Ortiz-Garcia et al v. Pereira-Castillo et al, No. 3:2007cv02004 - Document 88 (D.P.R. 2009)

Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART and DENYING IN PART 64 Motion for summary judgment. We DISMISS Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment claim, but RETAIN all other claims. We strongly urge the parties to settle this case. Signed by Chief Judge Jose A Fuste on 9/15/09.(mrj)

Download PDF
1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO JESà S ORTIZ-GARCà A, et al., 4 Plaintiffs, 5 v. 6 Civil No. 07-2004 (JAF) MIGUEL PEREIRA-CASTILLO, et al., 7 Defendants. OPINION AND ORDER 8 9 Plaintiffs, Jesús Ortiz-García and Elsie Lima-Tartabú, bring the 10 present action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, both personally and on behalf 11 of 12 Defendants, Miguel A. Pereira-Castillo ( Pereira ), Héctor Fontánez- 13 Rivera ( Fontánez ) and his conjugal partnership with Lydia Ivette 14 Lasalle, Ramón L. Díaz-Correa ( Díaz ) and his conjugal partnership 15 with his unnamed spouse, Roberto del Valle Navarro ( del Valle ) and 16 his conjugal partnership with his unnamed spouse, José A. Sánchez- 17 Acevedo ( Sánchez ) and his conjugal partnership with his unnamed 18 spouse, 19 partnership with his unnamed spouse, Rafael López-Colón ( López ) and 20 his conjugal partnership with his unnamed spouse, David à guila- 21 Rodríguez ( à guila ) and his conjugal partnership with his unnamed 22 spouse, à ngel C. Medina ( Medina ) and his conjugal partnership with 23 his unnamed spouse, Hiram Peña and his conjugal partnership with his their deceased Gilberto son, Jesús Negrón-Falcón Ortiz-Lima ( Decedent ), ( Negrón ) and his against conjugal -2- Civil No. 07-2004 (JAF) 1 unnamed spouse,1 2 her unnamed spouse,2 in their personal capacities, alleging violations 3 of Decedent s rights under the U.S. Constitution. (Docket No. 23.) 4 Plaintiffs also allege violations of their and Decedent s rights 5 under Puerto Rico law. (Id.) Pereira, Fontánez, Díaz, del Valle, 6 Sánchez, Negrón, López, à guila, and Medina (together, Movants ) move 7 for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 56(c) (Docket No. 64), and and Myrna Rivera and her conjugal partnership with Plaintiffs oppose (Docket No. 72). 9 I. 10 Factual and Procedural History 11 We derive the following factual and procedural summary from the 12 parties pleadings, motions, exhibits, and statements of uncontested 13 facts. (Docket Nos. 11; 23; 45; 58; 64; 68; 72; 73;3 77; 79; 81.) 14 A. Movants 15 During the time period relevant to this case, Movants were all 16 officials of the Administration of Corrections ( AOC ). The AOC 17 operates correctional facilities like the one at issue in this case, 1 Hiram Peña (Docket No. 51.) has been voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. 2 Myrna Rivera has not appeared in this case, though she was served with process on June 11, 2008. (See Docket No. 49.) 3 Movants did not controvert Plaintiffs proffered facts (Docket No. 73 at 11-16), which are, therefore, deemed admitted under Local Civil Rule 56(e). -3- Civil No. 07-2004 (JAF) 1 the now-closed Institution 352 of Río Piedras ( Río Piedras 352 ). 2 (Docket Nos. 73-22; 77-7.) 3 Pereira was secretary of the AOC. (Docket No. 68-28.) His 4 testimony reveals that he was actively involved in monitoring and 5 prioritizing security measures taken at Río Piedras 352. (See, e.g., 6 Docket 7 subordinates regarding the conditions there. (Id. at 2; see also 8 Docket No. 68-8 at 6.) 9 No. Fontánez No. 73-22 was 77-6.) at 10-11.) assistant His He also secretary testimony of reveals received reports security in that had he the from AOC. 10 (Docket specific 11 knowledge of, and gave instructions regarding, the conditions of 12 security at Río Piedras 352. (See Docket No. 79-4 at 3-4.) 13 officials reported to him regarding security incidents at Río Piedras 14 352. (See Docket No. 77-6 at 2.) Further, he headed the office in 15 charge of preparing the master roster (Docket No. 68-2 at 2), which 16 assigned guards to specified posts within Río Piedras 352 (Docket 17 No. 77-3 at 15-16). Other AOC 18 Díaz was director of the East Region for the AOC. (Docket 19 No. 68-2.) His testimony reveals that he made decisions regarding 20 security expenditures, and otherwise handled security deficiencies, 21 at Río Piedras 352. (See, e.g., Docket No. 73-19 at 3, 11.) 