Ceballos-Germosen et al v. Ortiz-Cotty et al, No. 3:2014cv01217 - Document 39 (D.P.R. 2014)
Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER: Granting 25 Doctor's Center's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Dismissing Plaintiffs' state law claims for lack of sibject matter jurisdiction. Signed by Judge Gustavo A. Gelpi (MET)
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Ceballos-Germosen et al v. Ortiz-Cotty et al Doc. 39 1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 3 4 ENRIQUE CEBALLOS-GERMOSÉN, et 5 al. 6 Plaintiffs 7 v. 8 DOCTOR’S HOSPITAL CENTER MANATI, et al. CASE NO. 14-1217 (GAG) 9 Defendants. 10 OPINION AND ORDER 11 12 Enrique Ceballos (“Ceballos”), Fremia Ceballos-Germosén (“Fremia”) and Maysa 13 Ceballos-Germosén (“Maysa”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed the instant action seeking 14 compensation for the damages suffered from the wrongful death of Doctor Fremia Germosén- 15 Canela (“Germosén”), their mother, against Doctor’s Center Manatí (“Doctor’s Center”) and 16 Germosén’s treating physicians (collectively “Defendants”) under the Emergency Medical 17 Treatment and Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1395 dd. (Docket No. 1.) Plaintiffs 18 also assert a medical malpractice claim, invoking the court’s diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 19 Puerto Rico’s general tort statutes, Article 1802 and 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. 20 LAWS ANN. tit., §§ 5141-5142. Id. 21 Pending before the court is Doctor’s Center’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 22 seeking dismissal of Plaintiffs’ EMTALA claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant 23 24 1 Dockets.Justia.com Civil No. 14-1217 (GAG) 1 to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 (Docket No. 25.) Namely, Doctor’s Center 2 contends that Plaintiffs’ EMTALA claim fails as a matter of law and therefore the claim should 3 be dismissed. Id. ¶ 4. 4 After carefully reviewing the parties’ submissions and pertinent law, Doctor’s Center’s 5 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Furthermore the court, sua sponte, notes 6 that the Plaintiffs lack complete diversity, therefore the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction 7 over their state law claims. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ state law claims are DISMISSED. 8 I. 9 Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to 10 interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 11 genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 12 matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 13 “An issue is genuine if ‘it may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party’ at trial, . . . and 14 material if it ‘possess[es] the capacity to sway the outcome of the litigation under the applicable 15 law.’” Iverson v. City of Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir. 2006) (alteration in original) (internal 16 citations omitted). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of 17 evidence to support the non-moving party’s case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. “The movant must 18 aver an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. The burden then shifts to the 19 nonmovant to establish the existence of at least one fact issue which is both genuine and 20 material.” Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodríguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1994). The 21 nonmovant may establish a fact is genuinely in dispute by citing particular evidence in the record 22 1 23 24 Standard of Review Originally, Doctor’s Center moved the court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court ordered that it would be treating Defendant’s motion as a Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment and thus ordered Plaintiffs’ to oppose it accordingly. (See Docket No. 27.) 2 Civil No. 14-1217 (GAG) 1 or showing that either the materials cited by the movant “do not establish the absence or presence 2 of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the 3 fact.