URI Student Senate et al v. Town of Narragansett et al, No. 1:2008cv00207 - Document 28 (D.R.I. 2010)
Court Description: AMENDED OPINION AND ORDER re 22 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment: GRANTING 16 Motion for Summary Judgment; DENYING 17 Motion for Summary Judgment (amended for clerical/typographical corrections). So Ordered by Judge William E. Smith on 3/2/10. (Jackson, Ryan)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND ___________________________________ ) URI STUDENT SENATE, et al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) C.A. No. 08-207 S ) TOWN OF NARRAGANSETT, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) ___________________________________ AMENDED OPINION AND ORDER WILLIAM E. SMITH, United States District Judge. Each fall, students at the University of Rhode Island ( URI ) flock to the nearby town of Narragansett (the Town ) to take advantage of its abundant seasonal housing. do not welcome their presence. However, all The Town council blames student renters for throwing rowdy parties that encourage lawbreaking, such as underage drinking and fighting. the Town passed an ordinance To curb this behavior, banning so-called unruly gatherings ones at which partygoers commit unlawful acts that disturb the neighbors. Students, the URI student government, and owners of rental property in the Town ( Plaintiffs ) believe the enactment statute. is unconstitutional and preempted by a state Seeking to nullify the measure, they have brought this action against the Town, various Town officials, and the Town council ( Defendants ). Presently before the Court are the parties cross-motions for summary judgment, which turn squarely on the question of whether the unruly gatherings ordinance is constitutionally valid on its face. After holding a hearing on this matter on November 17, 2009, and considering the issues carefully, the Court concludes the Ordinance is indeed constitutional. I. Background A. The Challenged Ordinance At bottom, this dispute springs from friction students and year-round residents of the Town. between Approximately twenty-two percent of the housing stock in the Town consists of seasonal or vacation rental units, attracting many students during the school ( Facts ) ¶ 6.) year. (See Agreed Statement of Facts, The Town has long complained of quality-of-life issues resulting from high turnover and absentee landlords. concerns include overcrowding, property abuse, Its excessive traffic, noise, litter, public drunkenness, underage drinking, and fights. In the Town s view, large gatherings of people, such as parties are often to blame for these annoyances. (See Narragansett, R.I. Nuisance Ordinance ch. 856, preamble (2005), Ex. A to Facts.) The gatherings frequently become loud and unruly to the point that they constitute a threat to the peace, health, safety, or general welfare of the public. 2 (Id.) To ordinance deter such targeting Ordinance ). conduct, the unruly (See id.) Town enacted gatherings in a nuisance 2005 The key provisions of the current version provide as follows: Sec. 46-31. Public nuisance. (a) It shall be a public nuisance to conduct a gathering of five or more persons on any private property in a manner which constitutes a substantial disturbance of the quiet enjoyment of private or public property in a significant segment of a neighborhood, as a result of conduct constituting a violation of law. Illustrative of such unlawful conduct is excessive noise or traffic, obstruction of public streets by crowds or vehicles, illegal parking, public drunkenness, public urination, the service of alcohol to minors, fights, disturbances of the peace, and litter. (b) A gathering abated by all limited to, an disbanded and violators under statutes. . . . constituting a public nuisance may be reasonable means including, but not order requiring the gathering to be citation and/or arrest of any law any applicable ordinances and state Sec. 46-32. Notice of unruly gathering; posting, mailing. (a) When the police department intervenes at a gathering which constitutes a nuisance under this article, the premises at which such nuisance occurred shall be posted with a notice stating that the intervention of the police has been necessitated as a result of a public nuisance under this article caused by an event at the premises, the date of the police intervention, and that any subsequent event within the period set forth below on the same premises, which necessitates police intervention, shall result in the (the 3 joint and several liability of any guests causing the public nuisance, or any persons who own or are residents of the property at which the public nuisance occurred, or who sponsored the event constituting the public nuisance as more fully set forth below. Any notice posted between September 1 and May 31 of any year shall remain posted until May 31. Any notice posted between June 1 and August 31 of any year shall remain posted until August 31. (b) The residents and owner of such property shall be jointly responsible for ensuring that such notice is not removed or defaced and it shall be an ordinance violation carrying a penalty of a minimum, mandatory $100.00 fine in addition to any other penalties which may be due under this section if such notice is removed, obscured or defaced, provided, however, that the residents of the premises or sponsor of the event, if present, shall be consulted as to the location in which such notice is posted in order to achieve both the security of the notice and its prominent display. Ordinance §§ 46-31-32 (2007). The Ordinance thus empowers the Town police to break up parties that they decide are causing a substantial disturbance of the quiet enjoyment of private or significant segment of a neighborhood. public property in Id. § 46-31(a). a The police may only act, however, if the disturbance is a result of a violation of law. exhaustive intervene. list of These Id. misdemeanors include The Ordinance gives a nonthat excessive authorize noise or police to traffic, obstruction of public streets by crowds or vehicles, illegal parking, public drunkenness, public urination, the service of 4 alcohol to litter. minors, fights, disturbances of the peace, and Id. After dispersing a gathering determined to be a nuisance, the police premises. must post a notice prominently on the Id. § 46-32(a)-(b). This takes the form of a ten-by- fourteen-inch entrance. then orange sticker placed (See Facts ¶ 21-22.) on or about the front The sticker warns that any further police intervention for a nuisance violation at the same address during a designated time period will result in joint and several liability for sponsors of a gathering, the residents and owners of the premises, and any guests who cause the nuisance. The time period runs for the duration of the seasonal housing cycle, during which the sticker must remain in place. If posted September 1 or after, it stays until May 31; if posted after May 31, it stays until September 1. Removing or otherwise tampering with the sticker during that time carries a $100.00 fine for residents and landlords. (b). See Ordinance § 46-32 Landlords also receive copies of the notice in the mail. See id. § 46-33. Section 46-34 of the Ordinance identifies the parties who may be punished for subsequent bearing stickers: 5 police responses to houses Sec. 46-34. Persons liable for subsequent response to gathering constituting a public nuisance. (a) If the police department is required to respond to a gathering constituting a public nuisance on the premises more than once in any posting periods set forth in Section 46-32(a), the following persons shall be jointly and severally liable for fines as set forth below: (1) The person or persons who own the property where the gathering constituting the public nuisance took place, provided that notice has been mailed to the owner of the property as set forth herein and the gathering occurs at least two weeks after the mailing of such notice. (2) The person or persons residing on or otherwise in control of the property where such gathering took place. (3) The person or persons who organized or sponsored such gathering. (4) All persons attending such gatherings who engage in any activity resulting in the public nuisance. (5) Nothing in this section shall be construed to impose liability on the resident or owners of the premises or sponsor of the gathering, for the conduct of persons who are present without the express or implied consent of the resident or sponsor, as long as the resident and sponsor have taken all steps reasonably necessary to exclude such uninvited participants from the premises, including landlords who are actively attempting to evict a tenant from the premises. Ordinance § 46-34(a). 