Colon v. Blades, No. 3:2007cv01380 - Document 177 (D.P.R. 2010)

Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER denying re 167 MOTION for Reconsideration re 154 Opinion and Order, filed by Roberto Morgalo Signed by Chief Mag. Judge Justo Arenas on 4/28/2010.(nydi)

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1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 2 3 4 WILLIAM ANTHONY COLà N, 5 6 Plaintiff 7 v. 8 RUBà N BLADES, ROBERTO MORGALO, MARTà NEZ MORGALO & ASSOCIATES, 9 10 11 12 Defendants RUBà N BLADES, 13 Cross-Plaintiff 14 v. 15 CIVIL 07-1380 (JA) 18 ROBERT MORGALO, in his personal capacity and as owner and member of MARTà NEZ, MORGALO & ASSOCIATES, LLC; MARTà NEZ, MORGALO & ASSOCIATES, LLC, 19 Cross-Defendants 20 ROBERT J. MORGALO, 21 Plaintiff 16 17 22 23 24 v. RUBà N BLADES, RUBà N BLADES PRODUCTIONS, INC., 25 26 27 28 Defendants 1 CIVIL 07-1380 (JA) 2 2 3 OPINION AND ORDER 4 5 This matter is before the court on motion for reconsideration of the 6 March 31, 2010 Opinion and Order, filed by Robert J. Morgalo ( Mr. Morgalo ) on 7 April 13, 2010, which motion was opposed by Rubén Blades ( Mr. Blades ) and 8 Rubén Blades Productions, Inc., ( RBP ) on April 16, 2010. (Docket Nos. 154, 167 9 10 11 & 173.) For the reasons set forth below, Mr. Morgalo s motion for reconsideration is DENIED. 12 13 I. BACKGROUND On March 23, 2010, Mr. Blades and RBP moved to dismiss Mr. Morgalo s 14 15 defamation claim for failing to answer and/or object to the second set of 16 interrogatories. 17 March 31, 2010. (Docket No. 154.) On April 13, 2010, Mr. Morgalo filed a motion 18 (Docket No. 148.) The motion to dismiss was granted on for reconsideration. (Docket 167.) Mr. Morgalo argues that dismissal of the 19 20 defamation claim was not warranted because: (1) his actions did not amount to 21 contumelious behavior; (2) he was not given any notice of the consequences for 22 not answering the interrogatories to either Mr. Blades or the court s satisfaction; 23 (3) the court did not analyze whether lesser sanctions were more appropriate. 24 (Id. at 5, 7 & 8.) The motion for reconsideration was opposed by Mr. Blades on 25 26 27 28 April 16, 2010. (Docket No. 173.) In essence, Mr. Blades contends that Mr. 1 CIVIL 07-1380 (JA) 3 2 3 Morgalo s motion is unjustified and should be denied because it does not meet any 4 5 6 7 8 of the standards for a motion for reconsideration. (Id. at 1-2.) II. STANDARD OF REVIEW [M]otions for reconsideration should be granted sparingly because parties should not be free to re-litigate issues a court has previously decided. Silva 9 10 Rivera v. State Ins. Fund Corp., 488 F. Supp. 2d 72, 78 (D.P.R. 2007) (citing 11 Williams v. City of Pitsburgh, 32 F. Supp. 2d 236, 238 (W.D. Pa. 1998)). A 12 district court may, however, grant a party's motion for reconsideration in any of 13 three situations: (1) the availability of new evidence not previously available, (2) 14 15 an intervening change in controlling law, or (3) the need to correct a clear error 16 of law or to prevent manifest injustice. Sánchez-Rodríguez v. Departamento de 17 Corrección y Rehabilitación, 537 F. Supp. 2d 295, 297 (D.P.R. 2008) (citing Dodge 18 v. Susquehanna Univ., 796 F. Supp. 829, 830 (M.D. Pa. 1992)). 19 20 III. ANALYSIS 21 Mr. Morgalo argues that the court should not have dismissed the defamation 22 claim because: (1) the interrogatories were not produced on the agreed date; 23 (2) only 19 interrogatories were answered. (Docket No. 167, at 4.) Mr. Morgalo 24 claims that these alleged transgressions should not have been taken in whole or 25 26 in part as an intention on his behalf to refuse to answer or subvert the court s 27 order, which according to him was non-existent. 28 (Id. at 4-5, at 5, n.3.) 