Rodriguez-Diaz v. Cruz-Colon et al, No. 3:2010cv01764 - Document 13 (D.P.R. 2010)

Court Description: OPINION and ORDER granting in part and denying in part 10 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Gustavo A. Gelpi on 12/15/10. (SAA)

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Rodriguez-Diaz v. Cruz-Colon et al Doc. 13 1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 3 4 ALEX ELI RODRIGUEZ -DIAZ, 5 Plaintiff, 6 v. 7 RAMON L. CRUZ-COLON, et al., 8 Defendants. CIVIL NO. 10-1764(GAG) 9 10 11 OPINION AND ORDER 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Plaintiff in this matter, Alex Eli Rodriguez-Diaz ( Plaintiff ) brought this action against codefendants Ramon L. Cruz-Colon ( Cruz ) and Ana Maria Lopez-Erquicia ( Lopez ), in their personal and official capacities as Insurance Commissioner and Sub-Commissioner of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, respectively as well as against the Insurance Commission of Puerto Rico (collectively Defendants ), seeking redress for alleged acts of discrimination and deprivation of due process. Plaintiff s claims were brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; and the Civil Rights Act of Puerto Rico, P.R. Laws Ann. tit 1, §§ 13-19. 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 This matter is currently before the court on Defendants motion to dismiss (Docket No. 10). The motion was opposed by Plaintiff (Docket No. 11). After reviewing the submissions and pertinent law the court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants motion to dismiss (Docket No. 10). I. Standard of Review Under Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss an action against him for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). When considering a motion to dismiss, the court must decide whether the complaint alleges enough facts to raise a right 28 Dockets.Justia.com Civil No. 10-1764 (GAG) 1 to relief above the speculative level. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 2 1955, 1965 (2007). In so doing, the court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts and draws all 3 reasonable inferences in the plaintiff s favor. Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 2008). 4 However, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint 5 is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ---, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). 6 Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 7 do not suffice. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). [W]here the well-pleaded facts do not 8 permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged 9 but it has not show[n] that the pleader is entitled to relief. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (quoting 10 Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). 11 In sum, when passing on a motion to dismiss the court must follow two principles: (1) legal 12 conclusions masquerading as factual allegations are not entitled to the presumption of truth; and (2) 13 plausibility analysis is a context-specific task that requires courts to use their judicial experience and 14 common sense. Id. at 1949-50 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56). In applying these principles, 15 courts may first separate out merely conclusory pleadings, and then focus upon the remaining well- 16 pleaded factual allegations to determine if they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Iqbal, 17 129 S. Ct. at 1950. However the court cautions against thinking of plausibility as a standard of 18 likely success on the merits; the standard is plausibility assuming the pleaded facts to be true and 19 read in plaintiff s favor. Sepulveda-Villarini v. Dept. of Educ. of P.R., No. 08-2283, slip op. at 10- 20 11 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) 21 II. Relevant Factual & Procedural Background 22 Plaintiff began working for the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in 1991. 23 From 1991 through 2009, Plaintiff was employed by a number of different government agencies. 24 During his tenure with the government Plaintiff never received a warning, oral or written, related 25 to the performance of his duties. Beginning in 1995 and ending on June 16, 2009, Plaintiff occupied 26 the tenured position of Director of Human Resources at the Planning Board. His title in this position 27 28 2 Civil No. 10-1764 (GAG) 1 was Administration Analyst VI. 2 On June 16, 2010, Plaintiff was recruited by the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance 3 ( OIC ) to occupy a trust position as Director of Human Resources of said agency. After appointing 4 Plaintiff to a trust position, Defendants learned that Plaintiff was a member of the Popular 5 Democratic Party ( PDP ) and not the New Progressive Party ( NPP ) the party his employers 6 were affiliated with. 7 On August 26, 2009, Cruz, acting on behalf of Lopez, ordered Plaintiff to immediately go 8 on vacation for fifteen days. The order was communicated to Plaintiff in a rude, energetic, hostile, 9 and violent manner. Lopez also ordered that Plaintiff return his office keys and identification card 10 and told him that he would be escorted out of the building. Cruz wrote a letter to Eng. Hector 11 Morales Vargas, Chairman of the Planning Board of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, indicating 12 that the OIC no longer required Plaintiff s services and asked that he be reinstated to his tenured 13 position as Administrative Analyst VI at the Planning Board. 