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(B). If the court finds that some genuine factual issue remains, 4 the resolution of which could affect the outcome of the case, then the court must deny summary 5 judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 6 When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in 7 the light most favorable to the non-moving party and give that party the benefit of any and all 8 reasonable inferences. Id. at 255. Moreover, at the summary judgment stage, the court does not 9 make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Id. Summary judgment may be 10 appropriate, however, if the non-moving party’s case rests merely upon “conclusory allegations, 11 improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.” Forestier Fradera v. Mun. of Mayaguez, 12 440 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Benoit v. Technical Mfg. Corp., 331 F.3d 166, 173 (1st 13 Cir. 2003)). 14 II. 15 During the month of March 2013, Germosén, an eighty-two (82) year old retired 16 gynecologist/obstetrician, underwent hip surgery at HIMA Hospital after suffering a hip fracture 17 on her right hip. (Docket No. 1 ¶ 17.) Thereafter, Germosén was transferred to Health South 18 Hospital (“Health South”) for rehabilitation care. (Docket Nos. 1 ¶ 17; 25 at 8.) Upon their 19 arrival at Health South, Fremia and Maysa informed the nurses of their mother’s condition and 20 constipation. (Docket No. 1 ¶ 18.) At Health South, Defendant Dr. José De León Collazo (“Dr. 21 De León”) arrived at Germosén’s hospital room and introduced himself to Germosén and her 22 daughters as an internal medicine doctor. Id. ¶ 19. Dr. De León then performed a brief physical 23 examination on Germosén. Id. 24 Relevant Factual and Procedural Background 3 Civil No. 14-1217 (GAG) 1 On March 18, 2013, Germosén woke up complaining and feeling nauseous. (Docket No. 2 1 ¶ 20.) She vomited a dark substance that was later identified as blood. Id. Consequently, Dr. 3 De León diagnosed her with active upper gastrointestinal bleeding and ordered the patient be 4 transferred to Doctor’s Center. (Docket No. 1 ¶ 21.) Dr. De León did not inform Germosén’s 5 daughters of their mother’s medical condition. Id. Health South and Doctor’s Center are 6 contiguous facilities that connect through a walkway. 7 “participating hospital” as defined by EMTALA. (See 42 U.S.C. § 1395 dd (e)(3)(A).) Id. ¶ 22. Doctor’s Center is a 8 At approximately 6:28 a.m., Germosén arrived at the Doctor’s Center Emergency Room. 9 (Docket No. 1 ¶ 22.) During her transfer, Germosén continued vomiting blood. Id. ¶ 23. At 10 6:30 a.m. Defendant Doctor Ricardo Piñero (“Dr. Piñero”) inserted a nasogastric tube into 11 Germosén’s nose. Id. ¶ 26. Dr. Piñero failed to speak to or notify Germosén, or her daughter 12 Fremia, of the status of her condition. Id. ¶ 26. Germosén was transferred to a room with glass 13 windows. Id. On or about 7:40 a.m., Fremia approached the clerk’s desk requesting to speak to 14 Dr. De León and the clerk told her that they were expecting him soon. Id. ¶ 29. At 8:08 a.m. 15 two nurses took blood samples from Germosén and administered medication. Id. During the 16 time Germosén was waiting at the emergency room she continued coughing blood. Id. 17 Plaintiffs and Defendant dispute as to the exact time when Germosén was admitted to the 18 hospital as an inpatient. According to Plaintiffs, Germosén was admitted as an inpatient at 12:55 19 p.m., and directly transferred to the Intensive Care Unit (“ICU”). (Docket Nos. 1 ¶ 47; 31-2 at 20 2.) Until that time, Plaintiffs contend, Germosén had not been admitted to the hospital as an 21 inpatient, instead she was being treated as an emergency room patient. Id. 22 Conversely, Doctor’s Center argues that Germosén was admitted to the hospital at 7:50 23 a.m. as an inpatient shortly after her arrival and initial evaluation at the Emergency Room. 24 4 Civil No. 14-1217 (GAG) 1 (Docket No. 25 at 9.) Doctor’s Center set forth Germosén’s medical records. Id. By virtue of 2 the medical records provided, Doctor’s Center evinces that Germosén was admitted to the 3 hospital as an inpatient by Dr. Piñero, under Dr. De León’s orders and his service. (Docket