6 The effect of § 46-34 is to make landlords, residents, party sponsors, and any guests who cause a nuisance jointly and severally liable for any additional unruly stickered houses during the same season. gatherings at However, residents, owners, and sponsors may assert the defense that only uninvited participants engaged in illegal conduct. the resident, owner, or sponsor took This requires that all necessary to exclude such party-crashers. steps reasonably Id. § 46-34 (a)(5). For landlords, these measures may include active[] attempts to evict a tenant. Id.1 Finally, section 46-35 establishes the penalties for liable parties. Id. § 46-35(a). The first post- sticker police intervention at an unruly gathering during the posting period triggers a fine of $300; the second, $400; and the third, $500. See id. service first for the Violators may also receive community nuisance abatement; See id. § 46-35(b). starting with the second. The Town Ordinance. police have compiles information related it to is mandatory enforcing the Nuisance house lists display all addresses where dispersed an unruly gathering, houses have stickers during a given season. and show (Facts Ex. D.) which The 1 In addition, § 46-34(b) creates an exception for isolated instances of nuisance-causing behavior by invited guests requiring police intervention. Provided the unlawful conduct was unforeseeable, this defense relieves residents and sponsors of liability. 7 Town also maintains a URI Stats chart to track infractions specifically committed by URI students. data on (See Pls. Resp. Mem. 6.) B. Procedural History Plaintiffs students fall residing into in four the Town categories: who have (i) been individual charged with violating § 46-31, and claim they were subjected to discipline at URI as a result; (ii) individual students who had their rental homes posted with orange stickers, and claim that as a result they were evicted from their apartments and disciplined by URI; (iii) landlords who had their properties posted with orange stickers and claim they have not been able to rent their property as elected body a result; purporting and (iv) to the URI represent the student senate, interests of an URI students. Prior to this lawsuit, prosecution of the Plaintiffs in category (i) had been underway in the Town s Municipal Court. However, Defendants suspended outcome of this case. complaint in Rhode those proceedings pending the In May 2008, all Plaintiffs filed a Island Superior Court against Defendants, challenging the Ordinance as invalid under federal and state 8 law.2 Defendants removed the action to federal court in this District on the basis that questions of federal law. many of the claims depended on Plaintiffs petitioned for remand to state court, but Judge Torres of this Court denied the motion in September 2008. The case was subsequently reassigned to this Court. Plaintiffs raise six arguments in their frontal attack on the Ordinance: (i) the Ordinance violates their rights to substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment; (ii) it offends due process under the Fourteenth Amendment because it is too vague; (iii) it violates the First Amendment because it is overbroad; (iv) it denies Plaintiffs procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, because police may post orange stickers without a hearing; (v) it deprives Plaintiffs of equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment; and (vi) it is preempted Defendants seek by the dismissal Rhode of each stipulated to all material facts. the case turns entirely on Island Landlord-Tenant claim. The parties Act. have Accordingly, the outcome of whether the Ordinance survives Plaintiffs facial challenges. 2 Defendants apparently disputed the standing of the student senate in state court proceedings, without success. The disposition of that challenge is not part of the record here. 9 II. Discussion A. Substantive Due Process Several of Plaintiffs claims depend on how much, if any, constitutionally-protected activity is at stake, so it is most economical to initially address the assertion that the Ordinance burdens substantive due process rights. Plaintiffs do not invoke the due process doctrine used for redressing state action that shocks the conscience. Cf. Rivera v. Rhode Island, 402 F.3d 27, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2005). Rather, they contend that the Ordinance privacy rights. targets (Pls. fundamental Mem. 15.) and Plaintiffs associational heavy reliance on Lawrence v Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), shows how ill-suited the constitutional right of privacy is to their claims. Lawrence is the culmination of a line of cases holding that states cannot criminalize choices central to personal dignity and autonomy. Id. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)). that these personal The Supreme Court has held decisions relate to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. Id. at 573-74. The Ordinance in issue here does not punish such decisions, or even Casey. remotely relate to any of the topics identified in It does not make private or intimate behavior criminal. Rather, the Ordinance targets nuisances at gatherings of five 10 or more people caused by an underlying misdemeanor, such as underage drinking or fighting. The possibility that some form of intimate activity of the type Lawrence contemplated may be going on behind the scenes is beside the point that is not what the law is targeting. This line of attack holds no more water than one that claims an overnight parking ban in a city park is unconstitutional because the parkers may be having sex in the back seat. Plaintiffs also fail to articulate how the Ordinance inhibits any constitutionally protected intimate association. They cite the right to choose one s roommates and friends. Aside from the fact that the Ordinance does not mention, let alone criminalize, these choices, [t]he unmarried cohabitation of adults does not fall under any of the Supreme Court s brightline categories for fundamental rights in the area of intimate association. (1st Cir. Poirier v. Mass. Dep t of Corr., 558 F.3d 92, 96 2009). friendships, The even those same is true embodied of by organizations, which do not appear here. Murphy, 511 F.3d 247, 278-79 (2d Cir. close formal See 2007). personal clubs or Piscottano v. Beyond that, Plaintiffs have not explained how the relationships at issue involve personal bonds that have played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and 11 beliefs[, and] thereby foster diversity and act as critical buffers between the individual and the power of the State. Poirier, 558 F.3d at 95 (quoting the intimate association standard from Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984)). The rights they assert therefore do not qualify for constitutional protection. B. The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine Plaintiffs assert that § 46-31 of the Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague, because it hinges on imprecise adjectives that invite capricious application by the police. In particular, Plaintiffs object to the words unruly gathering, substantial disturbance, public nuisance, and a significant segment of a neighborhood. These terms do obligate the police to exercise discretion in enforcing the Ordinance. If such phrases were unmoored, Plaintiffs might have a viable complaint, but here the Ordinance provides sufficient guidance to satisfy the requirements of due process. 