1 CIVIL 07-1380 (JA) 4 2 3 Mr. Morgalo, therefore, believes that dismissal was not appropriate because there 4 5 was not a pattern of extreme behavior present in this case. 6 Contrariwise, Mr. Morgalo claims that he has provided all the information that has 7 been requested from him by the other parties. (Id.) 8 (Id. at 5. ) Mr. Blades, on the other hand, contends that the court has not erred in 9 10 dismissing the defamation claim because Mr. Morgalo s failure to respond to the 11 interrogatories on time was predicated on willful defiance and/or gross 12 indifference to the court s order. (Docket No. 173, at 5.) According to Mr. Blades 13 the answers to the interrogatories were untimely and even after supplementation 14 15 remained seriously deficient, false and cryptic. (Id. at 5-6.) Mr. Blades claims 16 that Mr. Morgalo has failed to provide relevant documents and names of 17 witnesses, thereby severely affecting his efforts to prepare for trial. (Id. at 7.) 18 It is well settled that [d]ismissal . . . [is one of the] most severe penalties 19 20 that may be ordered against a recalcitrant party. Ruiz-Rosa v. Rullán, 485 F.3d 21 150, 154 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Benítez-García v. González-Vega, 468 F.3d 1, 4 22 (1st Cir. 2006)). In determining whether dismissal is warranted, courts must 23 consider all of the aspects of the case including the severity of the violation, the 24 legitimacy of the party's excuse, repetition of violations, the deliberateness vel 25 26 non of the misconduct, mitigating excuses, prejudice to the other side and to the 27 operations of the court, and the adequacy of lesser sanctions. Malot v. Dorado 28 1 CIVIL 07-1380 (JA) 5 2 3 Beach Cottages Assocs., 478 F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Benítez-García 4 5 v. González-Vega, 468 F.3d at 5 (quoting Robson v. Hallenbeck, 81 F.3d 1, 2-3 6 (1st Cir. 1996)). 7 8 According to Mr. Morgalo, dismissal based on a single fault, as the one committed by him, is not warranted. (Docket No. 167, at 6.) Mr. Morgalo s 9 10 argument is, however, contradicted by the record since it shows that he has 11 repeatedly failed to comply with his discovery obligations. Mr. Morgalo was served 12 with a first set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents on 13 December 3, 2008. (Docket 173, at 8, ¶ 6.) After attempts to obtain the 14 15 discovery sought, Mr. Blades filed a motion to compel against Mr. Morgalo on 16 March 20, 2009. (Docket No. 93.) Mr. Blades motion was granted by the court 17 on May 12, 2009. (Docket No. 101.) The interrogatories, Mr. Blades claims, 18 were answered on May 18, 2009. However, according to Mr. Blades the answers 19 20 served by Mr. Morgalo were incomplete. (Docket No. 173, at 9, ¶ 10.) Mr. Blades 21 claims that although the answers were later supplemented on September 15, 22 2009, no documents were produced. (Id. at 9, ¶ 12.) As a result, a motion to 23 compel was filed by Mr. Blades requesting that the court order Mr. Morgalo to 24 produce the documents that had been requested. (Docket No. 119.) The motion 25 26 to compel was eventually granted. (Docket No. 145.) On January 22, 2010, Mr. 27 Morgalo was served with a second set of interrogatories. (Docket No. 173, at 9, 28 1 CIVIL 07-1380 (JA) 6 2 3 ¶ 14.) However, since Mr. Morgalo s answers were untimely and incomplete, Mr. 4 5 Blades filed a motion to dismiss on March 23, 2010. (Docket No. 148.) On March 6 31, 2010, Mr. Blades motion was granted. (Docket No. 154.) 7 8 The procedural background shows that all throughout this case Mr. Morgalo has been attempting to circumvent the court's orders in order to unjustifiably 9 10 delay the proceedings. Mr. Morgalo s conduct cannot be considered as isolated 11 incidents [that would serve as a] plausible excusatory circumstance . . . . 