Nos. 4 25 at 9; 25-4.) The medical records submitted as evidence show that the admission order was 5 placed at 7:50 a.m. (Docket No. 25-4.) Then, due to her condition, Dr. De León transferred 6 Germosén to the ICU. (Docket No. 25-5.) The medical records provided as evidence show that 7 Germosén’s transfer to the ICU was ordered at 8:30 a.m. Id. 8 While she was being treated at the ICU, Germosén lost consciousness and was intubated 9 and mechanically ventilated. (Docket No. 1 ¶ 50.) On or about 5:10 p.m., Germosén and her 10 daughters received a visit from Doctor Wilson Ortiz Cotty (“Dr. Ortiz Cotty”) who informed 11 them that the following morning he would perform an endoscopy on Germosén to find the source 12 of the bleeding. Id. ¶ 52. Fremia and Maysa claim that while their mother was under the care of 13 the doctors at the ICU she looked desperate and uncomfortable. Id. ¶ 52. Her daughters noticed 14 that the monitor was not reflecting information and asked one of the nurses about the problem. 15 Id. ¶ 54. The nurse responded that the monitor was not working. Id. Said monitor was never 16 replaced. Id. 17 At 6:30 a.m. the following day, Fremia and Maysa received a call from one of the ICU 18 nurses asking them to come to the ICU. Id. ¶ 55. Upon their arrival, Fremia and Maysa were 19 informed that their mother had passed away. Id. Germosén passed away at 5:45 a.m. of March 20 19, 2013. Id. 21 On March 14, 2014, Plaintiffs filed suit against Doctor’s Center, Dr. De León, Dr. Piñero, 22 Dr. González, Dr. Ortiz and other unnamed defendants, alleging that Defendants are liable for 23 the wrongful death of their mother and seeking compensation for the damages suffered by the 24 5 Civil No. 14-1217 (GAG) 1 deceased and their own pain and suffering under EMTALA. (Docket No. 1.) 2 Plaintiffs claim damages under Article 1802 by invoking the court’s diversity jurisdiction 3 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Id. 4 5 III. Moreover, Discussion A. EMTALA Violations 6 Doctor’s Center primarily argues that Plaintiffs do not have a valid EMTALA claim 7 because Germosén was never transferred from Doctor’s Center to another institution, but was 8 instead admitted to Doctor’s Center as an inpatient. (Docket No. 25.) As a result, Doctor’s 9 Center posits that the EMTALA provisions were never triggered. Conversely, Plaintiffs contend 10 that Germosén was not admitted as an inpatient at the time Defendants contend, but hours after 11 Defendants suggest. (Docket No. 31.) Moreover, Plaintiffs posit that while treating Germosén at 12 the emergency room, Defendants violated EMTALA’s provisions. Id. According to Plaintiffs, 13 the emergency room staff at Doctor’s Center violated EMTALA’s provisions before admitting 14 Germosén to the hospital as an inpatient. Id. 15 EMTALA has two essential provisions. The first requires that a participating hospital 16 afford an appropriate medical screening to all persons who come to its emergency room seeking 17 medical assistance. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a). The second requires that if an emergency 18 medical condition exists, the participating hospital must render the services that are necessary to 19 stabilize the patient’s condition, unless transferring the patient to another facility is medically 20 indicated and can be accomplished with relative safety. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395dd (b)(1)(A), 21 (b)(1)(B); Ortega v. Hospital San Pablo Bayamón, No. 10-1080 (GAG), 2012 WL 3583533 at* 2 22 (D.P.R. 2012). A plaintiff may allege a violation under either provision, or both. Benítez 23 Rodríguez v. Hospital Pavía Hato Rey, 588 F. Supp. 2d 210, 214 (D.P.R. 2008). Here, Plaintiffs 24 6 Civil No. 14-1217 (GAG) 1 contend that Doctor’s Center incurred in violations of both provisions by failing to adequately 2 screen Germosén and failing to stabilize her emergency medical condition before transferring 3 her. (Docket No. 1 ¶ 59.) Upon examination of the pertinent law and facts of this case, the court 4 holds that pursuant to EMTALA, Germosén was never transferred; therefore, the hospital was 5 not bound by EMTALA’s stabilization requirement. The court sets forth the following reasons 6 for this conclusion. 