Coleman et al v. Hamilton County Government et al, No. 1:2012cv00190 - Document 106 (E.D. Tenn. 2015)
Court Description: ORDER granting in part and denying in part 83 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Harry S Mattice, Jr on 4/22/15. (JLMc, )
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Coleman et al v. Hamilton County Government et al Doc. 106 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE at CHATTANOOGA THOMAS J OSEPH COLEMAN, III and BRANDON RAYMOND J AMES, Plaintiffs, v. HAMILTON COUNTY, TENNESSEE, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. 1:12-cv-190 J udge Mattice ORD ER Before the Court is Defendant Ham ilton County, Tennessee’s (“Ham ilton County”) Motion for Sum m ary J udgm ent (Doc. 83). For the reasons stated herein, the Court will GRAN T IN PART and D EN Y IN PART Defendant’s Motion. (Doc. 83). Plaintiffs’ claim s arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First and Fourteenth Am endm ents to the U.S. Constitution will be D ISMISSED W ITH PREJU D ICE. Plaintiff Colem an’s federal and state law claim s arising out of his seizure at the J uly 12, 20 12 County Com m ission Meeting will PROCEED TO TRIAL. I. BACKGROU N D & FACTS For the purposes of sum m ary judgm ent, the Court will view the facts in the light m ost favorable to Plaintiff. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). However, m any facts in this case are undisputed, and certain facts have previously been stipulated to by both parties. (See Doc. 38; Doc. 84 at 5-6; Doc. 89). Dockets.Justia.com Pr a y e r Po licy Ham ilton County is a political subdivision of the State of Tennessee, and the Com m ission is its elected legislature and final policym aker. (Doc. 38 at 1). The Com m ission conducts the County’s business during its regularly scheduled public m eetings. (Id.). On J uly 3, 20 12, the Com m ission adopted Resolution 712-13, entitled “A Resolution Adopting a Policy Regarding Opening Invocations Before Meetings of the Ham ilton County Com m ission” (“the prayer policy” or “the policy”).1 (Doc. 38-1). The resolution is nine pages in length, and it contains approxim ately five pages of pream ble, in which various clauses set forth, inter alia, the Com m ission’s intention to “invoke divine guidance”; quotes from Suprem e Court and federal appellate cases concerning the constitutionality of legislative prayer; and the resolution’s goal of adopting a policy that does not “proselytize or advance any particular faith, or show any purposeful preference of one religious view to the exclusion of others.” (Id. at 1-5). The policy perm its “an eligible m em ber of the clergy in Ham ilton County, Tennessee,” to give an invocation at the opening of Com m ission m eetings. (Id. at 5). The invocation speakers are drawn from a list of “all the religious congregations with an established presence in Ham ilton County,” com piled based on local listings for religious institutions found within the Yellow Pages. (Id.; Doc. 89-5 at 2-3). Although the substantial m ajority of the congregations on the list are Christian churches, institutions representing Muslim , J ewish, and Baha’i faiths, as well as others, are also included.2 1 Resolution 712-13 expressly repealed and replaced any prior practices concerning opening invocations at Com m ission m eetings. (Doc. 38-1 at 5). 2 Plaintiffs repeatedly note that Wiccans, Satanists, and Covens are not included on the list; however, they have presented no evidence that any such congregations had an established presence in the County. 2 (Doc. 38-2; Doc. 89-7 at 8, 12; Doc. 83-1 at 4; Doc. 83-2 at 3). If an institution is not represented on the list, it m ay request inclusion in writing, with any dispute as to an organization’s religious bona fides being resolved by reference to the Internal Revenue Code’s guidelines for tax-exem pt status. 3 (Doc. 38-1 at 6). The Com m ission does not engage in any content review of the invocations, and it places no guidelines on what m ay be said, except: “[T]he Com m ission requests that no invocation should proselytize or advance any faith, disparage the religious faith or nonreligious views of others, or exceed five m inutes in length.” (Doc. 38). To that end, the policy dictates the contents of the invitation letter that is m ailed to religious leaders. (Doc. 38-1 at 7-8). It states that: This opportunity is voluntary, and you are free to offer the invocation according to the dictates of your own conscience. However, please try not to exceed no [sic] m ore than five (5) m inutes for your presentation. To m aintain a spirit of respect for all, the Com m ission requests only that the opportunity not be exploited as an effort to convert others to the particular faith of the invocation speaker, nor to disparage any faith or belief different than that of the invocation speaker. (Id. at 7). Additionally, Com m ission agendas include the following printed language: Any invocation that m ay be offered before the official start of the Com m ission m eeting shall be the voluntary offering of a private citizen, to and for the benefit of the Com m ission. The view s or beliefs expressed by the invocation speaker have not been previously review ed or approved by the Com m ission and do not necessarily represent the religious beliefs or view s of the Com m ission in part or as a w hole. N o m em ber of the com m unity is required to attend or participate in the invocation and such decision w ill have no im pact on their right to actively participate in the business of the Com m ission. (Id. at 8) (em phasis original). Religious leaders notify the Com m ission of their willingness to offer an invocation via reply letter. (Id. at 7-8). The policy provides that religious leaders will 3 Additionally, a resident of the County who attends a congregation outside of the County m ay m ake a request for the inclusion of their congregation on the list. 3 then be scheduled to give an invocation at upcom ing Com m ission m eetings on a “firstcom e, first-serve basis.” (Id. at 8; Doc. 83-1 at 4; Doc. 83-2 at 4). Since the adoption of the policy, religious leaders of various congregations – including Baptist, Lutheran, Church of God, Presbyterian, J ewish, and Unitarian Universalist – have volunteered to be placed on the County’s agenda as the invocation speaker. (Doc. 38). The County has granted every request for inclusion on the invocation schedules from representatives of qualified assem blies. (Doc. 83-1 at 5; Doc. 83-2 at 4). Many of the invocation speakers have offered prayers referencing their faith tradition, the m ajority of which represent Christian traditions. (Doc. 83-1 at 6-7; Doc. 83-2 at 6). None of the speakers, however, has offered an invocation which denigrates m inority faiths or nonbelievers, threatens dam nation, or preaches conversion to a particular faith. (Doc. 83-1 at 6-7; Doc. 83-2 at 6). In Novem ber 20 12, a few m onths after creation of the congregations list, Plaintiff Colem an requested that he be added to the invitation list and scheduled to deliver an invocation. (Doc. 83-1 at 7-8; Doc. 89-3 at 3-6). The County asked for the nam e and address of the assem bly in order to send an invitation. (Doc. 83-1 at 7-8; Doc. 89-3 at 36). Plaintiff replied “I do not represent any religious assem bly or congregation . . . I am not a clergym an . . . I have no address to give you . . . [and] I do not have 50 1(c)(3) taxexem pt status.”4 (Doc. 83-1 at 7-8; Doc. 89-3 at 3-6). There is no dispute that Plaintiff Colem an was never added to the invitation list or scheduled to give an invocation. 