1. Legal standard [T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does discriminatory enforcement. not encourage arbitrary and United States v. Lachman, 387 F.3d 42, 56 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)). [F]lexibility and reasonable breadth, are 12 acceptable, and meticulous specificity is not Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972). no easy depends test on for unconstitutional whether, taken in the vagueness. particular The required. There is outcome context of operation, Grayned, 408 U.S. at 112, the Ordinance establishes minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358. 2. Level of scrutiny Laws that chill speech or other protected conduct receive closer scrutiny in a vagueness analysis. See Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Authority, 390 F.3d 65, 94 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that the absence of a chilling effect relaxes scrutiny for vagueness, and citing Children of the Rosary v. City of Phoenix, 154 F.3d 972, 983 (9th Cir. 1998)). The classic example of such a law is one that abut[s] upon . . . First Amendment freedoms because its scope is indefinite. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09. The Supreme Court has also applied closer scrutiny to laws that discourage the exercise of other freedoms, such as the liberty interest in loiter[ing] for innocent purposes in public. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53-54 (1999) (invalidating an anti-loitering law on vagueness grounds).3 On the other hand, 3 Plaintiffs cannot rely on any right to loiter. The Ordinance does not punish party guests who loiter innocently, but only those who engage in any activity resulting in the 13 if the law has no effect on protected conduct, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497 (1982). high hurdle. This is a dauntingly Donovan v. City of Haverhill, 311 F.3d 74, 77 (1st Cir. 2002). Can Plaintiffs identify Ordinance might chill? any protected conduct that the The Court has already determined that substantive due process privacy and associational rights are not at issue. What about free speech, expression, and assembly? Plaintiffs do pursuant to the not assert Ordinance that were any gatherings political dispersed demonstrations, see Grayned, 408 U.S. at 105, meetings of organizations that seek[] to transmit . . . a system of values to their members, see Boy public nuisance. Ordinance § 46-34(5). Section 46-31(a) defines the activity that result[s] in a public nuisance: conduct constituting a violation of law, such as underage drinking or public urination. Id. § 46-31(a). This means that only guests who break laws that Plaintiffs do not challenge (such as the legal drinking age, parking ordinances, etc.) may be fined. True, there is no language in § 46-34 limiting liability for owners, event sponsors, and residents to people who engage in nuisance-causing crimes. But unlike the antiloitering law in Morales, the Ordinance would not penalize party-going owners, sponsors, or residents because they were loitering. Instead, it would punish them for failing to prevent a party from escalating into a nuisance because of lawbreaking guests. 14 Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 650 (2000), or concerts, see Ward v. (explaining Rock Against that protection). Racism, playing Instead, 491 music Plaintiffs U.S. 781, enjoys First proclaim that 790 (1989) Amendment [s]tudents should have the right to congregate and socialize whether for political or social reasons. nothing in the record (Pls. Resp. Mem. 16.) suggests that the In fact, gatherings serve anything other than social purposes, an objective that falls flat. Anyone who has college-aged children knows that hanging out is an important, even vital social experience. But just as the Constitution does not recognize[] a generalized right of social association of the type that includes chance encounters in dance halls, City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989), it does not protect college house parties, no matter how many problems of the world may be solved at them. Under Stanglin, protection for Plaintiffs get-togethers cannot that do claim not serve constitutional political or expressive ends.4 For these reasons, the Court has no serious concern about a chilling effect. Ridley, 390 F.3d at 94. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that Defendants could use the Ordinance to disrupt 4 In other words, while the Beastie Boys might disagree, the First Amendment does not imply a right to party dissociated from expression. 15 political homes. events, meetings or religious congregations at students Therefore, although the record lacks evidence of such the Court examines the Ordinance closely for impermissible vagueness.5 3. Analysis The definition of public nuisance in § 46-31(a) rests, in part, on the meaning of the phrase, a substantial disturbance of the quiet enjoyment of private or significant segment of a neighborhood. It is true that, significant gatherings. on draw no their clear own, line the public property in a Ordinance § 46-31(a). words between substantial legal and and illegal Their flexibility and breadth leave discretion to the police. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110. For this reason, these same adjectives have created vagueness problems in other municipal ordinances. See Fantasy Book Shop, Inc. v. City of Boston, 652 F.2d 1115, 1119 (1st Cir. 1981) (finding the phrase otherwise significantly harm[] the legitimate protectable interests of the affected citizens of the city too vague as grounds for denying a public amusement license); Ellwest Stereo Theater, Inc. v. Boner, 718 F. Supp. 1553, 1581 (M.D. Tenn. 5 That the Ordinance warrants a careful review. 352, 358 (1983). imposes criminal penalties also See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 16 1989) (finding substantial or significant unconstitutionally vague in an adult bookstore ordinance). What sets the Ordinance apart from such laws is the latter part of § 46-31(a), enforcement. which imposes a key precondition to Before the police can step in, someone at the party must first engage in conduct constituting a violation of law, such as underage drinking or public urination. 