22 Del Valle was superintendent of Río Piedras 352. (Docket No. 68- 23 14.) He received reports from other officials regarding security 24 incidents at Río Piedras 352. (Docket No. 68-14 at 7.) He was also -4- Civil No. 07-2004 (JAF) 1 charged with identifying and reporting to his superiors the security 2 conditions at Río Piedras 352. (Docket No. 77-14 at 10.) 3 Sánchez was commander of the guard at Río Piedras 352. (Docket 4 No. 77-10.) His testimony reveals that he was charged with notifying 5 his superiors of security conditions and with implementing security 6 measures at Río Piedras 352. (Docket No. 73-3 at 2, 11-12.) He also 7 assigned correctional officers to their shifts and monitored the 8 rosters used at Río Piedras 352. (Docket No. 77-11 at 1, 13) 9 Negrón was security advisor to Díaz. (Docket No. 68-31.) He 10 inspected Río Piedras 352 and made recommendations to Díaz regarding 11 security conditions there. (Docket No. 68-8 at 1, 5-6.) Fontánez 12 considered 13 (Docket No. 79-4 at 4.) 14 López Negrón was the chief sub-commander of of security the guard at Río Piedras 352. of Río Piedras 352. 15 (Docket No. 68-19.) He ensured officers compliance with security 16 regulations and reported on security conditions at Río Piedras 352. 17 (Id.) 18 à guila was a supervisor of the correctional officers at Río 19 Piedras 352. (Docket No. 68-7.) He ensured officers compliance with 20 security regulations and implemented security conditions at Río 21 Piedras 352. (Docket Nos. 68-7 at 1; 73-15 at 12.) He was the on-duty 22 supervisor at the time of Decedent s death. (Docket No. 68-7 at 6.) 23 Medina was a correctional officer at Río Piedras 352. (Docket 24 No. 68-27.) He stood guard in assigned posts at Río Piedras 352. Civil No. 07-2004 (JAF) -5- 1 (Id.) He was the on-duty guard in Decedent s living quarters at the 2 time of Decedent s death. (Docket No. 68-29.) 3 B. Conditions of Decedent s Confinement and Death 4 On October 28, 2006, the date of his death, Decedent was in the 5 penal custody of the AOC at Río Piedras 352. (Docket No. 77-7.) At 6 that time, Río Piedras 352 housed 448 medium-security, minimum- 7 security, and protective-custody inmates. (Docket Nos. 68-7 at 3; 77- 8 11 at 4.) Decedent was assigned to Section B, the medium-security 9 section of the facility, which housed approximately 174 inmates. 10 (Docket Nos. 68-7 at 3; 73-9 at 7; 77-7.) 11 At that time, Río Piedras 352 suffered from various security 12 deficiencies, as did other institutions under AOC s control. (E.g. 13 Docket No. 73-22.) For example, inside the living quarters, the locks 14 on the cell doors did not function (e.g. Docket No. 73-15); had they 15 been working, they would have separated Decedent from three of the 16 four inmates convicted for his murder (see Docket Nos. 73-9 at 7; 73- 17 15 at 1-2; 73-17; 77-4 at 9-11). The prison was understaffed (e.g. 18 Docket Nos. 73-20 at 4; 77-14 at 2); for example, whereas security 19 analyses prescribed two fixed posts inside Decedent s living quarters 20 (Docket No. 73-3 at 15),4 only one guard was stationed there at the 21 time of Decedent s death (Docket Nos. 73-3 at 7; 73-15 at 6). Guards 22 routinely found shanks in inmates possession (e.g. Docket No. 68-7 4 A fixed post is one that must be occupied by a guard at all times. (Docket No. 68-7 at 5.) -6- Civil No. 07-2004 (JAF) 1 at 2),5 and there was a history of violence among the inmates (e.g. 2 Docket No. 73-20 at 5-7). 3 While prison officials were aware of these conditions,6 Río 4 Piedras 352 was in the process of closing, and certain administrators 5 had decided that no money would be spent on repairing the conditions 6 there. (E.g. Docket Nos. 73-19; 73-22.) Instead, prison officials 7 worked to maintain order, performing routine searches (see Docket 8 No. 68-7 at 1-4) and attempting to keep the guard posts filled, 9 sometimes by assigning guards to double shifts or by borrowing guards 10 assigned to other institutions (see Docket Nos. 68-7 at 8-9; 73-20 at 11 7). 12 On the evening of Decedent s death, one guard, Medina, was on 13 duty in the sole post assigned to Decedent s living quarters. 14 (Docket No. 68-29.) 15 p.m. (Id.) At 6:00 p.m., following routine practice, the prison 16 officials closed down the living quarters for the night, which 17 consisted of shutting the doors that separated the inmates housed 18 along the lower level of the quarters from those, like Decedent, His shift that day lasted from 2:00 until 10:00 5 Shanks are makeshift knives, crafted by sharpening common items such as toothbrushes. (Docket No. 77-4 at 6.) 