RUSSELL v. ASTRUE, No. 3:2011cv00104 - Document 17 (W.D. Pa. 2012)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER denying 12 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 14 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. See Memorandum Judgment Order for further details. Signed by Judge Gustave Diamond on 7/30/12. (gpr)
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RUSSELL v. ASTRUE Doc. 17 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA DAVID BRIAN RUSSELL! Plaintiff l v. Civil Action No. 11-104J MICHAEL J. ASTRUE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY! I Defendant. MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER #t- AND NOW, this ~ day of JulYI 2012 of the parties l Social upon due consideration cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to plaintiff/s request of 1 review of the decision of the Commissioner ("Commissioner Security lt ) plaintiiEf/s denying applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVII Soc 1 Security Act ("Act lt ), motion for summary judgment hereby iS I respectivelYI of! the IT IS ORDERED that the Commissioner s l (Document No. 14) be, and the same granted and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Document No. 12) be, and the same hereby is, denied. As the factfinder, an Administrative Law Judge (flALJ") has an obligation to weigh all of the facts and evidence of record and may rej ect or discount reasons for doing so. Cir. 1999). any evidence if Plummer v. Apfel, the ALJ explains: the 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d ImportantlYI where the ALJ's findings of fact supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court is bound by 'i'l>.A072 (Rev. 8/82) those findings, even if it would have decided the factual inquiry Dockets.Justia.com differently. 2001). Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. These well-established principles preclude a reversql or remand of the ALJ' s decision here because the record contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ's findings and conclusions. Plaintiff protectively filed his pending applications 1 for sability insurance benefits and supplemental security income on May II, 2009, alleging a disability onset date of April 24, 2009, due to headaches, seizures and applications were denied initially. ld a video ~~~Y'~sented 2010, hearing on July depression. Plaintiff's At plaintiff's request an ALJ 28, 2010, at which plaintiff, by counsel, appeared and testified. On August 20, the ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff is not disabled. On March 2, 2011, the Appeals Council denied review making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff was 43 years old at the time of the ALJ's decision and is classified as a younger person under the regulations.' C.F.R. §§404.1563(c) and 416.963(c}. He has a high 20 school education and past relevant work experience as a meat cutter and ivery driver, but he has not engaged in any substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date. After testimony reviewing from plaintiff's plaintiff and a medical records vocational and expert, hearing the: ALJ 1 For purposes of plaintiff's Title II application, the ALJ found that plaintiff met the disability insured status requirements of the Act on his alleged onset date and had acquired sufficient coverage to remain insured through March 31, 2013. ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) 2 concluded that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of: the Act. The ALJ found that although the medical evidence establi~hes that plaintiff suffers from the severe impairments of seizvres (controlled by medication) and depression, those impairme~ts, alone or in combination, do not meet or equal the criteria of: any of the impairments listed at Appendix 1 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P. The ALJ also found that plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity to perform simple, unskilled light work but with certain restrictions recognizing the limiting effects of. his impairments, specifically, he cannot drive and cannot have exposure to dangerous equipment or to extreme heat and cold. 14). (R. A vocational expert identified numerous categories of jobs which plaintiff could perform based upon his age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity, including cashieriand Relying on the vocational expert's testimony, the ALJ cleaner. found that while plaintiff cannot perform his past relevant work, he is capable of making an adjustment to work which exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Accordingly, the: ALJ determined that plaintiff is not disabled. i The Act defines "disability" as the inability to engag$ substant gainful activity by reason of a physical or mehtal impairment which can be expected to of at least 1382c (a) (3) (A) . twelve months. 42 for a continuous petiod U.S.C. §§423 (d) (1) (A) i and The impairment or impairments must be so severe that the claimant nis not only unable to do his previous work but ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 3 cannot, considering his age, education and work experience, engage in any other kind national substantial gainful work which exists in the economy 42 II U.S.C. §§423 (d) (1) (B) and 1382c (a) (3) (B) . The Commissioner has promulgated regulations incorporating a five-step sequent a claimant evaluation process 2 for determining whether is under a disability. 20 C. F . R . § § 404 . 