Castro-Davis v. USA, No. 3:2013cv01662 - Document 7 (D.P.R. 2014)
Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER denying in part 1 MOTION to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence (2255) (Criminal Number 07-186) filed by Felix Alberto Castro-Davis. We will hold an evidentiary hearing to address the issues described in Part C of this opi nion and order. We ORDER that Petitioner, Felix Alberto Castro-Davis, and Attorneys Epifanio Morales-Cruz and Rafael Anglada-Lopez be available at the hearing. Evidentiary Hearing set for 4/23/2014 09:30 AM in Courtroom 7 before Judge Jose A. Fuste. Signed by Judge Jose A. Fuste on 03/18/2014.(mrj)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 1 2 3 4 FELIX ALBERTO CASTRO-DAVIS, Petitioner, Civil No. 13-1662 (JAF) v. (Crim. No. 07-186-01) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. 5 6 OPINION AND ORDER 7 Petitioner Félix Alberto Castro-Davis ( Castro-Davis ) comes before the court 8 with a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence we 9 imposed in Criminal No. 07-186-01. (Docket No. 1.) For the reasons set forth below, we 10 order a hearing on the issue of whether or not Castro-Davis was advised of all plea 11 options, but we deny the remainder of the motion. 12 I. 13 Background 14 On April 25, 2007, the grand jury indicted Castro-Davis for several offenses 15 relating to a carjacking that resulted in death. (Crim. No. 07-186-01, Docket No. 13.) On 16 March 10, 2008, the jury found Castro-Davis guilty on all three counts. (Crim. No. 07- 17 186-01, Docket No. 244.) We sentenced Castro-Davis to five years imprisonment for 18 conspiracy; to the remainder of his natural life for the carjacking itself, to be served 19 concurrently; and to seven years for the use of a firearm during the crime, to be served 20 consecutively to the other sentences. 21 Morales-Cruz (Crim. No. 07-186-01, Docket No. 275.) Through this point, his lawyer was Epifanio Mr. Morales-Cruz is an Civil No. 13-1662 (JAF) -2- 1 experienced attorney, having served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney and as an Assistant 2 Federal Public Defender for many years. 3 Castro-Davis timely appealed. U.S. v. Castro-Davis, 612 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2010). 4 On July 16, 2010, the First Circuit affirmed Castro-Davis convictions, but remanded for 5 resentencing. Id.; (Crim. No. 07-186-01, Docket No. 305). On November 30, 2010, we 6 resentenced Castro-Davis to the same terms as in the original judgment. He was 7 represented at resentencing by Rafael Anglada-López (Crim. No. 07-186-01, Docket 8 No. 342.) Castro-Davis timely appealed, and his resentencing was affirmed on May 15, 9 2012. (Crim. No. 07-186-01, Docket Nos. 363, 379.) The First Circuit issued its 10 mandate on July 2, 2012. On August 28, 2013, Castro-Davis filed the instant motion to 11 vacate, set aside or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Docket No. 1.) The 12 government opposed. (Docket No. 3.) Castro-Davis replied. (Docket No. 6.) 13 II. 14 Legal Standard 15 A federal district court has jurisdiction to entertain a § 2255 petition when the 16 petitioner is in custody under the sentence of a federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255. To 17 file a timely motion, a petitioner has one year from the date his judgment becomes final. 18 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). His judgment became final on the last day that he could have filed a 19 petition for a writ of certiorari, which was ninety days after the entry of the Court of 20 Appeals judgment. Sup. Ct. R. 13(1); Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522 (2003). 21 Therefore, Castro-Davis petition is timely and we have jurisdiction. 22 A federal prisoner may challenge his sentence on the ground that, inter alia, it 23 was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. Id. A 24 petitioner cannot be granted relief on a claim that has not been raised at trial or direct Civil No. 13-1662 (JAF) -3- 1 appeal, unless he can demonstrate both cause and actual prejudice for his procedural 2 default. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167 (1982). Indeed, [p]ostconviction 3 relief on collateral review is an extraordinary remedy, available only on a sufficient 4 showing of fundamental unfairness. Singleton v. United States, 26 F.3d 233, 236 (1st 5 Cir. 1994). Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, however, are exceptions to this 6 rule. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 123 (2003) (holding that failure to 7 raise ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal does not bar subsequent 8 § 2255 review.) 9 III. 10 Discussion 11 Because Castro-Davis appears pro se, we construe his pleadings more favorably 12 than we would those drafted by an attorney. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 13 (2007). Nevertheless, Castro-Davis pro-se status does not excuse him from complying 14 with procedural and substantive law. See Dutil v. Murphy, 550 F.3d 154, 158 (1st Cir. 15 2008). Castro-Davis alleges several grounds for habeas relief. 16 He alleges that trial 17 counsel was ineffective for failing to make proper objections; that his eighty-four-month 18 sentence must be reduced to sixty months in light of Alleyne v. United States, ___ U.S. 19 ___ (2013), 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013); and that trial counsel provided inaccurate advice 20 during plea discussions. (Docket No. 1.) 