6 Submitted testimony suggests that all Movants had specific knowledge of said conditions, namely Pereira (e.g. Docket No. 73-22 at 2), Fontánez (e.g. Docket No. 79-4 at 3), Díaz (e.g. id., Docket Nos. 73-19 at 11; 77-14 at 2), del Valle (e.g. Docket No. 79-4 at 5), Sánchez (e.g. Docket No. 73-3 at 1-2), Negrón (e.g. Docket Nos. 73-3 at 1-2; 79-4 at 4), López (e.g. Docket No. 68-19), à guila (e.g. Docket No. 68-7 at 11), and Medina (e.g. Docket No. 73-20 at 4). Civil No. 07-2004 (JAF) -7- 1 residing in the upper, and performed a headcount of the inmates. 2 (Docket Nos. 73-4 at 2; 73-5 at 1; 73-15 at 1.) While Medina was also 3 supposed to make a preventative round every half hour (Docket No. 68- 4 7 at 4, 10), testimony from one of the inmates suggests that the 5 6:00 p.m. headcount was the only round Medina made that evening 6 (Docket No. 73-5 at 1). 7 According to Medina s testimony, guards facilities, including 8 the restroom and water fountain, were located outside the living 9 quarters, in the control room. (Docket No. 73-6.) The control room 10 was a glass-encased room connecting Section B, where Decedent was 11 housed, to Section A, the minimum-security living quarters. (Docket 12 No. 73-3 at 7-10.) One guard was assigned to the control room to 13 watch over both sections and to control access to them. (Id. at 17- 14 18.) While Medina was obliged to leave his post and enter the control 15 room in order to use the guards facilities, when he did so he was 16 supposed to call by radio his on-duty supervisor, à guila, for a 17 replacement guard. (See Docket No. 68-7 at 6, 13.) That evening, 18 Medina instead called the control-room guard, asking that guard to 19 watch over Section B for him while he used the water fountain. 20 (Docket Nos. 68-27; 73-6.) The control-room guard remained inside the 21 control room, however, leaving Decedent s living quarters without a 22 guard. (Id.) It was then, at approximately 8:20 p.m., when four of 23 Decedent s fellow inmates fatally stabbed him with shanks. (See id.) -8- Civil No. 07-2004 (JAF) 1 During or immediately after the stabbing, Medina noticed the 2 commotion and then saw Decedent, wounded, walking along a corridor 3 toward the control room. (Docket No. 73-6.) Medina then notified 4 à guila 5 ambulance, which took Decedent to the hospital where he died. (See 6 Docket Nos. 73-6; 77-4 at 3-4.) 7 as the cause of death. (Docket No. 79-2 at 12.) 8 of an informant inmate, the murder weapons were recovered, and four 9 inmates were convicted for Decedent s murder. (See Docket No. 73-5.) 10 C. of the emergency. (Id.) The officials arranged for an The autopsy revealed the stab wounds Later, with the help Procedural History 11 On October 22, 2007, Plaintiffs filed suit in this court. 12 (Docket No. 1.) On May 7, 2008, they filed an amended complaint. 13 (Docket No. 23.) Movants moved for summary judgment on June 1, 2009 14 (Docket No. 64), and Plaintiffs responded on June 17, 2009 (Docket 15 No. 72). -9- Civil No. 07-2004 (JAF) 1 II. 2 Summary Judgment under Rule 56(c) 3 We grant a motion for summary judgment if the pleadings, the 4 discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show 5 that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant 6 is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 7 A factual dispute is genuine if it could be resolved in favor of 8 either party and material if it potentially affects the outcome of 9 the case. Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep t of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st 10 11 Cir. 2004). The movant carries the burden of establishing that there is no 12 genuine issue as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 13 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, we 14 view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. 15 Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). 16 Once the moving party has made a preliminary showing that no 17 genuine issue of material fact exists, the nonmovant must produce 18 specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form, to establish the 19 presence of a trialworthy issue. Clifford v. Barnhart, 449 F.3d 20 276, 280 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Triangle Trading Co. v. Robroy 21 Indus., Inc., 200 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1999)). 22 rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, The nonmovant may not -10- Civil No. 07-2004 (JAF) 1 its response must . . . set out specific facts showing a genuine 2 issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). 