Colon v. Blades, No. 3:2007cv01380 - Document 257 (D.P.R. 2010)
Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER denying re 246 MOTION for Joinder of Ruben Blades Productions, Inc. as Co-Plaintiff to Cross-Claim and denying 247 MOTION to Alter Judgment Re: 245 Opinion and Order filed by Ruben Blades, 247 MOTION to Alter Judgment filed by Roberto Morgalo Signed by Chief Mag. Judge Justo Arenas on 10/21/2010.(nydi) Modified on 10/21/2010 to add docket entry relationship and docket entry information. (re)
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Colon v. Blades Doc. 257 1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 2 3 4 RUBÉN BLADES, 5 6 Cross-Plaintiff 7 v. 8 ROBERTO MORGALO, in his personal capacity, and as owner and member of MARTÍNEZ, MORGALO & ASSOCIATES, LLC; MARTÍNEZ, MORGALO & ASSOCIATES, LLC, 9 10 11 12 CIVIL 07-1380 (JA) Cross-Defendants 13 14 OPINION AND ORDER This matter is before the court on motion to join pursuant to Federal Rules 15 16 of Civil Procedure 17(a)(3) and 19, filed by cross-plaintiff, Rubén Blades, on 17 September 8, 2010. 18 defendants Roberto Morgalo, in his personal capacity, and as owner and member 19 (Docket No. 246.) The motion was opposed by cross- of Martínez, Morgalo & Associates, LLC; Martínez, Morgalo & Associates, LLC, on 20 21 September 9, 2010. (Docket No. 248.) Cross-defendants also filed a motion to 22 alter or amend the order entered against their motion for summary judgment on 23 September 9, 2010. (Docket No. 247.) For the reasons set forth below, cross- 24 plaintiff’s motion is hereby DENIED. The cross-defendants’ motion is also DENIED. 25 26 I. OVERVIEW 27 On September 2, 2010, this court issued an Opinion and Order denying 28 cross-defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Colón v. Blades, Civil No. 07- Dockets.Justia.com 1 CIVIL 07-1380 (JA) 2 2 3 1380 (JA), 2010 WL 3490172 (D.P.R. Sept. 2, 2010). The court found that cross4 5 plaintiff lacked standing to sue cross-defendants. Id. at *6. As a result, the 6 court determined that Rubén Blades Productions, Inc. (“RBP”), not cross-plaintiff, 7 was the real party in interest in this case. Id. Despite the court’s findings the 8 amended cross-claim was not dismissed and cross-plaintiff was allowed to amend 9 10 the pleadings so that RBP may substitute him. (Id. at 19.) Notwithstanding the 11 court’s order, cross-plaintiff moves to join RBP as a co-plaintiff. (Docket No. 246.) 12 According to plaintiff, RBP has to be joined in order 13 to avoid a potential miscarriage of justice, and to obtain complete and final relief. (Id. at 2.) Cross- 14 15 defendants, however, oppose cross-plaintiff’s request. (Docket No. 247.) They 16 argue that because it was determined that cross-plaintiff did not possess standing 17 to sue, the court does not have the authority to allow cross-plaintiff to amend the 18 pleadings. (Id. at 5, ¶ 10.) Cross-defendants further argue that even if it was 19 20 assumed that the court had said authority, allowing an amendment to the 21 pleadings would divest it of diversity jurisdiction because Mr. Morgalo and RBP are 22 citizens of the State of Florida. (Id. at 6 & 7, ¶¶ 12-13.) Also, cross-defendants 23 find that the court erred by stating in the Opinion and Order that allowing an 24 amendment to the pleadings would not require re-opening discovery, create 25 26 27 28 additional costs and make substantial changes to the course of the case. (Id. at 9, ¶ 17.) According to cross-defendants, allowing RBP to enter the case would not 1 CIVIL 07-1380 (JA) 3 2 3 only require them to conduct depositions and request additional documents but 4 5 also it would multiply the litigation costs. (Id. at 9, ¶ 18 & at 10, ¶ 20.) Cross- 6 defendants also claim that the court was mistaken in holding that an amendment 7 to the pleadings would not cause any prejudice and that it would prevent 8 subsequent similar actions against them. (Id. at 10, ¶ 21.) They argue that by 9 10 allowing cross-plaintiff, who does not have standing to sue, to amend the 11 pleadings would artificially keep alive a cause of action that is time barred and 12 divested of diversity jurisdiction. (Id.) Moreover, cross-defendants argue that the 13 court erred in stating that not including RBP originally as the real party in interest 14 15 was an honest mistake. (Id. at 11, ¶ 23.) They claim that because cross-plaintiff 16 did not even insinuate that such a mistake was made, the court was precluded 17 from raising and/or accepting the affirmative defense. 