Colon v. Blades, No. 3:2007cv01380 - Document 262 (D.P.R. 2010)

Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER denying re 258 MOTION for Reconsideration re 257 Opinion and Order, filed by Ruben Blades Signed by Chief Mag. Judge Justo Arenas on 12/22/2010.(nydi)

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Colon v. Blades Doc. 262 1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 2 3 4 WILLIAM ANTHONY COLà N, 5 6 Plaintiff 7 v. 8 RUBà N BLADES, ROBERTO MORGALO, MARTà NEZ, MORGALO & ASSOCIATES, 9 CIVIL 07-1380 (JA) 10 11 Defendants 12 13 RUBà N BLADES, 14 Cross-Plaintiff 15 v. 16 ROBERT MORGALO, in his personal capacity and as owner and member of MARTà NEZ, MORGALO & ASSOCIATES, LLC; MARTà NEZ, MORGALO & ASSOCIATES, LLC, 17 18 19 20 Cross-Defendants 21 22 OPINION AND ORDER 23 24 Cross-plaintiff Rubén Blades moves this court for reconsideration of my 25 opinion and order filed on October 21, 2010. (Docket No. 257.) For the reasons 26 set forth below, cross-plaintiff s motion is DENIED. 27 28 Dockets.Justia.com 1 CIVIL 07-1380 (JA) 2 2 3 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 4 5 Cross-plaintiff Rubén Blades ( Blades ) moves this court for reconsideration, 6 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), (Docket No. 258), of my opinion 7 and order filed on October 21, 2010. (Docket No. 257.) In that order I denied 8 the request to join Blades and his company Rubén Blades Productions, Inc. 9 10 ( RBP ) as co-plaintiffs. In finding that Blades was not a real party in interest, I 11 concluded that RBP would be able to pursue all claims with no prejudice at all to 12 Rubén Blades. (Docket No. 257, at 13:16-17.) In his motion for reconsideration, 13 Blades presents three arguments: first, that Blades is in fact an indispensable 14 15 party, whose rights may not be fully adjudicated if substituted as a party by RBP; 16 second, that collateral estoppel precludes any attempt at substituting Blades with 17 RBP; and finally, that the doctrine of the law of the case requires that I maintain 18 consistency in my rulings, namely, that my June 17, 2010 opinion awarding of 19 20 21 $133,168.16 to Blades precludes any substitution. (Docket Nos. 258 & 229.) STANDARD OF REVIEW 22 Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not specifically provide for 23 the filing of a motion for reconsideration, depending on the time it is served, it 24 may be entertained either as . . . (1) a motion to alter or amend judgment 25 26 pursuant to Rule 59(e) Fed. R. Civ. P. or (2) a motion for relief from judgment 27 under Rule 60 Fed. R. Civ. P. Rosario-Méndez v. Hewlett Packard Caribe, 660 28 1 CIVIL 07-1380 (JA) 3 2 3 F. Supp. 2d 229, 232 (D.P.R. 2009) (quoting Lozano v. Corona, 186 F. Supp. 2d 4 5 77, 79 (D.P.R. 2002)); see, e.g., Colón v. Blades, Slip Copy, Civil No. 07-1380 6 (JA), 2009 WL 3347627, at *1 (D.P.R. Oct. 14, 2009). Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) 7 allows a party, within [28] days of the entry of judgment, to file a motion seeking 8 to alter or amend said judgment. The rule itself does not specify on what grounds 9 10 the relief sought may be granted, and courts have ample discretion in deciding 11 whether to grant or deny such a motion. Candelario del Moral v. UBS Fin. Servs. 12 Inc. of P.R., 703 F. Supp. 2d 79, 81 (D.P.R. Apr. 9, 2010) (citing Venegas- 13 Hernández v. Sonolux Records, 370 F.3d 183, 190 (1st Cir. 2004)); see Fed. R. 14 15 Civ. P. 59(e) (West 2010); Rodríguez-Rivas v. Police Dep t of P.R., 699 F. Supp. 16 2d 397, 400 (D.P.R. 2010). Despite the lack of specific guidance by the rule on 17 that point, the First Circuit has stated that a Rule 59(e) motion must either clearly 18 establish a manifest error of law or must present newly discovered evidence. 19 20 Cintrón v. Pavía Hato Rey Hosp., 598 F. Supp. 2d 238, 241 (D.P.R. 2009) (quoting 21 F.D.I.C. v. World Univ., Inc., 978 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing F.D.I.C. v. 22 Meyer, 781 F.2d 1260, 1268 (7th Cir. 1986)). Rule 59(e) may not, however, be 23 used to raise argument that could and should have been presented before 24 judgment was entered, nor to advance new legal theories. Cintrón v. Pavía Hato 25 26 Rey Hosp., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 241 (citing Bogosian v. Woloohojian Realty Corp., 27 323 F.3d 55, 72 (1st Cir. 2003)). 