Diaz-Castro v. Roman-Roman et al, No. 3:2009cv01033 - Document 42 (D.P.R. 2010)
Court Description: ORDER. DENIED 37 MOTION for Reconsideration re 31 Opinion and Order, Terminate Motions; NOTED 41 MOTION Submitting English Translation; MOOT 40 MOTION to Appoint Counsel filed by Maria Judith Diaz-Castro. Signed by Judge Salvador E Casellas on 6/11/2010.(LB)
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Diaz-Castro v. Roman-Roman et al Doc. 42 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 1 2 3 MARIA JUDITH DIAZ-CASTRO 4 Petitioner 5 v. 6 7 CIVIL NO. 09-1033 (SEC) ROMAN-ROMAN, ET AL Defendants 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 OPINION AND ORDER In the Opinion and Order dated February 10, 2010, this Court denied Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition on two fronts: failure to exhaust administrative remedies and untimeliness. Docket # 31. Therein this Court noted that Petitioner did not file a motion pursuant to Puerto Rico Criminal Procedure Rule 192.1, P.R. Laws ann. tit. 34, § 1741(c), and as a result, dismissal of her Section 2254 was warranted. Moreover, we pointed out that Petitioner was sentenced on June 23, 2003; that her appeal to the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals was denied on December 12, 2005; her subsequent motion for reconsideration to the appeals court was denied on March 3, 2006; her writ of certiorari to the Puerto Rico Supreme Court was denied on June 2, 2006; her two requests for reconsideration to said Court were denied on July 21 and August 21, 2006. Therefore, the State court’s final judgment was final on or around August 21, 2006. Although Petitioner should have filed the instant petition on or around August 22, 2007, her petition was filed on January 13, 2009, that is, well after the one-year period of limitations for petitions under Section 2254. Absent allegations or proof of extraordinary circumstances which impeded Petitioner’s timely filing, this Court held that Petitioner’s claims were time-barred, and as a result, dismissal of her petition was also warranted on these grounds. 25 26 Dockets.Justia.com 1 CIVIL NO. 09-1033 (SEC) Page 2 2 On March 16, 2010, Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration in the Spanish language 3 (Docket # 33), arguing that she exhausted all remedies available in the state court, to wit, that 4 she filed a Rule 192.1 motion in the state court. She also set forth alleged exculpatory evidence 5 to support her request for habeas relief. The Government opposed, arguing that Petitioner’s 6 motion for reconsideration was untimely filed, and fails to rebut this Court’s conclusion that her 7 Section 2254 petition is time-barred. 8 Upon reviewing the record, for the reasons set forth in our prior Opinion, this Court finds 9 that Petitioner’s Section 2254 is time-barred. Moreover, she has not exhausted all the remedies 10 available in the state court. As previously discussed in the Opinion, a petition for writ of habeas 11 corpus may be brought by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court, if such 12 custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 13 2254(a). However, Section 2254(b)(1)(A) provides that an application for a writ of habeas 14 corpus under said section shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted 15 the remedies available in the courts of the State. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 839 16 (1999) (finding that “[f]ederal habeas relief is available to state prisoners only after they have 17 exhausted their claims in state court”). A petitioner shall not be deemed to have exhausted the 18 remedies available in the state courts within the meaning of Section 2254, “if he has the right 19 under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.” 28 20 U.S.C. § 2254(c). 21 The Supreme Court has held that “[t]he exhaustion doctrine is a judicially crafted 22 instrument which reflects a careful balance between important interests of federalism and the 23 need to preserve the writ of habeas corpus as a ‘swift and imperative remedy in all cases of 24 illegal restraint or confinement.’” Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 490 25 (1973) (citations omitted). Accordingly, federal courts “will not entertain an application for 26 1 CIVIL NO. 09-1033 (SEC) Page 3 2 habeas relief unless the petitioner first has fully exhausted his state remedy with respect to each 3 and every claim contained in the application.” Delgado v. Martinez, 72 F. Supp. 2d 2, 5 (D.P.R. 4 1999) (citing Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518-19 (1982). In Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 5 32 (2004), the Court ruled that a claim cannot be exhausted if it is not presented directly to the 6 state’s highest court. See also Delgado, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 4. Moreover, a petitioner for federal 7 habeas review must present claims to the state supreme court irrespective of whether said 8 court’s review is discretionary. O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 839. Based on the foregoing, a “habeas 9 petitioner has to avail himself, not only of whatever appeals he was entitled to as a matter of 10 right, but also as to any discretionary remedies available.” Marin-Robles v. Del Valle, 2005 U.S. 11 Dist. LEXIS 1800, *8-9 (D.P.R. 2005). 12 The Puerto Rico courts provide for appellate relief and state habeas corpus post 13 conviction relief. P.R. Laws ann. tit. 34, § 1741. Therefore, in order to be afforded federal 14 habeas corpus relief, a Petitioner challenging a Puerto Rico court conviction must exhaust these 15 mechanisms. Rodriguez v. Warden, 791 F. Supp. 41, 42 (D.P.R. 1992) (finding that a federal 16 habeas petitioner fails to exhaust all state court remedies when he fails to avail himself of state 17 post-conviction court proceedings). A prerequisite to state habeas corpus relief is the filing and 18 disposition of a motion pursuant to Puerto Rico Criminal Procedure Rule 192.1. P.R. Laws ann. 19 tit. 34, § 1741(c); Rodriguez v. Warden, 791 F.Supp. 41, 42 (D.P.R. 1992). As such, the 20 prisoner must first seek post-conviction collateral relief under Rule 192.1, which provides that 21 “any person who is imprisoned by virtue of a judgment rendered by any Division of the Court 22 of First Instance and who alleges the right to be released because . . . the sentence was imposed 23 in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or of the 24 Constitution and laws of the United States, . . . may file a motion, in the part of the court which 25 imposed the sentence, to vacate, set aside, or correct the judgment.” Thereafter, the order 26 1 CIVIL NO. 09-1033 (SEC) Page 4 2 entered by the Court of First Instance is appealable to the appeals court, and subsequently to the 3 Puerto Rico Supreme Court. After said remedy has been exhausted, the prisoner must then seek 4 habeas relief in the state courts, prior to filing a petition for federal habeas relief. Thus even if 5 Petitioner filed a Rule 192.1 motion before the state court (Docket # 33), she fails to show that 6 she appealed said court’s denial of the same, and sought habeas relief in the state courts. 7 Therefore, Petitioner has not exhausted all state court remedies. 8 Conclusion 9 Based on the foregoing, Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 11 th day of June, 2010. 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 S/ Salvador E. Casellas SALVADOR E. CASELLAS U.S. Senior District Judge
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