31(a). Officers premises, or gathering, misdemeanor. may cite unless The not anyone one of language place in an connection the of orange revelers § 46-31(a) Id. § 46- sticker with an first on unruly commits requires any a and Defendants confirmed at oral argument that this infraction must pertain to a law other than the Ordinance itself, such as a littering ordinance or the legal drinking age.6 Consequently, the Ordinance does not take effect only at the whim of [a] 6 Plaintiffs dispute this interpretation of the Ordinance, arguing that police intervention is not limited to incidents where specific laws have been broken. (Pls. Resp. Mem. 1415.) The plain terms of the Ordinance demonstrate otherwise, as discussed above. In addition, Defendants attest that § 46-31(a) does, in fact, carry a misdemeanor prerequisite. Thus, even if the language of the Ordinance plausibly admitted Plaintiffs proposed interpretation (which it does not), the Court would be free to accept Defendants narrower view. In the context of a facial challenge, courts should extend a measure of deference to the judgment of the legislative body that enacted the law. IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 62 (1st Cir. 2008) ( This perspective requires us to give [the government s proposed] exceptions [to the law in question] their full scope and eliminates any chilling effect. ) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted). 17 police officer. 87, 90 (1965). Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. Instead, the misdemeanor prerequisite shapes a particular context for enforcement. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 112; see Dupres v. City of Newport, Rhode Island, 978 F. Supp. 429, 434 (D.R.I. 1997) ( [T]he vagueness of a statute s terms can often be dispelled by language reciting the statute s purpose and specifically defining the setting in which it applies. ). Moreover, gatherings § 46-31(a) qualify as predicate offenses. sharpens nuisances the by picture listing of what illustrative Plaintiffs do not argue that the listed crimes are vaguely defined. In particular, public urination, the service of alcohol to minors, and litter are unambiguous. Ordinance § 46-31(a). Other examples, such as obstruction of public streets by crowds or vehicles, public drunkenness, and fights, are clear enough to communicate [the] reach of the Ordinance in words of common understanding. 485 U.S. creates 312, no regulation 332 fatal (1988). flaw. requires unconstitutionally That The the mere interpretation vague. Lachman, list fact does 387 Boos v. Barry, is that non-exclusive a F.3d at or render not statute it 56. The Ordinance thus need not enumerate every conceivable breach of local, state, or federal law that might trigger a nuisance. Rather, it effectively narrows its scope by suppl[ying] . . . 18 specificity cover[s]. by way of examples of the conduct which [it] Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 754 (1974).7 The term quiet enjoyment further hones the context for the Ordinance enactment. by calling attention to the reasons for its The preamble to the 2005 version identifies threats to the peace, health, safety, or general welfare of the public as a result of the same crimes listed in 46-31(a) of the current version ( excessive noise, excessive traffic, etc.). (See Facts Ex. A.) life issues, The preamble s concern for such quality of mirrored in the Town s provides additional guidance for police. Comprehensive (Facts ¶ 7.) Plan, The Town may properly rely on these sources, though they are not part of the definition of a public nuisance itself, to demonstrate that the circumstances sufficiently narrow. in which the Ordinance applies are See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110-11 (looking to the preamble of a statute to determine context); IMS Health 7 oral argument, counsel for Defendants disclosed that police are not obligated to issue citations for predicate misdemeanors when enforcing the Ordinance. For purposes of a vagueness challenge, this does not matter. In this context, the significance of the violation of law provision is not that it assures process for Ordinance violators in the form of a misdemeanor hearing. Rather, as emphasized above, the point of the petty offense prerequisite is that it restricts the circumstances in which the Ordinance may be invoked. The fact that police retain discretion to charge a violation of the Ordinance, but not the underlying misdemeanor, does not lift that restriction. Whether or not an independent violation of law is itself prosecuted, the police cannot enforce the Ordinance unless and until they identify one. At 19 Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 62 (1st Cir. 2008) (relying on the state s articulated purpose of a statute to judge context). In sum, the requirement that someone at a gathering must commit a crime, the concrete examples of predicate misdemeanors, and the concern for quiet enjoyment of property and quality of life, together, achieve the necessary minimal guidelines to govern the police in enforcing the Ordinance. U.S. at 358. For unconstitutionally substantial, that vague reason, and the Ordinance it because significant, Kolender, 461 uses is not words See nuisance. the Doctor John s, Inc. v. City of Roy, 465 F.3d 1150, 1159-60 (10th Cir. 2006) (approving significant or substantial language in adult business statute where the law provided adequate guidelines for police); Helguero v. City of Costa Mesa, 134 F.3d 377 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision) (rejecting vagueness challenge to entertainment permit ordinance designed to fight noise that turned on a substantially adverse impact ); see also Reeves v. McConn, 631 F.2d 377, 386 (5th Cir. 1980) (approving of the term nuisance in a noise regulation); Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for Town of Morristown, 958 F.2d 1242, 1268 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding the word nuisance was not too vague because it involved an objective reasonableness subjective annoyance test). 20 test rather than a C. Overbreadth Plaintiffs contend that the Ordinance is over-inclusive in that it punishes individuals who have committed no crime or violation for simply being location or an event. present at or (Pls. Mem. 17.) associated with a To the extent this argument relies on the constitutional overbreadth doctrine, it is misconceived. Overbreadth analysis looks to whether a law sweeps within its ambit protected activities as well as unprotected ones. Fantasy Book Shop, 652 F.2d at 1122 n.9 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To invalidate a law on overbreadth grounds, the impermissible applications of the law must be substantial when judged in relation to [its] plainly legitimate sweep. Morales, 527 U.S. at 52 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As a result, if a law does not reach a constitutionally-protected substantial amount of the overbreadth challenge . . . must fail. conduct, Whiting v. Town of Westerly, 942 F.2d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 1991). As explained above, nothing in the record indicates that the Ordinance reaches protected conduct, let alone a substantial amount of constitutional activity. Speculation that with it could, in some circumstances, interfere First Amendment expression is not sufficient to sustain an overbreadth attack. Even laws that infringe 21 on some constitutionally protected rights overbreadth. do See not rise Morales, to 527 the U.S. level at 52 of impermissible (discussing an ordinance that chilled the exercise of constitutional freedoms but did not fit within the overbreadth doctrine because it did not affect a substantial amount of protected conduct).8 The Court thus discerns no overbreadth problem with the Ordinance. D. Procedural Due Process Plaintiffs argue that the orange sticker provision in § 46-32 lets the police defame[] and humiliate[] landlords and tenants without due process of law. (Pls. Mem. 14.) That 8 At best, Plaintiffs argument amounts to a misplaced challenge to what appears to be a strict liability feature of the Ordinance. In what would seem to be its most extreme application, § 46-34(a)(2) could conceivably extend to a party sponsor s roommate studying in the library who did not even know about the gathering at his house in other words, to someone who did not take any culpable action or possess any culpable mental state. This, however, would not necessarily create a constitutional problem. While strict liability offenses generally are disfavored, there are exceptions. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606 (1994). Some laws that are regulatory in nature can impose strict liability if they provide only for misdemeanor offenses punishable by fines instead of imprisonment. Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 476-77 (7th Cir. 1999) (discussing misdemeanor offenses that could fairly impose strict liability and citing cases); see, e.g., United States v. Zak, 486 F. Supp. 2d 208, 213-14 (D. Mass. 2007) (upholding a strict liability misdemeanor provision of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act). In any event, the fact that neither party briefed this issue precludes the Court from fully addressing it. 22 there is no opportunity to challenge the posting of unruly gathering notices is, without aspect of the Ordinance. question, the most troubling However, to demonstrate that a law permits the deprivation of life, liberty, or property, without due process, U. S. Const. amend. XIV, a party must first identify a specific liberty or property interest harmed by the enactment. Here, under First Circuit precedent defining such freedoms, the interests cited by Plaintiffs fall shy of constitutional constrained protection. to uphold For the that Ordinance reason, as the compliant Court is with due process. 1. Alleged liberty and property interests Plaintiffs stigmatizing procedural effect of § due process 46-32. The claim orange centers on stickers, the they assert, publicly brand residents and owners of the premises as criminals. any student houses, and Compounding the problem, the Town informs URI when receives has, a sticker, according newspapers of the postings. to keeps a list Plaintiffs, of nuisance notified (See Pls. Mem. 14.) local Plaintiffs contend that the absence of an opportunity for a hearing on whether there are legitimate grounds to place a sticker on a house and thereby to malign the reputation of its owner and residents offends due process. They rely on Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) and Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 23 565 (1975), person s for good the name, government harm. principle reputation, that due honor, process [and] protects integrity a from Goss, 419 U.S. at 574 (quoting Constantineau). The Court agrees that receiving an orange sticker might be humiliating. However, the Supreme Court has made clear that due process claims cannot rest on harm to reputation alone. v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). Paul A party must point to some more tangible interests that the government has impaired. Id. [T]he reputational injury must be accompanied by a change in the injured person's status or rights under substantive state or federal law. Silva v. Worden, 130 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1997). This could take the form of employment termination, see Paul, 424 U.S. at 701, suspension from a public school, which was the injury suffered by the plaintiffs in Goss, see 419 U.S. at 567, or revocation of the right to buy alcohol, a privilege taken away in Constantineau, see 400 U.S. at 435. In defamation actions against state officials, the more tangible requirement stigma-plus standard. translates into what is known as the The plus aspect of the test requires proving that steps taken by a government actor adversely impact a right or status previously enjoyed under state law. Pendleton v. City of Haverhill, 156 F.3d 57, 63 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing Paul protected). for the principle that reputation alone is not In Pendleton, the police arrested the plaintiff on 24 drug charges, but a judge dismissed the case upon learning that the alleged contraband had not been tested. Subsequently, the arresting officer told a newspaper reporter that he thought the plaintiff cocaine was use. guilty, After divulging a story lurid ran details quoting the about alleged officer, plaintiff s employer, a private organization, fired him. the See id. at 61-62. The First Circuit held that the loss of the plaintiff s job did not measure up as a plus factor, for two reasons. First, the state action that tarnishes a plaintiff s reputation must occur incident to the more tangible Pendleton, 156 F.3d at 63 (citation omitted). plus element. In Pendleton, the alleged defamation and the decision to cashier [the plaintiff] came from two separate, unrelated officer and the plaintiff s employer. explained, occurred [t]he incident former to cannot the sources: As arresting The First Circuit Id. plausibly latter. the be such, said the to have allegedly defamatory remarks cannot be viewed as working a denial of a previously recognized right or status. Id. For this reason, in later cases the First Circuit has rejected due process claims if the source of the plus and that of the stigma are two different actors, even where both are government entities. See Hawkins v. R.I. Lottery Comm n, 238 F.3d 112, 116 (1st Cir. 2001) ( In this case, the party responsible for the alleged 25 defamation [the governor of Rhode Island] was not the party responsible for the termination [the state lottery commission]. ); see also WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 80 F.3d 1315, 1320 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining that, under the stigmaplus approach, a plaintiff cannot rely on injury caused by the act of some third party ). Second, a action. plus factor benefices government valid denied as Pendleton, 156 F.3d a at requires result 63. the of loss of governmental The loss of the plaintiff s job did not qualify, because he worked for a nongovernmental position. employer Id. and lost a private (not a public) Accordingly, Pendleton made clear that the loss of private employment, or of business opportunities from private clients, cannot suffice as more tangible interests under Paul. Pendleton, 156 F.3d at 63; see Goulding v. Feinglass, 811 F.2d 1099, 1102-03 opportunities (7th due Cir. to a 1987) damaged (finding that reputation lost did business not create reputation-based liberty interest); see also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. (explaining 226, 241-242, that Supreme (1991) Court (Marshall, cases J., finding dissenting) stigma-based procedural due process violations involved loss of present or future government employment, employment) (emphasis in original). 26 as opposed to private In this case, Plaintiffs expressly premise their theory of harm on stigma. Consequently, the fact that their claims reach further than defamation they challenge the law on its face, not merely a single defamatory application of it does not relieve them of satisfying the plus element defined in Pendleton. It is here construing the representations cognizable that Plaintiffs record, at plus the oral eludes into briefs, argument factor run most their a wall. and Plaintiffs favorably grasp. Even to They them, a rely on various censures imposed by people other than Defendants in the wake of sticker postings. For example, as a result of the Town informing URI when student houses get stickers, some Plaintiffs have endured academic discipline, and one was suspended from the hockey team. (See Facts ¶¶ 30, 33.) evicted from their apartments. Several have also been (See id. ¶¶ 31-32.) As for the landlord Plaintiffs, some have been unable to rent apartments for the season. The shortcoming of the claimed involve third parties in some way. harms is that they all To begin with, it is clear that the academic discipline and vacant apartments arise from independent decisions of actors who are separate from, and