Reyes-Perez v. State Insurance Fund Corporation (SIFC) et al, No. 3:2011cv01070 - Document 82 (D.P.R. 2012)

Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 33 Joint MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by State Insurance Fund Corporation (SIFC), Mayra Domenech, Zoime Alvarez-Rubio, Jorge Garcia-Ortiz, Saul Rivera-Rivera. We DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff's federal claims, and we DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff's supplemental Commonwealth law claims. Judgment to be entered accordingly. Signed by Judge Jose A Fuste on 10/12/2012.(mrj)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 1 2 3 ROBERTO REYES-PEREZ, 4 Plaintiff, 5 v. 6 7 Civil No. 11-1070 (JAF) STATE INSURANCE FUND, et al., Defendants. 8 9 10 OPINION AND ORDER 11 Plaintiff Roberto Reyes-Pérez ( Plaintiff ) brings this action against Defendants, 12 Puerto Rico s State Insurance Fund Corporation ( SIFC ) and several of its officers. 13 (Docket No. 1 at 2 3.) Plaintiff alleges violations of his rights under the First, Fifth, and 14 Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. (Id.) Plaintiff also brings supplemental 15 claims under various Commonwealth statutes, including P.R. Law No. 100, of June 30, 16 1959, as amended, 29 L.P.R.A. § 146 et seq. ( Law 100 ); P.R. Law No. 115, of December 17 20, 1991, as amended, 29 LPRA §§ 146 151 ( Law 115 ), as well as Articles 1802 and 18 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, 31 L.P.R.A. § 5141 and § 5142; and the Constitution of 19 Puerto Rico. (Docket No. 1 at 2.) Defendants move for summary judgment under Federal 20 Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (Docket Nos. 33; 34), Plaintiff opposes (Docket No. 43), 21 Defendants respond (Docket No. 52), and Plaintiff replies (Docket No. 60). -2- Civil No. 11-1070 (JAF) 1 I. 2 Factual Synopsis 3 We derive the following facts from the parties motions and responses, statements of 4 uncontested material facts, and exhibits. (Docket Nos. 34; 34-46; 43; 43-1; 43-2; 52; 52-1; 5 60.) 6 We note at the outset that Plaintiff has largely failed to comply with the applicable 7 rules governing summary judgment practice in this district. On many critical matters in this 8 case, Plaintiff s denials and qualifications are either irrelevant to the matter at hand, add 9 facts that should have been filed in a separate statement, or consist of mere speculation, 10 generalities, conclusory assertions, improbable inferences, and, for lack of a better phrase, a 11 lot of hot air. 1 Gomez-Gonzalez v. Rural Opportunities, Inc., 658 F.Supp. 2d 325, 336 12 n.16 (D.P.R. 2009) (quoting Dominguez v. Eli Lilly and Co., 958 F.Supp. 721, 738 (D.P.R. 13 1997)). For example, Plaintiff denies Defendants SUF ¶ 27, which reads: On January 14, 2009, the SIFC s organizational structure was reverted, by the current Administrator, with the approval of the SIFC s Board of Directors, to the organizational structure that was in place in April 1, 2005, prior to the revised organizational structure that was approved during the incumbency of the former Administrators. (Docket No. 34-46 at 8.) Plaintiff replies to this statement with the following statement: Defendants SUF No. 27 is denied. Plaintiff denies that the SIFC s organizational structure was ever reverted, since, Plaintiff nor any other managerial employees were formally informed of such change. See Plaintiff s SUF No. 23. (Docket No. 43-2 at 5.) There are at least two ways in which Plaintiff s denial does not properly controvert Defendants statement. (D.P.R.R. 56(e); see also Docket No. 52-1 at 16.) First, Plaintiff s denial fails a basic test of logic: the allegation that Plaintiff was never told of the organizational reversion does not mean that the reversion did not happen. Second, Plaintiff s denial does not refer to record material properly considered on summary judgment. D.P.R.R. 56(e). Instead of referring to the original record material that controverts Defendants statement, Plaintiff s denial cites its own Statement of Uncontested Facts. Moreover, the Statement of Uncontested Facts that Plaintiff cites to is itself controverted, properly, by Defendants. Many of Plaintiff s denials of Defendants statements suffer from the same defects, see, e.g., notes 4, 9, infra. 