21 A. Failure to make proper objections 22 To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Castro-Davis must show that 23 both: (1) the attorney s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and 24 (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel s unprofessional errors, the Civil No. 13-1662 (JAF) -4- 1 result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Wash., 466 U.S. 688, 2 688-94 (1984). 3 First, a trial witness testified that Castro-Davis told him they had done it 4 policeman style, and said that he understood that phrase to mean that they stopped the 5 victim s car with a weapon and claimed to be policemen. Trial counsel did not object. 6 Castro-Davis alleges that the witness testimony as to the meaning of the phrase was 7 improper because it was a conclusion. (Docket No. 1 at 5.) This issue was already 8 raised and considered on appeal. The First Circuit rejected the contention that the use of 9 the phrase policeman style was too vague to support a jury finding that the taking of the 10 car was done by force and violence by intimidation. See Castro-Davis, 612 F.3d at 62. 11 The First Circuit has held that when an issue has been disposed of on direct appeal, it will 12 not be reviewed again through a § 2255 motion. United States v. Doyon, 16 Fed.Appx. 6, 13 9) 1st Cir. 2001); Singleton v. United States, 26 F.3d 233, 240 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing 14 Dirring v. United States, 370 F.2d 862, 863 (1st Cir. 1967)). The Supreme Court has held 15 that if a claim was raised and rejected on direct review, the habeas court will not 16 readjudicate it absent countervailing equitable considerations. Withrow v. Williams, 17 507 U.S. 680, 721 (1993). Given the First Circuit s decision in Castro-Davis appeal that 18 the phrase policeman style could support a jury finding that the taking of the car was 19 done by force and violence, this issue does not warrant further consideration. 20 Secondly, at trial, we asked a witness in the presence of the jury whether she was 21 afraid of being in court. Castro-Davis alleges that his counsel s failure to move for a 22 mistrial constituted ineffectiveness. (Docket No. 1 at 5.) Petitioner is precluded from 23 raising this issue in a Section 2255 motion because he failed to raise the issue on appeal. 24 Bucci v. United States, 662 F.3d 18, 27 (1st Cir. 2011). However, even if it were not Civil No. 13-1662 (JAF) -5- 1 precluded, it fails on the merits. Petitioner takes the question we asked the witness out of 2 context. After allowing the prosecution to treat her as hostile, the witness was still unable 3 to provide answers to the government s questions. We were concerned that the witness 4 had been tampered with: 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 THE COURT: Any cross? MR. MORALES-CRUZ: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Please. Aside from law enforcement agents, has somebody else contacted you regarding your testimony in this case? THE WITNESS: Law enforcement? THE COURT: Aside from FBI agents or police officers, has somebody knocked on your door to ask you questions about this case? THE WITNESS: I was called and I was called to to I don t remember exactly what it was. I remember I called Agent Means and asked him if I should talk to the defense. His name is Alvin something. I don t remember his last name. And I asked Agent Means if that was necessary, and he told me it wasn t necessary. That it was up to me. So I chose not to. THE COURT: Okay. THE WITNESS: And then this week I got he went to my house, knocked on my door, and gave me a Subpoena to come here. Same guy. THE COURT: All right. Are you afraid of being here today? THE WITNESS: I m really uncomfortable with it. THE COURT: Why? THE WITNESS: I d rather not be. Civil No. 13-1662 (JAF) -6- THE COURT: What bothers you being here? 1 2 3 4 5 (Crim. No. 07-186-01, Docket No. 290 at 197-98). Here, our interaction with the witness 6 was brief and her response in no way indicated that her fear of the courtroom was related 7 to any fear she might have had of Castro-Davis. Nothing about her response could 8 reasonably have prejudiced the jury against him. Castro-Davis claim fails. THE WITNESS: That I don t really know what happened. 9 Castro-Davis also alleges that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 10 several statements the government made during closing argument. First, the prosecutor 11 told the jury: And you hold them accountable for what they did, all three of them. You 12 hold them accountable. (Docket No. 1 at 5.) Second, the government said: Because 13 you heard Jose Figueroa tell you how Felix Alberto described to him how they had done 14 it police style, pointing a gun at him, slapping handcuffs on him, throw him in the 15 backseat of his own car, and drove him to Jose Figueroa-Cartagena s house, which 16 Castro-Davis claims is a misstatement. (Docket No. 1 at 6.) Third, the prosecutor said: 17 So Felix Gabriel did not say that they couldn t control Don Perez. That s not what he 18 said. Think back to Jose Figueroa s testimony before you. What Felix Gabriel told Jose 19 Figueroa was, we couldn t strangle him, that s what he said. (Docket No. 1 at 6.) 