1520 • and 416.920; Newell v. Commissioner of Social Security, 347 F.3d 541, 545 (3d Cir. 2003). disabled at any step, If the claimant is found disabled or: not the claim need not be reviewed further. Id.; see Barnhart v. Thomas, 124 S.Ct. 376 (2003). Here, plaintiff raises the following challenges to the ALJ's findings: (1) the ALJ erred at step 3 by finding that plaintiff's impairments do not meet the c teria of any of impairments; (2) the ALJ improperly assessed plaint functional capacity; and, (3) that all of the listed f's resipual the ALJ failed to consider all of plaintiff's impairments in combination. satisfied the ALJ's Upon review, the cou~t is findings are supported by substantial evidence. 2 The ALJ must determine in sequence: (1) whether the claimant currently is in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not , whether he has a severe impairment; (3) if so, whether his impairment meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpa~t P, Appendix 1; (4) if not, whether the claimant's impairment prevents him from performing his past-relevant work; and, (5) if so, whether the claimant can perform any other work which exists in the national economy in light of his age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520 and 416.920. In addition, when there is evidence of a mental impairment that allegedly prevents a claimant from working, the Commissioner must follow the procedure for evaluqting mental impairments set forth in the regulations. 186 F. 2d at 432; 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520a and 416.920a. I ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 4 First, the court is satisfied that the ALJ's step 3 finding is supported by substantial evidence. determine whether equivalent to, the one claimant's of the At step 3, impairment listed the ALJ must matches, or is impairments. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d . 2000). The listings describe impairments that prevent an adult, regardless of age, education, or work experience, performing any gainful activity. Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78.1 85 (3d Cir. 2000); 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520{d) and 416.920{d). impairment is claimant] per necessary." Here, equivalent se to ~rom a disabled listed and impairment no further "If the then analysis [the is Burnett, 220 F.3d at 119. as required, impairments that the ALJ identified the relevant listed compare stings 11.02 and 11.03) with plaintiff's and depression adequately explained why plaintif f' s seizure disorder (Listing 12.04) impairments, and alone or in combination, do not meet or equal the severity of those listed impairments. (R. 12 14) i see Burnett, 220 F.3d at 120, n.2. In particular, as to plaintiff's seizure disorder, the ALJ noted that plaintiff controls his seizures through medication. (R. 12). As to plaintiff's depression, the ALJ found that plaintiff failed to meet either the "B" or the "C" criteria of Listing 12.04. {12 14) . The ALJ's step 3 finding is well-supported by the medical evidence. meet In finding that plaintiff's seizure disorder does not sting 11.02 or 11.03, the ALJ noted that plaintiff had '<\it.AOn (Rev. 8/82) - 5 reported in consultant, October of 2009 to Dr. Lukacs, a neurolog~cal that he had been seizure free since 2005, and Dr. Lukacs noted that plaintiff's seizure disorder was clinic~lly stable. Although plaintiff contests the ALJ's statement , regarding the frequency of seizures by asserting that he did. not report all of his seizures because he feared losing his driver's license, the relevant listings are not met unless a claimant, can show a typical seizure pattern "occurring more frequently than once a month" once weekly" (Listing 11.02) or "occurring more frequently than (Listing 11.03), and there is nothing in the record to suggest that plaintiff had seizures at that frequency. To the contrary, as the ALJ noted, on physical examination plaintiff did not show signs of having seizures and multiple EEG's reveale~ brain activity consistent with epilepsy or similar trauma. no (R. 15) . Substantial evidence likewise supports the ALJ' s finding that plaintiff does not meet Listing 12.04 for depression. more than adequately explained his conclusion that The ALJ plaintiff failed to meet either the "B" or the "C" criteria of Listing 12.04 and his conclusions are supported by the objective medical evidence as well as the fact that no medical source found that plaintiff meets the requisite criteria. (R. 12-14). As • the required level of severity is met only when the requirements in both A and B of the listings are satisfied, or when the "C" criteria of those listings are met, the ALJ correctly concluded that plaintiff does not meet Listing 12.04. <%AO 72 (Rev. 8/82) - 6 To the extent plaintiff contends that the ALJ failect to consider a number of GAF scores in determining whether plaintiff meets Listing 12.04, this argument is not well-taken. score considers psychological, social and occupational on a hypothetical continuum of mental health. The GAF functio~ing See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manua], of Mental Disorders (DSM- IV) (4 th ed. 1994). scale is because not its disability endorsed scores do by the not requirements Social have and a While the use of the GAF Security Administration direct standards of correlation the Act, to the the ALJ's findings at step 3 that plaintiff has moderate difficulties in social functioning and in concentration, persistence and pace are consistent with the clinical GAF ratings medical sources, found by all of the the lowest of which are ratings of 55, indicates moderate symptoms. which It is clear from the record that the ALJ considered all of the medical evidence in rating the severity of plaintiff's depression and that his step 3 finding is supported by that medical evidence. Moreover, plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of presenting any medical findings to either the ALJ or to this court showing that any of his impairments, alone or in combination, meet or equal any listed impairment. F.2d 1178, 1186 (3d Cir. See Williams v. Sullivan,. 