4 The parties have presented different versions of the facts after this point. According to Plaintiff, he asked the County for suggestions as to how to proceed after he inform ed it that he was not a clergym an and did not represent any religious assem bly, and the County never responded to him again. According to the County, it responded to Plaintiff by letter stating that “[n]o qualifying congregation/ assem bly will be excluded from the ‘congregations list’ based on the religious perspective of the organization, even religious perspectives that do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God,” and setting forth the criteria for a qualifying congregation/ assem bly. The County further m aintains that Plaintiff responded to this letter, asking if his request was being denied, to which the County replied 4 Ju ly 12 , 2 0 12 Co m m is s io n M e e t in g 5 On J uly 12, 20 12, Plaintiff Colem an and Aaron Moyer (who is not a party to this action) attended a Com m ission m eeting that was open to m em bers of the public. (Doc. 89-1 at 1; Doc. 89-3 at 1). According to the Com m ission, it sets aside 10 m inutes for public com m ents at its m eetings, and when m ultiple persons wish to speak, the Com m ission will lim it individual speakers to 3 m inutes in order to hear from a variety of citizens.6 (Doc. 83-1 at 8-9). Moyer was the second person to speak during the public com m ents portion of the m eeting on J uly 12, 20 12; two other citizens were waiting to speak after Moyer. (Id. at 9). After approxim ately four and a half m inutes, Larry Henry, Chairm an of the Com m ission, can be heard on the video inform ing Moyer that his tim e was nearly expired and asking Moyer to “wrap it up.”7 (Id.; Doc. 89-1 at 1; Doc. 89-3 at 1). Moyer can be heard on the video continuing to speak for approxim ately a m inute and a half, at which point Henry said “Sir, I am going to have to ask you to wrap it up. We need to m ove on. We’ve got two m ore.” Moyer did not stop, however, but continued speaking. “No, not necessarily . . . we could not tell if you are part of a qualifying congregation/ assem bly. If you affirm that you are and provide the name and address of the organization, the invitation will be extended.” The County contends that Plaintiff never responded to that correspondence. 5 Plaintiffs have subm itted a video recording from the J uly 12, 20 12 Com m ission meeting. Although the video neither confirm s nor refutes, as a whole, either party’s account of the events at the J uly 12, 20 12 m eeting, the Court has nonetheless viewed the video and will consider it in assessing the m erits of Defendant’s Motion. The Court will note, where applicable, which facts are readily discernible from the video and therefore “undisputed.” 6 According to Colem an and Moyer, they were never notified that they had less than 10 m inutes to speak when they attended a public m eeting to m ake comm ents. Moyer notes in his affidavit that he has seen one other individual address the Comm ission “for nearly ten minutes” without interruption; however, Moyer has not m ade any declaration as to whether other individuals were waiting to speak during the public com ment period at those tim es. (Doc. 89-1). This assertion, without more, is insufficient to refute the County’s evidence that they had a policy of allowing only 10 m inutes for public com ments, and that speakers tim e was further lim ited when m ultiple citizens wish to make such comm ents. 7 It is not clear from the video that Henry is the Com missioner speaking; however, the parties have agreed that Henry was the Com m issioner speaking to Moyer throughout the course of this incident. 5 Henry asked Moyer to sit down. When Moyer refused to sit down and raised his voice, Henry can be heard asking security to “escort this gentlem an to his seat.” After Moyer returned to his seat, a female deputy approached Moyer and Colem an. (Doc. 89-1 at 2; Doc. 89-3 at 2). She is briefly seen on cam era, standing by Moyer’s seat, before the recording focuses on the next speaker. At this point, it sounds as though Moyer and Colem an m ay be having a conversation with the deputy; however, the conversation is not audible on the video. According to Moyer and Colem an, the Com m issioners were m aking gestures indicating that they should be rem oved from the m eeting; Moyer also averred that one of the Com m issioners told the deputy to “get them out of here.” (Doc. 89-1 at 2; Doc. 89-3 at 2). The County m aintains that none of the Com m issioners asked the deputy to rem ove Moyer or Colem an from the room . (Doc. 83-1 at 10 ). The County m aintains that, while the deputy was dealing with Moyer, Colem an asked the deputy: “Me too?” (Id.). The deputy indicated yes and proceeded to escort Colem an and Moyer out of the room . (Id.). Colem an m aintains that he did not ask, “Me too?” and was still rem oved from the m eeting room . (Doc. 89-3 at 2). Colem an can be seen on the video standing up while stating, “I’m now being forced to leave, and I have done nothing wrong.” The video then shows Colem an walking freely towards the exit door of the Com m ission cham bers, which is being held open by the fem ale deputy. Colem an can then be seen walking out of the Com m ission cham bers, past the deputy and into the lobby, at which point he states, “this is Tom m y Colem an and Aaron Moyer, who have been asked to leave. I can’t speak for Aaron, but I, m yself, have done absolutely nothing to be asked to leave.” After Moyer and Colem an have exited into the lobby, the deputy is seen closing the door to the Com m ission 6 cham bers; she then takes a seat inside the cham bers, facing towards the Com m issioners and away from the door that Moyer and Colem an have exited. Th e In s t a n t La w s u it Plaintiffs filed this action on J une 15, 20 12, and their first Am ended Com plaint on J une 29, 20 12, both prior to the official enactm ent of the prayer policy and prior to the incident at the J uly 12, 20 12 m eeting. (Docs. 1, 20 ). In their Second Am ended Com plaint, filed im mediately following the J uly 12, 20 12 m eeting, Plaintiffs claim that Defendant violated their rights under the Establishm ent Clause of the First Am endm ent and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Am endm ent. (Doc. 27 at 8). Plaintiff Colem an also claim s that he was unlawfully seized in violation of the Fourth Am endm ent, and that Defendant’s actions constituted