-LDA Hajian-Buhamany v. Women and Infants Hospital of Rhode Island, No. 1:2010cv00120 - Document 23 (D.R.I. 2011)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 13 Motion for Summary Judgment- So Ordered by Judge John J McConnell, Jr. on 8/4/11. (Barletta, Barbara)
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-LDA Hajian-Buhamany v. Women and Infants Hospital of Rhode Island Doc. 23 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND Nasrin Hajian-Bahmany, Plaintiff, v. Women and Infants Hospital of Rhode Island, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CA No: 10-120 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR., United States District Judge. This case involves Plaintiff, Nasrin Hajian-Bahmany's ("Ms. Hajian-Bahmany") allegations of discrimination based on sex and national origin against he former employer, Defendant Women and Infant's Hospital of Rhode Island ("Hospital"). efore the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket #13). I. FACTS The relevant facts are not in dispute and the parties appear to be i agreement on the applicable law. How the law applies to the facts, however, is very much in di pute. Ms. Hajian-Bahmany was employed at the Hospital as a clinical s cial worker in its Project Link unitl for approximately six years, from April 29, 2002 until she was terminated on July 9, 2008. During her employment, up to the point of her termination, M . Hajian-Bahmany always received excellent annual evaluations and had no significant disciplin problems. Project Link is a behavioral health program that services pregnant and post artum women with current or past substance abuse and mental health issues. 1 Dockets.Justia.com Ms. Hajian-Bahmany, a female and native of Iran, was the only e ployee within her department born in the Middle East and the only employee whose native I age is Farsi. The sole male employee within the department, Mathew Bouchard ("Mr. Bouch d"), apparently had a penchant for playing "practical jokes" on his co-workers at the Hospi 1. Mr. Bouchard's actions included, for example, taking pens and other objects from co-work s and hiding them, and placing a fake surveillance camera within Ms. Hajian-Bahmany's offi e during a time of added emphasis on security at the hospital. Ms. Hajian-Bahmany complained to her direct supervisor, Eileen Dykeman ("Ms. Dykeman"), the clinical program manager for Project Link, who tol rated this behavior and never took any action to stop it. Another department supervis r, AIda Medeiros ("Ms. Medeiros") had also received complaints from Ms. Hajian-B any about Mr. Bouchard's conduct. Upon reflection, both supervisors agree that Mr. B uchard's behavior toward his co-workers was inappropriate. Ms. Dykeman was aware that s. Hajian-Bahmany was "upset and angry" about being the object of "practical jokes." Ms. Haji at her deposition that she told Ms. Dykeman that she felt humiliated becaus of Mr. Boucher's conduct. In addition to Mr. Bouchard's "practical jokes," Ms. Hajian-B Mr. Bouchard engaged in certain behavior that targeted her national origin. "repeatedly" said "shut up" to her in Farsi, her native language, includi g in front of coworkers. 2 The Hospital denies that this exchange occurred on "many occasio s," but admits that Mr. Bouchard "kept repeating it." There is no evidence that Ms. Hajian-B her supervisors about this behavior when it occurred. Upon Mr. Bouchard's request, Ms. Hajian-Bahamany had previously tau t him how to say "shut up" and other words and phrases in Farsi. 2 2 Additionally, on more than one occasion, Mr. Bouchard referred to s. Hajian-Bahmany as a "dictator" and he also placed a sign bearing the word "dictator" on h r office door. Ms. Hajian-Bahmany alleges (but the Hospital lacks information to admit or deny that Mr. Bouchard also made comments about what he saw in the news relative to Iranians, t e Middle East, and Iranian dictator Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. When Ms. Hajian-Bahmany comp ained to one of her supervisors, Ms. Medeiros, she instructed Mr. Bouchard to stop using e term "dictator." Mr. Bouchard complied with this admonition, but was never disciplined. With these events as a back-drop, the activities culminating in Ms. Hajian-Bahmany's termination took place on July 2,2008. At a departmental meeting, the disc ssion turned to the status of one of Ms. Hajian-Bahmany's clients who had missed an appointme t the previous day. Mr. Bouchard and Ms. Hajian-Bahmany had a verbal disagreement that ed to her making physical contact with him. According to Ms. Hajian-Bahmany, she ''tappe Bouchard on the arm" and according to Mr. Bouchard, she "struck his arm with a closed fist." Under any spin, it is undisputed that Ms. Hajian-Bahmany made unwanted physical contact with Mr. Bouchard. After an investigation by the Hospital, Ms. Hajian-Bahmany was i formed by Daniel Michaud ("Mr. Michaud"), the Vice President of Human Resources for th Hospital, that her employment was being terminated because she violated the Hospital's ze 0 tolerance policy against workplace violence. The policy, which Ms. Hajian-Bahmany admi s having received, defines violence to include any unwanted or hostile physical contact. Th policy states that violence is always prohibited and appropriate discipline, including terminati n, will be imposed for violation of this policy. 