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 Castro-Davis already raised this issue on appeal. Addressing the issue, the First Circuit held: [T]he court s general closing instructions did properly counsel the jury regarding what constituted evidence and the fact that they were the sole judges of credibility. The instructions specifically reminded jurors they were the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and that arguments and statements of counsel are not evidence. Given the evidence presented at trial from multiple witnesses, any potentially harmful effect from the prosecutor s closing was Civil No. 13-1662 (JAF) -7- safeguarded by the district court s final jury instructions. See United States v. MejÃa-Lozano, 829 F.2d 268, 274 (1st Cir. 1987)(finding that the district judge s standard instruction was sufficient to overcome any prejudice). [Quotations and citation in original.] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Castro-Davis, 612 F.3d at 68. Again, because Castro-Davis previously raised this issue 8 on direct appeal, he is precluded from asserting it anew in a collateral proceeding. 9 Singleton, 26 F.3d at 240. 10 B. Alleyne v. United States 11 Castro-Davis alleges that his sentence must be reduced from eighty-four months to 12 sixty months in light of Alleyne v. United States, ___ U.S. ___ (2013), 133 S. Ct. 2151 13 (2013). He argues that this is because our 84-month mandatory minimum sentence was 14 not authorized by the jury s verdict. 15 argument is misplaced. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the Supreme 16 Court held that a fact must be submitted to a jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt if 17 it increases a defendant s statutory mandatory maximum sentence. Alleyne extends this 18 principle to facts that increase a defendant s statutory mandatory minimum sentence. 19 The Supreme Court held in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), that Apprendi 20 was not retroactively applicable. While the Supreme Court has not decided whether 21 Alleyne applies retroactively to cases on collateral review, the United States Court of 22 Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has suggested, without deciding, that because Alleyne is 23 an extension of Apprendi ¦ [t]his implies that the Court will not declare Alleyne to be 24 retroactive. Simpson v. United States, 721 F.3d 875 (7th Cir. 2013). At this time, 25 several district courts have held that Alleyne does not apply retroactively to cases on 26 collateral review. See Lassalle-Velazquez v. United States, 2013 WL 4459044 (D.P.R. 27 Aug. 16, 2013); United States v. Stanley, 2013 WL 3752126, at *7 (N.D.Okla. July 16, (Docket No. 1 at 7.) Castro-Davis Alleyne Civil No. 13-1662 (JAF) -8- 1 2013); United States v. Eziolisa, 2013 WL 3812087, at *2 (S.D.Ohio July 22, 2013); 2 Affolter v. United States, 2013 WL 3884176, at *2 (E.D.Mo. July 26, 2013); United 3 States v. Reyes, 2013 WL 4042508, at *19 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 8, 2013). Since neither the 4 Supreme Court nor the First Circuit has held Alleyne to be retroactively applicable, we 5 decline to do so here. 6 C. Advice during plea discussions 7 Castro-Davis alleges that his trial counsel provided inaccurate advice during plea 8 discussions. He claims that he told counsel he wanted a plea option that did not require 9 cooperation with the government, but that trial counsel said that was not available. 10 Castro-Davis alleges that counsel failed to advise the petitioner that he could have 11 entered an open guilty plea. (Docket No. 1 at 9.) He points to a case from another 12 circuit, United States v. Booth, 432 F.3d 542 (3rd Cir. 2005). According to Booth, an 13 open guilty plea is a guilty plea made by the defendant without the benefit of a plea 14 agreement. Id at n.1. We refer to it as a straight plea. 15 We are skeptical of this claim, and Castro-Davis assertion that he would have 16 accepted a guilty plea is less credible given the record evidence that he steadfastly 17 maintained his innocence post-conviction. (Docket No. 2 at 13.) However, due to an 18 abundance of caution, we will hold an evidentiary hearing with Castro-Davis, as well as 19 his two lead lawyers, Epifanio Morales-Cruz and Rafael Anglada-López. The evidentiary 20 hearing will only investigate whether or not counsel advised Castro-Davis that he had the 21 option to plead guilty without entering a cooperation agreement with the government. 22 All other claims are summarily dismissed. Civil No. 13-1662 (JAF) -9- 1 IV. 2 Conclusion 3 We will hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Castro-Davis was 4 advised of his plea options. We ORDER that Castro-Davis, Morales-Cruz, and Anglada- 5 López be available at the hearing to be held on April 23, 2014, at 9:30 A.M. 6 For the foregoing reasons, we hereby DENY the remainder of Castro-Davis 7 § 2255 motion (Docket No. 1). Pursuant to Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing § 2255 8 Proceedings, summary dismissal of these claims is in order because it plainly appears 9 from the record that Castro-Davis is not entitled to § 2255 relief from this court on those 10 claims. Since this is not a final disposition until we address the issues described in Part C 11 above during a hearing, we defer entry of judgment and a decision on the issuance of a 12 certificate of appealability. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 18th day of March, 2014. 15 16 17 S/José Antonio Fusté JOSE ANTONIO FUSTE U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