assault and negligence under Tennessee com m on law. (Id. at 1, 8). Defendant has now m oved for sum m ary judgm ent as to Plaintiffs’ federal claim s – that is, the First Am endm ent claim asserted by both Plaintiff’s and the Fourth Am endm ent seizure claim asserted by Colem an.8 (Doc. 83). II. SU MMARY JU D GMEN T STAN D ARD Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 instructs the Court to grant sum m ary judgm ent “if the m ovant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any m aterial fact and the m ovant is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party asserting the presence or absence of genuine issues of m aterial facts m ust support its position either by “citing to particular parts of m aterials in the record,” including depositions, docum ents, affidavits or declarations, stipulations, or other m aterials, or by “showing that the m aterials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine 8 Defendant has not m oved for sum m ary judgment as to Plaintiff Colem an’s state law claim s. 7 dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce adm issible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). As previously noted, when ruling on a m otion for sum m ary judgm ent, the Court m ust view the facts contained in the record and all inferences that can be drawn from those facts in the light m ost favorable to the nonm oving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (1986); Nat’l Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis Inc., 253 F.3d 90 0 , 90 7 (6th Cir. 20 0 1). The Court cannot weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, or determ ine the truth of any m atter in dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby , Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The m oving party bears the initial burden of dem onstrating that no genuine issue of m aterial fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The m oving party m ay discharge this burden either by producing evidence that dem onstrates the absence of a genuine issue of m aterial fact or sim ply “by ‘showing’ – that is, pointing out to the district court – that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonm oving party’s case.” Id. at 325. Where the m ovant has satisfied this burden, the nonm oving party cannot “rest upon its . . . pleadings, but rather m ust set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Moldow an v. City of W arren, 578 F.3d 351, 374 (6th Cir. 20 0 9) (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56). The nonm oving party m ust present sufficient probative evidence supporting its claim that disputes over m aterial facts rem ain and m ust be resolved by a judge or jury at trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968)); see also W hite v. W y ndham Vacation Ow nership, Inc., 617 F.3d 472, 475-76 (6th Cir. 20 10 ). A m ere scintilla of evidence is not enough; there m ust be evidence from which a jury could reasonably find in favor of the nonm oving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; Moldow an, 578 F.3d at 374. If the nonm oving party fails to m ake a sufficient showing 8 on an essential elem ent of its case with respect to which it has the burden of proof, the m oving party is entitled to sum m ary judgm ent. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. III. AN ALYSIS A. Co n s titu tio n al Claim s aris in g u n d e r th e Firs t Am e n d m e n t 1. Free Speech Clause The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that all pleadings m ust contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). At a m inim um , Rule 8(a) requires the plaintiff to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]” Bell Atlantic v. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 556 n.3 (20 0 7). In their response to Defendant’s instant Motion and at the oral argum ent on Defendant’s Motion, Plaintiffs raise the issue of prior restraint on free speech; however, Plaintiffs’ Second Am ended Com plaint neither referenced the Free Speech Clause of the First Am endm ent nor included any factual allegations suggesting that Plaintiffs sought to raise such a challenge.9 Plaintiffs further failed to raise any Free Speech Clause issue while litigating their Motion for Prelim inary Injunction in this Court and in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. By declining to reference the Free Speech Clause at any point prior to their response to Defendant’s Motion for Sum m ary J udgm ent, Plaintiffs failed to give Defendant adequate notice that they intended to pursue such a claim . Plaintiffs failed to file a m otion to am end their Com plaint to add such a claim before the deadline for requesting leave to am end, or at any tim e thereafter. The Court thus finds that Plaintiffs have failed to assert a claim for violations 9 Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Com plaint specifically invokes only the Establishm ent Clause of the First Am endm ent. (Doc. 27 at 1, 8). 9 of the Free Speech Clause of the First Am endm ent and that this action – which has been ongoing for two and a half years – has advanced well beyond the stage at which the pleadings could or should be am ended. The Court will accordingly disregard Plaintiffs’ argum ents regarding the Free Speech Clause.10 2. Establishm ent Clause Plaintiffs’ First Am endm ent claim is a legislative prayer challenge. “As practiced by Congress since the fram ing of the Constitution, legislative prayer lends gravity to public business, rem inds lawm akers to transcend petty differences in pursuit of a higher purpose, and expresses a com m on aspiration to a just and peaceful society.” See Tow n of Greece, NY v. Gallow ay , 134 S.Ct. 1811, 1818 (20 14). Legislative prayer is a peculiar subspecies of governm ent conduct im plicating the Establishm ent Clause of the First Am endm ent, in that it is both religious in nature and “long . . . understood as com patible with the Establishm ent Clause.” Id. at 1818-19; see, e.g., Joy ner v. Forsy th Cnty ., 653 F.3d 341, 345 (4th Cir. 20 11) (“[T]his is not a case about the Establishm ent Clause in general, but about legislative prayer in particular.”); Sny der v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10 th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (“[T]he evolution of Establishm ent Clause jurisprudence indicates that the constitutionality of legislative prayers is a sui generis legal question.”). The United States Suprem e Court has explained this apparent paradox by noting that in light of the unam biguous and unbroken history of m ore than 20 0 years, there can be no doubt that the practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer has becom e part of the fabric of our society. To invoke Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with m aking the laws is not, in these circum stances, an “establishm ent” of religion or a step toward establishm ent; it is sim ply a tolerable acknowledgm ent of beliefs widely held am ong the people of this country. 