (Doc. 17), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b). Magistrate J udge Steger recom m ended that (1) Plaintiff’s Motion for J udgm ent on the Pleadings, (Doc. 12), be denied; (2) Defendant’s Motion for Sum m ary J udgm ent, (Doc. 14), be granted; and (3) the decision of the Com m issioner be affirm ed. (Doc. 17 at 1). Plaintiff has filed tim ely objections to the Magistrate J udge’s Report and Recom m endation. (Doc. 18). Therein, Plaintiff, for the m ost part, reiterates argum ents from her Motion for J udgm ent on the Pleadings regarding the Adm inistrative Law J udge’s allegedly improper weighing of the m edical opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician. (Id. at 4– 10 ). The Court has conducted a review of the Report and Recom m endation, as well as the record, and it agrees with m agistrate J udge Steger’s well-reasoned conclusions for the reasons stated herein. Accordingly, the Court will ACCEPT an d AD OPT Magistrate J udge Steger’s Report and Recom m endation, (Doc. 17), Plaintiff’s Motion for J udgm ent on the Pleadings, (Doc. 12), will be D EN IED , Dockets.Justia.com Defendant’s Motion for Sum m ary J udgm ent, (Doc. 14), will be GRAN TED and the Com m issioner’s decision will be AFFIRMED . I. BACKGROU N D Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits on August 17, 20 11, alleging a disability onset date of J uly 31, 20 0 8 “due to chronic pain, fatigue, and cognitive defects – all sym ptom s caused by her fibrom yalgia.” (Doc. 13 at 1). After conducting a hearing on April 8, 20 14, Adm inistrative Law J udge (“ALJ ”) J eannie S. Bartlett denied Plaintiff’s application, finding that she was “capable of perform ing a reduced range of sedentary work.” (Id. at 2). After the ALJ ’s decision becam e final, Plaintiff appealed to this Court on Decem ber 16, 20 15. Pursuant to a standing order of the court, this m atter was referred to Magistrate J udge Steger to issue a Report and Recom m endation. In Plaintiff’s Motion for J udgment on the Pleadings, (Docs. 12, 13), Plaintiff argued that (1) “[t]he ALJ erred in assigning only ‘m inim al weight’ to the opinion of treating specialist, Dr. Eugene Huffstutter, choosing to rely on the opinions of nonexam ining Agency physicians instead;” and (2) “[t]he ALJ ’s Decision errs by finding Plaintiff’s subjective pain com plaints not credible due solely to her reported daily activities.”1 (Doc. 13 at 2). On February 13, 20 17, Magistrate J udge Steger issued a thorough Report and Recom m endation rejecting Plaintiff’s argum ents and finding that the ALJ ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence in the record. (Doc. 17 at 16– 17). Plaintiff filed tim ely objections to the Report and Recom m endation on February 27, 20 17. (Doc. 18). Defendant has filed a response to Plaintiff’s Objections, (Doc. 19), and this m atter is now ripe for review. 1 Plaintiff did not object to Magistrate J udge Steger’s finding that there was no error in the ALJ ’s credibility determ ination. 2 II. AN ALYSIS Plaintiff raises two broad objections, the upshot of which is that the ALJ erred in assigning “little weight” to Dr. Huffstutter’s opinion. Plaintiff believes that because Dr. Huffstutter was her treating physician, the ALJ should have afforded m ore weight to his finding that she was disabled. (Doc. 18 at 4– 8). More specifically, she claim s that “[t]he ALJ ’s stated reasons for rejecting Dr. Huffstutter’s opinion are erroneous,” and that “[t]he ALJ erred in preferring the opinion of a physician who did not exam ine Ms. Stearns, did not have access to all the relevant m edical evidence, and who is not a specialist in the relevant m edical condition.” (Id. at 4). Plaintiff m akes several sub-argum ents within these objections, which can be grouped into two categories.2 The first category of objections consists of argum ents that have already been presented to, and rejected by, the Magistrate J udge. First, Plaintiff sets forth the standard for the “treating physician rule,” which states that “the opinion of a treating physician is entitled to substantial deference . . . if it is supported by sufficient m edical data,” and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record. Shelm an v. Heckler, 821 F.2d 316, 320 – 21 (6th Cir. 1987); see also 20 C.F.R. § 40 4.1527. Second, she argues that the ALJ m ischaracterized Plaintiff’s reported daily activities, and that the ALJ im perm issibly found that her ability to engage in certain activities m eant that she was capable of perform ing sedentary work. (Doc. 18 at 7). Third, she argues that the ALJ erred in finding that Dr. Huffstutter’s opinion was internally inconsistent. (Id. at 7– 8). Fourth, she claims that the ALJ should not have credited the opinion of a state agency non-exam ining m edical consultant. (Id. at 8– 9). Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have given m ore credit to Dr. Huffstutter’s 2 For organizational purposes, the Court will discuss Plaintiff’s argum ents in a different order than they appear in her Objections. 