1 Civil No. 11-1070 (JAF) -3- 1 After an exhaustive examination of Plaintiff s responses, (Docket Nos. 43; 43-1; 43- 2 2), we find that Plaintiff has failed to contest Defendants statements of uncontested facts 3 properly under Local Rule 56(c) and (e), which require the nonmoving party to submit a 4 separate, short, and concise statement of material facts [that] shall admit, deny or qualify 5 the facts supporting the motion for summary judgment . . . . [they] shall support each denial 6 or qualification by a record citation as required by this rule. D.P.R.R. 56(c). For the most 7 part, Plaintiff s denials and qualifications lack proper record citations as required by Local 8 Rule 56(e), which requires inclusion of a specific page or paragraph of identified record 9 material supporting the assertion. D.P.R.R. 56(e). Instead of citing to original record 10 material, Plaintiff s denials cite his own Statement of Uncontested Facts. 11 Plaintiff s separate Statement of Uncontested Facts does contain adequate record 12 citations, the First Circuit has previously held that submitting an alternate statement of 13 facts, rather than admitting, denying, or qualifying a defendant s assertions of fact 14 paragraph by paragraph as required by Local Rule 56(c), does not meet the requirements 15 of the rule. Mariani-Colon v. Dep t of Homeland Sec., 511 F.3d 216, 219 (1st Cir. 2007) 16 (quoting Hernandez v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007)). While 17 Plaintiff s failure to comply with the rules has had several important consequences. 18 First, the Plaintiff s sloppy work has made the court s task of assembling facts exceptionally 19 difficult. We have done our best to comb through hundreds of pages of the parties exhibits 20 and records, connecting the dots from one docket entry to the next. This type of painstaking 21 work, though, imposes a significant drain on our court s finite resources. This burden is Civil No. 11-1070 (JAF) -4- 1 especially acute in cases such as this, which present tangled questions of local law and 2 personnel regulations. Even in a case with proper fact development, the First Circuit has 3 noted the obvious difficulties for courts task of evaluating an employer s Mt. Healthy 4 defense. Sanchez-Lopez v. Fuentes-Pujols, 375 F.3d 121, 126 (1st Cir. 2004). In cases such 5 as this, the trier of fact essentially becomes a kind of super-personnel board making 6 determinations about whether particular personnel actions violated state or local personnel 7 laws. Id. That task is made even more difficult by Plaintiff s failure to submit a proper 8 statement of contested facts. 9 Moreover, Plaintiff s failure to contest the issues properly has also had important 10 consequences for the parties. On some issues, Plaintiff s failure to properly controvert 11 Defendants facts has led us to deem certain of Defendants properly supported statements 12 as admitted.2 13 (affirming district court s decision to deem moving party s statements of facts admitted if 14 opposing party fails to controvert properly). Still, we are mindful of the requirement that we 15 view the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff on summary judgment. Therefore, 16 we have done our best, where possible, to compile a set of facts from both parties 17 statements and responses. (Docket Nos. 34; 34-46; 43; 43-1; 43-2; 52; 52-1; 60.) Cosme-Rosado v. Serrano-Rodriguez, 360 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 2004) 18 Plaintiff is a Popular Democratic Party ( PDP ) activist, who comes from a family of 19 well-known former public figures hailing from the PDP. (Docket No. 43-1 at 2.) A year 20 after his graduation from law school in 2001, Reyes went to work as legal advisor to then2 See e.g., note 1, supra, and notes 4 and 9, infra. Civil No. 11-1070 (JAF) -5- 1 governor of Puerto Rico, PDP member Sila Calderón. (Id.) Immediately following that 2 position, Plaintiff was offered a trust position as Contracting Director of the SIFC. (Id.) 3 Plaintiff accepted the position in 2005. (Id.) 4 In February 2008, the SIFC went through a large organizational restructuring. (Id. at 5 3.) In the restructuring, Plaintiff s position was reclassified from a trust to a career position. 6 (Id.) Plaintiff s position, number 3034, was one of three positions that were reclassified at 7 the time from trust to career. (Docket No. 34-46 at 9.) These positions were: Associate 8 Director of Education and Development, position number 6733; Special Assistant I, position 9 number 3743; and finally, the position Plaintiff occupied of Contracting Director. (Id. at 10 10.) 11 In the elections of November 2008, the New Progressive Party (NPP)--Puerto Rico s 12 other major political party and PDP rival--won control of the executive branch of 13 government in Puerto Rico. (Docket No. 43-1 at 4.) In January 2009, NPP activist Zoimé 14 à lvarez-Rubio ( à lvarez-Rubio ) was appointed as Administrator of the SIFC. (Id.) Soon 15 after her appointment, in January 2009, à lvarez-Rubio changed the organizational structure 16 back to the way it was in April 2005.3 (Docket No. 34-46 at 10.) This reversion had the 17 blessing of SIFC s board. Id. The parties refer to this action as a reversion. Plaintiff s attempt to deny this fact fails, as we explain in note 1, supra. 