14 On September 16, 2009, Plaintiff received a copy of the letter sent by Cruz to Hector Vargas. 15 Plaintiff was supposed to return to work at the OIC on September 18, 2009. On that day, Plaintiff 16 went to the Planning Board offices and showed the letter to the Executive Director, Manual Cardona. 17 Cardona told Plaintiff that he had no knowledge of this letter and it had never been received by the 18 Planning Board. Human Resources Director of the Planning Board, Attorney Jeffrey Perez, 19 informed Plaintiff that the agency required to reinstate him to a tenured position was the OIC, as he 20 had been transferred there on June 16, 2009. 21 On September 17, 2009, Plaintiff received a letter addressed to him signed by Cruz. The 22 letter indicated that Plaintiff had been terminated from his employment because of various 23 infractions to the Administrative Order on Conduct, Corrective Measures and Disciplinary Actions 24 of the OIC. The letter had not been personally delivered but had been left at his home. Following 25 his termination, Plaintiff requested a hearing with the agency. On November 17, 2009, the agency 26 held an informal hearing. No one from the agency appeared during the hearing. Additionally there 27 28 3 Civil No. 10-1764 (GAG) 1 were no witnesses present at the hearing, and no documentary evidence was presented. The officer 2 in charge of the hearing ultimately affirmed the decision of the agency. Plaintiff was notified of the 3 decision on December 21, 2009. The notification did not indicate the effective date of Plaintiff s 4 termination. 5 On January 12, 2010, Plaintiff filed an appeal before the Appellate Commission for the 6 Public Service s System of Human Resources Administration. The appeal is currently pending. 7 III. Discussion 8 A. 9 Plaintiff alleges violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the U.S. 10 Constitution, for the alleged acts of political discrimination committed by the directing officers at 11 the OIC. In order for a claim to be cognizable under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove three 12 elements of the cause of action: (1) that the named defendant acted under color of state law; (2) that 13 the plaintiff was deprived of federally protected rights, privileges or immunities; and (3) that the 14 defendant s alleged conduct was causally connected to the plaintiff s deprivation. 15 Gutierrez Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 558 (1st Cir. 1989). This causal connection may 16 consist of direct acts by the defendant, or certain acts performed at the defendant s direction or 17 knowledge and consent. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370 (1976). 18 § 1983 Claims Against the Defendants 1. Violation of Federally Protected Right 19 [Section] 1983 creates no independent substantive rights, but rather provides a cause of 20 action by which individuals may seek money damages for governmental violations of rights 21 protected by federal law. Cruz-Erazo v. Rivera-Montanez, 212 F.3d 617, 621 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing 22 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). As such, Plaintiff s § 1983 claims are grounded in 23 violations of his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. In their 24 motion to dismiss (Docket No. 10), Defendants aver that Plaintiff s claims are not actionable under 25 the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and therefore pray for the outright 26 dismissal of these claims. 27 28 4 Civil No. 10-1764 (GAG) 1 a. Due Process Claim 2 The Fourteenth Amendment protects against deprivation of life, liberty, or property without 3 the due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. This due process guarantee has both procedural 4 and substantive aspects. See Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 101 (1st Cir. 2008). The Supreme Court 5 has consistently held that substantive due process rights are violated by executive action when it 6 can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense. 7 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998). The requirements of procedural due 8 process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment s 9 protections of liberty and property. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). This right 10 encompasses those public employees who possess a property interest in continued employment and 11 requires notice and a hearing prior to the termination of their employment. Febus-Cruz v. Sauri- 12 Santiago, 652 F. Supp. 2d 140, 150-51 (D.P.R. 2009) (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 13 470 U.S. 532, 542-44 (1985). Property interests subject to due process protection are delineated 14 by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law. 15 Cortes-Reyes v. Salas-Quintana, 608 F.3d 41, 52 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting Bd. of Regents, 408 U.S. 16 at 577). The First Circuit has continually recognized that Puerto Rico law grants career government 17 employees a constitutionally protected property interest in their continued employment. See Costa- 18 Urena v. Segarra, 590 F.3d 18, 27 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Figueroa-Serrano v. Ramos-Alverio, 221 19 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2000). 20 Defendants do not contest the fact that Plaintiff was a career employee of the Puerto Rico 21 government. Instead Defendants contend that no due process violation occurred, as either adequate 22 post-deprivation process was sufficient under the circumstances, or in the alternative, if pre- 23 deprivation process was in fact required, plaintiff received sufficient process. 24 Defendants contend that post-deprivation process is adequate under these circumstances, 25 pursuant to the Parratt-Hudson doctrine. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984); Parratt v. 26 Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). According to this doctrine, a random or unauthorized deprivation of 27 property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of due 28 5 Civil No. 10-1764 (GAG) 1 process, if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533. 2 However, the court finds that this doctrine is inapplicable to this case, as the alleged actions by the 3 named defendants were not random or unauthorized as described in the holdings of Parratt and 4 Hudson. [T]he reasoning of Parratt and Hudson emphasizes the State's inability to provide pre- 5 deprivation process because of the random and unpredictable nature of the deprivation . . . . 6 Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 138 (1990). Here, the alleged violations of due process were 7 orchestrated by the Commissioner and Sub-commissioner of the OIC, both of whom are authorized 8 by the state to take the described action terminate Plaintiff s employment and ensure procedural 9 safeguards. Therefore, the deprivation here is unauthorized only in the sense that it was not an 10 act sanctioned by state law, but, instead, was a depriv[ation] of constitutional rights . . . by an 11 official's abuse of his position. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 138 (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 12 172 (1961)). Such grounds do not call for the application of the Parratt-Hudson doctrine. See id. 13 (finding Parratt-Hudson doctrine inapplicable when [t]he State delegated to [the state actors] the 14 power and authority to effect the very deprivation complained of. . . and also . . . the concomitant 15 duty to initiate the procedural safeguards . . . . ); see also Concepcion Chaparro v. Ruiz-Hernandez, 16 607 F.3d 261, 267 (1st Cir. 2010); Chmielinski v. Massachusetts, 513 F.3d 309, 315 (1st Cir. 2008) 17 (cases finding inapplicability of Parratt-Hudson doctrine to cases where actions are authorized by 18 the state). Accordingly, the termination of Plaintiff s career employment required both sufficient 19 pre-deprivation and post-deprivation process. See Zinermon ,494 U.S. at 132 ( In situations where 20 the State feasibly can provide a predeprivation hearing before taking property, it generally must do 21 so regardless of the adequacy of a postdeprivation tort remedy to compensate for the taking. ) 22 (citations omitted). 23 To satisfy the requirements of due process, the state need only include oral or written 24 notice of the charges, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity for the 25 employee to tell his side of the story. O'Neill v. Baker, 210 F.3d 41, 48 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting 26 Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 929 (1997)). With regard to an initial hearing, [d]ue process 27 requires only that the pre-termination hearing fulfill the purpose of an initial check against mistaken 28 6 Civil No. 10-1764 (GAG) 1 decisions-essentially, a determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the 2 charges against the employee are true and support the proposed action. Marrero-Gutierrez v. 3 Molina, 491 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Cepero-Rivera v. Fagundo, 414 F.3d 124, 135 (1st 4 Cir. 2005)). 