3 Two former employees had previously been terminated by the provision. ospital under this There is no evidence of any discipline less-than-termination being imposed for violation of this Hospital policy. After her termination, the Plaintiff filed a three count complaint a ainst the Hospital. Counts I and II allege "discriminatory terms and conditions of em loyment, unlawful termination and retaliation based on gender and ethnic background" purs t to the RI. Civil Rights Act of 1990 (R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-112-1 et. seq.) and the RI. Fair E Act (RI. Gen. Laws § 28-5-1 et. seq.), respectively. Count III alleges "discri inatory terms and conditions of employment, unlawful discharge and retaliation based on gender and ethnic background" pursuant to Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000 et. seq.). summary judgment on all three counts. II. STANDARDOFREVIEW Summary judgment can be granted only when the Court finds that ere is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts give rise to an entitleme t to judgment as a matter of law. Wilson v. Moulison N. Corp., 639 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2011). he Court must and will view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving reasonable inferences in her favor. Id III. ANALYSIS First, there is absolutely no evidence in this case to support any of Ms. ajian-Bahmany's gender discrimination claims. Therefore, the Court grants Defendant's m tion for summary judgment with respect to the gender aspect of Ms. Hajian-Bahmany's clai . The Court will now analyze Ms. Hajian-Bahmany's remaining national origin based discrimi ation claims. 4 The three statutes cited in Ms. Hajian-Bahmany's three-count complaint provide essentially the same protection against discrimination based on national 0 gin. 3 In this case, Ms. Hajian-Bahmany alleges that she was subjected to disparate treatment b ed on her ethnicity resulting in her termination, discriminatory retaliation, and a hostile work env ronment. A. Disparate Treatment The U.S. Supreme Court has set forth a burden-shifting method to alyze a claim for disparate treatment. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). "Under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, a plaintiffmu t establish a prima facie case, which in turn gives rise to an inference of discrimination. The mployer then must state a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. If the employ r can state such a reason, the inference of discrimination disappears and the plaintiff is requir d to show that the employer's stated reason is a pretext for discrimination." Kosereis v. Rho e Island, 331 F.3d 207,212 (1st Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). 1. Prima Facie Case of Discrimination Ms. Hajian-Bahmany establishes a prima facie case of discriminatio by demonstrating that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was performing her j b at a level that rules out the possibility that she was fired for inadequate job perfo ance; (3) she suffered an adverse job action by her employer; and (4) her emplo er sought a replacement for her with roughly equivalent qualifications. While Ms. Hajian-Bahmany cites three statutes (two state, one federal) s a basis for her complaint, the law underlying the state's statutory claims is based largely 0 federal case law interpreted and applying federal law under Title VII so the applicable cas law for all three counts is the same. Neri v. Ross Simons, Inc., 897 A.2d 42, 48 (R.!. 2006). 