10 The Court notes that, even if such a claim had been pled, it would fail for the reasons discussed in Subsection B, infra. 10 Marsh v. Cham bers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 30 6, 313 (1952)); Greece, 134 S.Ct. at 1819 (“Marsh stands for the proposition that it is not necessary to define the precise boundary of the Establishm ent Clause where history shows that the specific practice is perm itted.”). Legislative prayer policies have previously been sustained without scrutiny under the sorts of form al tests that are typically used in the analysis of Establishm ent Clause claim s. See, e.g., Greece, 134 S.Ct. at 1818; Marsh, 463 U.S. at 796, 813 (finding no First Am endm ent violation in the Nebraska Legislature’s practice of opening its sessions with a prayer delivered by a Presbyterian chaplain, who was paid with state funds, because there was no evidence that the practice stem m ed from an im perm issible m otive and because the prayers given by the chaplain were not used to advance or disparage any particular faith or belief). Instead, federal courts have looked m ore generally at whether legislative prayer policies and practices are based on im perm issible m otives or are used to advance one faith or belief over another. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has previously reviewed the County’s legislative prayer policy under the Establishm ent Clause of the First Am endm ent, in connection with Plaintiffs’ previously filed m otion for a prelim inary injunction. On J uly 19, 20 13, the Sixth Circuit expressly held that Ham ilton County’s prayer policy is facially constitutional. Jones v. Ham ilton Cnty . Gov’t, Tenn., 530 F. App’x 478, 487-90 (6th Cir. 20 13) (“Here, the Policy is facially constitutional. The Policy aim s to respect the diversity of all religious groups, and it does not seek to advance one faith or belief over another. The Policy is sim ilar to other policies that have been recognized as facially neutral by our sister circuits. Indeed, not one of our sister circuits 11 that have addressed this sam e issue have struck down a legislature's policy as facially unconstitutional.” (internal citations om itted)). The Sixth Circuit declined to address Plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge, noting that it was not yet ripe. Id. at 490 . Nonetheless, the Court noted that “[w]ithout the ability to establish basic criteria for selecting religious groups to participate in the prayer invocations, the Com m ission would be unable to ensure that speakers are m em bers of bonafide religious organizations, as opposed to com m ercial entities or other groups with m issions com pletely unrelated to the Com m ission’s practice of solem nizing its m eetings with an invocation.” Id. at 488-89. Then, on May 5, 20 14, the Suprem e Court of the United States issued its opinion in Tow n of Greece, N.Y. v. Gallow ay , 134 S. Ct. 1811 (20 14). The facts of Greece are sim ilar to the facts presented in this case. The Town of Greece followed an inform al m ethod for selecting a clergym an to provide an invocation during town board m eetings.11 Id. at 1816. To select a clergym an to provide an invocation, a town em ployee would call congregations listed in a local directory until she found a m inister available for that m onth’s m eeting. Id. The town eventually com piled a list of willing “board chaplains” who had accepted previous invitations and agreed to return in the future. Id. Town leaders m aintained that a m inister or layperson of any persuasion, including atheist, could give the invocation, but nearly all of the congregations in town were Christian. Id. Respondents Susan Galloway and Linda Stephens objected that the 11 At oral argum ent, Plaintiffs argued that the County’s prayer practice was distinguishable from that in Greece and ran afoul of the Establishm ent Clause because the invocations are given after the opening gavel and after the the Com m ission was called to order for official business. (Doc. 10 5 at 32-35). However, in Greece, the invocation was given “[f]ollowing the roll call and recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance.” Gallow ay , 134 S.Ct. at 1816. The Court finds the County’s practice of allowing opening invocations after the opening gavel to be constitutionally perm issible under the analysis in Greece; further, the Court finds any distinction between prayers offered before or after an opening gavel at a legislative m eeting to be artificial and imm aterial to a constitutional inquiry. 12 prayers offered at the board meetings violated their religious beliefs and philosophical views. Id. at 1817. After Galloway and Stephens com plained that Christian them es pervaded the prayers to the exclusion of citizens who did not share those beliefs, the town invited a J ewish laym an, the chairm an of the local Baha’i tem ple and a Wiccan priestess to deliver prayers. Id. Galloway and Stephens filed suit requesting an injunction requiring the town to lim it prayers to “inclusive and ecum enical” prayers that referred only to a “generic God” that would not associate the Governm ent with any one faith or belief. Id. Specifically, Galloway and Stephens argued that any prayer offered at the town m eetings m ust be “nonsectarian, or not identifiable with any one religion.” Id. at 1820 . The Suprem e Court held that the town’s prayer practices did not violate the First Am endm ent. The Suprem e Court explained that “an insistence on nonsectarian or ecum enical prayer as a single, fixed standard is not consistent with the tradition of legislative prayer” outlined in cases like Marsh and that the constitutionality of prayer does not turn on the neutrality of its content.12 Id. Although the Suprem e Court held that the First Am endm ent does not require legislative prayer to be nonsectarian, it did hold that certain restraints rem ain: If the course and practice over tim e shows that the invocations denigrate nonbelievers or religious m inorities, threaten damnation, or preach conversion, m any present m ay consider the prayer to fall short of the desire to elevate the purpose of the occasion to unite lawm akers in their com m on effort. That circum stance would present a different case than the one presently before the Court. . . . Prayer that reflects beliefs specific to only som e creeds can still serve to solem nize the occasion, so long as the 12 The Supreme Court further explained that “[t]o hold that invocations m ust be nonsectarian would force the legislatures that sponsor prayers and the courts that are asked to decide these cases to act as supervisors and censors of speech, a rule that would involve governm ent in religious m atters to a far greater degree than is the case under the town’s current practice of neither editing or approving prayers in advance nor criticizing their content after the fact.” Gallow ay , 134 S.Ct. at 1822. 