3 Civil No. 11-1070 (JAF) -6- 1 à lvarez-Rubio also ordered a comprehensive investigation of all of the SIFC s 2 personnel transactions that were carried out from January 1, 2001, to December 31, 2008.4 3 (Id.) The purpose of the investigation was to ensure that all of the personnel transactions 4 had complied with applicable human resources procedures, in particular the merit 5 principle. 5 (Id. at 10-11.) The merit principle, which seeks to ensure open competition 6 for positions at the SIFC, finds expression in various internal regulations of the SIFC 7 Employee Manual, and is mandated by Puerto Rico law, 3 L.P.R.A. § 1461. (Id. at 10-14.) 8 à lvarez-Rubio delegated this investigation to Mr. Saúl Rivera-Rivera ( Rivera ), 9 then Director of the Human Resources Department.6 (Id. at 11.) During the investigation, 10 Rivera and his team reviewed the personnel files for every single employee of the SIFC, 11 which amounted to 3,835 personnel files. (Id.) The investigation concluded that 232 12 personnel files contained personnel transactions that violated Article 14.1 of the SIFC s 13 Employee Manual, because the positions were filled through internal announcements rather 14 than through a competitive process open to outsiders. (Id.) 15 During 2009, the SIFC also conducted a second investigation of personnel 16 transactions. (Id.) This second investigation focused on whether the reclassifications of the The parties dispute this fact, Defendants SUF ¶ 28, at various levels. (Docket No. 34-46 at 8; 43-2 at 5; 52-1 at 17.) Again, Plaintiff s denial fails to properly controvert Defendants statement for several reasons. (Docket No. 43-2 at 5.) First, in support of his denial, Plaintiff cites to his own Statement of Uncontested Facts instead of to original record material. Second, the item that Plaintiff points to in his own Statement of Uncontested Facts is properly controverted by Defendants. (Docket No. 52-1 at 108.) Third, the underlying evidence that Plaintiff points to his own statement that there was never any official communication of the reversion does not contradict Defendants claim regarding the audit. 5 Plaintiff denies this fact, again improperly. See note 4, supra. (Docket No. 43-2 at 5.) 6 Plaintiff denies this fact, Defendants SUF ¶ 29, again improperly. (Docket Nos. 43-2 at 5; 52-1 at 17-18.) We deem it admitted. 4 Civil No. 11-1070 (JAF) -7- 1 three earlier mentioned positions from trust to career were valid under existing procedures.7 2 To conduct this investigation, the SIFC hired a human resources management consultant, 3 Mr. José Miguel à lvarez ( Miguel ). (Id. at 12.) After investigating the reclassifications 4 and analyzing the relevant procedures, Miguel provided three reports submitting his expert 5 opinion on the matter. His conclusion was that all three reclassifications were in direct 6 violation of the merit principle.8 (Id.) 7 Miguel then prepared a report ( Audit Report or Report ) that summarized his 8 findings and recommended appropriate actions. The Report explained in detail why all of 9 the three reclassifications in question had violated the SIFC Employee Manual.9 (Id.) The 10 Audit Report also recommended that each of these transactions be annulled. (Id.) Miguel 11 gave the Audit Report to Rivera in his capacity as Director of Human Resources, who then 12 gave the Report to à lvarez-Rubio. (Id.) 7 Defendants maintain that they began this investigation after various employees and employee organizations complained about the reclassifications made during the previous administration. (Docket No. 34-46 at 11.) The complaints were filed before the SIFC Board of Appeals, by several managerial employees, the Federation of Managerial Employees of the SIFC, and the Association of Managerial Employees of the SIFC. (Id.) 8 Article 9.5 of the SIFC s Employee Manual governs the reclassifications of positions from trust to career and career to trust. In order to preserve the so-called merit principle, reclassifications from trust to career positions are authorized only when there is a change in the position s functions or when there is a change in the corporation s organizational structure. Article 9.5 further states that if the position is occupied, the position can be reclassified from trust position to a career position only if the employee occupying the position at the time complies with the following conditions: (1) meets the established requirements for the position s class; (2) has occupied the position for no less than the term provided for the probationary period of said position s class; (3) has passed the exam required for the position s class; and (4) the employee s services have been satisfactory, as certified by the Administrator. (Docket No. 34-46 at 10-11.) 