3 5 Smith v. Stratus Computer, Inc., 40 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing Mesnic v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 823 (1st Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985, 112 S.Ct. 2965 (1992)). The First Circuit has held that proving a prima facie case in a Title VII action is "not nerous." Id at 15 nA. "If the plaintiff successfully bears this relatively light burden, we pres that the employer engaged in impermissible [ ] discrimination." Id. at 15 (citing Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094,67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981).) There is no dispute in this case, in fact the Hospital conceded at ral argument, that Ms. Hajian-Bahmany has established a prima facie case: Ms. Hajian-Bahman ,a Middle Eastern woman, is clearly part of a protected class; the parties agree that Ms. Hajian Bahmany's annual performance evaluations were excellent; in terminating her employment, the Hospital adversely affected her employment; and Ms. Hajian-Bahmany's position was not fi led but rather her clients were divided among the other clinicians with similar quali lcations and job responsibilities. Accordingly, all of the elements of a prima facie case have b en established. 2. Nondiscriminatory Reason Because Ms. Hajian-Bahmany has met this modest prima facie inference of intentional discrimination, "that inference shifts the burden 0 urden, raIsmg an production to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the chall nged employment decision." Ahern v. Shinseki, 629 F.3d 49,54 (1st Cir. 2010). The Hospital has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reas for terminating Ms. Hajian-Bahmany - that she violated the Hospital's workforce violence policy by making unwanted physical contact with a co-worker. This reason for terminatio is supported by deposition testimony, evident from the policy itself, and not disputed by Ms. Hajian-Bahmany. Whether it was a tap or a closed fist punch, Ms. Hajian-Bahmany violated 6 e Hospital's zero tolerance policy and the Hospital enforced the policy by tenninating her. ether this Court or anyone else would have made that same decision given these circumstan es is not relevant. "Courts may not sit as super personnel departments, assessing the merits - or even the rationality - of employers' nondiscriminatory business decisions." Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 825 (1st Cir. 1991). Therefore the Hospital has met its burden of pro ucing a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for tenninating Ms. Hajian-Bahmany's employmen. 3. Pretext The burden then shifts back to Ms. Hajian-Bahmany, who must en prove that the Hospital's reason for termination was a pretext for discriminatory animu. "The 'ultimate touchstone' of the McDonnell Douglas analysis is whether the emplo er's actions were improperly motivated by discrimination. Evidence that the employer's st ted reasons for its actions are pretextual can be sufficient to show improper motive, and hence, low the plaintiff to survive summary judgment." Kosereis, 331 F.3d at 213-14 (internal citatio s omitted). "One method is to produce evidence that the plaintiff was treated differently situated employees." Id. at 213 (citing Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, nc., 199 F.3d 572, 585-86 (1st Cir. 1999)). This is where Ms. Hajian-Bahmany's claim of disparate treatment ulf ately fails. In this case, Ms. Hajian-Bahmany must prove that the reason for her tennination - violation of the Hospital's zero tolerance workplace violence policy - was a pretext for her t nnination because she is Middle Eastern. Ms. Hajian-Bahmany has produced no evidence to s port the assertion that her firing was a pretext for a discriminatory motive. Looking specifi ally at the record submitted by both parties, there is no evidence that Ms. Hajian-Bahmany was treated differently from other employees tenninated under the same or similar circumstances. In fact, the record 7 shows that in each of two prior incidents of unwanted physical contact t the Hospital, the employees who struck a co-worker were also terminated. 4 There is no evid ce of the Hospital ever having taken a different action with regard to a violation of this policy. Because Ms. Hajian-Bahmany has not shown any evidence that her Iring was a pretext for discrimination or that her termination for violating the Hospital's workpl ce violence policy was conducted disparately from other employees similarly situated, her clai based on disparate treatment due to her national origin fails. B. Retaliation Ms. Hajian-Bahmany claims that her employment was terminated a retaliation for her complaints to her supervisors and to Mr. Michaud about the treatment she re eived from her coworker, Mr. Bouchard. "To maintain a claim of discriminatory retaliatio , a plaintiff must produce evidence that (1) [s]he engaged in protected conduct under Ttle VII; (2) [s]he experienced an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection xists between the protected conduct and the adverse action." Kosereis, 331 F.3d at 217 (citing u v. Boston Police Dep't, 312 F.3d 6, 14 (1st Cir. 2002)). "It is insufficient for [plaintiff] to [s]he complained and that [s]he was disciplined .... " King v. Hanover, 116 .3d 965, 968 (1st Cir. 1997). Because Ms. Hajian-Bahmany has failed to meet this evidentiary burden, her claims for discriminatory retaliation fail. Ms. Hajian-Bahmany did engage in protected activity by complaini g to her superiors about Mr. Boucher's conduct and she did experience an adverse employment ecision, satisfying the first two elements. Reflecting on the record as to the third element of h retaliation claim, In one case, the employee was a member of a union so the termination went 0 arbitration. The employee was re-hired, but as a result of the arbitration and not as a resul of the Hospital's decision. 