Crispin-Taveras v. The Municipality of Carolina et al, No. 3:2007cv02017 - Document 67 (D.P.R. 2009)

Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 46 Motion to Dismiss; granting in part and denying in part 18 Motion to Dismiss. We DISMISS Plaintiff's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims for false arrest and all claims against Def endant Jose C. Aponte-Dalmau. We DISMISS all claims against Puerto Rico Police Department officials in their official capacities. The remaining triable issues are: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 conspiracy against all Defendants; (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 conspiracy among the Municipality of Carolina, the Commissioner of the Carolina Municipal Police Department, and the police association; (3) supervisory liability against the Municipality of Carolina, the Carolina Municipal Police Department, and th e police association; (4) 42 U.S.C. § 1985 conspiracy; (5) First Amendment violation; (6) Fourth Amendment violation; (7) Fourteenth Amendment claim for denial of medical treatment while in pretrial detention; (8) 42 U.S.C. § 1986 claim for failure to prevent the § 1985 conspiracy; (9) Puerto Rico tort claim; (10) Puerto Rico assault claim; (11) Puerto Rico false arrest claim; (12) Puerto Rico claims for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (13) Puerto Rico respondeat superior claim. Signed by Chief Judge Jose A Fuste on 2/10/09. (mrj) Modified on 2/10/2009 as to title (dv).

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1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO YONATTA CRISPà N-TAVERAS, Plaintiff, 6 7 8 Civil No. 07-2017 (JAF) v. MUNICIPALITY OF CAROLINA, et al., 9 Defendants. OPINION AND ORDER 10 11 Plaintiff Yonatta Crispín-Taveras brings this action against 12 Defendants the Municipality of Carolina; José C. Aponte-Dalmau, Mayor 13 of Carolina; Carlos Haddock, Commissioner of the Carolina Municipal 14 Police Department ( CMPD ); Rubén Moyeno, Director of the Special 15 Reserve Unit of the CMPD; John Cruz-González, Luis Díaz-Ruiz, Karimar 16 Peraza-Salgado, and other unnamed CMPD officers; Vanessa Carmona and 17 Alfredo Rivera-Suárez, officers in the Puerto Rico Police Department 18 ( PRPD ); and an unknown police association, under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 19 1985, 20 resulting from an incident of alleged police brutality. Docket No. 3. 21 Defendants Peraza-Delgado, Carmona, Rivera-Suárez, Aponte-Dalmau, 22 Haddock, 23 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to 24 state a claim, Docket No. 18, and Plaintiffs oppose, Docket No. 19. 25 Defendants Haddock and Moyeno move to dismiss pursuant to Federal 26 Rule 27 immunity, Docket No. 46; that motion is unopposed. and of 1986 and Moyeno, Civil various Puerto Cruz-González, Procedure and 12(b)(1), Rico laws, Díaz-Ruiz asserting seeking move to Eleventh damages dismiss Amendment Civil No. 07-2017 (JAF) -2- 1 I. 2 Factual and Procedural Synopsis 3 We derive the following factual summary from the complaint, 4 Docket No. 3. As we must, we assume all of Plaintiff s allegations to 5 be true and make all reasonable inferences in his favor. Alternative 6 Energy, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., Co., 267 F.3d 30, 36 7 (1st Cir. 2001). 8 Plaintiff is a naturalized United States citizen who was born in 9 the Dominican Republic. Since June 20, 2000, he has been a member of 10 the United States Marine Corps. Beginning July 27, 2004, he was 11 stationed at the Roosevelt Roads Naval Station in Ceiba, Puerto Rico, 12 where he was a marine instructor. 13 On February 4, 2007, Plaintiff attended a baseball game between 14 the Dominican national team and the Puerto Rico team at the Roberto 15 Clemente Stadium in Carolina, Puerto Rico. He was wearing a cap with 16 the 17 spectator, identified as Oscar , began shouting and walking up and 18 down the aisles of the stadium with a large Dominican flag. Oscar s 19 behavior attracted the attention of CMPD personnel who were in charge 20 of security at the stadium. They moved in to eject Oscar from the 21 stands. In the process, they also forcibly removed Plaintiff from the 22 stadium. CMPD officer Cruz-González struck Plaintiff in the head with 23 a retractable metal baton, and then several other officers began to 24 kick Plaintiff and strike him with their batons. The officers then 25 handcuffed Plaintiff and detained him at the stadium detention center insignia of the Dominican flag. During the game, another Civil No. 07-2017 (JAF) -3- 1 without advising him of his constitutional rights. Although Plaintiff 2 was bleeding profusely, the officers denied him medical attention 3 while he was detained. At approximately 3:00 a.m. the following 4 morning, Marine personnel arrived and Plaintiff was transported to 5 the University of Puerto Rico Hospital in Carolina, Puerto Rico. At 6 the hospital, Plaintiff received stitches and was released a few 7 hours later. 8 On March 27, 2007, Cruz-González, Díaz-Ruiz and Peraza-Salgado, 9 with the assistance of Carmona and Rivera-Suárez, charged Plaintiff 10 in absentia with three felony charges of aggravated assault and 11 destruction of property. On March 28, 2007, Plaintiff was arrested 12 again, handcuffed, and taken to the police station for processing. 