Rivera-Romero et al v. INSPIRA Behavioral Care et al, No. 3:2016cv02721 - Document 85 (D.P.R. 2020)
Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER denying 74 Joint MOTION in Limine to Preclude the Opions & Testimony of Dr. Santiago Noa. Signed by US Magistrate Judge Camille L. Velez-Rive on 1/23/2020. (ari) Modified on 1/24/2020 to correct document type (gmm).
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Rivera-Romero et al v. INSPIRA Behavioral Care et al Doc. 85 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO BLANCA RIVERA ROMERO, et. al., Plaintiffs, CIVIL NO. 16-2721 (CVR) v. INSPIRA BEHAVIORAL CARE, et. al., Defendants. OPIN ION AN D ORD ER IN TROD U CTION Before the Court is a “J oint Motion in Lim ine to Preclude the Opinions and Testim ony of Plaintiffs’ Expert Dr. Víctor Santiago Noa” filed by co-Defendants Hospital Metropolitano Dr. Pila and Inspira Behavioral Care (collectively “Defendants”). Defendants aver that Plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Víctor Santiago Noa (“Dr. Santiago Noa”) should not be allowed to testify at trial because his report fails to conform to the requirem ents of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. In addition, they contend that his report and testim ony are not reliable under Federal Rule of Evidence 70 2 and the landm ark case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm ., Inc., 50 9 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993). (Docket No. 74). Plaintiffs proffer a variety of reasons in opposition to Defendants’ Motion in Lim ine. (Docket No. 83). For the reasons explained below, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion in Lim ine. Dockets.Justia.com Blanca Rivera Rom ero, et al. v. Inspira Behavioral Care, et al. Opinion and Order Civil 16-2721 (CVR) Page 2 _______________________________ AN ALYSIS Federal Rule of Evidence 70 2 states that: A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education m ay testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determ ine a fact in issue; (b) the testim ony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testim ony is the product of reliable principles and m ethods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and m ethods to the facts of the case. Fed. R. Evid. 70 2. A review of the case law after Daubert shows that the rejection of expert testim ony is the exception, rather than the rule. The Daubert case did not work a “seachange over federal evidence law,” and “the trial court’s role as gatekeeper is not intended to serve as a replacem ent for the adversary system .” United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land Situated in Leflore County, Mississippi, 80 F.3d 10 74, 10 78 (5th Cir. 1996). “Vigorous crossexam ination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate m eans of attacking shaky but adm issible evidence.” Daubert, 50 9 U.S. at 595. Furtherm ore, it has been established that “Daubert does not require that a party proffering expert testim ony convince the court that the expert’s assessm ent of the situation is correct, but rather, [a]s long as an expert’s scientific testim ony rests upon good grounds it should be tested by the adversary process-com peting expert testim ony and active cross-exam ination-rather than excluded from jurors’ scrutiny for fear that they Blanca Rivera Rom ero, et al. v. Inspira Behavioral Care, et al. Opinion and Order Civil 16-2721 (CVR) Page 3 _______________________________ will not grasp its com plexities or satisfactorily weigh its inadequacies.” United States v. Perocier, 269 F.R.D. 10 3, 10 7 (D.P.R. 20 0 9) (citing Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of Puerto Rico Bottling Co., 161 F.3d 77, 85 (1st Cir. 1998)). Therefore, the Court’s analysis m ust be flexible, not rigid, and m ust ensure that expert testim ony is relevant. Daubert, 50 9 U.S. at 592. Besides establishing relevancy, the Court m ust also ensure that the expert opinion is sufficient and reliable. Carrelo v. Advanced Neurom odulation Sys., Inc., 777 F. Supp. 2d 315, 318 (D.P.R. 20 11). Turning to the case at bar, Defendants argue that Dr. Santiago Noa allegedly failed to establish the proper standard of care in his report. However, after a review of the reports of the expert witnesses for all parties, it is noted that Plaintiffs’ expert witness and those of Defendants do address the standard of care and they do so in the sam e way. Thus, what is good for the goose is good for the gander. Dr. Santiago Noa’s report states that “in this case, it was identified that the patient was at risk of elopem ent”, 1 a fact clearly stated in the record and an undeniable conclusion reached by that all experts in this case, including those for Defendants. All three experts, in addressing the standard of care, conclude that special care m ust be taken by the institution in cases where patient elopem ent is a possibility. Dr. Santiago Noa then goes on to detail how Dr. Pila Hospital, breached said requirem ent, a conclusion which Dr. Pila Hospital naturally does not agree with. Therefore, Defendants’ contention that the report does not detail the standard of care and that they cannot “properly prepare for rebuttal or cross exam ination at trial” regarding this issue falls short. 