3 III. 4 Analysis 5 Movants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because 6 (1) Plaintiffs have failed to establish a cause of action under 42 7 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of Decedent s Eighth and Fourteenth 8 Amendment rights; and (2) Movants are entitled to qualified immunity. 9 (Docket No. 64.) 10 A. We address each argument in turn. Prima-Facie Case under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 11 Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for violation of a federal 12 right by a person acting under the color of state or territorial law.7 13 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, under § 1983, a supervisory official 14 may be held liable for his subordinates behavior, but only if 15 (1) 16 violation; 17 affirmatively 18 characterized 19 acquiescence 20 indifference. Pineda v. Toomey, 533 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2008) his 7 subordinates and (2) linked as or behavior the to official s that supervisory gross resulted behavior in a action or such that encouragement, negligence constitutional amounting inaction it could condonation to was be or deliberate Movants argue that Sánchez was on vacation at the time of Decedent s death and, thus, was not acting under color of state law during the relevant time period. (Docket No. 64 at 15.) We find this argument wholly unpersuasive given that Plaintiffs allege Sánchez , and all other Defendants , ongoing involvement in creating and maintaining the conditions of Decedent s confinement. -11- Civil No. 07-2004 (JAF) 1 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 2 864 F.2d 881, 902 (1st Cir. 1988)). 3 Plaintiffs allege each Movants direct violation both of 4 Decedent s Eighth Amendment rights and of his substantive due process 5 rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.8 6 also allege supervisory liability as to all Movants except Medina for 7 said violations. (Id.) We discuss these allegations below. (Docket No. 23.) Plaintiffs 8 1. 9 The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. 10 U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Under it, prisoners have the right to humane 11 conditions of confinement, which imposes on prison officials a duty 12 to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates. 13 Giroux v. Somerset County, 178 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting 14 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). Specifically, prison 15 officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the 16 hands of other prisoners. Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833). 17 But not all incidents of inmate-on-inmate violence give rise to 18 official liability; a prison official may be held liable under the 19 Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if 8 Eighth Amendment Plaintiffs also mention a Fifth Amendment claim in their complaint (Docket No. 23 at 10) but, based on the record, do not appear to pursue it. We merely note that because this case does not allege any action by the federal government, any such claim would be dismissed as a matter of law. See Martínez-Rivera v. Sánchez-Ramos, 498 F.3d 3, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2007) (upholding dismissal of Fifth Amendment claim given absence of federal government action). -12- Civil No. 07-2004 (JAF) 1 he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and 2 disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate 3 it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847. 4 Accordingly, to hold an official personally liable in these 5 circumstances, a plaintiff must show that the official was 6 deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm. 7 Burrell v. Hampshire County, 307 F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing 8 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). For conduct to be deliberate, the 9 official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could 10 be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must 11 also draw the inference. Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). 12 Further, an official will not be found indifferent if he responded 13 reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not avoided. 14 Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844). 15 Movants argue that Plaintiffs cannot establish direct violation 16 of Decedent s Eight Amendment rights, as (1) Decedent did not face a 17 substantial risk of serious harm; (2) Movants were unaware of the 18 risk, general or particular, that Decedent faced; and (3) Movants 19 took reasonable steps to abate any risk Decedent might have faced. 