18 (Id.) Finally, cross- defendants request that if cross-plaintiff is allowed to amend the pleading, they 19 20 should also be allowed to bring into the case Ariel Rivas, César Sainz, Rompeolas, 21 Dissar Productions and Arturo Martínez as third-party defendants. (Id. at 12-13, 22 ¶ 27.) 23 24 II. ANALYSIS A. Diversity Jurisdiction 25 26 27 28 “In order to maintain an action in federal court based upon diversity jurisdiction, the plaintiff must be diverse from the defendant in the case.” Colón 1 CIVIL 07-1380 (JA) 4 2 3 v. Blades, 570 F. Supp. 2d 204, 213 (D.P.R. 2008) (quoting Gorfinkle v. U.S. 4 5 Airways, Inc., 431 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 2005)). In other words, diversity 6 jurisdiction only exists when plaintiff and defendant are citizens of different states. 7 Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005). “The complete diversity rule 8 ‘is most inflexibly applied at the time of filing, for it has long been settled that “the 9 10 jurisdiction of the court depends upon the state of things at the time of the action 11 brought.”’” Inter Am. Builders Agencies Co. v. Sta-Rite Indus., Inc., 602 F. Supp. 12 2d 306, 308 (D.P.R. 2009) (quoting In re Olympic Mills Corp., 477 F.3d 1, 8 (1st 13 Cir. 2007) (quoting Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 570 14 15 (2004)). Nevertheless, “[t]he postfiling context is more elastic.” Id. “As a 16 general matter, ‘if jurisdiction exists at the time an action is commenced, such 17 jurisdiction may not be divested by subsequent events.’” Inter Am. Builders 18 Agencies Co. v. Sta-Rite Indus., Inc., 602 F. Supp. 2d at 308 (quoting Freeport- 19 20 McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428 (1991)). 21 On May 4, 2007, plaintiff, William Anthony Colón, filed a complaint against 22 Mr. Blades. (Docket No. 1.) The complaint was later amended on April 29, 2009 23 to include Mr. Morgalo and MM&A as co-defendants. (Docket No. 45.) Mr. Colón 24 alleged that he and Mr. Blades had agreed to give a concert in San Juan, Puerto 25 26 27 28 Rico for a $350,000 fee to be evenly split between them. (Id. at 2, ¶ 9.) To manage the business aspects of the concert, Mr. Blades contracted the services 1 CIVIL 07-1380 (JA) 5 2 3 of MM&A and its partners Arturo Martínez and Mr. Morgalo. (Id. at 2, ¶ 10.) 4 5 According to plaintiff, the day before the concert Mr. Blades told him that 6 Mr. Martínez had disappeared with their money. (Id. at 2-3, ¶ 13.) After hearing 7 this, Mr. Colón told Mr. Blades that he was not going to perform at the concert. 8 (Id. at 3, ¶ 14.) However, Mr. Colón claimed that Mr. Blades allegedly told him 9 10 that he was going to pay him so that the concert could go on as scheduled. (Id. 11 at 3, ¶ 15.) Mr. Colón accepted Mr. Blades’ offer and performed at the concert. 12 (Id.) As a result of the foregoing, Mr. Colón demanded from Mr. Blades, Mr. 13 Morgalo and MM&A the $115,000 that was owed to him plus interest, costs and 14 15 attorney’s fees. (Id. at 3, ¶ 18.) On June 5, 2008, Mr. Blades filed a cross-claim 16 against Mr. Morgalo and MM&A. (Docket No. 49.) The cross-claim was amended 17 on July 29, 2008. (Docket No. 56.) The amended cross-claim is an action for 18 damages that exceed $75,000, exclusive of interests, costs and attorney’s fees. 19 20 (Id. at 2, ¶ 1.) In the amended cross-claim, Mr. Blades essentially alleges that 21 Mr. Morgalo and MM&A engaged in fraud by failing to pay amounts owed in 22 connection with the concert which is the subject matter of this case, conspiracy 23 to defraud, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duties, and that they are 24 liable vicariously and jointly and severally to him for damages, and in the event 25 26 27 28 of adverse judgment, by way of indemnity