5 Plaintiff contends that the termination notice he received from Cruz did not satisfy the 6 requirements of due process. Plaintiff s termination notice only contained vague and general 7 terms as grounds for his termination. (See Docket No. 1 at ¶ 12.) Further, the notice only indicated 8 that his termination was the result of various infractions to an Administrative Order of the Office 9 of the Insurance Commissioner. (See id.) Plaintiff was also never faced with specific allegations, 10 nor was he permitted to see the relevant reports or investigations of the OIC related to his case. (See 11 id. at ¶ 46.) Plaintiff further contends that the agency hearing, which took place on November 17, 12 2009, was constitutionally inadequate. Plaintiff alleges that no one from the agency appeared to 13 testify at the hearing, and no witnesses or documentary evidence were presented to the administrative 14 officer. See id. at ¶ 16.) Additionally, Plaintiff contends that during the hearing, the administrative 15 officer made comments demonstrating a lack of impartiality. (See id.) 16 Accepting all of Plaintiff s allegations as true, the court finds that even when considering 17 Plaintiff s opportunity for a post-deprivation remedy, the pre-termination process does not meet the 18 minimal requirements for due process. See Chmielinski, 513 at 316 (finding that a pre-termination 19 hearing need not be elaborate as long as an employee receives (1) oral or written notice of the 20 charges against him, (2) an explanation of the employer's evidence, and (3) an opportunity to present 21 his side of the story. ) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added). Among his averments, 22 Plaintiff alleges that he did not receive any explanation of the OIC s evidence, either in the 23 termination notice or at the pre-termination hearing. Without such information, Plaintiff was not 24 provided with a meaningful opportunity to present his side of the story. See Ojeda-Rodriguez v. 25 Zayas, 666 F. Supp. 2d 240, 254 (D.P.R. 2009) (recognizing that a failure to provide plaintiff with 26 an explanation of the evidence against her, thus impeding her from presenting story in a meaningful 27 way, constitutes sufficient grounds for due process violation.) Therefore, Plaintiff has alleged 28 7 Civil No. 10-1764 (GAG) 1 sufficient grounds to demonstrate a procedural due process violation. Accordingly, the court 2 DENIES Defendants motion to dismiss Plaintiff s procedural due process claim. 3 4 b. Political Discrimination 5 To state a valid political discrimination claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that 6 the named defendants deprived him/her of a federally protected right under the color of state law and 7 that the exercise of that right was a substantial factor in the adverse employment action. Aguiar 8 Carrasquillo v. Agosto Alicea, 445 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2006). To establish a prima facie case of 9 political discrimination, a plaintiff must make four showings: (1) the plaintiff and the defendant 10 belong to opposing political affiliations; (2) the defendant has knowledge of the plaintiff s opposing 11 political affiliation; (3) that a challenged employment action has occurred; (4) and sufficient 12 evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that the challenged employment action stemmed from 13 politically based animus. Gonzlez-De-Blasini v. Family Dept., 377 F.3d 81, 85 (1st Cir. 2004). In 14 their motion to dismiss, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to 15 satisfy the pleading requirements of a prima facie case of political discrimination. Specifically, 16 Defendants aver that Plaintiffs have failed as to the second and fourth elements of their claim. 17 As to the second and fourth elements, Plaintiff alleges that following his transfer to the trust 18 position at the OIC, Defendants learned that Plaintiff was not a member of the NPP. (See Docket 19 No. 1 at ¶ 3.) After obtaining knowledge of Plaintiff s political affiliation, co-defendant Cruz wrote 20 a letter to Engineer Hector Morales Vargas, Chairman of the Planning Board, indicating that the OIC 21 no longer required Plaintiff s services and asking that he be reinstated to his previous career position. 22 (See Docket No. 1 at ¶ 10.) This request was denied by the Planning Board and Defendants 23 subsequently terminated Plaintiff s employment. The court finds these allegations sufficient to 24 demonstrate Defendants knowledge of Plaintiff s political affiliation and its alleged impact on 25 Defendants decision to terminate Plaintiff s employment. Defendants efforts to hastily remove 26 Plaintiff from his trust position and return him to his previous position at the Planning Board, only 27 to ultimately terminate his employment when it was discovered that the OIC was legally obligated 28 8 Civil No. 10-1764 (GAG) 1 to reinstate him, permit the court to infer more than a mere possibility of misconduct. Iqbal, 129 2 S. Ct. at 1950. Plaintiff has therefore satisfied the pleading requirements of his first amendment 3 claim. Accordingly, the court DENIES Defendants motion to dismiss Plaintiff s First Amendment 4 claim. 