9 Docket No. 52-1 at 21-23, 37-38. -8- Civil No. 11-1070 (JAF) 1 After reviewing the Audit Report, à lvarez-Rubio approved the Report s 2 recommendations. (Id. at 17.) Thereafter, the Human Resources Department began 3 notifying all of the employees who would be affected. (Id. at 18.) 4 On March 26, 2010, Plaintiff received a letter notifying him of the Administrator s 5 intent to nullify the personnel transaction that had reclassified his position as a career 6 position. (Id.) The letter explained that because the position Plaintiff held before the 7 reclassification was a trust position, Plaintiff had no right to be reinstated to the position. 8 (Id.) The letter further informed him of his right to request an administrative informal 9 hearing before an Official Examiner. (Id.) 10 On April 8, 2010, Plaintiff exercised that right by requesting an administrative 11 informal hearing. (Id.) On the same day, Plaintiff was informed that his hearing would be 12 scheduled for April 23. (Id.) The following week, on April 16, Plaintiff was informed that 13 a copy of his personnel file would be available for pick up on or before April 20. (Id.) 14 According to Plaintiff, his personnel file was only made available to him on the day of the 15 hearing, April 23. (Docket No. 43-1 at 5.) On that day, the administrative hearing was held, 16 and Plaintiff admits he was afforded the opportunity to present his position on the matter. 17 (Id. at 19.) 18 On April 27, 2010, the Official Examiner who presided over Reyes informal hearing 19 informed Plaintiff of her decision. (Id.) The Examiner agreed that the reclassification of 20 Plaintiff s position from a trust position to a career position violated applicable laws and -9- Civil No. 11-1070 (JAF) 1 regulations. (Id.)Therefore, the Examiner recommended to à lvarez-Rubio that the 2 reclassification of Plaintiff s position from trust to career be nullified. (Id.) 3 On April 30, 2010, after having reviewed the Official Examiner s decision, à lvarez- 4 Rubio notified Plaintiff of her final determination. (Id.) In a letter, à lvarez-Rubio informed 5 Plaintiff that she was adopting the Official Examiner s decision and nullifying the 6 reclassification of his position. 7 permanently separated from the career service of the SIFC s managerial employees and, 8 therefore, dismissed. (Id.) The letter also advised Plaintiff of his right to appeal the 9 Administrator s decision before the SIFC s Board of Appeals. (Id.) Plaintiff did not, 10 (Id.) Having no right to reinstatement, Plaintiff was however, appeal the decision to the SIFC s Board of Appeals. (Id.) 11 After Plaintiff s reclassification was nullified, Alvarez-Rubio returned the 12 Contracting Area to its previous status, under the direct supervision of the Administrator. 13 (Id. at 20.) Plaintiff s former position of Contracting Director was also returned to its 14 original trust classification.10 (Id.) 15 16 II. 17 Summary Judgment Under Rule 56 18 We must grant a motion for summary judgment if the pleadings, the discovery and 19 disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine dispute as to Plaintiff denies this, again improperly, by providing an assertion that in no way contradicts Defendants statement, and by citing to his own Statement of Uncontested Facts instead of to original record material. (See Docket No. 52-1 at 42-44.) 10 Civil No. 11-1070 (JAF) -10- 1 any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. 2 P. 56(a). A factual dispute is genuine if it could be resolved in favor of either party and 3 material if it potentially affects the outcome of the case. Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep t of 4 Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004). 5 The movant carries the burden of establishing that there is no genuine dispute as to 6 any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). The movant may 7 satisfy this burden by citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including 8 depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, . . . or 9 other materials. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Furthermore, to establish the absence of a 10 genuine dispute of material fact, the movant need not produce evidence but may instead 11 point to a lack of evidence supporting the nonmovant s case. 12 56(c)(1)(B); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Once the moving party has made a 13 preliminary showing that no genuine [dispute] of material fact exists, the nonmovant must 14 produce specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form, to establish the presence of a trialworthy 15 [dispute]. Clifford v. Barnhart, 449 F.3d 276, 280 (1st Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks 16 omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, we must view the record in the light 18 most favorable to the nonmovant. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 19 150 51 (2000). The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other 20 materials in the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). -11- Civil No. 11-1070 (JAF) 1 III. 2 Analysis 3 Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on each of Plaintiffs 4 claims. (Docket Nos. 33; 52.) We agree, and for the reasons discussed below, dismiss the 5 Complaint in its entirety. 6 A. First Amendment Claim 7 The parties here dispute whether Plaintiff has made a prima-facie case of political 8 discrimination. (Docket Nos. 33; 43.) Without deciding this question, we note that Plaintiff 9 has presented considerable evidence of a highly-charged political environment at the SIFC 10 following the elections of 2008. (Docket No. 43-1.) We assume, without deciding, that 11 Plaintiff has proven a prima-facie case of political discrimination, and proceed instead to the 12 dispositive question of whether Defendants have presented a winning Mt. Healthy defense, 13 see Mt. Healthy Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). We do this for the 14 following reason: [E]ven if a jury could reasonably conclude from the summary-judgment evidence that [Plaintiff s] political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor in their decisional calculus, he still would not be home free. The defendants could still meet their summary-judgment burden by showing that no sensible jury would reject their defense that they would have taken the same action against him in the absence of the protected conduct. . . . This is what is known as a Mt. Healthy Defense. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Soto-Padro v. Public Bldgs. Auth., 675 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2012) (internal quotations and 24 citations omitted). Civil No. 11-1070 (JAF) Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment based on their Mt. 1 2 -12- Healthy defense. (Docket No. 34 at 2.) We agree. 3 Defendants have established that the reason behind plaintiff's dismissal was the 4 violations of rules and regulations of the SIFC, particularly Article 9.5 of the SIFC 5 Employee Manual.11 (Docket Nos. 34; 34-46.) Still, as the First Circuit has noted, simply 6 showing that an appointment was illegal under local law does not suffice to meet 7 defendants Mt. Healthy burden. Sanchez-Lopez, 375 F.3d at 133. Additional factors 8 gleaned from First Circuit case law convince us that Defendants have met their burden in 9 this case. 10 For one, the personnel investigations that formed the basis for à lvarez-Rubio s 11 actions affected members of both parties: PDP and NPP sympathizers alike. For example, 12 one of the persons whose appointment was annulled as a result of à lvarez-Rubio s 13 investigations was codefendant Rivera, an NPP supporter. (Docket No. 34-46 at 17.) See 11 Defendants have shown that Plaintiff did not satisfy the requirements of Article 9.5 of the SIFC Employee Manual. (Defendants SUF ¶ 39, Docket No. 34-46 at 13-14.) Plaintiff s denial, (Docket No. 43-2 at 6), fails to properly controvert this crucial fact. Even looking past that flaw, however, Plaintiff has failed to controvert Defendants subsidiary demonstrations that he was unqualified for the position. To take one example, Plaintiff agrees that the career position of Contracting Director requires five years of contracting experience, three of which should include supervision. (Defendants SUF ¶ 53.) Defendants show that Plaintiff did not have the requisite five years of contracting experience. (Defendants SUF ¶ 54.) Plaintiff denies this fact by saying that documents were missing in his personnel file, which are part of the information that certified that Plaintiff qualified for the position. See Plaintiff s SUF No. 60. (Docket No. 43-2 at 8.) This denial is both procedurally flawed, in that it cites to his own statement instead of original record material, and it is non-responsive. The fact that a piece of paper is missing from a file does not controvert Defendants statement that Plaintiff lacked the requisite experience for the position. Defendants have cited several pieces of record evidence in support of their contention that Plaintiff did not possess the requisite five years of experience in contracting goods and services. (Docket Nos. 34-46 at 1314, 16; 52-1 at 26-29.) Plaintiff has failed to properly controvert this statement. We remind Plaintiff that we have no independent duty to do his job of searching the record to controvert Defendants assertions of fact. Civil No. 11-1070 (JAF) -13- 1 Soto Padro, 675 F.3d at 5 (noting that the people affected included NPP and PDP 2 sympathizers ). 