13 All 14 misdemeanor charge remained outstanding as of the filing of the 15 present complaint. 16 felony charges were dismissed on September 17, 2007. A At some point, Defendants either confiscated or destroyed all 17 surveillance 18 Defendants in supervisory positions were aware of the violent beating 19 but failed to intercede or report the incident. 20 The recordings CMPD, Carolina, of and the February individual 4, CMPD 2007, officers incident. have an 21 unspoken policy of harassing and discriminating against Dominicans. 22 Supervisory officials in the CMPD and Carolina government were aware 23 of 24 investigate alleged police misconduct and discipline offending police 25 officers and personnel, thereby creating a policy tolerating police 26 brutality. this policy. Supervisory officials also failed to properly Civil No. 07-2017 (JAF) -4- 1 On October 25, 2007, Plaintiff filed a complaint in federal 2 district court. Docket No. 1. On February 27, 2008, Plaintiff filed 3 an amended complaint. Docket No. 3. On June 25, 2008, Defendants 4 moved to dismiss, Docket No. 18; Plaintiff opposed on July 10, 2008, 5 Docket No. 19. On December 8, 2008, Haddock and Moyeno moved to 6 dismiss. Docket No. 46. 7 II. 8 Motion to Dismiss Standards 9 A. Rule 12(b)(1) 10 Under Rule 12(b)(1), a defendant may move to dismiss an action 11 against him for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. See 12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The party asserting jurisdiction has the 13 burden of demonstrating its existence. See Skwira v. United States, 14 344 F.3d 64, 71 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing Murphy v. United States, 15 45 F.3d 520, 522 (1st Cir. 1995)). 16 Rule 12(b)(1) is a "large umbrella, overspreading a variety of 17 different types of challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction." 18 Valentin v. Hosp. Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 362-63 (1st Cir. 19 2001). A moving party may base a challenge to the sufficiency of 20 the plaintiff s assertion of subject matter jurisdiction solely on 21 the pleadings. Id. at 363. In that case, we take the plaintiff s 22 jurisdictionally-significant facts as true and assess whether 23 the plaintiff has propounded an adequate basis for subject-matter 24 jurisdiction. Id. at 363; see Pejepscot Indus. Park, Inc. v. Maine 25 Cent. R.R. Co., 215 F.3d 195, 197 (1st Cir. 2000). Civil No. 07-2017 (JAF) 1 2 B. -5- Rule 12(b)(6) Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss an 3 action against him, based solely on the pleadings, for the 4 plaintiff s failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 5 granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In assessing a motion to dismiss, 6 [w]e begin by accepting all well-pleaded facts as true, and we draw 7 all reasonable inferences in favor of the [nonmovant]. Wash. Legal 8 Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 971 (1st Cir. 1993); see 9 also Coyne v. City of Somerville, 972 F.2d 440, 442-43 (1st Cir. 10 1992). We then determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim 11 under which relief can be granted. 12 A plaintiff must set forth a short and plain statement of the 13 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, Fed. R. Civ. 14 P. 8(a)(2), and need only give the respondent fair notice of the 15 nature of the claim and petitioner s basis for it. Swierkiewicz v. 16 Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-15 (2002). We note that in order to 17 survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege facts that 18 demonstrate a plausible entitlement to relief. Rodríguez-Ortiz v. 19 Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 F.3d 92, 95 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Bell Atl. 20 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1967 (2007)). 21 III. 22 Analysis 23 Plaintiff asserts twenty-one counts against Defendants, 24 including 42 U.S.C. § 1983 conspiracy, 42 U.S.C. § 1985 conspiracy, 25 violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986 for failure to prevent the § 1985 26 conspiracy, violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Civil No. 07-2017 (JAF) -6- 1 Amendments, municipal liability, and supplemental claims under Puerto 2 Rico law. Document No. 3. Defendants move to dismiss, asserting 3 Eleventh Amendment immunity, failure to allege personal involvement 4 of certain defendants, failure to state a claim of violation of the 5 First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, failure to state a 6 claim 7 conspiracy, and qualified immunity. Docket Nos. 18, 46. They also ask 8 that we dismiss the supplemental claims. Docket No. 18. We address 9 Defendants arguments in turn. 10 A. 11 12 of supervisory liability, failure to state a claim of Eleventh Amendment Immunity Defendants Haddock and Moyeno move to dismiss on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Docket No. 46. 