5 2. Individual Liability of Cruz and Lopez 6 Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiff s Section 1983 claims against Cruz and Lopez in 7 their personal capacities. Personal capacity suits against governmental officials seek to impose 8 personal liability for actions taken by the government official under color of state law. Kentucky 9 v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 10 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own 11 individual actions, has violated the Constitution. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948. 12 With regard to the individual actions of defendants Cruz and Lopez, Plaintiff s allegations 13 are as follows: (1) Cruz gave an order to Lopez to tell Plaintiff to go on vacation for fifteen days; 14 (2) on that same day Lopez ordered Plaintiff to return his office keys and I.D. card, and told him that 15 he would be escorted out of the building; (3) Cruz wrote a letter to Eng. Hector Morales Vargas, 16 Chairman of the Planning Board, indicating that the OIC no longer required Plaintiff s services and 17 requesting his reinstatement into his previous career position; (4) Plaintiff provided both Lopez and 18 Cruz with letters identifying his right to reinstatement to a career position similar to the one he had 19 previously held with the Planning Board; (5) Following Plaintiff s letter and the Planning Board s 20 response, Cruz wrote a letter to Plaintiff indicating that Plaintiff s employment had been terminated 21 because of various infractions to an administrative order. (See Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 5 -7, 10-12.) 22 Accepting these allegations as true, the court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged 23 actions by defendant Cruz, which demonstrate his personal involvement in the alleged violations of 24 Plaintiff s constitutional rights. According to the allegations, Cruz was instrumental in terminating 25 Plaintiff s trust position. (See Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 5, 7.) He was also the one that sought Plaintiff s 26 return to his position at the Planning Board, only to inform Plaintiff that the OIC was terminating 27 his career employment following the Planning Board s refusal to reinstate him. (See Docket No. 28 9 Civil No. 10-1764 (GAG) 1 1 at ¶¶ 7, 10, 11, 12.) In contrast, Plaintiff fails to allege any action by Lopez that would lead this 2 court to infer liability on her behalf. The allegations against Lopez recognize her participation in 3 discharging Plaintiff from his trust position, however they do not describe how she was personally 4 involved in any way in the termination of Plaintiff s career employment. (See Docket No. 1 at ¶ 5- 5 6.) As it is this deprivation that Plaintiff alleges resulted in the constitutional violations, Lopez 6 cannot be held personally liable for these claims. Accordingly, the court GRANTS Defendants 7 motion to dismiss the claims against Lopez in her personal capacity and DISMISSES the same. a. 8 Qualified Immunity 9 In their motion to dismiss, Defendants present a perfunctory defense of qualified immunity. 10 Defendants contend that, because Plaintiff has failed to establish a violation of a constitutional right, 11 they are entitled to a defense of qualified immunity. (See Docket No. 10 at 18-19.) As previously 12 stated, the court has found that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support his First Amendment 13 and Due Process claims. As Defendants have failed to elaborate on the second prong of the qualified 14 immunity defense, the court DENIES Defendants motion to dismiss the claims against defendant 15 Cruz in his personal capacity based on qualified immunity. 16 B. Title VII Claim 17 In his opposition Plaintiff moved to voluntarily dismiss his Title VII claim against the 18 Defendants. Therefore, this claim is DISMISSED without prejudice. 19 IV. Conclusion 20 For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants 21 motion to dismiss. Remaining before this court are Plaintiff s local law claims as well as his Section 22 1983 claims against Defendants in their official capacity and defendant Ramon L. Cruz-Colon in his 23 personal capacity. All other claims are DISMISSED. 24 25 SO ORDERED. 26 In San Juan, Puerto Rico this 15th day of December, 2010. 27 28 10 Civil No. 10-1764 (GAG) 1 s/ Gustavo A. GelpÃ 2 GUSTAVO A. GELPI 3 United States District Judge 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11

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