3 opinion than that of the state agency non-exam ining consultant because Dr. Huffstutter is a specialist in the field of rheum atology. (Id. at 9– 10 ). All of these argum ents, however, are not properly before the Court, as they are m erely restated from Plaintiff’s Motion for J udgm ent on the Pleadings and Plaintiff’s response in opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Sum m ary J udgm ent. (Com pare Doc. 13 and Doc. 16 w ith Doc. 18); see also VanDiver v. Martin, 30 4 F. Supp. 2d 934, 937 (E.D. Mich. 20 0 4) (“A general objection, or one that m erely restates the argum ents previously presented is not sufficient to alert the court to alleged errors on the part of the m agistrate judge. An ‘objection’ that does nothing m ore than state a disagreem ent with a m agistrate’s suggested resolution, or sim ply sum m arizes what has been presented before, is not an ‘objection’ as that term is used in this context.”). This deficiency is underscored by the fact that Plaintiff’s objections repeatedly discuss errors m ade by the ALJ , rather than errors m ade by the Magistrate J udge in his Report and Recom m endation. (See generally Doc. 18). Because Plaintiff’s restated argum ents outlined above are not proper objections within the context of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), they will be OVERRU LED . Plaintiff’s second category of objections suffers from the opposite problem —they were never raised before Magistrate J udge Steger. First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in discrediting Dr. Huffstutter’s opinion because it was not supported by objective m edical evidence. Fibrom yalgia, Plaintiff argues, “cannot be confirm ed by objective tests.” (Doc. 18 at 6); see also Preston v. Sec’y of Health and Hum an Servs., 854 F.2d 815, 817– 18 (6th Cir. 1988) (“In stark contrast to the unrem itting pain of which fibrositis patients com plain, physical exam inations will usually yield norm al results—a full range of m otion, no joint swelling, as well as norm al m uscle strength and 4 neurological reactions.”). Second, Plaintiff claim s that the ALJ erred in crediting the opinion of the state agency non-exam ining consultant because she did not have access to all of Plaintiff’s m edical records. (Doc. 18 at 9). Whatever their m erit, the Court cannot consider these argum ents, as they were never raised before the Magistrate J udge. Accordingly, these objections are deem ed waived. Murr v. United States, 20 0 F.3d 895, 90 2 n.1 (6th Cir. 20 0 0 ) (“Courts have held that while the Magistrate J udge Act, 28 U.S.C. § 631 et seq., perm its de novo review by the district court if tim ely objections are filed, absent com pelling reasons, it does not allow parties to raise at the district court stage new argum ents or issues that were not presented to the m agistrate. Hence, Petitioner’s failure to raise this claim before the m agistrate constitutes waiver.”) (citations om itted). Because Plaintiff has failed to provide the Court with any reason, let alone com pelling reasons, that her argum ents should be considered for the first tim e by the District Court, these waived objections will be OVERRU LED . See United States v. W aters, 158 F.3d 933, 936 (6th Cir. 1998). Despite these procedural shortcom ings, the Court has conducted a review of the record, and it agrees with Magistrate J udge Steger’s conclusion that the ALJ ’s decision to discredit Dr. Huffstutter’s opinion was supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 17 at 13). Specifically, the ALJ found that I give m inim al weight to Dr. Huffstutter’s opinion as his narrative lim itations and checkbox opinions are som ewhat inconsistent with each other, and not supported by the objective medical evidence or her reported activities. The evidence shows com plaints of pain, yet adequate functional abilities with regard to range of m otion, sensation, m otor functioning, and balance. At one tim e, she even described her pain as m ild . . . It also shows im provem ent in her sym ptom s with m edication (Lyrica). Lastly, [Plaintiff’s] activities, including using a treadm ill, doing water exercises, and light housework are not consistent with such a restrictive assessm ent. 5 (Doc. 8 at 28). The Court finds that, even setting aside the consideration of the internal inconsistency of Dr. Huffstutter’s opinion, the ALJ ’s discussion of Plaintiff’s daily activities, as well as the im provem ent of her condition with m edication, constitute “good reasons” for not giving controlling weight to Dr. Huffstutter’s m edical assessm ent, as required by the treating physician rule. Gay heart v. Com m ’r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 376 (6th Cir. 20 13) (“The Com m issioner is required to provide ‘good reasons’ for discounting the weight given to a treating-source opinion.”). Accordingly, because the ALJ ’s opinion is supported by substantial evidence in the record, Plaintiff’s objections are without m erit. III. CON CLU SION For the reasons stated herein: The Court hereby ACCEPTS and AD OPTS Magistrate J udge Steger’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recom m endations, (Doc. 17), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Plaintiff’s Objections, (Doc. 18), are hereby OVERRU LED ; Plaintiff’s Motion for J udgm ent on the Pleadings, (Doc. 12), is hereby D EN IED ; Defendant’s Motion for Sum m ary J udgm ent, (Doc. 14), is hereby GRAN TED ; and The decision of the Com m issioner is hereby AFFIRMED . A separate judgm ent will enter. SO ORD ERED this 21st day of March, 20 17. / s/ Harry S. Mattice, Jr._ _ _ _ _ _ HARRY S. MATTICE, J R. UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 6
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