13 practice over tim e is not exploited to “proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief.” Id. at 1823. (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794-95). Accordingly, in further defining the param eters of constitutionally perm issible legislative prayer, the Suprem e Court explained that “[a]bsent a pattern of prayers that over tim e denigrate, proselytize, or betray an im perm issible governm ent purpose, a challenge based solely on the content of prayer will not likely establish a constitutional violation.” Id. at 1824. Galloway and Stephens also argued that the town of Greece contravened the Establishm ent Clause by inviting a predom inantly Christian set of m inisters to lead prayer. Id. The Suprem e Court disagreed, holding that “[t]he town m ade reasonable efforts to identify all congregations within its borders and represented that it would welcom e a prayer by any m inister or laym an who wished to give one.” Id. The Suprem e Court explained that “[s]o long as the town m aintains a policy of nondiscrimination, the Constitution does not require it to search beyond its borders for non-Christian prayer givers in an effort to achieve religious balancing. The quest to prom ote a diversity of religious views would require the town to m ake wholly inappropriate judgm ents about the num ber of religions [it] should sponsor and the relative frequency with which it should sponsor each, a form of governm ent entanglem ent with religion that is far m ore troublesom e than the current approach.” Id. (internal quotation m arks and citations om itted). It is against this legal backdrop that the Court considers Defendant’s Motion for Sum m ary J udgm ent as to Plaintiffs’ Establishm ent Clause claim , both facially and asapplied. The County argues that the undisputed facts dem onstrate: (1) that participation in prayer at Com m ission m eetings is voluntary and not coerced; (2) 14 selection to give an invocation at Com m ission m eetings is nondiscrim inatory and is not dependent on the faith of the prayer giver; and (3) the content of the prayers do not exhibit a pattern over tim e that denigrate nonbelievers or religious m inorities, threaten dam nation, or preach conversion. Accordingly, they argue that the policy is constitutional under the standards set forth in Greece, and that the policy as written and as im plem ented com plies with the criteria established by the Suprem e Court.13 Plaintiffs argue that Ham ilton County’s prayer policy is unconstitutional because “im plem entation of the policy reveals the pre-textual nature of the policy[.]” Although not entirely clear from Plaintiffs’ response brief, it appears that Plaintiffs’ prim ary argum ent is that the Policy is unconstitutional because it requires invocation givers to be part of an eligible and established assem bly or congregation and m akes no provision for individuals who wish to give an invocation. In arguing that the Policy is “pretextual,” Plaintiffs take issue with certain aspects of the Policy and its im plem entation, such as that (1) “the policy does not set forth any test with a proven record to m ake the determ ination of just what constitutes eligible and established congregations”; (2) although the Policy requires invocations to happen before the start of official business, on Novem ber 29, 20 12, a citizen was perm itted to give an invocation after the Chairm an 13 Defendant also m oved for sum m ary judgm ent as to any claim that prayers delivered before the adoption of the official Policy on J uly 12, 20 13 violated the First Am endment. However, Plaintiffs’ response to Defendant’s Motion does not include any argum ent regarding invocations offered prior to J uly 12, 20 13. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has abandoned any argument or claim regarding the constitutionality of the prayers or invocations offered at the County’s comm ission m eetings prior to J uly 12, 210 3. See, e.g., Clark v. City of Dublin, Oh., 178 F. App’x 522, 524-25 (6th Cir. 20 0 6) (finding that, when a plaintiff did not properly respond to arguments asserted by a defendant’s motion for sum m ary judgment as to two claim s, “the District Court did not err when it found that the Appellant abandoned [those] claims”); Conner v. Hardee’s Food Sy s., Inc., 65 F. App’x 19 (6th Cir. 20 0 3) (finding that the plaintiffs had abandoned their claim “[b]ecause [they] failed to brief the issue before the district court”); Anglers of the Au Sable v. United States Forest Svc., 565 F. Supp. 2d. 812, 839 (E.D. Mich. 20 0 8) (“It is well settled that abandonm ent m ay occur where a party asserts a claim in its com plaint, but then fails to address the issue in response to an omnibus m otion for sum m ary judgm ent.”); see also Morris v. City of Mem phis, 20 12 WL 3727149, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 27, 20 12) (collecting cases).). 15 called the m eeting to order; (3) the Policy “allows too m uch power in the hands of the Com m ission” which can “weed out” individuals by “arbitrary Q&A”; and (4) one citizen was perm itted to give an invocation despite not being a m em ber of an “established” congregation. Based on these considerations, Plaintiffs conclude that “[i]n light of the refusal to allow Colem an to give an invocation at all, and the overwhelm ingly Christian representation of ‘invocation givers’ . . . this Court cannot help but determ ine the ‘policy’ is a pretext to exclude individuals of all walks of life to address the defendant through its Com m ission and to ensure that the m ajority of ‘eligible’ m em bers are wholly Christian.” a. Facial Challenge Facial challenges are generally disfavored as “[1] they ‘often rest on speculation’ and thus ‘raise the risk of prem ature interpretation,’ [2] they ‘run contrary to the fundam ental principle of judicial restraint,’ and [3] they ‘threaten to short circuit the dem ocratic process.’” Green Party of Tenn. v. Hargett, 70 0 F.3d 816, 826 (6th Cir. 20 12) (quoting W ash. State Grange v. W ash. State Republican Party , 552 U.S. 442, 450 – 51, (20 0 8)). “Facial invalidation is strong m edicine that is not to be casually em ployed.” Ohio Citizen Action v. City of Englew ood, 671 F.3d 564 (6th Cir. 20 12) (internal quotation m arks om itted) Plaintiffs’ response in opposition to Defendant’s instant Motion does not appear to challenge the County’s prayer policy on its face. Nonetheless, the Court notes for the record that the County’s policy is facially constitutional. The Sixth Circuit has already ruled upon the facial constitutionality of this exact policy, noting that it “aim s to respect the diversity of all religious groups, and it does not seek to advance one faith or belief over another.” The Suprem e Court reiterated in Greece that a legislative prayer policy does not have to require sectarian prayers, nor does a legislative body have to act as 16 “supervisors or censors” of such prayers. Indeed, Greece confirm ed that legislative prayer policies m ay be constitutional even if all of the speakers are of the sam e religion so long as there is no “pattern