and/or contribution in relation to the claims made against him in the original action. (Id.) On April 2, 2009, Mr. Blades 1 CIVIL 07-1380 (JA) 6 2 3 moved for summary judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Docket No. 4 5 95.) According to Mr. Blades, Mr. Colón’s complaint had to be dismissed because 6 the amount in controversy did not meet, nor exceed the jurisdictional amount of 7 $75,000. (Id.) The court concluded that Mr. Colón had averred sufficient facts 8 that indicated that his claim exceeded the jurisdictional amount required by 28 9 10 U.S.C. § 1332. Colón v. Blades, Civil No. 07-1380 (JA), 2009 WL 2612523, at *6 11 (D.P.R. Aug. 21, 2009). As a result, the motion for summary judgment was 12 denied. Id. On August 31, 2009, Mr. Blades moved for reconsideration. (Docket 13 No. 108.) The motion was denied on October 14, 2009. Colón v. Blades, Civil No. 14 15 07-1380 (JA), 2009 WL 3347627 (D.P.R. Oct. 14, 2009). On May 6, 2010, 16 Mr. Colón filed a motion requesting dismissal with prejudice of his claims against 17 Mr. Blades, Mr. Morgalo and MM&A pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18 41(a)(2). (Docket No. 188.) Mr. Colón’s motion for voluntary dismissal was 19 20 granted the following date. (Docket No. 193.) On June 17, 2010, default 21 judgment was entered in favor of Mr. Blades and against MM&A in the amount of 22 $133,168.16 plus interest. (Docket Nos. 228 & 229.) 23 24 Based on the foregoing, it is evident that at the time that this case commenced complete diversity existed. Thus, the amended cross-claim filed by 25 26 27 28 Mr. Blades against Mr. Morgalo and MM&A falls “within the ancillary jurisdiction of the court and need not present independent grounds of federal jurisdiction.” 6 1 CIVIL 07-1380 (JA) 7 2 3 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and 4 5 Procedure § 1433 (3d ed. 2010); see Atl. Corp. v. United States, 311 F.2d 907, 6 910 (1st Cir. 1962) (holding that ancillary jurisdiction may exist even if all the 7 parties to a cross-claim are citizens of the same state). Furthermore, the court 8 finds that Mr. Blades, at the time the amended cross-claim was filed, had the right 9 10 to proceed with his claims against Mr. Morgalo and MM&A because they arise “out 11 of the [same] transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the original 12 action . . . [and/or] relates to [the] property that is the subject matter of the 13 original action.” Balerna v. Gilberti, 266 F.R.D. 42, 45 (D. Mass. 2010) (quoting 14 15 Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(g)). It is important to note that “[t]he general policy behind 16 allowing cross-claims is to avoid multiple suits and to encourage the determination 17 of the entire controversy among the parties before the court with a minimum of 18 procedural steps.” Balerna v. Gilberti, 266 F.R.D. at 45 (quoting 6 Charles Alan 19 20 Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1431 21 (2d ed. 1990)). 22 Mr. Blades, Mr. Morgalo and MM&A, the court had authority to decide whether or 23 not it would entertain the amended cross-claim, which in this case it decided to 24 After Mr. Colón voluntarily dismissed his claims against do even though jurisdiction would not have existed if the amended cross-claim 25 26 27 28 would have been brought as an independent action. See 6 Charles Alan Wright, 1 CIVIL 07-1380 (JA) 8 2 3 Arthur R. Miller and Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1433 (3 ed. 4 5 2010). 6 B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 7 Mr. Morgalo argues that because it was determined that Mr. Blades lacked 8 standing to sue, the court has no jurisdiction to enter into the merits of the case, 9 10 much less to allow Mr. Blades to amend the pleadings. (Docket No. 247, at 2.) 