3 Second, the investigations focused on positions not persons. Soto-Padro, 675 F.3d 4 at 5. The Audit Report itself identified the positions according to their number, giving 5 specific reasons independent of politics for why the reclassifications were improper. 6 (Docket No. 34-46 at 11-12.) 7 Third, the reversion of the SIFC s organizational structure that à lvarez-Rubio 8 effected had the blessing of [SIFC s] governing board, (Docket No. 34-46 at 10), and the 9 audit and restructuring were entity-wide in other words, it was not one that was targeted 10 exclusively at [Plaintiff s] particular corner of the SIFC. Soto-Padro, 675 F.3d at 5. The 11 investigations that Alvarez Rubio undertook extended to every single personnel file at the 12 SIFC more than 3,800 employees. (Docket No. 34-46 at 10-11.) 13 In these respects, this case is unlike those in which the First Circuit has found the 14 real motives of defendants reorganization plans questionable. Soto-Padro, 675 F.3d at 5. 15 Unlike in Padilla-Garcia v. Guillermo Rodriguez, 212 F.3d 69, 78 (1st Cir. 2000), for 16 example, here the restructuring affected several positions, not just one. Id. Nor was there 17 any evidence in this case that the personnel actions were taken against members of the 18 opposing party but not against similarly situated members of defendants own party. 19 Sanchez-Lopez, 375 F.3d at 126 (citing Acevedo-Garcia v. Vera-Monroig, 204 F.3d 1, 10- 20 11 (1st Cir. 2000)). -14- Civil No. 11-1070 (JAF) 1 As the First Circuit has made clear, even if a plaintiff shows an impermissible 2 political motive, he cannot win if the employer shows that it would have taken the same 3 action anyway, say, as part of a bona fide reorganization. Soto-Padro, 675 F.3d at 5 (citing 4 Nereida-Gonzalez v. Tirado-Delgado, 990 F.2d 701, 706 n.4 (1st Cir. 1993)). That is what 5 happened here: The summary judgment record shows that defendants still would have 6 reclassified [Plaintiff s] position even if he were an [NPP] member, which means that they 7 have sufficiently established a Mt. Healthy defense. Id. 8 The First Circuit has noted that, at times, in Puerto Rico, the outgoing party attempts 9 to secure the continued tenure of its members in public jobs through a variety of devices, 10 such as reclassifying policy-type appointments as career positions. Morales-Santiago v. 11 Hernandez-Perez, 488 F.3d 465, 467 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Sanchez-Lopez, 375 F.3d at 12 125 (1st Cir. 2004)). That appears to be what happened here: Just months before the 13 elections in 2008, Plaintiff s position was reclassified from a trust to a career position, 14 despite the fact that he was under-qualified, per SIFC rules and regulations, for the position. 15 This was just the sort of personnel transaction that Alvarez-Rubio s investigations were 16 designed to root out. (Docket No. 34-46 at 10-11.) We reject Plaintiff s attempt to label 17 this type of house cleaning unconstitutional political discrimination. For the foregoing 18 reasons, Plaintiff s claims under the First Amendment will be dismissed. 19 B. 20 Due Process Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff s due (Docket No. 34 at 30-34.) Plaintiff s response, to the extent we can 21 process claim. 22 understand it, is that his pre-termination hearing should have provided him with a -15- Civil No. 11-1070 (JAF) 1 meaningful opportunity to respond [to] and challenge the alleged illegality of his 2 appointment. 3 termination hearing was sufficient for constitutional due-process standards. We, therefore, 4 grant Defendants summary judgment on this claim. (Docket No. 43 at 33.) On this record, we find that Plaintiff s pre- 5 Due process requires that a deprivation of property be preceded by notice and 6 opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. 7 Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust 8 Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)). State employees holding a legally-protected property 9 interest in their employment generally must be given a pre-termination hearing before they 10 are dismissed for cause. See id.; Whalen v. Mass. Trial Court, 397 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 11 2005). A hearing is not required, however, where a reorganization or other cost-cutting 12 measure was the cause of the employees dismissal. Whalen, 397 F.3d at 24. 