of prayers that over tim e denigrate, proselytize, or betray an im perm issible governm ent purpose[.]” The County’s policy, on its face, does not advance one religion over another; it allows for invocations from a variety of faiths and allows for prayers with religious references, but has not led to denigration or proselytizing. The County does not involve itself in the content of the prayers offered and has allowed speakers from assem blies representing a variety of faith traditions. In fact, the County has never rejected a request to be added to the invocation schedule from an eligible m em ber of the clergy under the policy. Thus, under the standards set forth in Greece, the County’s legislative prayer policy is constitutional, and any facial challenge to said policy thus fails. b. As-Applied Challenge In their response in opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Sum m ary J udgm ent and at oral argum ent, Plaintiffs prim arily argued that Defendant’s im plem entation of their prayer policy violated the First Am endm ent. Specifically, Plaintiffs have argued that the County applies the policy in a m anner so as to “deny[] the right of the individual to address the governm ent body.”14 (Doc. 10 5 at 24-30 ). When specifically asked by the 14 The arguments m ade by Plaintiffs’ counsel at the oral argum ent on Defendant’s Motion dem onstrate that Plaintiffs have a confused view of the protections afforded by, and interplay between, various am endm ents to the U.S. Constitution, and the clauses contained therein. For exam ple, in arguing how the Defendant’s legislative prayer policy has been applied in a m anner that violates the Establishm ent Clause of the First Am endm ent, Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that Defendant was “violat[ing] the individual’s right to equal protection to address their government actor, and to have a [free] speech aspect because that what the flavor of this is because when we’re giving a prayer you’re actually providing a forum.” (See Doc. 10 5 at 25-26). As discussed in Subsection B, infra, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Am endm ent and the Free Speech Clause of the First Am endm ent are not im plicated in legislative prayer cases; indeed, even other Establishm ent Clause precedent is not applicable in such cases. Thus, despite Plaintiffs’ argum ents to the contrary, the Court does not believe that it’s analysis of Plaintiffs’ as-applied 17 Court whether “each and every [Am erican] posses[es] an individualized right to address a prayer to a session of Congress,” Plaintiffs’ counsel responded “I would say so.” (Id. at 26). Plaintiffs’ argum ent is clearly flawed and flies in the face of established Suprem e Court precedent. In Marsh, the Suprem e Court expressly authorized legislative bodies to appoint and retain a single person to give invocations at the beginning of official m eetings. To find that each and every individual person under the jurisdiction of a particular legislative body has the right to give an opening prayer or invocation at the body’s m eetings would effectively overrule not only Marsh, but an entire body of federal case law approving of the constitutionality of chaplains and non-discrim inatory legislative prayer policies. Plaintiffs have repeatedly conflated the protections of the Free Speech Clause of the First Am endm ent with those provided by the Establishm ent Clause. But Plaintiffs have brought suit im plicating the doctrine of legislative pray er, not legislative speech. Im plicit in the body of federal case law on legislative prayer – which all repeatedly em phasize that legislative prayer is som ehow different than other Establishm ent Clause cases – is the understanding the governm ent m ay favor religion over nonreligion in this narrow circum stance. Prayer, by its very definition, is religious in nature. See The Am erican Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 35, 1379 (4th ed. 20 0 0 ) (defining prayer as “[a] reverent petition m ade to God, a god, or another object of worship.”). Thus, while legislative bodies cannot intentionally discrim inate against particular faith system s, they can require that invocation givers have som e religious credentials. See Center for Inquiry , Inc. v. Marion Circuit Court Clerk, 758 F.3d 869, 874 (7th Cir. challenge to Defendant’s legislative prayer policy should be “flavored” with considerations of other portions of the U.S. Constitution. 18 20 14) (“[N]either [Marsh nor Greece] can be divorced from its context. Both concern the long-established practice of opening legislative m eetings with prayer. That is to say, they concern what a chosen agent of the governm ent says as part of the governm ent’s own operations. . . . Marsh and Greece show that a governm ent m ay, consistent with the First Am endm ent, open legislative sessions with Christian prayers while not inviting leaders of other religions . . . .”); Pelphrey v. Cobb Cnty ., Ga., 547 F.3d 1263, 1281 (11th Cir. 20 0 8) (noting that the Marsh “does not require that all faiths be allowed the opportunity to pray. The standard instead prohibits purposeful discrim ination.”). Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has already determined as m uch in this very case, noting that the County had an interest in “establish[ing] basic criteria for selecting religious groups to participate in the prayer invocations . . . [in order to] ensure that speakers are m em bers of bonafide religious organizations, as opposed to com m ercial entities or other groups with m issions com pletely unrelated to the Com m ission’s practice of solem nizing its m eetings with an invocation.” Plaintiffs have failed to present to the Court any evidence or argum ent that Defendant’s prayer policy is im plem ented in a way that discrim inates against particular faith system s, either intentionally or unintentionally. Their argum ent that the policy discrim inates against each and every individual who is not an eligible mem ber of the clergy affiliated with a bona fide religious assem bly sim ply has no basis under current legislative prayer jurisprudence.15 The Court accordingly finds that Defendant’s prayer 15 In their response in opposition to Defendant’s instant Motion, Plaintiffs devote substantial discussion to an incident wherein a m an nam ed Eddie Bridges was perm itted to give an invocation to the Com m ission, despite the fact that he was not an eligible clergym an affiliated with a religious assem bly. The Court finds this incident to be of little to no im port in its instant analysis. Bridges, by his own adm ission, was vague regarding his religious affiliation when discussing his inclusion on the invocation list with County officials. Additionally, the fact that Bridges was perm itted to give an invocation despite his lack of eligibility dem onstrates that the County has m ade every effort to be inclusive and avoid religious discrim ination in im plementing its prayer policy. It does not, as Plaintiffs argue, dem