13 The Eleventh Amendment provides states with immunity from 14 federal lawsuits by their own citizens or by citizens of other 15 states. U.S. Const. amend. XI; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662- 16 63 (1974). The Eleventh Amendment also bars suits for monetary relief 17 against state officers in their official capacities, because such 18 awards will be paid from the state treasury. Ford Motor Co. v. Dep t 19 of 20 immunity applies to states themselves and to entities that are arms 21 of a state. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. v. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 991 22 F.2d 935, 939 (1st Cir. 1993). The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is 23 considered a state for purposes of Eleventh Amendment analysis. 24 Jusino Mercado v. Puerto Rico, 214 F.3d 34, 37 (1st Cir. 2000). The 25 Puerto Rico Police Department ( PRPD ) is an arm of the state, 26 entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Sánchez Ramos v. P.R. Police the Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945). Eleventh Amendment Civil No. 07-2017 (JAF) -7- 1 Dep t, 392 F. Supp. 2d 167, 177 (D.P.R. 2005). However, political 2 subdivisions of a state, such as municipalities and counties, do not 3 lie within the Eleventh Amendment s reach. Metcalf & Eddy v. P.R. 4 Aqueduct and Sewer Auth., 991 F.2d 935, 939 (1st Cir. 1993). 5 It appears from the complaint that Haddock and Moyeno are both 6 officers in the CMPD, see Docket No. 3; Haddock and Moyeno do not 7 state otherwise in their motion to dismiss, see Docket No. 46. As 8 municipal officials, they are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment 9 immunity. See Metcalf & Eddy, 991 F.2d at 939. However, Plaintiff has 10 asserted claims against several PRPD officials in their official 11 capacity; these claims are subject to Eleventh Amendment immunity. 12 See Jusino Mercado, 214 F.3d at 37. Accordingly, we dismiss all 13 claims against any PRPD officers in their official capacities as 14 barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Claims against Haddock, Moyeno, and 15 CMPD officials sued in their personal and official capacities, and 16 PRPD officers sued in their personal capacities, remain. 17 B. 18 Lack of Personal Involvement Defendants argue that we must dismiss the § 1983 claims against 19 Aponte, Haddock, Moyeno, Carmona, and Rivera-Suárez because 20 Plaintiffs have failed to specifically allege any wrongful actions by 21 those defendants. Docket No. 18. We find that Plaintiff has alleged 22 specific actions taken by Carmona and Rivera-Suárez. See Docket 23 No. 3. Furthermore, to the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to 24 assert claims of supervisory liability, he has appropriately pled 25 claims against Haddock for his role as Commissioner of the CMPD, and 26 Moyeno, for his role as Director of the Special Reserve Unit of the Civil No. 07-2017 (JAF) -8- 1 CMPD. See id. However, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to support 2 a 3 supervising the police officers who allegedly denied Plaintiff his 4 civil 5 Accordingly, we dismiss all claims against Aponte. 6 C. 7 8 finding that rights, Aponte, or aware as Mayor of the of Carolina, alleged was involved misconduct. See in id. First Amendment Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a valid claim under the First Amendment. Docket No. 18. 9 The First Amendment protects the choice to wear clothing as a 10 symbol of an opinion, cause, ethnic heritage, religious belief, or 11 social view. Littlefield v. Forney Ind. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 285 12 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Canady v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 240 F.3d 13 437, 440-41 (5th Cir. 2001)); see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 14 18 (1971). A plaintiff may state a First Amendment claim by alleging 15 that he was arrested or otherwise punished as a result of protected 16 expression. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 18; McGuire v. Reilly, 386 F.3d 17 45, 59 (1st Cir. 2004). 18 Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested and beaten because 19 he was wearing a hat bearing the Dominican flag. We, therefore, find 20 that he has sufficiently stated a claim for violation of his First 21 Amendment rights. See Cohen, 402 U.S. at 18. 22 D. Fourth Amendment 23 Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for 24 violation of his Fourth Amendment rights because his arrest was based 25 on probable cause. Docket No. 18. Civil No. 07-2017 (JAF) -9- 1 The Fourth Amendment requires that all arrests be supported by 2 probable cause. Wilson v. City of Boston, 421 F.3d 45, 54 (2005); see 3 Roche v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 254 (1st 4 Cir. 1996) ( If probable cause to arrest and prosecute the appellant 5 existed, no unconstitutional deprivation occurred. ). An officer has 6 probable cause to arrest a suspect if, at the moment of the arrest, 7 the facts and circumstances of which the officer was aware would 8 cause a reasonable person to believe that the suspect had perpetrated 9 or was about to perpetrate an offense. Roche, 81 F.3d at 254. The 10 fact that an arrest does not lead to prosecution or that a jury 11 acquits the defendant at trial does not speak to the issue of 12 probable cause. Id. at 255. 