4 8 however, there is neither any evidence, nor even a reasonable inference, of causal connection between Ms. Hajian-Bahmany's complaints about Mr. Bouchard's termination. s The Court considers the two audiences to which Ms. Hajian-B any complained about Mr. Boucher that form the basis for her retaliation claim. The first w her supervisors - Ms. Dykeman and Ms. Medeiros - to whom she complained during various The second audience was Mr. Michaud in Human Resources to whom she co plained in July of 2008, which was after the incident but during the subsequent investigati n and termination discussions. As to Ms. Hajian-Bahmany's complaints to the first audience, a consi ration oftemporal proximity prevents the Court from inferring retaliation because Ms. Hajian-Bahmany's complaints about Mr. Bouchard's conduct to Ms. Dykeman and Ms. Medeir s occurred months before her termination. In looking at the timing of events, "[t]he cases that ac ept mere temporal proximity between an employer's knowledge of protected activity and an a verse employment action as sufficient of causality to establish a prima facie case uniformly hoI that the temporal proximity must be very close." Clark Cnty Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U .. 268, 273 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). From the record in this case, it appear that Ms. HajianBahmany had not complained about Mr. Boucher to any superior post-Aug st 2007 - almost a year before she was terminated in July 2008. Based on the First Circuit's consideration of temporal proximity in Bennett v. Saint-Gobain Corp., 507 F.3d 23, 32 (1st Ci . 2007) and Ahern v. Shinseki, 629 F.3d 49,58 (1st Cir. 2010), the Court finds that Ms. Hajian-B any's claim for retaliation based on her earlier complaints to her first audience must fail. In fact, when asked at her deposition if "the hospital somehow retali ted against" her, Ms. Hajian-Bahmany answered, "Well, no." S 9 As for her complaint to Mr. Michaud, those retaliation claims too m st fail. While she did complain to Mr. Michaud during the discussion that ultimately led to h r termination, that discussion occurred as a result of her physical contact with Mr. Boucher and as not initiated by Ms. Hajian-Bahmany for the purposes of making a complaint about Mr. Bo cher. In fact, Mr. Michaud testified that he had no knowledge of Ms. Hajian-Bahmany's co plaints about Mr. Boucher prior to the investigation of the physical contact incident. Bahmany never complained to Mr. Michaud or to anyone in Human Res urces prior to the incident, and because the two supervisors to whom she did complain ab ut Mr. Boucher's conduct had no role in her termination, there is no causal connection be employment decision and her protected conduct. Therefore, Ms. Hajian-B any's claim of discriminatory retaliatory firing fails for lack of evidence. C. Hostile Work Environment Moving on to Ms. Hajian-Bahmany's hostile work environment claim, in order to prove those claims, she must demonstrate to the Court: "(1) that she [ ] is a member of a protected class; (2) that she was s bjected to unwelcome [ ] harassment; (3) that the harassment was based upo [national origin]; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive s as to alter the conditions of plaintiffs employment and create an abusive work e vironment; (5) that [ ] objectionable conduct was both objectively and subjectivel offensive, such that a reasonable person would find it hostile or abusive and victim in fact did perceive it to be so; and (6) that some basis for employer I ability has been established." O'Rourke v. Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 728 (1st Cir. 2001). Because Ms. H 'ian-Bahmany has either established or raised a disputed fact as to the first, second, third, required to prove a hostile work environment, the Court's analysis of this clai d fifth elements focuses only on the fourth and sixth elements, considering whether the harassment was severe and pervasive and whether employer liability has been established. 