onstrate that the 19 policy is constitutional as applied, and Defendant’s Motion for Sum m ary J udgm ent as to Plaintiffs’ Establishm ent Clause claim will be GRAN TED . B. Equ al Pro te ctio n In their Second Amended Com plaint and their Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Sum m ary J udgm ent, Plaintiffs m ake vague references to violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Am endm ent. (Doc. 27 at 1, 8; Doc. 88 at 1, 4). At the oral argum ent on Defendant’s Motion, Plaintiffs argued that, although this case is ultim ately an Establishm ent Clause case, “[t]here are other flavors and aspects of the U.S. Constitution that com e into play,” such as the Equal Protection Clause. (Doc. 10 5 at 23). Plaintiffs argued that “[i]t violates the individual’s right to equal protection to address their governm ent actor[.]” (Id. at 26). In response, Defendant – while conceding that the phrase appeared in the Second Am ended Com plaint – argued that Plaintiffs did not plead an Equal Protection argument in their Com plaint. (Id. at 48-50 ). Defendant argued that, even if such a claim was properly pled, the Equal Protection clause does not apply because the speech at issue in this case is governm ent speech, rather than individual speech. (Id. at 50 ). In any event, and regardless of whether Plaintiffs’ properly pled a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, such a claim m ust fail. Defendant has correctly noted that legislative prayer cases – such as this one – are subject to analysis only under the Establishm ent Clause of the First Am endm ent, and not under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Am endm ent. See, e.g., Sim pson v. Chesterfield Cnty . Bd. of Supervisors, 40 4 F.3d 276, 287-88 (4th Cir. 20 0 5) (holding in a legislative prayer case that “the speech in this case was governm ent speech ‘subject only to the proscriptions of County used its prayer policy as a “pretext” to support only Christian prayer; indeed, it suggests the opposite. 20 the Establishm ent Clause,’” and thus rejecting plaintiff’s other claim s, including an Equal Protection Clause challenge); Atheists of Fla., Inc. v. City of Lakeland, Fla., 779 F. Supp. 2d 1330 , 1341-42 (M.D. Fla. 20 11) (“The proper analytical device in this [legislative prayer] case is the Establishm ent Clause, and not the Equal Protection or Free Speech clauses—Plaintiffs’ recouching their true claim (alleging a violation of the Establishm ent Clause) as a different constitutional species therefore changes nothing.”). Plaintiffs’ claim that the legislative prayer policy at issue in this case violates the U.S. Constitution has been fully analyzed under the Establishm ent Clause of the First Am endm ent. They are not entitled to argue the sam e claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Am endm ent, nor would such a claim be successful. Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiffs’ have pled an Equal Protection Clause challenge, this claim will be D ISMISSED W ITH PREJU D ICE. C. U n law fu l Se izu re Plaintiff Colem an has also argued that he was seized without probable cause when the deputy escorted him from the Com m ission m eeting room and that the County is responsible for the deputy’s actions because Com m ission m em bers told the deputy to “get them out of here.” Colem an also contends that the Com m ission is liable because no one did anything “to stop the deputy, or correct the situation,” arguing that the failure of the Com m issioners to correct the deputy’s actions constitutes ratification. The Fourth Am endm ent protects citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures by the governm ent. U.S. Const. am end. IV. A person m ay be seized in violation of the Fourth Am endm ent if “a reasonable person would not feel free to leave an encounter with police.” United States v. Cam pbell, 486 F.3d 949, 956 (6th Cir. 20 0 7) (quoting Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810 , 834 (6th Cir. 20 0 5)). Because 21 Defendant did not argue in its Motion for Sum m ary J udgm ent that Plaintiff Colem an was not seized, the Court will assum e – solely for the purposes of this Order – that Plaintiff Colem an was “seized” under the Fourth Am endm ent.16 Defendant argues that the County cannot be liable to Plaintiff Colem an for unlawful seizure because the County did not direct rem oval of Plaintiff from the m eeting room and any such seizure was not an action of its agent taken in accordance with any County custom or policy. It is well settled that m unicipalities and other local governing bodies m ay be sued under § 1983. See Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In order to establish m unicipal liability under § 1983, however, “the plaintiff m ust establish that: (1) the plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional violation; and (2) the [m unicipality] was responsible for that violation.” Spears v . Ruth, 589 F.3d 249, 256 (6th Cir. 20 0 9); Bd. of the Cnty . Com m ’rs of Bry an Cnty . v. Brow n, 520 U.S. 397, 16 Although Defendant argued in its reply brief and at the oral argum ent that Plaintiff Colem an was not, in fact, “seized,” the Defendant m ade no such argument in its pending Motion for Sum m ary J udgm ent. Thus, for the purposes of deciding the instant Motion, the Court m ust assume, without deciding, that Plaintiff Colem an was, in fact, seized. The Court will not, however, prevent Defendant from presenting such an argum ent as a defense at the trial of this m atter. The Court has its own reservations about Plaintiff Colem an’s argum ent that he was “seized” when he was asked or m ade to leave the com m ission m eeting. At the oral argum ent on Defendant’s instant Motion, the Court noted that “if a police officer tells m e to get out of here, that seem s to m e to be the antithesis of an arrest or seizure because . . . [an] arrest or a seizure is when the police officer detained m e for som e period of tim e saying you’re not free to leave.” (Doc. 10 ). The Court concedes that at least one federal court has found that the Fourth Amendment is invoked in cases where plaintiffs did not feel “free to stay.” See Beverlin v. Grim m , 1995 WL 470 274, at *3 n.1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 1995) (“In the case at bar, the question was not whether Beverlin and her children were ‘free to leave,’ but whether they were free to stay . But we think the [Fourth Am endm ent] is applicable to unlawful interference with freedom of m ovem ent whether it be exerted by preventing a person from leaving or by forcing her to leave.”); see also Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810 , 834 (6th Cir. 20 0 5) (noting that “Fourth Am endm ent jurisprudence suggests a person is seized not only when a reasonable person would not feel free to leave an encounter with police, but also when a reasonable person would not feel free to rem ain som ewhere, by virtue of som e official action,” and holding that genuine issues of m aterial