12 Robledo-Rivera v. Cartagena, 233 F.R.D. 236, 238 (D.P.R. 2005) (citing Crossman 13 v. Raytheon Long Term Disability Plan, 316 F.3d 36, 39 (1st Cir. 2009)). The fact 14 15 that there was not a written order compelling Mr. Morgalo to answer the second 16 set of interrogatories does not mean that he had the right to disregard his 17 discovery obligations. During the discovery hearing held on March 1, 2010, the 18 parties informed the court that they had agreed on a date to answer the 19 20 interrogatories. Thus, the court was entitled to expect the interrogatories to be 21 answered on the agreed date. Cintrón-Lorenzo v. Departamento de Asuntos del 22 Consumidor, 312 F.3d 522, 526 (1st Cir. 2002) ( [w]hen a litigant . . . proposes 23 a compliance date, the court is entitled to expect that the litigant will meet its self- 24 imposed deadline ) (quoting Tower Ventures, Inc. v. City of Westfield, 296 F.3d 25 26 43, 47 (1st Cir. 2002); see Young v. Gordon, 330 F.3d 76, 81-82 (1st Cir. 2003) 27 (affirming district court s sanction of dismissal for, inter alia, noncompliance with 28 1 CIVIL 07-1380 (JA) 7 2 3 courts orders and failing to meet self-imposed deadlines). The court cannot 4 5 simply turn a blind eye to Mr. Morgalo s litigation tactics. To do so would allow Mr. 6 Morgalo to determine at its own convenience the pace on how discovery should 7 proceed. That will not happen. 8 As to Mr. Morgalo s contention that the lack of notice before dismissing the 9 10 defamation claim serves as a mitigating factor, I find that it is unpersuasive. In 11 the Opinion and Order of March 19, 2010, the court warned Mr. Morgalo that 12 dismissal was an available sanction for failing to comply with a discovery request. 13 (Docket No. 154, at 3.) Although the warning might not have been as explicit as 14 15 Mr. Morgalo would have wanted, it does not mean that he was not aware that 16 dismissal was out of the question. García-Pérez v. Hosp. Metropolitano, 597 F.3d 17 6, 9 (1st Cir. 2010). Based on the fact that Mr. Morgalo s discovery violations 18 resulted in two motions to compel and that trial is scheduled for May 17, 2010, 19 20 he had adequate notice that his failure to answer the second set of interrogatories 21 in a proper and timely manner would lead to sanctions, including the dismissal of 22 the defamation claim. 23 (quoting Pomales v. Celulares Telefónica, Inc., 342 F.3d 44, 50 n.5 (1st Cir. 24 García-Pérez v. Hosp. Metropolitano, 597 F.3d at 9 2003)). The court does not have the obligation to play nursemaid to indifferent 25 26 parties. Pinto v. U.P.R., 895 F.2d 18, 19 (1st Cir. 1990). Consequently, the 27 court was not required to consider a lesser sanction before dismissing his claim. 28 1 CIVIL 07-1380 (JA) 8 2 3 Torres-Vargas v. Pereira, 431 F.3d 389, 393 (1st Cir. 2005) (when a litigant has 4 5 been forewarned of the consequences of disregarding an order, the court need 6 not exhaust less toxic sanctions before dismissing a case . . . ). If a lesser 7 sanction had been imposed, it would have shrunk the court s duty to secure the 8 just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. Dyno Nobel, Inc. 9 10 v. Amotech Corp., 63 F. Supp. 2d 140, 144 (D.P.R. 1999) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. 11 P. 1); see Figueroa Ruiz v. Alegría, 896 F.2d 645, 649 (1st Cir. 1990); John's 12 Insulation, Inc. v. L. Addison & Assocs., Inc., 156 F.3d 101, 109-10 (1st Cir. 13 1998). Mr. Morgalo has failed to show entitlement to the relief sought. 14 III. CONCLUSION 15 16 17 18 For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Morgalo s motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED. At San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 28th day of April, 2010. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 S/ JUSTO ARENAS Chief United States Magistrate Judge

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