20 (Docket No. 64 at 6-25.) We address each argument in turn. 21 First, Movants contest that no substantial risk existed because 22 Río Piedras 352 housed mostly low risk inmates and because the 23 incidences [sic] of violence was minimal there. (Docket No. 64 at 24 16.) To support that conclusion, they cite Negrón s testimony -13- Civil No. 07-2004 (JAF) 1 describing the layout of inmates dormitories. (Id.; Docket Nos. 68 2 at 2; 68-8 at 5.) Needless to say, Movants utterly fail to support 3 their conclusory statements regarding the risks Decedent faced in 4 their facility. In fact, at least two Movants opined that the 5 conditions there were dangerous and inhumane. (See Docket Nos. 68-8 6 at 4; 73-20 at 4.) 7 both systemic and particular to the stabbing incident, supra Part 8 I.B, we find that Plaintiffs have submitted sufficient evidence to 9 show that Decedent faced a substantial risk of serious harm during 10 Given the security deficiencies described above, his confinement. 11 Second, Movants argue that they were unaware of any risk, 12 general or specific, Decedent faced at Río Piedras 352. (Docket 13 No. 64 at 14-15.) 14 that they never received any notice that Decedent was at particular 15 risk of harm. (Id.) But that evidence does not shield Movants from 16 liability; if they had knowledge regarding the general risk to 17 someone 18 regardless of whether Decedent faced any particular risk. See Farmer, 19 511 20 security for Río Piedras 352 in some capacity, we find knowledge 21 regarding general risks there fairly attributable to each. Moreover, 22 Plaintiffs submitted sufficient evidence to show that each Movant 23 did, in fact, possess knowledge, and responsibility, regarding that 24 risk. See sources cited supra note 6; supra Part I.A. U.S. in at To support that argument, they point to evidence Decedent s 843-44. circumstances, And insofar as they each can be actively found liable administered Civil No. 07-2004 (JAF) -14- 1 Finally, Movants argue that, given the limited resources and 2 control available to each, all Movants took reasonable steps to abate 3 any risk that existed at Río Piedras 352. (Docket No. 64 at 11-25.) 4 In support, they point to various security measures they took, 5 including fielding inmates complaints (id. at 15); routine searches 6 (id. at 21); sufficient personnel (id. at 21, 24, 25); general 7 implementation of security policies (id. at 21); and disciplinary 8 proceedings against officers (id. at 23). Further, they explain that 9 certain decisions regarding security at Río Piedras 352 fell outside 10 their control. (Docket No. 64 at 11-25.) 11 In response, Plaintiffs proffered evidence showing that despite 12 Movants promulgation and implementation of security policies, basic 13 security measures, such as locking cell doors or guards at all 14 prescribed posts, or even one guard at the solitary post, were, 15 nevertheless, absent at the time of Decedent s death. See supra Part 16 I.B. 17 security for prisoners at Río Piedras 352, supra Part I.A, the 18 absence of same suffices to support the inference that Movants failed 19 to take reasonable steps to abate the risk that Decedent faced. In view of the role each Movant played in providing such basic 20 We now address briefly the issue of supervisory liability. 21 Movants essentially argue that there is no affirmative link between 22 supervisors activities and any violations that occurred at the hands 23 of their subordinates. (Docket No. 64 at 20-25.) Plaintiffs, in turn, 24 have submitted evidence showing that each supervisor was charged, to -15- Civil No. 07-2004 (JAF) 1 some extent, with ensuring that subordinates took prescribed measures 2 to secure their prisoners. See supra Part I.A. 3 absent, the inference arises that supervisors failed in their duty to 4 adequately 5 encouragement, condonation or acquiescence or gross negligence, 6 Pineda, 7 deliberate indifference toward Decedent s safety. We, thus, find no 8 grounds for granting summary judgment on Plaintiffs supervisory 9 liability claims. 533 train F.3d or at oversee 54, As such measures were subordinates, otherwise or facilitated that their subordinates 10 2. Fourteenth Amendment 11 The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the deprivation of a person s 12 life, liberty, or property by a state or territory without due 13 process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; see Exam g Bd. of 14 Eng rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 586 15 (1976) 16 Nevertheless, [s]ubstantive due process is an inappropriate avenue 17 of relief when the governmental conduct at issue is covered by a 18 specific constitutional provision. 