13 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant police officers arrested him 14 because he was wearing a cap bearing the Dominican flag while another 15 spectator at the stadium created a disturbance by shouting and waving 16 a large Dominican flag nearby. Docket No. 3. Felony charges against 17 Plaintiff were dismissed on September 17, 2007; a misdemeanor charge 18 was still outstanding at the time that Plaintiff filed the present 19 complaint. Id. Defendants correctly argue that the mere fact that 20 Plaintiff has not been successfully prosecuted for the incident does 21 not mean that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him in the 22 first place. See Roche, 81 F.3d at 255. However, at this stage, the 23 facts do not establish that a reasonable officer would have thought 24 that 25 offense. See id. at 254. Accordingly, we find that Plaintiff has 26 stated a Fourth Amendment claim. Petitioner had perpetrated or was about to perpetrate an Civil No. 07-2017 (JAF) 1 E. 2 -10- Due Process Claims Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a due 3 process 4 Amendments. Docket No. 18. [S]ubstantive due process may not furnish 5 the constitutional peg on which to hang a claim for malicious 6 prosecution or false arrest. Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46, 53-54 7 (citing 8 Accordingly, we dismiss the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due 9 Process claims premised on the false arrest.1 10 11 12 F. claim for Albright false v. arrest Oliver, under 510 U.S. the Fifth 266, 271 or Fourteenth n.4 (1994)). Supervisory Liability Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim of supervisory liability under § 1983. Docket No. 18. 13 Section 1983 does not provide for respondeat superior liability. 14 Calvi v. Knox County, 470 F.3d 422, 429 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing 15 Monell v. Dep t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692-94 (1978)). 16 Nevertheless, a supervisory official may be held liable under § 1983 17 for his subordinates behavior if (1) his subordinates behavior 18 results in a constitutional violation and (2) the official s action 19 or inaction was affirmatively linked to that behavior such that it 20 could be characterized as supervisory encouragement, condonation or 1 Plaintiff also asserts that he was denied medical treatment while detained. Docket No. 3. Denial of medical treatment to pretrial detainees is actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Burrell v. Hampshire Cty., 307 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that pretrial detainees are protected under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause); Jones v. City of Cincinnati, 521 F.3d 555, 560 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting that deliberate indifference to detainees medical needs constitutes a substantive due process violation). Because Defendants have not moved to dismiss this claim, it remains intact. Civil No. 07-2017 (JAF) or -11- 1 acquiescence gross negligence amounting to deliberate 2 indifference. Pineda v. Toomey, 533 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2008) 3 (quoting Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 902 (1st Cir. 1988)) 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). 5 Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to establish that the 6 officer Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free 7 from police brutality, unreasonable seizure, arrest, and detention. 8 See Docket No. 3. Plaintiff alleges that Carolina and the CMPD had an 9 unspoken policy of systematically harass[ing], coerc[ing], 10 intimidat[ing], and discriminat[ing] against Dominicans within their 11 jurisdiction 12 established policies and customs that created a climate in which 13 officers believed they could use excessive force with impunity. 14 Docket No. 3. Plaintiff further asserts that supervisors in the 15 police department had received complaints concerning the use of 16 excessive force on civilians, especially on those of Dominican 17 descent, and had failed to take remedial measures to guard against 18 police brutality. Id. We find that these allegations sufficiently 19 state a claim of supervisory liability. Cf. Pineda, 533 F.3d at 54. 20 To require more at this stage would amount to the imposition of a 21 heightened 22 Acción v. Hernández, 367 F.3d 61, 66 (1st Cir. 2004) (rejecting 23 heightened pleading standard for civil rights actions). due to pleading their national standard. See race and/or Educadores origin, Puertorriqueños and en Civil No. 07-2017 (JAF) 1 G. -12- Conspiracy 2 Plaintiff asserts conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 3 1985(2) and (3). Docket No. 3. Defendants contend that Plaintiff has 4 failed to state a claim of conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 because 5 he has not alleged discrimination on the basis of race or any other 6 protected class. Docket No. 18. 