unrelated to Defendants: namely, URI officials and prospective tenants who elected not to rent 27 houses with stickers. See Pendleton, 156 F.3d at 63. Even if catalyzed by government action, harms at the hands of those parties cannot serve as plus factors, any more than the employer s dismissal of the plaintiff in Pendleton could. See id.; WMX Techs., 80 F.3d at 1320. The fact that URI is a state institution does not help Plaintiffs, because it is a separate entity and not the source of the alleged defamation. that the governor of In Hawkins, the plaintiff complained Rhode Island falsely accused him of scandal, causing the state lottery commission to oust him. Hawkins, 238 F.3d at 115. a See The plaintiff sued both the governor and the commission, relying on the close relationship between the two, but the process claim. defamation First Circuit Id. at 115. refer to refused to recognize a due The only specific allegations of statements by the governor, while the termination was at the will of the [commission], which by law is fiscally and operationally autonomous. Id. at 115-16. Therefore, the party responsible for the alleged defamation was not the party responsible for the plaintiff s stigma-plus theory collapsed. is true here with respect to URI. termination, Id. at 116. and the The same In fact, it is even less plausible that the party responsible for the stigma could have any ostensible authority over the party responsible for the 28 plus factor. The Town is a municipality, whereas URI is operated by a branch of the state.9 As for the evictions, it is true that the line between Defendants and the source of more tangible harm blurs slightly with respect to this alleged injury. Of course, landlords who ejected their tenants are third parties in the sense that they are not Defendants. See WMX Techs., 80 F.3d at 1320. But their actions are, at least arguably, not unrelated to the source of the stigma the Town s enforcement of the Ordinance. Section 46-34 gives landlords who are actively attempting to evict a tenant from the premises a defense to liability for penalties under § 46-35. Ordinance § 46-34 (5). Thus, the Ordinance incentivizes landlords to dispossess renters from any apartment that gets a sticker. The evictions are thus closer to the mark than the type of unrelated plus factor termination in Pendleton. exemplified by the plaintiff s Adopting the perspective of the third party responsible for the alleged more tangible harm drives 9 The notice of Ordinance violations the Town provides to URI does not bridge the gap between the two. In Hawkins, the allegation that the Governor influenced the lottery commission did not change the result. Nor is this a case like Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 630 (1980), in which, as the First Circuit pointed out, the defendant at issue was not an individual, but the city in other words, a single entity and all of the challenged conduct was that of city officials. Hawkins v. R.I. Lottery Comm n, 238 F.3d 112, 115 (1st Cir. 2001). 29 home the point. It is one thing to learn that one s employee or, in this case, one s tenant is unfit to fulfill the terms of her another contract to be because put to of the criminal choice of activity. either contract or facing criminal penalties oneself. It is quite terminating the In other words, the Ordinance coerces landlords to choose eviction out of selfdefense. Thus, unlike the private employer s reaction to the scandal in Pendleton, it is easier to see the landlords actions as an extension of the challenged government activity, rather than truly unrelated. Ultimately, however, even if the Court could accept this proposition, it would not secure victory for Plaintiffs. As explained below, the evictions do not qualify as government benefices denied as a result of governmental action the other criterion for a plus factor. Nor do they, or the other alleged injuries, constitute government intrusion on protected property or liberty interests independent from any stigma. The Court addresses each in turn. i. Although contract Evictions no between obligations, not canceled leases private government appear parties in would benefices. the record, secure The Rhode any private Island Landlord-Tenant Act (the Act ) creates no right to particular lengths of tenancy irrespective of lease terms that allow a 30 landlord to seek eviction. On the contrary, a landlord may use streamlined eviction proceedings against any seasonal tenant who has been charged with violating a municipal ordinance or has otherwise violated the terms of the rental agreement pertaining to legal occupancy or excessive noise or other disturbance of the peace. R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-18-36(f) (2009). For the same reason, the evictions do not rise to the level of interference with a protected property interest separate from the interests stigma must imposed rest on by orange legitimate stickers. claim[s] of Property entitlement under state law, as opposed to unilateral expectation[s]. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Such interests are created and defined by existing rules or understandings state law. that stem from an independent source such as Hatfield-Bermudez v. Aldonando-Rivera, 496 F.3d 51, 59-61 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577) (quotation marks and alterations omitted). Section 34-18-36(f) eliminates any argument that Plaintiffs could be entitled to continued occupancy notwithstanding an Ordinance violation. Indeed, any seasonal tenant charged with violating a municipal ordinance may be subject to expedited eviction. 18-36(f). 31 See R.I. Gen. Laws § 34- ii. Lost rents These conclusions apply to the rents landlords have been unable to earn from vacant properties as well. Act gives landlords apartments all year. the right to have Nothing in the tenants lease their Where a tenant and landlord do decide to enter a lease, the Act contemplates that they may agree on the amount of rent to be paid. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-18-15(a). The Act thus envisions that owners ability to earn revenues by leasing their property depends on willing lessees. short of creating a legitimate claim of This falls entitlement to a desired rental value for an apartment, or transforming rental income into a government benefice. Moreover, in this context, losing rent for as long as an orange sticker remains in place is not the type of temporary injury to process. or real property that has been held to violate due The Supreme Court has held that even the temporary partial impairments to property rights that attachments, liens, and similar encumbrances entail are sufficient to merit due process protection. Garcia-Rubiera v. Calderon, 570 F.3d 443, 457 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 12 (1991)). The reason is that such devices may cloud[] title, alienability, limit[] potential mortgages. [and] current and Id. at 457-58 (citation, quotation marks, and internal alterations omitted). affect[] 32 The property owners here might insist that limiting alienability is exactly what the orange stickers achieve, as evidenced by the vacancies. However, this is not due to any legal effect the sticker has, but the practical reality that potential renters find houses with stickers less desirable. Unlike liens or attachments, which create interests that might trump those of future tenants, buyers, or creditors, the sticker does not erect any legal barriers to renting, selling, or mortgaging a residence. The orange sticker provision is therefore not analogous to those encumbrances. Of course, the distinction between legal effects and practical consequences means little to the landlord Plaintiffs. The end result is