11 The only thing that, according to Mr. Morgalo, the court can do is dismiss the 12 amended cross-claim. (Id.) The court disagrees. It is correct that “[i]f a plaintiff 13 lacks standing to bring a matter before a court, the court lacks jurisdiction to 14 15 decide the merits of the underlying case.” Orta-Rivera v. Congress of U.S. of Am., 16 338 F. Supp. 2d 272, 276 (D.P.R. 2004) (citing United States v. AVX Corp., 962 17 F.2d 108, 113 (1st Cir. 1992)). However, this does not mean that dismissal is 18 warranted and that the court has no authority to allow an amendment to the 19 20 pleadings. See Benítez-Bithorn v. Rosselló-González, 200 F. Supp. 2d 26, 31 -32 21 (D.P.R. 2002) (holding that even if a party lacks standing to sue or be sued, the 22 court cannot dismiss on said ground pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 17(a)); Esposito v. United States, 368 F.3d 1271, 1274-75 (10th Cir. 2004). Rule 24 17(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that: 25 26 27 28 The court may not dismiss an action for failure to prosecute in the name of the real party in interest until, after an objection, a reasonable time has been allowed for the real party in interest to ratify 1 CIVIL 07-1380 (JA) 9 2 3 4 5 join, or be substituted into the action. After ratification, joinder, or substitution, the action proceeds as if it had been originally commenced by the real party in interest. 6 7 Colón v. Blades, Civ. No. 97-1380 (JA), 2010 WL 3490172, at *6 (D.P.R. Sept. 2, 8 2010) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(3)). It is clear, therefore, that the only way 9 that the court can decide the merits of the amended cross-claim is by allowing 10 Mr. Blades to amend the pleadings so that RBP may substitute him as the real 11 12 party in interest. To rule otherwise would defeat the purpose behind Federal Rule 13 of Civil Procedure 17(a). Id. (quoting Pabón-Lugo v. MONY Life Ins. Co. of Am., 14 465 F. Supp. 2d 123, 128 (D.P.R. 2006) (quoting Prevor-Mayorsohn Carribean, 15 Inc. v. P.R. Marine Mgmt. Inc., 620 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1980)). 16 Also, in this case the cross-defendants mistake the issue of prudential 17 18 standing with constitutional standing related to Article III’s jurisdictional doctrine 19 of standing. A party has constitutional standing when it has suffered an “injury 20 in fact” that is “causally connected to the challenged conduct” and is “capable of 21 being remedied through suit.” Fideicomiso de la Tierra del Caño Martín Peña v. 22 23 Fortuño, 604 F.3d 7, 16 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Pagán v. Calderón, 448 F.3d 16, 24 27 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Luján v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 25 (1992)). “The burden of stating facts sufficient to support standing rests with the 26 party seeking to assert federal jurisdiction.” Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 27 28 314, 325 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Sea Shore Corp. v. Sullivan, 158 F.3d 51, 54 1 CIVIL 07-1380 (JA) 10 2 3 (1st Cir. 1998)). As applied here, the plaintiff has made a sufficient showing to 4 5 demonstrate standing to sue in federal court. 6 The actual question at hand is one of prudential standing. “Some courts 7 have described Rule 17's real-party-in-interest requirement as essentially a 8 codification of this nonconstitutional, prudential limitation on standing.” Rawoof 9 10 v. Texor Petroleum Co., 521 F.3d 750, 757 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Warnick v. 11 Yassian (In re Rodeo Canon Dev. Corp.), 362 F.3d 603, 607-08 (9th Cir. 2004) 12 (withdrawn on other grounds); Ensley v. Cody Res., Inc., 171 F.3d 315, 320 (5th 13 Cir. 1999)). Specifically, the Supreme Court has held that Federal Rules of Civil 14 15 Procedure 17(a) and 19 address party joinder, not federal-court subject-matter 16 jurisdiction. Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. at 90. The prudential standing 17 doctrine is not jurisdictional in the manner that Article III standing is. Rawoof v. 18 Texor Petroleum Co., 521 F.3d at 756. An important distinction is that “if there 19 20 is no Article III standing, the court is obliged to dismiss the suit even if the 21 standing issue has not been raised[.]” Id. (quoting MainStreet Realtors Org. of 22 Realtors v. Calumet City, Ill., 505 F.3d 742, 747 (7th Cir. 2007)); City of L.A. v. 23 Cnty. 24 of Kern, 581 F.3d 841, 844-46 (9th Cir. 2009). However, “‘nonconstitutional lack of standing belongs to an intermediate class of cases in 25 26 27 28 which a court can notice an error and reverse on the basis of it even though no party has noticed it and the error is not jurisdictional, at least in the conventional 1 CIVIL 07-1380 (JA) 11 2 3 sense.” MainStreet Org. of Realtors v. Calumet City, Ill., 505 F3d at 747. 