7 EMTALA was enacted in 1986 in response to reports of hospital emergency rooms 8 refusing to treat indigent, uninsured patients without first assessing and/or stabilizing the 9 patient’s condition. This practice is colloquially known as “patient dumping.” Benítez 10 Rodríguez, 588 F.Supp.2d at 213. To deter said practice, EMTALA imposed some limited 11 requirements on emergency rooms of hospitals participating in the federal Medicare program. 12 Failure to comply with EMTALA requirements results in monetary fines. See Rodríguez v. 13 American Intern. Ins. of Puerto Rico, 402 F.3d 45, 47 (1st Cir. 2005); Correa v. Hosp. San 14 Francisco, 69 F.3d 1184, 1189-1190 (1st Cir. 1995); Benítez Rodríguez, 588 F.Supp.2d at 213. 15 On multiple occasions, the First Circuit has stated that “EMTALA does not create a cause of 16 action for medical malpractice,” Correa, 69 F.3d at 1192, but rather, “[it’s] a limited ‘anti- 17 dumping’ statute, not a federal malpractice statute. It is designed to complement and not 18 incorporate state malpractice law.” Reynolds v. Maine Gen. Health, 218 F.3d 78, 83-84 (1st Cir. 19 2000) (internal citations omitted). Instead, it “create[s] a remedy for patients in certain contexts 20 in which a claim under state medical malpractice law was not available.” Reynolds, 218 F.3d 78, 21 83. EMTALA complements but in no way displaces or substitutes traditional state-law tort 22 remedies for medical malpractice. 23 24 To assert a cause of action under EMTALA, a plaintiff must show the following. 7 Civil No. 14-1217 (GAG) 1 2 3 4 5 6 (1) the hospital is a participating hospital, covered by EMTALA, that operates an emergency department (or an equivalent treatment facility); (2) the patient arrived at the facility seeking treatment; and (3) the hospital either (a) did not afford the patient an appropriate screening in order to determine if she had an emergency medical condition, or (b) bade farewell to the patient (whether by turning her away, discharging her, or improvidently transferring her) without first stabilizing the emergency medical condition. Correa, 69 F.3d at 1190. 7 1. The screening requirement 8 The statute requires that every “participating hospital afford an appropriate medical 9 screening to all persons who come to its emergency room seeking medical assistance.” See 10 Correa, 69 F.3d at 1189; 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)-(c). In other words, every patient must be 11 afforded the same type of screening procedure, in compliance with hospital protocol. See Cruz 12 Vázquez v. Mennonite General Hosp., 717 F.3d 63, 69 (1st Cir. 2013). “The essence of this 13 requirement is that there be some screening procedure, and that it be administered even- 14 handedly.” Correa, 69 F.3d at 1192. 15 “A hospital fulfills its statutory duty to screen patients in its emergency room if it 16 provides for a screening examination reasonably calculated to identify critical medical conditions 17 that may be afflicting symptomatic patients and provides that level of screening uniformly to all 18 those who present substantially similar complaints.” Id. As previously stated, EMTALA is not a 19 cause of action for medical malpractice. “[F]aulty screening . . . as opposed to disparate 20 screening or refusing to screen at all, does not contravene the statute.” Id. at 1192-93 (internal 21 citations omitted). 22 In this case, Plaintiffs tackle the adequacy of Germosén’s emergency room screening, 23 (Docket No. 1 ¶ 59) which is not encompassed by EMTALA’s screening requirement. By 24 8 Civil No. 14-1217 (GAG) 1 questioning the standard of care afforded, Plaintiffs try to disguise a medical malpractice claim 2 with an EMTALA violation. Thus, Plaintiffs “faulty screening” claim is not actionable under 3 EMTALA. 2. The stabilization requirement 4 5 The statute’s second provision guarantees that “if an emergency medical condition exists, 6 the participating hospital must render the services that are necessary to stabilize the patient’s 7 condition . . . unless transferring the patient to another facility is medically indicated and can be 8 accomplished with relative safety.” 