28 1 CIVIL 07-1380 (JA) 4 2 3 ANALYSIS 4 5 Blades submits that a substantial right of [his] will be lost should I not 6 reconsider my denial of Joinder. (Docket No. 258, at 4.) What that right is, 7 Blades does not highlight. 8 Rather, he rests his argument on the belief that litigation in federal courts presumes that the correct parties were named when 9 10 the action was filed. (Id. at 5.) As I discussed in my September 2, 2010 ruling, 11 Blades has no particularized injury that requires he remain in this case in his 12 individual capacity. 13 Colón v. Blades, Slip Copy, Civil 07-1380 (JA), 2010 WL 3490172, at *7 (D.P.R. Sept. 2, 2010). Blades is the sole shareholder in RBP. 14 15 He conducted all his business through RBP. As a general rule shareholders . . . 16 do not have standing to sue in their personal capacities unless the alleged 17 misconduct causes harm to them separate and distinct from the injury inflicted 18 upon the . . . corporation. Id. (quoting Pagán v. Calderón, 448 F.3d 16, 29 (1st 19 20 Cir. 2006)). 21 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(c) governs issues of substitution. Rule 22 25(c) is a procedural vehicle, designed not to recalibrate the relationships 23 amongst the parties, but rather because the transferee is brought into court 24 solely because it [owns] the property in issue. Maysonet-Robles v. Cabrero, 323 25 26 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 2003). In this case, the property is the debt owed by MM&A, 27 which belongs to RBP, not Blades. 28 As Rule 25(c) is a discretionary 1 CIVIL 07-1380 (JA) 5 2 3 determination by this court, designed to facilitate the conduct of the litigation 4 5 and does not alter the substantive rights of the parties, I find that joinder is 6 improper. Citibank v. Grupo Cupey, Inc., 382 F.3d 29, 32 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting 7 Maysonet-Robles v. Cabrero, 323 F.3d at 49). Blades fails to meet the clear 8 error threshold required for Rule 59(e) reconsideration. 9 10 Similarly, collateral estoppel is not at issue. As I stated in my September 11 2 opinion, there is nothing that might suggest that the injury allegedly suffered 12 by cross-plaintiff is separate and distinct from any injury that RBP might have also 13 suffered as a result of cross-defendants actions. Colón v. Blades, Slip Copy, Civil 14 15 07-1380 (JA), 2010 WL 3490172, at *7. The cross-plaintiff has submitted no 16 evidence of any particularized injury that cannot be adequately represented by 17 RBP, and so collateral estoppel does not apply. 18 Finally, Blades relies on my June 17, 2010 ruling to conclude that the law 19 20 of the case precludes substitution as inconsistent with my prior rulings. (Docket 21 258, at 6-7.) The concept behind law of the case flows from the concern that 22 disregarding an earlier ruling in a case should not result in prejudice to a party. 23 In this case, as the cross-plaintiff envisions, prejudice refers to law of notice that 24 my prior ruling in favor of Blades is not controlling. But as stated, there is no 25 26 such inconsistency. 27 rulings inconsistent. This substitution is merely a remedy for the incorrect party 28 Substituting RBP for Blades in no way renders my prior 1 CIVIL 07-1380 (JA) 6 2 3 to the lawsuit. See Colón v. Blades, Slip Copy, Civil 07-1380 (JA), 2010 WL 4 5 3490172, at *7 (citing 6A Charles Alan Write & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice 6 and Procedure, § 1542 (3d ed. 1990)). Therefore the motion for reconsideration 7 is denied. 8 At San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 22d day of December, 2010. 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 S/ JUSTO ARENAS Chief United States Magistrate Judge

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