1 Docket 74, Exhibit 1, p. 4. Blanca Rivera Rom ero, et al. v. Inspira Behavioral Care, et al. Opinion and Order Civil 16-2721 (CVR) Page 4 _______________________________ Defendants also aver that Dr. Santiago Noa’s report violated the Federal Rules because he changed his expert opinion during his deposition, offering opinions of alcohol withdrawal that were not originally included in his report. Plaintiffs’ m ain contention, however, is that Dr. Pila Hospital failed to properly supervise J ulio Mayol while there, and he eloped. Facts and conclusions as to this specific m atter are clearly detailed in the report. That Dr. Santiago Noa failed to include in his report an opinion regarding alcohol withdrawal does not deviate from Plaintiffs’ m ain assertion, to wit, that Dr. Pila Hospital had a duty toward a patient in this case, failed to com ply with it, and was therefore negligent in the treatm ent provided to him. This is precisely the kind of issue that falls squarely within the jury’s province. See Carrelo 777 F. Supp. 2d at 318-19 (a challenge to the factual underpinnings of an expert opinion is a m atter that affects the weight and credibility of the testim ony and is a jury question) citing United States v. Vargas, 471 F.3d 255, 264 (1st Cir. 20 0 6) and Int’l Adhesive Coating Co. v. Bolton Em erson Int’l, Inc., 851 F.2d 540 , 544-545 (1st Cir. 1988)) (“The burden is on opposing counsel through crossexam ination to explore and expose any weaknesses in the underpinnings of the expert’s opinion”). This reasoning also applies to Defendants’ argum ent that Dr. Santiago Noa never worked in hospital adm inistration and is not an expert in em ergency room m edicine or internal m edicine. Whether these facts m ay ultim ately help Defendants during the trial is not for this Court to determ ine at this stage, but is a m atter entrusted to the jury as part of its fact-assessm ent duty. All these argum ents go to the weight of Dra. Santiago Noa’s testim ony, not its adm issibility. Defendants are free to voire dire and cross-exam ine the doctor on the stand, and the jurors will give his testim ony the probative value they see fit. Blanca Rivera Rom ero, et al. v. Inspira Behavioral Care, et al. Opinion and Order Civil 16-2721 (CVR) Page 5 _______________________________ Regarding the reliability of principles and m ethods under Daubert and its progeny, som e types of expert testim ony will be m ore objectively verifiable, and subject to the expectations of falsifiability, peer review, and publication, than other, non-scientific testim ony. Indeed, som e types of expert testim ony will not rely on anything like a scientific m ethod, and will thus have to be evaluated by reference to other standard principles attendant to the particular area of expertise. It is therefore the job of the trial judge to determ ine whether proffered expert testim ony is properly grounded, wellreasoned, and not speculative before it can be adm itted. See e.g., Am erican College of Trial Lawyers, Standards and Procedures for Determ ining the Adm issibility of Expert Testim ony after Daubert, 157 F.R.D. 571, 579 (1994) (“[W]hether the testim ony concerns econom ic principles, accounting standards, property valuation or other non-scientific subjects, it should be evaluated by reference to the ‘knowledge and experience’ of that particular field.”). In the instant case, Dr. Santiago Noa is qualified as an expert because of his knowledge, skill, and experience and training, as his deposition testim ony clearly established. He has further rendered services in several cases as an expert, both for plaintiffs and defendants. That he has a psychiatry specialization is undeniably relevant to the case at hand, insofar as J ulio Mayol, the decedent, had a m ental condition at the tim e the events in this case took place. 2 As such, Dr. Santiago Noa’s testim ony will certainly help the trier of fact better understand the relevant issues in this case. 2 Co-Defendant Inspira Behavioral Care is a specialized psychiatric hospital that serves adult patients with m ental conditions and substance dependence. (Docket No. 37, p. 2). Blanca Rivera Rom ero, et al. v. Inspira Behavioral Care, et al. Opinion and Order Civil 16-2721 (CVR) Page 6 _______________________________ Additionally, as an expert in psychiatry, Dr. Santiago Noa offered his conclusions as to the cause of the elopem ent and death, after evaluating the totality of the evidence before him . The Court cannot say that his conclusions are irrelevant or unreliable, insofar as they seem properly grounded, well-reasoned, and are clearly based on the evidence he exam ined and his knowledge and long experience in this field. At this stage, that is all the Court needs to analyze as part of its gatekeeping function. Whether or not Dr. Santiago Noa’s opinions and conclusion, as to any negligence by Defendants and the cause of death, will ultim ately sway a jury rem ains a m atter to be assessed at trial by the trier of fact. CON CLU SION In view of the above, Defendants’ Motion in Lim ine is DENIED. (Docket No. 74). IT IS SO ORDERED. In San J uan, Puerto Rico, on this 23 rd day of J anuary 20 20 . S/ CAMILLE L. VELEZ-RIVE CAMILLE L. VELEZ RIVE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE J UDGE
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