9 EMTALA defines “to stabilize” as “to provide such medical treatment of the condition as may 10 be necessary to assure, within reasonable medical probability that no material deterioration of the 11 condition is likely to result from or occur during the transfer of the individual from a facility.” 12 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3)(A) (emphasis provided). Correa, 69 F.3d at 1189; 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)-(c). 13 The First Circuit has established that EMTALA’s stabilization requirement “does not 14 impose a standard of care prescribing how physicians must treat a critical patient’s condition 15 while he remains in the hospital, but merely prescribes a precondition the hospital must satisfy 16 before it may undertake to transfer the patient.” Álvarez Torres v. Ryder, 582 F.3d 47, 51-52 17 (1st Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted). In other words, the “stabilization” directive applies 18 only where a transfer occurs, “[o]therwise, no effect is given to the phrase during the transfer.” 19 Álvarez Torres, 582 F.3d at 52 (citing Harry v. Marchant, 291 F.3d 767, 770–72 (11th Cir. 2002) 20 (en banc) (emphasis provided). Moreover, “transfer” is defined as “the movement (including the 21 discharge) of an individual outside a hospital’s facilities at the direction of any person employed 22 by (or affiliated or associated, directly or indirectly, with) the hospital.” 23 1395dd(e)(4). 24 9 42 U.S.C. § Civil No. 14-1217 (GAG) 1 Thus, a hospital cannot violate EMTALA’s duty to stabilize unless it actually transfers a 2 patient. Álvarez Torres, 582 F.3d at 52. To establish a violation to the stabilization requirement, 3 a plaintiff must prove that the hospital “bade farewell” to the patient. Correa, 69 F.3d at 1190. 4 In light of mixed interpretations of the statute’s “transfer” provision, the Code of Federal 5 Regulations clarified the provision and implemented a straightforward “inpatient” exception as 6 follows: 10 If an emergency medical condition is determined to exist, provide any necessary stabilizing treatment, as defined in paragraph (d) of this section, or an appropriate transfer as defined in paragraph (e) of this section. If the hospital admits the individual as an inpatient for further treatment, the hospital's obligation under this section ends, as specified in paragraph (d)(2) of this section. 11 … 12 (i) If a hospital has screened an individual under paragraph (a) of this section and found the individual to have an emergency medical condition, and admits that individual as an inpatient in good faith in order to stabilize the emergency medical condition, the hospital has satisfied its special responsibilities under this section with respect to that individual. 7 8 9 13 14 15 16 42 C.F.R. 489.24 (a)(i) & (a)(ii) (emphasis provided). 17 The parties spill ink going back and forth debating over Germosén’s time of admission. 18 Doctor’s Center argues that the record evidence demonstrates that Germosén was admitted to the 19 hospital as an inpatient by Dr. De León at 7:50 a.m. and transferred to the hospital’s ICU at 8:50 20 a.m. (Docket Nos. 25-4; 25-5). Plaintiffs contend that Germosén remained in the emergency 21 room until her emergency medical condition deteriorated and became critical, and was ultimately 22 transferred to the ICU at 12:55 p.m. (Docket Nos. 1 ¶ 47; 32 ¶ 11.) The parties’ disagreement is 23 24 10 Civil No. 14-1217 (GAG) 1 futile. The patient’s admission to the hospital is essential to this court’s decision –the time of 2 admission is not. 3 Drawing all inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that Doctor’s 4 Center effectively bade Germosén farewell. The record shows that Germosén never left Doctor’s 5 Center’s facilities, i.e., she was never transferred, because she was admitted as an inpatient. 6 Plaintiffs allege that Doctor’s Center violated EMTALA’s provisions by failing to stabilize 7 Germosén before transferring her. This allegation is erroneous because Germosén was never 8 transferred; therefore, the stabilization precondition was never triggered. 