13 In this case, we think that due process required plaintiff be given some kind of 14 hearing before he was terminated.12 Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 482. As a career employee, 15 Plaintiff had a protected property interest in continued employment. Rodriguez-Sanchez v. 16 Municipality of Santa Isabel, 658 F.3d 125, 129 (1st Cir. 2011). 17 Having established that due process applies, the question remains what process is 18 due. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 We reject Defendants argument that because Plaintiff s termination was a random and unauthorized deprivation, no pre-deprivation hearings were required. The reorganization exception does not apply here, because the decision to terminate Plaintiff had to do with his individual qualifications for the career position. Whalen, 397 F.3d at 24. Therefore, this case is unlike those in which a pre-deprivation hearing would have been idle. See id. 12 Civil No. 11-1070 (JAF) -16- 1 (1972)). The Supreme Court has made clear that the pre-termination hearing need not 2 definitively resolve the propriety of the discharge, but need only be an initial check against 3 mistaken decisions essentially, a determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to 4 believe that the charges against the employee are true and support the proposed action. Id. 5 at 545-46. This pre-termination process, especially when there is a comprehensive post- 6 termination procedure in place, need not be elaborate. Calderon-Garnier v. Rodriguez, 578 7 F.3d 33, 38 (1st Cir. 2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted). To be adequate, the 8 pre-termination hearing need only include oral and written notice of the charges, an 9 explanation of the employer s evidence, and an opportunity for the employee to tell his side 10 of the story. Id. (quoting Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 929 (1997)). 11 On this record, we think that the process given Plaintiff was sufficient. In advance of 12 the pre-termination hearing, Plaintiff received written notice of the SIFC s decision to annul 13 the reclassification. He then participated in an informal hearing in which he admits that he 14 had an opportunity to tell his side of the story. (Docket No. 34-46 at 18-20.) At this stage, 15 no more was required to satisfy due process. Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 929. 16 C. Supplemental Claims 17 The Supreme Court has stated that if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, 18 . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 19 715, 726 (1966). This is not a mandatory rule to be applied inflexibly in all cases. 20 Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988). Rather, a district court 21 must exercise informed discretion when deciding whether to exercise supplemental 22 jurisdiction over state law claims. Redondo Constr. Corp. v. Izquierdo, 662 F.3d 42, 49 -17- Civil No. 11-1070 (JAF) 1 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Roche v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 256 57 2 (1st Cir. 1996)). This decision involves a weighing of various factors, including comity, 3 judicial economy, convenience, and fairness. Id. (internal citations omitted). 4 Having considered these factors, we decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 5 over Plaintiff s Puerto Rico law claims. Both parties have focused their efforts here on the 6 federal claims; the Puerto Rico law issues have received much less attention. Moreover, the 7 remaining issues in this case concern delicate and complicated questions of Puerto Rico law. 8 Many of the cases of other plaintiffs terminated by the SIFC are currently working their way 9 through the Commonwealth courts. In the interests of comity, we think that Puerto Rico s 10 11 12 own courts are best positioned to handle the resolution of the Puerto Rico law claims. Accordingly, those supplemental Commonwealth claims are dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 13 IV. 14 Conclusion 15 For the foregoing reasons, we hereby GRANT Defendants motion for summary 16 judgment (Docket No. 33). We DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff s federal claims, 17 and we DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff s supplemental Commonwealth law 18 claims. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 12th day of October, 2012. 21 22 23 s/José Antonio Fusté JOSE ANTONIO FUSTE United States District Judge

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