10 The Court is very conscious of the fact that an analysis of a hostile work environment claim is "fact specific" and that the "determination is often reserved for a ct finder." Vega- Colon v. Wyeth Pharm., 625 F.3d 22, 32 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting Po Telefonica, Inc., 447 F.3d 79, 83 (lst Cir. 2006)). The First Circuit, howev r, has imparted to district courts a clear legal standard that a plaintiff must meet regardin the "severe and pervasive and abusive work environment" element. The First Circuit held tha : A hostile work environment exists in violation of Title VII '[w]hen th workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and ins It that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's e ployment and create an abusive work environment.' There is no 'mathematic lly precise test' to determine whether [a plaintiff] presented sufficient evidenc that [s]he was subjected to a hostile work environment. Kosereis v. Rhode Island, 331 F.3d 207,216 (lst Cir. 2003) (internal citations To persuade the Court that the discrimination was "severe or perv ive," Ms. HajianBahmany points to the following, all of which were perpetrated by Mr. oucher: (1) one incident where Mr. Boucher placed a fake surveillance camera in her office; ( ) repeatedly being told to "shut-up" in her native language of Farsi (which Ms. Hajian-Bahman had taught him to say); and (3) Mr. Boucher calling her a "dictator" on multiple occasions and utting a sign with that word on her office door on one occasion. Ms. Hajian-Bahmany test fied that she was distraught and upset by Mr. Boucher's actions. In this case, the Court finds that Ms. Hajian-Bahmany's evidence of few incidents of name calling and a single "practical joke" falls short of what is required to establish a hostile work environment claim. Much like the First Circuit's upholding of the rant of summary judgment for the employer in Vega-Colon, the Court finds that Ms. Hajian Bahmany has not forged allegations bolstered by evidence that the conduct underlying environment claims were severe and pervasive. In Vega-Colon, the Court held 11 er hostile work Here [the plaintiff] alleges a very limited number of comments, alon with more frequent name calling. Although the evidence demonstrates that the comments and name calling may have been subjectively offensive to [the plain ·ff], in this court's opinion, neither amounted to objectively offensive conduct as e behavior was not severe, physically threatening, or humiliating. Moreover, [t e plaintiff] has failed to set forth sufficient evidence from which a jury could co clude that the complained of conduct interfered with his work performance to an extent that is unreasonable or that altered the conditions of his employment. Vega-Colon, 625 F.3d at 32; see also Kosereis, 331 F.3d at 216 (internal citations omitted) ("name calling ... and the teasing ... do not rise to the level of 'severe and ervasive conduct,' that is required for a hostile work environment claim. A hostile work enviro ent generally is not created by a 'mere offensive utterance,' nor does it arise from 'simpl teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents. '''). In this case, the comments about Ms. Hajian-Bahmany's national orig n involved saying not sufficient to "shut-up" in Farsi and calling her a dictator. These actions, collectively, establish that Ms. Hajian-Bahmany's workplace was permeated with t e discriminatory "intimidation, ridicule and insult" necessary to meet the requirement of a claim under First Circuit precedent. Kosereis, 331 F.3d at 216. Moreover, as is clear from Ms. ajian-Bahmany's excellent performance evaluations during her tenure at the Hospital, there is n evidence that her co-worker's conduct interfered with her work performance and/or altered th conditions of her employment. The law in this instance does not protect Ms. Hajian-Bahm y from what may well have been an obnoxious, annoying and not-so-funny co-worker. Therefore, because Ms. Hajian-Bahmany has failed to establish a [; ctual dispute that would establish that the hostility in her work environment was severe and p asive, the Court enters summary judgment for the Hospital on this claim. 6 claim under the 6 The Court need not rule on whether Ms. Hajian-Bahmany has established sixth element of a hostile work environment, that there was some basis for mployer liability, because the claim fails under the fourth element. I 12 IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, this Court grants summary judgment in 1avor of Defendant Women & Infants Hospital of Rhode Island on all counts. IT IS SO ORDERED: 13
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