fact rem ained as to whether plaintiff was “seized” when he was asked to walk back to Detroit but was not physically escorted). However, this unpublished case from the Northern District of Illinois is not binding upon the Court, and the Court is not convinced that it was properly decided based on the current state of Fourth Am endm ent jurisprudence, or that these cases are factually similar enough to the instant case so as to be instructive. Thus, while the Court will assum e for the purposes of this Order that Plaintiff Colem an was “seized,” the parties are on notice that the Court m ay require additional legal argum ent regarding this issue, and could well determ ine at trial that this claim fails as a m atter of law. 22 40 4 (1997) (noting that a plaintiff seeking m unicipality liability under § 1983 “m ust . . . dem onstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the m unicipality was the ‘m oving force’ behind the injury alleged. A plaintiff m ust show that the m unicipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and m ust dem onstrate a direct causal link between the m unicipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.”). To dem onstrate that a m unicipality is responsible for a constitutional violation, a plaintiff m ust point to som e “policy” or “custom ” of the m unicipal defendant causing the com plained-of constitutional violation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. However, m unicipal liability “m ay be im posed for a single decision by m unicipal policym akers under appropriate circum stances,” such as “where the decisionm aker possesses final authority to establish m unicipal policy with respect to the action ordered.” Pem baur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 , 482 (1986). Accordingly, the Suprem e Court has held that “m unicipal liability under § 1983 attaches where—and only where—a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is m ade from am ong various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject m atter in question.” Id. at 483. “[W]hether a particular official has final policym aking authority is a question of state law .” Crosby v. Pickaw ay Cnty . Gen. Health Dep’t, 30 3 F. App’x 251, 256 (6th Cir. 20 0 8) (quoting Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 70 1, 737 (1989)). The Court’s consideration of such a question requires reference to “statutes, ordinances, and regulations, and less form al sources of law such as local practice and custom .” Row ell v. Madison Cnty ., Tenn., 20 0 9 WL 19180 78, at *6 (W.D. Tenn. J uly 2, 20 0 9) (quoting St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124 (1988)). Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s rem oval from the J uly 12, 20 12 Com m ission m eeting was an isolated incident of m isconduct by a nonpolicym aking em ployee – that 23 is, the deputy who rem oved Colem an and Moyer from the m eeting – which does not warrant the application of Monell liability. See Vinson v. Cam pbell Cnty . Fiscal Court, 820 F.2d 194, 20 0 (6th Cir. 1987). It is true that if the Court were to credit Defendant’s version of the facts – that is, Chairm an Henry m erely told the deputy to escort Moyer to his seat and said nothing else prom pting the deputy to rem ove Moyer and Colem an from the m eeting – it m ay well be able to conclude that Monell is inapplicable and that Defendant is entitled to sum m ary judgm ent. However, the Court cannot sim ply ignore the version of facts presented by Plaintiffs; in fact, at this stage of these proceedings, the Court is required to construe all facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have presented evidence that one or m ore m em bers of the Com m ission directed the deputy to rem ove Plaintiff Colem an and Moyer from the J uly 12, 20 12 meeting, through gestures and words, including “get them out of here.” Assum ing Plaintiffs’ facts to be true, a jury could determ ine that a deliberate decision was m ade to rem ove Colem an and Moyer from the Com m ission m eeting by a m em ber of the Com m ission. If Plaintiffs’ facts are credited, and if Plaintiff is able to dem onstrate that Com m ission m em bers have final policym aking authority for the County under state law, Plaintiff m ay be able to prevail under a one-tim e policy theory of Monell liability.17 The Court thus finds that genuine issues of m aterial fact rem ain as to the precise events that transpired at the J uly 12, 20 12 County Com m ission m eeting, and that factual and legal issues rem ain as to whether Henry and the other Com m issioners were final policym akers for the purpose of supporting a § 1983 action against the County. 17 Neither party offered argum ent or evidence regarding the final policymaking authority of the Com m issioners, either in their briefs or at oral argument. 24 Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Sum m ary J udgment will be D EN IED with respect to Plaintiff Colem an’s Fourth Am endm ent seizure claim. IV. CON CLU SION And so, like the world, this lawsuit ends not with a bang but a whim per.18 What began as a case with the potential for significant constitutional implications in the area of Establishm ent Clause jurisprudence ends as a run-of-the-m ill seizure case of little or no precedential significance.19 Only because there exists an apparent factual dispute concerning the precise events and circum stances which gave rise to the alleged illegal seizure will the com peting versions of those events be subm itted for trial. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s Motion for Sum m ary J udgm ent (Doc. 83) is hereby GRAN TED IN PART and D EN IED IN PART; Plaintiffs’ claim s arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First and Fourteenth Am endm ents to the U.S. Constitution will be D ISMISSED W ITH PREJU D ICE; Plaintiff Colem an’s claim s arising out of his alleged seizure at the J uly 12, 20 12 County Com m ission Meeting – that is, unlawful seizure pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, negligence under Tennessee law, and assault under Tennessee law – will PROCEED TO TRIAL; Counsel for both parties are hereby ORD ERED to confer regarding m utually agreeable alternative dates for the jury trial of this action. The parties SH ALL subm it for the Court’s consideration at le as t five m utually agreeable dates for the trial in the 20 15 calendar year. The parties SH ALL subm it their proposed dates via em ail to Mattice_ chambers@tned.uscourts.gov n o late r th an May 12 , 2 0 15. 18 T.S. Eliot, The Hollow Men (1925). 19 “[I]t is a tale . . . full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.” William Shakespeare, MacBeth, act 5, sc.5. 25 SO ORD ERED this 22nd day of April, 20 15. _ _ _ _ _/s/_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Jr._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Harry S. Mattice, _ HARRY S. MATTICE, J R. UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 26
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