the same: they lose (potentially) a season of rental income. against every But the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect law that property less profitable. has the ultimate outcome of making See BAM Historic District Ass'n v. Koch, 723 F.2d 233, 237 (2d Cir. 1983) (rejecting due process claim targeting quality of zoning life in a regulations that neighborhood, arguably causing a decreased decline in property values, where owners failed to demonstrate that their property has been taken or their regulated as to destroy its value ) use of it so drastically Here, the vacancies that allegedly resulted from the Ordinance do not fit any category of constitutional harm recognized in case law. 33 In fact, a comparison to the closest possible match the Court has located, Hidden Oaks Ltd. v. City of Austin, 138 F.3d 1036, 1040 (5th Cir. 1998), Plaintiffs: they have not pinpoints proven attributable to state action. another that See the obstacle lost rents for are Logiodice v. Trustees of Maine Cent. Inst., 296 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 2002) (explaining the state action requirement in Fourteenth Amendment cases). Hidden Oaks, the Fifth Circuit recognized a due In process violation where a municipality placed a two-year utility hold on the plaintiff s apartment collection of rental income. 1046-47. apartments necessary Plaintiffs Cutting off complete do not thus, the thereby precluding the Hidden Oaks, 138 F.3d at 1040, utilities uninhabitable; to complex, there alleged represent effectively that were no the further steps Not injury.10 orange rendered here: stickers so prevent apartments from being placed on the market, unlike a lack of power or hot water would.11 vacancies would not have Therefore, it is clear that the occurred renters to avoid stickered houses. but for the decisions of Plaintiffs have failed to 10 See Hidden Oaks Ltd. v. City of Austin, 138 F.3d 1036, 1039 (5th Cir. 1998) (explaining that utility service could not be reconnected once a tenant moved out of a unit). 11 Instead, they assert they have not been able to rent out their property, which indicates that they have attempted to do so. (Facts ¶ 36.) 34 demonstrate that attributable to such the third-party Town, result from state action. 922, 937 (1982); see such choices that they are can be fairly deemed to Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. Sullivan v. N.J. Div. of Gaming Enforcement, 602 F. Supp. 1216, 1220 (D.N.J. 1985) (rejecting a Fourteenth contract Amendment with the claim where plaintiff a third following a party state breached action, a and observing that courts do not allow due process claims whenever a state officer is indirectly involved in the chain of events leading to [the] plaintiff s harm ). For each of these reasons, the lost rents do not on their own give rise to a due process claim. iii. URI discipline As stated responsible disciplinary Pendleton. for above, the the alleged measures fact could that stigma serve URI officials douses as the plus are notion factors not that under Yet, the student Plaintiffs correctly assert that they possess a liberty interest in pursuing higher education. The Ordinance itself, however, does not interfere with educational freedom. [A] student facing expulsion or suspension from a public educational institution, such as URI, is entitled to the protections of due process. Gorman v Univ. of R.I., 837 F.3d 35 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1988).12 penalties that harsh. sanction[s] (Facts hockey team (see id. Here, no Plaintiff claims to face Some have been subject to unspecified ¶ 30); ¶ 33). another was suspended from the It is not clear that these events put constitutional due process into play. See Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1234-35 (10th Cir. 1996) ( With regard to the specific components of education which [the plaintiff] claims were lost (e.g., the right to participate in sports, to take advanced placement classes, and to attend a particular school), we do not believe that [the plaintiff] has a constitutional right to those particular incidents of education. ). In any event, assuming for the sake of argument that they do, the process due in such circumstances applies to procedures employed in a disciplinary action itself. 837 F.3d at 12. process the Gorman, Thus, a student could raise a procedural due challenge to constitutional deficiencies in URI s disciplinary procedures, as the URI-student plaintiff in Gorman did. But here, Plaintiffs do not name URI as a defendant, or allege any flaws in the disciplinary process. Moreover, they 12 But see Williams v. Wendler, 530 F.3d 584, 589 (7th Cir. 2008) ( [The plaintiffs] premise the claim entirely on the bald assertion that any student who is suspended from college has suffered a deprivation of constitutional property. That cannot be right. . . . [T]he Supreme Court requires . . . proof of an entitlement [defined by contract with the school]. ). 36 provide no authority for the proposition that educational freedom gives rise to a cause of action against a municipality whose actions precipitate university sanctions. 2. Conclusion The reasoning above suffices procedural due process claims. with the Court.13 perfect. to reject Plaintiffs Yet, the result sits uneasily Experience teaches that law enforcement is not What happens if the police, though acting in good faith, put stickers on some homes where no unruly gathering 13 A major reason for this is that, if Plaintiffs could demonstrate that a protected interest was at stake, it is likely that the Town s procedures in connection with § 46-32 would be inadequate. The Town proposes that defamation claims under state law are available to redress the harm from any improperlyposted stickers. Yet, state tort lawsuits filed after the fact only suffice to remedy random and unauthorized government actions. Chmielinski v. Mass., 513 F.3d 309, 315 (1st Cir. 2008); see Smith v. Mass. Dep t of Corr., 936 F.2d 1390, 1392-93 (1st Cir. 1991) (explaining allegations that the defendants abused their authority by threatening and coercing witnesses to fabricate complaints against the plaintiff). Unlike malicious prosecution, the conduct at issue in Smith, posting an orange sticker is an established state procedure, because the Ordinance expressly authorizes it. Rivera-Powell v. New York City Bd. of Elections, 470 F.3d 458, 465 (2d Cir. 2006). Because the Town can thus anticipate the imposition of the penalty, the ability to later sue for defamation would not be good enough if there were a protected interest in play. In that case, the Court would likely find that the Town could offer a hearing after an unruly gathering is disbanded, but before punishing anyone with a sticker similar to the standard procedure for traffic tickets. 37 actually occurred? Such errors cracks and allow for no remedy. appear to fall between the They are neither constitutional violations, nor, in the majority of cases, the types of mistakes that would be fruitful to pursue in a defamation lawsuit. landlords, sticker there goes is up, no but right the to a hearing resulting loss before of a an few For orange thousand dollars in rent is not likely to justify the cost of litigating a defamation claim. For students, the cost-benefit comparison yields a similar outcome, unless eviction or academic discipline results in a disaster such as expulsion or extreme emotional distress. This is especially true given the high bar punitive damages for defamation under Rhode Island law. to See Johnson v. Johnson, 654 A.2d 1212, 1217 (R.I. 1995) (stating that the party seeking punitive damages [must produce] evidence of such willfulness, recklessness or wickedness . . . as amounts to criminality ) citation (internal omitted). The quotation Court thus marks, alterations, cannot help but and wonder whether wrongfully-applied stickers simply evade a meaningful remedy altogether. The Court has reflected on the possibility that, for due process purposes, real property may deserve a special status. Some of the jurisprudence Supreme suggests Court s that Fifth real estate protection than other types of property. 