7 To state a claim of conspiracy in violation of § 1985(2), a 8 plaintiff must show a conspiracy between two or more people to 9 obstruct justice with the intention of denying a person the equal 10 protection of the law. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). To establish a § 1985(3) 11 conspiracy, a plaintiff must show a conspiracy between two or more 12 people for the purpose of depriving a person or class of people of 13 the equal protection of the law. Diva s Inc. v. City of Bangor, 411 14 F.3d 30, 38 (1st Cir. 2005). For both types of conspiracy, the 15 plaintiff must allege that the conspiracy is motivated by racial or 16 class-based animus. Id. (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 17 91 (1971)); Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 469 (1st Cir. 1975) 18 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting and applying Griffin, 403 U.S. 19 at 99). 20 Plaintiff has alleged attempted to that cover up the the officers beating beat because him he and 21 subsequently was 22 Dominican. Docket No. 3. Consequently, Plaintiff has successfully 23 alleged that these actions were because of invidious class-based 24 animus against Dominicans. See Soltani v. Smith, 812 F. Supp. 1280, Civil No. 07-2017 (JAF) -13- 1 1295 (D.N.H. 1993) (listing national origin discrimination as a 2 permissible basis for a § 1985 claim). Accordingly, we do not dismiss 3 Plaintiff s § 1985 claims. Because Defendants have made no arguments 4 as to Plaintiff s § 1983 conspiracy claims, those also remain. 5 H. Qualified Immunity 6 Defendant police officers assert that they are entitled to 7 qualified immunity because it is clearly evident that appearing 8 [D]efendants 9 [P]laintiff, and any actions taken by the appearing [D]efendants were 10 in accordance with the law, rules and regulations in effect at that 11 time, in good faith, and within the scope of their duties. Docket 12 No. 18. 13 have not violated any constitutional right of Animating the qualified immunity doctrine is the principle that 14 where a state official s duties require action that does not 15 implicate clearly-established rights, the public interest is better 16 served when the official may act without fear of future liability. 17 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982). We typically employ 18 a three-step inquiry to determine whether Defendants are entitled to 19 qualified immunity, asking: (i) whether the plaintiff s allegations, 20 if true, establish a constitutional violation; (ii) whether the 21 constitutional right at issue was clearly established at the time of 22 the putative violation; and (iii) whether a reasonable officer, 23 situated similarly to the defendant, would have understood the 24 challenged act or omission to contravene the discerned constitutional Civil No. 07-2017 (JAF) -14- 1 right. Pagán v. Calderón, 448 F.3d 16, 31 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing 2 Saucier 3 subjective good faith does not grant him qualified immunity from 4 suit. Mihos v. Swift, 358 F.3d 91, 104 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing 5 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814-15). 6 We v. Katz, found, 533 U.S. supra, 194, that 200-02 Plaintiff (2001)). has An official s sufficiently alleged 7 violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. Because Defendants sole 8 basis for their assertion of qualified immunity is that Defendants 9 did not violate the law, we need not consider the second and third 10 steps of the qualified immunity analysis. Accordingly, we find that 11 Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage. 12 I. 13 14 Supplemental Claims Because Plaintiff s federal claims remain intact, we do not dismiss his state claims. 15 IV. 16 Conclusion 17 For the foregoing reasons, we hereby GRANT IN PART Defendants 18 motion to dismiss, Docket No. 18, and DISMISS Plaintiff s Fifth and 19 Fourteenth Amendment claims for false arrest and all claims against 20 Defendant Aponte. We GRANT IN PART the motion to dismiss filed by 21 Haddock and Moyeno, Docket No. 46, and DISMISS all claims against 22 PRPD officials in their official capacities. The remaining triable 23 issues are: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 conspiracy against all Defendants; 24 (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 conspiracy among Carolina, the CMPD, and the Civil No. 07-2017 (JAF) -15- 1 police association; (3) supervisory liability against Carolina, the 2 CMPD, and the police association; (4) 42 U.S.C. § 1985 conspiracy; 3 (5) 4 (7) Fourteenth Amendment claim for denial of medical treatment while 5 in pretrial detention; (8) 42 U.S.C. § 1986 claim for failure to 6 prevent 7 (10) Puerto Rico assault claim; (11) Puerto Rico false arrest claim; 8 (12) Puerto Rico claims for intentional or negligent infliction of 9 emotional distress; and (13) Puerto Rico respondeat superior claim. First Amendment the § violation; 1985 (6) conspiracy; Fourth (9) Amendment Puerto Rico violation; tort 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 10th day of February, 2009. 12 13 14 15 S/José Antonio Fusté JOSE ANTONIO FUSTE U.S. District Judge claim;

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