970 1992). To the contrary, the medical evidence of record does not support a finding that plaintiff meets or equals any listing. Accordingly, the court finds plaintiff's challenge to the ALJ's step 3 finding to be without merit. ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 7 Plaintiffts remaining arguments relate to the ALJ's finding of not disabled at step 5 of the sequent evaluation process. At that step, the ALJ must show that there are other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy which the claimant can perform consistent with his medical impairments, age, education, past work experience and residual functional capacity. 20 C. F . R . § § 4 04 . 152 0 (f) and 416. 92 0 ( f) . Residual functional capacity is defined as that which an individual still is able to do despite the limitations caused by his impairments. §§404.1545{a) and 416.945{a) Here, the functional ALJ found capacity to i 20 C.F.R. Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 40. that plaintiff perform retains the residual work wi th several light restrictions accommodating his impairments. (R. 14). Although plaintiff disputes this finding t it is clear from the record that the ALJ adequately considered all of the evidence, as well as plaintiff's reported act relevant medical ties, in assessing plaintiff's residual functional capacity t and that he incorporated into his finding 1 of the limitations that reasonably could be supported by the medical and other relevant evidence, including the opinions of plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Shoenthal:, as well as the state agency medical consultant. (R. 14 16). . The court is satisfied that the ALJ's residual functional capacity finding is supported by substantial evidence. Although plaintiff now contends that inquire of the vocational expert regarding required to perform the jobs listed tt ""Aon (Rev. 8/82) - 8 or the ALJ failed to "the time on task regarding "absences permitted," there simply is nothing in the support any sort of limitations in this record that wpuld regard. Plaintiff's counsel at the administrative hearing did not ask any questions regarding time on-task or permissible absences, nor has plaintiff's current counsel on appeal pointed to any objective evidence in the record that would support any sort of restrictions in these areas. The court has reviewed the record and has fOund nothing to support any additional rest by the ALJ ctions beyond those f9und his residual functional capacity. Plaintiff's final argument is that the ALJ failed to consider the combined effects of all of plaintiff's medical conditions, both severe and non-severe, functional capacity. position. "considered in assessing plaintiff's residual However, the record Is to support that The ALJ specifically noted in s decision that he all symptoms" in assessing plaintiff's residual functional capacity, and his findings demonstrate that he did just that. (R. 12-16). consideration The court is satisfied that the ALJ took into 1 of the medically supportable limitations arising from all of plaintiff's impairments, in combination, and that the ALJ's residual functional substant capacity assessment is supported by evidence. Finally, to the extent that plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to consider the effect that migraine headaches have on plaintiff's ability to work, it is well settled that disability is not determined merely by the presence of impairments, but by the effect that those impairments ""'Aon (Rev. 8/82) - 9 have upon an individual's I ability to perform substantial gainful activity, and a mere diagnosis is insufficient to support a finding of disability. Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991). Here, although Dr. Lukacs diagnosed plaintiff with migraines, plaintiff has not suggested any additional restrictions arising from those migraines that would be more limiting than those already accounted for in the ALJ's residual functional capacity finding. is satisfied migraines, that along impairments, the with ALJ all adequately of in arriving at considered plaintiff's his residual other The court plaintiff's symptoms functional and capacity finding. After carefully and methodically considering all medical evidence of record and plaintiff's testimony, of ' the the ALJ determined that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. substantial The ALJ's findings and conclusions are supported by evidence and are not otherwise erroneou$. Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed. ~~ Gustave Diamond United States District cc: J. Kirk Kling, Esq. 630 Pleasant Valley Boulevard, Suite B Altoona, PA 16602 Stephanie L. Haines Assistant U.S. Attorney 319 Washington Street Room 224, Penn Traffic Building Johnstown, PA 15901 ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 10 Judg~
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