38 Amendment enjoys takings greater See, e.g., United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 62 n.9 (1989) (remarking that, unlike an constitutional intrusion importance on real property, attache[d] to the no special government s appropriation of money); Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 541-42 (1998) (Kennedy, dissenting in under takings the part) J., (listing concurring traditional doctrine, most of in judgment property which and interests concern real property). In fact, if the stickers could remain in place permanently, Plaintiffs arguably would have a viable takings claim, because the stickers are physical intrusions, however minute. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (explaining that permanent physical intrusions, no matter how minute, give rise to a takings claims). not plead this action as a taking. Yet, Plaintiffs did No case the Court has found transplants the per-se rule for physical takings codified in Lucas into the general due process context. The Court is at a loss for any way to put Plaintiffs injuries into a legal box other than purely reputational harms. It is true that, factually, the physical placement of an orange sticker on a house is different than a lost job opportunity, or sullied business reputation, in that the former is a tangible interference with real property; but legally, procedural due process, there is no difference. 39 in terms of For each of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs fail to show that the Ordinance tramples on a protected liberty or property interest. Therefore, Plaintiffs procedural due process challenge to the Ordinance must be rejected. E. Equal Protection Plaintiffs also contend that the Ordinance violates the Equal Protection clause, which obligates states to treat alike all persons similarly situated. 24, 33 (1st Cir. 2006). Toledo v. Sanchez, 454 F.3d The general standard of review requires only that the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d marks 42, 61 omitted). (1st Cir. 2008) (quotation and citation Under a rational basis review, courts defer to state laws, and need perform only a succinct analysis of their purpose and effect. See, e.g., Naeem v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 33, 38 (1st Cir. 2006) ( Congress passed the IIRIRA with the intention of improving the alien removal process. voluntary end. ). departure provision are The amendments to the rationally related to that Here, the purpose of the Ordinance is to improve the quality of life in the Town by discouraging parties that attract lawbreaking activity, which flourish due to seasonal housing and absentee landlords. at Ex. A.) (See Facts ¶¶ 6-7 & preamble to Ordinance To this end, it prohibits gatherings that create a nuisance as a result of misdemeanors such as excessive noise, 40 traffic, litter. public drunkenness, underage See Ordinance § 46-31. concluding this effort is drinking, fights, and The Court has little difficulty rationally related to the stated objective. Plaintiffs, however, cite Justice O Connor s concurrence in Lawrence as authority for their argument that they are entitled to closer scrutiny of the Ordinance. When a law exhibits . . . a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, the Supreme Court has applied a more searching form of rational review . . . under the Equal Protection Clause. U.S. at 580 (O Connor, J., concurring). basis Lawrence, 539 Plaintiffs propose that the history of conflict between URI students and Town homeowners makes students and renters politically unpopular groups. They point to the charts maintained by the Town tracking URI student infractions, students and receive student animus. the Town s Ordinance notification citations, as of URI evidence whenever of anti- Defendants even admit that the Ordinance was conceived as a way to combat problems the Town associates with renters. (See Facts ¶¶ 6-7.) Plaintiffs push for a more searching review fizzles, because nothing in the text of the operative provisions of the Ordinance draws any distinction between permanent Town residents, on the one hand, and seasonal renters student or otherwise on the other. The language of the law does not 41 exclude homeowners. By its terms, the Ordinance is equally enforceable against the purported politically unpopular group and everyone else in the Town indeed, against the very council members who voted for it. issue in review. the Supreme The same is not true of the laws at Court cases using a more searching For instance, the terms of the statute under review in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) applied to gay, lesbian, and bisexual people, but not straight people. See id. at 624. The terms of the ordinance at issue in City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) placed a heavier burden on mentally disabled people than others. See id. at 437. Finally, down the language of the statute struck in United States Dep t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), conferred lesser benefits on unrelated individuals living in house than on households in which everyone was related. at 530-31. the same See id. In each case, the language of the laws themselves, and not the context for their enactment, created the challenged classification. For that reason, Plaintiffs have not shown that any firmer judicial check on the Ordinance is warranted. holds that the Ordinance survives rational Because the Court basis Plaintiffs equal protection claim must be denied. 42 scrutiny, F. Rhode Island Landlord-Tenant Law Finally, Plaintiffs assert that the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-18-1 et seq., preempts the Ordinance. This claim is underdeveloped. Plaintiffs must demonstrate either To show preemption, that the Ordinance conflicts with the Act, or that the state legislature intended the Act to completely occupy landlord and tenant law. 907 (R.I. 2002) the field of regulation Amico s Inc. v. Mattos, 789 A.2d 899, (quotation marks and citation Plaintiffs do not cite a particular conflict laws. on omitted). between the two They do suggest that the eviction defense in § 46-34 (5) interferes with the Act, authorizes landlords but to the Act commence shows eviction otherwise. It proceedings for material noncompliance with a lease, or violations of the Act materially affecting health and safety. 18-36(a). In fact, as indicated R.I. Gen Laws § 34- above, the Act allows streamlined procedures when seasonal tenants have been charged with violating a municipal ordinance or [have] otherwise violated the terms of the rental agreement pertaining to . . . excessive noise or other disturbance of the peace. 18-36(f)(ii). expressly Furthermore, dovetailed the given Act with that the R.I. municipal Id. § 34Legislature ordinance[s], there can be no legitimate claim that it intended the Act to fully occupy the field. See 43 Amico s, 789 A.2d at 907 (rejecting a preemption argument where the Legislature has recognized the authority of municipal bodies to regulate the conduct at issue). III. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED and Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. IT IS SO ORDERED: /s/ William E. Smith William E. Smith United States District Judge Date: March 2, 2010 44
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
