Velez-Rivera et al v. Autos del Caribe et al, No. 3:2010cv01079 - Document 22 (D.P.R. 2010)

Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER. GRANTED 13 MOTION to dismiss as to Rafael Esteves, Carlos Rivera filed by Rafael Esteves, Carlos Rivera. Signed by Judge Salvador E Casellas on 5/6/2010.(LB) Modified on 5/7/2010 to correct document type (rc).

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 1 2 3 HECTOR VELEZ-CABRERA ET AL Plaintiff 4 5 v. Civil No. 10-1079 (SEC) AUTOS DEL CARIBE ET AL 6 Defendants 7 8 OPINION AND ORDER 9 10 Pending before this Court is Defendants Rafael Esteves, and Carlos Rivera s (collectively 11 Defendants ) motion to dismiss (Docket # 13). Plaintiffs did not file an opposition. After 12 reviewing the filings, and the applicable law, Defendants motion to dismiss is GRANTED. 13 Factual and Procedural Background 14 On February 4, 2010, Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants in their official and 15 individual capacity, and against Autos del Caribe, under the Age Discrimination Employment 16 Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq, Law 100, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 146 et seq, Law 80, P.R. Laws 17 Ann. tit. 29, § 185a et al, Article II of the Commonwealth s Constitution, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 18 1, and Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141. Docket # 1. 19 Shortly thereafter, Defendants filed their answer to the complaint (Docket # 14),1 and moved 20 to dismiss the claims against them arguing that there is no individual liability under the ADEA 21 and Law 80. Docket # 13. To this date, Plaintiffs have not opposed. 22 23 24 25 26 1 Autos del Caribe also answered the complaint. Docket # 12. 1 CIVIL NO. 10-1079 (SEC) Page 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Standard of Review Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Plaintiffs well-pleaded facts must possess enough heft to show that [they are] entitled to relief. Clark v. Boscher, 514 F. 3d 107, 112 (1 st Cir. 2008).2 In evaluating whether Plaintiffs are entitled to relief, the court must accept as true all of their well-pleaded facts [and indulge] all reasonable inferences therefrom in the plaintiff s favor. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007). The First Circuit has held that dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate if the complaint fails to set forth factual allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory. Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F. 3d 301, 305(1 st Cir. 2008). Courts may augment the facts in the complaint by reference to documents annexed to the complaint or fairly incorporated into it, and matters susceptible to judicial notice. Id. at 305-306. However, in judging the sufficiency of a complaint, courts must differentiate between well-pleaded facts, on the one hand, and bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, periphrastic circumlocution, and the like, on the other hand; the former must be credited, but the latter can safely be ignored. LaChapelle v. Berkshire Life Ins., 142 F.3d 507, 508 (quoting Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1 st Cir.1996)); Buck v. American Airlines, Inc., 476 F. 3d 29, 33 (1st Cir. 2007); see also Rogan v. Menino, 175 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1999). Thus Plaintiffs must rely in more than unsupported conclusions or interpretations of law, as these will be rejected. Berner v. Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 515 (1st Cir. 1988)). 24 25 26 2 FED . R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2) requires only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to allow the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007). 1 CIVIL NO. 10-1079 (SEC) Page 3 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 Therefore, even under the liberal pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, the Supreme Court has recently held that to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege a plausible entitlement to relief. RodrÃguez-OrtÃz v. Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 F.3d 92 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965). Although complaints do not need detailed factual allegations, the plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. At 1965; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). A plaintiff s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. At 1965. That is, factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all allegations in the complaint are true. Parker v. Hurley, 514 F. 3d 87, 95 (1 st Cir. 2008). The Court may augment the facts in the complaint by reference to documents annexed to the complaint or fairly incorporated into it, and matters susceptible to judicial notice. Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F. 3d 301, 305-06 (1 st Cir. 2008). Applicable Law and Analysis Although the Supreme Court and the First Circuit have yet to address whether or not there is individual liability under the ADEA or the ADA, this district has followed the majority of circuits that have confronted the issue and held that no personal liability can attach to employees under the ADEA or the ADA. Reyes-Ortiz v. Valdes, No. 09-1333, slip. op. at * 9-10 (D.P.R. Mar. 22, 2010); see also Julia v. Janssen, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 25, 28-29 (D.P.R. 2000) (citing Diaz v. Antilles Conversion & Export, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 463, 465 (D.P.R. 1999); Vizcarrondo v. Bd. of Trs., 139 F. Supp. 2d 198, 205 (D.P.R. 2001); Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 115, 120 (D.P.R. 1997); Pagan-Maldonado v. 1 CIVIL NO. 10-1079 (SEC) Page 4 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 Centennial Puerto Rico Communication Corp., No. 09-1389, slip. op. at 27 (D.P.R. Dec. 8, 2009). A similar conclusion has been drawn in this district regarding personal liability under Puerto Rico Law 80. See Flamand v. American Intern. Group, Inc., 876 F.Supp. 356, 364 (D.P.R. 1994); Martinez v. Blanco Velez Store, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 108, 113 (D.P.R. 2005). Accordingly, Plaintiffs ADEA and Law 80 claims against Defendants must be dismissed. Moreover, having dismissed Plaintiffs federal law claims against Defendants, their claims under Law 100 and Article 1802 against said Defendants are also DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. See Newman v. Burgin, 930 F.2d 955, 963 (1 st Cir. 1991) (holding that [t]he power of a federal court to hear and to determine sate-law claims in non-diversity cases depends upon the presence of at least one substantial federal claim in the lawsuit. ) Conclusion Based on the foregoing, Defendants motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Accordingly, Plaintiffs ADEA and Law 80 claims against Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and their Law 100 and Article 1802 are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Notwithstanding, Plaintiffs claims against Autos del Caribe remain pending before this Court. IT IS SO ORDERED. In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 6th day of May, 2010. S/ Salvador E. Casellas SALVADOR E. CASELLAS United States District Judge

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