Mercado-Santoni et al v. Hospital Buen Samaritano, Inc., No. 3:2009cv01829 - Document 27 (D.P.R. 2010)
Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART 9 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Hospital Buen Samaritano, Inc. We dismiss Rosa Mercado-Santoni's claims but retain Marcos Muniz-Mercado's claims. Signed by Chief Judge Jose A Fuste on 8/25/2010.(mrj)
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Mercado-Santoni et al v. Hospital Buen Samaritano, Inc. 1 2 3 4 5 Doc. 27 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO ROSA MERCADO-SANTONI and MARCOS MUÑÍZ-MERCADO, 6 7 Civil No. 09-1829 (JAF) Plaintiffs, v. 8 9 HOSPITAL BUEN SAMARITANO, et al., Defendants. 10 OPINION AND ORDER 11 Plaintiffs, Rosa Mercado-Santoni and Marcos Muñíz-Mercado, bring this diversity action 12 for medical malpractice under Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, 31 L.P.R.A. 13 §§ 5141–5142 (1999), against Hospital Buen Samaritano, Inc. (“HBS”) and various unknown 14 defendants. (Docket No. 1.) HBS files for summary judgment, arguing that the statute of 15 limitations for the cause of action has run out. (Docket No. 9.) Plaintiffs oppose. (Docket 16 No. 16.) 17 We grant a motion for summary judgment “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure 18 materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 19 the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A factual dispute 20 is “genuine” if it could be resolved in favor of either party and “material” if it potentially affects 21 the outcome of the case. Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004). Dockets.Justia.com Civil No. 09-1829 (JAF) -2- 1 The movant carries the burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue as to any 2 material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). In evaluating a motion for 3 summary judgment, we must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, and 4 we must consider the entire record of admissible evidence. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing 5 Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 150–51 (2000). “Once the moving party has made a preliminary showing 6 that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the nonmovant must produce specific facts, in suitable 7 evidentiary form, to establish the presence of a trialworthy issue.” Clifford v. Barnhart, 449 F.3d 8 276, 280 (1st Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). The nonmovant “may not rely merely 9 on allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response must . . . set out specific facts 10 showing a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). 11 A tort suit brought under Articles 1802 and 1803 must be commenced within one year of 12 the first day the suit could have been filed. See 31 L.P.R.A. §§ 5298, 5299. In medical 13 malpractice cases, the term of one year to bring the action is calculated once the affected party 14 knows the origin of the damage and the reason for the cause of the damages. See Riley v. 15 Rodríguez de Pacheco, 19 P.R. Offic. Trans. 806, 821 (1987). 16 In this case, Mercado-Santoni knew of the origin and reason for the cause of action in 17 November 2007, at the latest. (Docket No. 9 at 8.) However, this lawsuit was filed on January 21, 18 2009, two months after the one-year term for filing the complaint had passed. (Docket No. 9 at 19 1.) Mercado-Santoni concedes that her claim is barred by the statute of limitations. (Docket 20 No. 16 at 1.) Civil No. 09-1829 (JAF) -3- 1 Muñíz-Mercado’s mental incapacity prevents the statute of limitations from barring his 2 claim. While Puerto Rico’s Civil Code provides that statutes of limitations shall run against “all 3 kinds of persons,” see 31 L.P.R.A. § 5243 (1990), an exception to this general rule is made for 4 minors and the mentally disabled, see 32 L.P.R.A. § 254 (2004). See Torres v. P.R. Water Res. 5 Auth., 96 P.R. 634, 637–38 (1968). In the case of mental disability, the statute of limitations is 6 tolled, so long as the individual does not return to his full mental capacity. See id. at 637 n. 1. 7 Furthermore, the fact that the mentally-incapacitated person has a legally-appointed guardian does 8 not prevent the tolling of the statute of limitations. Id. 9 Muñíz-Mercado was recently deemed mentally incapacitated by a Florida court. (See 10 Docket No. 16-3 (appointing Mercado-Santoni as Muñíz-Mercado’s legal guardian).) 11 Furthermore, Mercado-Santoni attests that Muñíz-Mercado suffered said incapacity when the 12 alleged tort occurred and that it continues through the present day. (Docket No.17-1.) 13 Defendants present no challenge to the claim of Muñíz-Mercado’s mental incapacity. Thus, 14 because of his mental incapacity, Muñíz-Mercado’s claims are not time-barred. 15 For the foregoing reasons, we hereby GRANT in part and DENY in part HBS’ motion for 16 summary judgment. (Docket No. 9). We dismiss Rosa Mercado-Santoni’s claims but retain 17 Muñíz-Mercado’s claims. 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 25th day of August, 2010. 20 21 22 s/José Antonio Fusté JOSE ANTONIO FUSTE Chief U.S. District Judge
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