4 5 Because this is not a challenge to the Article III standing, but the prudential “non- 6 constitutional” standing of the cross-plaintiff, the court is not obliged to dismiss 7 this complaint for lack of standing and thus lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 8 This simple fact undercuts the cross-defendants’ entire argument and renders it 9 10 moot. 11 C. Amendment to the Pleadings 12 The cross-defendants argue that amending the pleadings at this point in the 13 proceedings would prejudice the cross-defendants, re-open discovery, create 14 15 additional costs and make substantial changes to the course of the case. The 16 court disagrees. “Amendments substituting new plaintiffs are liberally allowed 17 where the new plaintiff is the real party in interest, or where because of a mistake 18 as to capacity the wrong party-plaintiff was named.” Cape Ann Investors, LLC v. 19 20 Lepone, 171 F. Supp. 2d 22, 29 n.10 (D. Mass. 2001) (citing 6A Charles Alan 21 Wright, Arthur R. Miller and Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 22 1501 (3d ed. 2010)). The cross-defendants claim that allowing the pleadings to 23 be amended to allow the substitution of RBP would prejudice them. However, 24 taking a deposition of an available party does not amount to prejudice. See 25 26 27 28 Rawoof v. Texor, 521 F.3d at 754 (holding that a substitution would cause prejudice where a corporate-officer deposition could not take place due to the 1 CIVIL 07-1380 (JA) 12 2 3 death of the corporate officer). An increase in costs or travel time also does not 4 5 amount to prejudice. There is also no prejudice due to the case being kept 6 artificially alive, as the cross-defendants claim, because the basis of their legal 7 arguments are not supported by the law. “Despite the lack of specific guidance 8 by the rule on that point, the First Circuit has stated that a Rule 59(e) motion 9 10 ‘must either clearly establish a manifest error of law or must present newly 11 discovered evidence.’” Candelario del Moral v. UBS Fin. Servs. Inc. of P.R., 703 12 F. Supp. 2d 79, 81 (D.P.R. 2010) (quoting F.D.I.C. v. World Univ., Inc., 978 F.2d 13 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 781 F.2d 1260, 14 15 1268 (7th Cir. 1986)). The cross-defendants have not shown a manifest error of 16 law or presented any newly discovered evidence. As well, Rule 59(e) motions are 17 not to be used by parties who simply disagree with a court’s decision. Jiménez v. 18 Amgen Mfg. Ltd., 695 F. Supp. 2d 5, 7 (D.P.R. 2010). Here, the cross-defendants 19 20 simply disagree with the courts findings. 21 Cross-plaintiff also seeks to join RBP as a party to this action. However, this 22 court has previously determined that RBP, as the real party in interest, is an 23 appropriate party to this action and Rubén Blades is not because he lacked 24 prudential standing to sue. Colón v. Blades, 2010 WL 3490172, at *7. Rubén 25 26 27 28 Blades is still not the real party in interest in this action. It does not appear that there is a particular injury that Rubén Blades has suffered that is distinguishable 1 CIVIL 07-1380 (JA) 13 2 3 from that which RBP has suffered. As a substituted party and the real party in 4 5 interest, RBP will be able to pursue all claims originally brought by Rubén Blades. 6 Rubén Blades has not shown that he is a required party who must be joined 7 because the court can not otherwise accord complete relief between existing 8 parties. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(A). Nor will Rubén Blades’ absence from this 9 10 action impair or impede his ability to protect his interest. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 19(a)(1)(B)(i). Similarly, Rubén Blades will not be subject to a substantial risk of 12 incurring multiple or inconsistent obligations because of his claimed interest 13 relating to the subject of the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(ii). In truth, 14 15 it is not apparent to this court why Rubén Blades should remain as a party to this 16 action at all. RBP is able to pursue all claims with no prejudice at all to Rubén 17 Blades. In this situation, substitution of the parties is proper. 18 Cross-defendant also relies on the argument that the court can not raise or 19 20 accept affirmative defenses that a party has not raised on its own. In this case, 21 the cross-defendants claim that the court is invoking the honest mistake doctrine 22 on behalf of the cross-plaintiff. Cross-defendants believe that bringing this action 23 under Rubén Blades, as opposed to RBP, was a calculated judgment call and not 24 an honest mistake or inadvertent error, citing Rubén Blades’ law degrees from 25 26 27 28 prestigious academic institutions. In reality, there is no advantage that the crossplaintiff gained by bringing the suit as Rubén Blades as opposed to RBP. This 1 CIVIL 07-1380 (JA) 14 2 3 error was not made in bad faith as the cross-defendants allude to without any 4 5 substantive legal argument or evidence. Also, the cross-plaintiff still contends 6 that Rubén Blades is in fact the real party in interest. That this is their belief 7 indicates that bringing this action under Rubén Blades was not done in bad faith. 8 And while it is true that the cross-plaintiff has not claimed that naming Rubén 9 10 Blades instead of RBP was an honest mistake or inadvertent error, this does not 11 preclude naming Rubén Blades instead of RBP from being an honest mistake or 12 inadvertent error. While an error was made by the cross-plaintiff, Rule 17(a) is a 13 means of avoiding injustice when a good faith error has been made. Caribbean 14 15 Parts Agency, Inc. v. Hastings Mfg. Co., 262 F.R.D. 88, 92 (D.P.R. 2009) (citing 16 6A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & 17 Procedure § 1555 (2d ed. 2008)). Perhaps most importantly, motions under Rule 18 59(e) “must either clearly establish a manifest error of law or must present newly 19 20 discovered evidence.” Candelario del Moral v. UBS Fin. Servs., 703 F. Supp. 2d at 21 81 (citations omitted). Again, “[a] motion for reconsideration is not the means 22 to simply raise a point of disagreement between the court and the litigant.” 23 Villanueva-Méndez v. Nieves Vázquez, 360 F. Supp. 2d 320, 326 (D.P.R. 2005) 24 (citing Waye v. First Citizen's Nat'l Bank, 846 F. Supp. 310, 314 n.3 (M.D. Pa. 25 26 27 28 1994)). The cross-defendants simply disagree with the court. D. Third-Party Defendants 1 CIVIL 07-1380 (JA) 15 2 3 The cross-defendants also argue that if the cross-plaintiff is allowed to 4 5 amend the pleadings that the cross-defendants should in turn be allowed to add 6 Ariel Rivas, César Sainz, Rompeolas, Dissar productions and Arturo Martínez. 7 There is no legal precedent to support this position. This argument offered by the 8 cross-defendants re-asserts their belief that Arturo Martínez is an indispensable 9 10 party and that by not allowing the cross-defendants to bring in these third parties, 11 the court will be committing a great injustice and further prejudicing the cross- 12 defendants with this joinder. This is another instance where the cross-defendants 13 are using their Rule 59(e) motion to disagree with this court. This is an improper 14 15 use of a Rule 59(e) motion. Villanueva-Méndez v. Nieves Vázquez, 360 F. Supp. 16 2d at 326. No new evidence has been cited and nothing more than conclusory 17 statements are made, again with no support, in a futile attempt to show that a 18 manifest error was made by this court. 19 20 III. CONCLUSION 21 For the reasons set forth above, cross-plaintiff’s motion to join is hereby 22 DENIED. For the reasons set forth above, cross-defendants’ motion to alter or 23 amend judgment is also DENIED. 24 At San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 21st day of October, 2010. 25 26 27 28 S/JUSTO ARENAS Chief United States Magistrate Judge
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