19 33 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 20 833, 843 (1998); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989); S. 21 County Sand & Gravel Co. v. Town of South Kingstown, 160 F.3d 834, 22 835 (1st Cir. 1998)). [A]pplication of this prophylactic rule 23 depends only on whether a specific constitutional provision addresses (applying Due Process Clause to U.S. territories). Pagán v. Calderón, 448 F.3d 16, -16- Civil No. 07-2004 (JAF) 1 the type of conduct at issue, not on the probable success of the 2 claim under that provision. Id. Conditions-of-confinement cases, like 3 this one, are properly analyzed under the Eighth Amendment. See, 4 e.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. 825. Thus, Movants are entitled to summary 5 judgment as to Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment claim. 6 B. Qualified Immunity 7 Movants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity 8 because their actions did not violate Decedent s constitutional 9 rights and because the law governing their conduct was not clearly 10 established. (Docket No. 64.) 11 Qualified immunity protects state officials from the burden of 12 standing trial or facing 13 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). To determine whether 14 Movants are entitled to qualified immunity, we must ask (1) whether 15 the facts alleged or shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of 16 a constitutional right; and (2) if so, whether the right at issue was 17 clearly 18 violation. 19 2009) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815-16 (2009)). 20 The 21 inquiries: First, whether the right at issue was sufficiently clear; 22 and second, whether under the facts of the particular case, a 23 reasonable defendant would have known that his conduct violated that established second at other the onerous time of aspects the of litigation. defendant s alleged Maldonado v. Fontañes, 568 F.3d 263, 268-69 (1st Cir. prong of the Pearson analysis entails two separate -17- Civil No. 07-2004 (JAF) 1 right. Id. at 269 (citing Brousseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 2 (2004); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). 3 We already determined that Plaintiffs proffered sufficient 4 evidence to establish a violation of Decedent s Eighth Amendment 5 rights, supra Part III.A.1, and accordingly, we find the first prong 6 satisfied. Movants stipulated that the rights afforded to convicted 7 inmates under the Eighth Amendment are well established (Docket 8 No. 64 at 30); we agree and find the first inquiry under the second 9 step satisfied as well. As to the final inquiry, we need only note 10 that the AOC received regular analyses as part of an ongoing effort 11 to 12 conditions 13 conditions of confinement. (See, e.g., Docket Nos. 73-16 at 6-7, 9; 14 73-22 at 3-4.) Mindful as we are that the Puerto Rico prison system 15 has been the object of litigation and federal court supervision since 16 1979,9 no one can seriously argue that qualified immunity is an 17 available defense where the prison system is in shambles, and those 18 who 19 situations like the one presented here. Thus, Movants cannot persuade 20 that 21 concluded that perpetuating, or exacerbating, those very conditions 22 did not violate Decedent s Eighth Amendment rights. comply work a 9 with this deemed there violative assume reasonable court s the official standing of risk in its of order to prisoners being their held remedy right to certain humane responsible circumstances would for have Given the above Morales Feliciano v. Acevedo Vilá, Civ. No. 79-004 (PG). -18- Civil No. 07-2004 (JAF) 1 conclusions, we find that Movants are not entitled to qualified 2 immunity, and we strongly urge the parties to settle this case. 3 IV. 4 Conclusion 5 For the reasons stated herein, we GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART 6 Movants motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 64). We DISMISS 7 Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment claim, but RETAIN all other claims. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 15th day of September, 2009. 10 11 12 s/José Antonio Fusté JOSE ANTONIO FUSTE Chief U.S. District Judge

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.