9 Germosén as an inpatient, the hospital had no duty to stabilize under EMTALA. Álvarez Torres, 10 582 F.3d at 51-52. Because no transfer occurred, Plaintiffs have not established an adequate 11 EMTALA stabilization claim. 12 EMTALA. By admitting Any other interpretation would undermine the purpose of 13 Plaintiffs’ failure to claim actionable screening and stabilization claims under EMTALA 14 leaves the court without subject matter jurisdiction over said claims; therefore, dismissal is 15 warranted. 16 judgment of Plaintiffs’ EMTALA claims at Docket No. 25. Accordingly, the court GRANTS Doctor’s Center partial motion for summary B. State Law Claims 17 18 Plaintiffs set forth a medical malpractice action, pursuant to the court’s diversity 19 jurisdiction and Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, for Defendants’ alleged negligence 20 while treating Germosén. (Docket No. 1 ¶ 4.) Upon examination of the Plaintiffs domicile, the 21 court finds that Plaintiffs are not completely diverse; therefore, the court lacks subject matter 22 jurisdiction. 23 24 11 Civil No. 14-1217 (GAG) 1 The requisites for diversity jurisdiction are set forth in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(a). “Diversity 2 jurisdiction exists only when there is complete diversity, that is, when no plaintiff is a citizen of 3 the same state as any defendant.” Díaz-Rodríguez v. Pep Boys Corp., 410 F.3d 56, 58 (1st Cir. 4 2005) (quoting Gabriel v. Preble, 396 F.3d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 2005)). Citizenship is determined by 5 domicile. García Pérez v. Santaella, 364 F.3d 348, 350 (1st Cir. 2004). The party that invokes 6 the court’s diversity jurisdiction bears the burden of proof. “Since federal courts are courts of 7 limited jurisdiction, there is a presumption against our jurisdiction, and the party invoking 8 federal jurisdiction bears the burden of proof.” Crowley v. Glaze, 710 F.2d 676, 678 (10th Cir. 9 1983). Diversity is determined at the time the complaint is filed. See Valentín v. Hosp. Bella 10 Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 361 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing Bank One v. Montle, 964 F.2d 48, 49 (1st Cir. 11 1992)). To properly invoke the court’s diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the 12 parties must be completely diverse and the action is for more than $75,000. See Picciotto v. 13 Cont’l Cas. Co., 512 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 2008). 14 between the parties results in dismissal. Furthermore, a dismissal for lack of subject matter 15 jurisdiction is not a dismissal on the merits and has no res judicata effect. Thus, Plaintiffs are 16 free to file their state law claims in State Court. See Northeast Erectorrs Ass’n v. Secretary of 17 Labor, OSHA, 62 F.3d 37, 39 (1st Cir. 1995). 18 Failure to demonstrate complete diversity Plaintiff Ceballos is a Resident of the Dominican Republic. (Docket No. 1 ¶ 7.) 19 sisters, Fremia and Maysa, are residents of Bayamón, Puerto Rico. 20 Defendants are all citizens of Puerto Rico. (Docket No. 1 ¶¶ 8-12.) As such, the parties fail to 21 meet the complete diversity requirement. 22 jurisdiction to address Plaintiffs’ state law claims. Fremia, Maysa Consequently, this court lacks subject matter 23 24 Id. His 12 Civil No. 14-1217 (GAG) 1 In light of the above this court DISMISSES without prejudice Plaintiffs’ state law 2 claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Plaintiffs may very well have a solid medical 3 malpractice claim under Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code. However, the same must be 4 presented before a Court of the Commonwealth and no this federal court. 5 IV. 6 For the foregoing reasons the court GRANTS Doctor’s Center’s Partial Summary 7 Judgment at Docket No. 25 and DISMISSES without prejudice Plaintiffs’ state law claims for 8 lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 9 10 Conclusion SO ORDERED. In San Juan, Puerto Rico this 2nd day of December, 2014. s/ Gustavo A. Gelpí 11 GUSTAVO A. GELPI 12 United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 13
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