CUMMINGS v. ADAMS et al, No. 2:2021cv01062 - Document 22 (W.D. Pa. 2023)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION denying 4 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by ERIC ALLEN CUMMINGS. Signed by Magistrate Judge Patricia L. Dodge on 4/26/2023. (mqe)
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CUMMINGS v. ADAMS et al Doc. 22 Case 2:21-cv-01062-PLD Document 22 Filed 04/26/23 Page 1 of 21 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA ERIC ALLEN CUMMINGS, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Petitioner, v. M. ADAMS, PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, Respondents. Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-1062 MEMORANDUM 1 For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF 4) filed by state prisoner Eric Allen Cummings (“Petitioner”), deny a certificate of appealability and close this case. I. Relevant Background and Facts In the first part of 2018, Petitioner was on parole and under the supervision of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (“Board”). Petitioner’s maximum sentence date for the sentence he was serving at that time was set to expire on April 29, 2019. (ECF 4-1 at p. 14.) In July 2018, the Commonwealth filed an Information in the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County at criminal docket number CP-61-CR-470-2018 (“2018 Venango County case”) charging Petitioner with these crimes: Count 1—Persons not to Possess a Firearm, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6105(a)(1); Count 2—Firearms Ownership/Duty of Other Persons, id. § 6111(c); Count 3—Marijuana, Small Amount Personal Use, 35 Pa. Stat. § 780-113(a)(31)(i); In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have voluntarily consented to have a U.S. Magistrate Judge conduct proceedings in this case, including entry of a final judgment. (ECF 7, 13.) 1 1 Dockets.Justia.com Case 2:21-cv-01062-PLD Document 22 Filed 04/26/23 Page 2 of 21 and Count 4—Possession with Intent to Use Drug Paraphernalia, id. § 780-113(a)(32). (ECF 4-1 at pp. 21-26.) On December 17, 2018, Petitioner pleaded guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement to Counts 1 and 2 “as amended.” 2 Counts 3 and 4 were nol prossed. (Plea Agreement Form at pp. 1-2; docket sheet for 2018 Venango County case at p. 4.) 3 On March 8, 2019, the trial court sentenced him to a total aggregate sentence of five years to be served “concurrent with any and all sentences previously imposed upon [Petitioner] whether in Venango County or elsewhere.” (ECF 15-1 at pp. 1-2.) Petitioner did not file a direct appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. (ECF 4 at p. 2; docket sheet for the 2018 Venango County case at pp. 4-6.) Accordingly, his judgment of sentence became final under both state and federal law 30 days later on April 8, 2019, which is when the time for him to file an appeal expired. Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9545(b)(3); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 149-54 (2012) (a judgment becomes final under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) at the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for seeking such review). Petitioner became a convicted parole violator under state law as a result of his convictions in the 2018 Venango County case. Thus, on April 18, 2019, the Board issued a decision recommitting him “to a state correctional institution as a convicted parole violator to serve 18 Count 1 was originally graded as a felony of the second degree. When Petitioner pleaded guilty to that count it was graded as a misdemeanor in the first degree. 2 An up-to-date version of the docket sheet for the 2018 Venango County case is available online at https://ujsportal.pacourts.us (lasted visited Apr. 25, 2023) and the Court takes judicial notice of it. The Court also takes judicial notice of the December 17, 2018 Plea Agreement Form and the August 25, 2020 and November 9, 2020 orders entered in Petitioner’s 2018 Venango County case, which are public records and are attached to this Memorandum. 3 2 Case 2:21-cv-01062-PLD Document 22 Filed 04/26/23 Page 3 of 21 months, concurrently, for a total of 18 months backtime.” (ECF 4-1 at p. 4.) In this same decision, the Board notified Petitioner that due to his status as a convicted parole violator, it had recalculated his maximum sentence date to be December 23, 2021 instead of April 29, 2019. (Id.; ECF 4-1 at pp. 14-15.) At the end of the Board’s April 18, 2019 decision, it expressly notified Petitioner of his appeal rights, explaining to him that: [t]his decision involves an issue that is subject to the Board’s administrative remedies process. See 37 Pa. Code. Sec. 73. Failure to administratively appeal the decision may affect your legal rights. If you wish to appeal this decision, you must file a request for administrative relief with the Board within thirty (30) days of the mailing date of this decision. This request shall set forth specifically the factual and legal bases for the allegations. You have the right to an attorney in this appeal and in any subsequent appeal to the Commonwealth Court. You may be entitled to counsel from the Public Defender’s Office at no cost. Enclosed with this Board decision is an administrative remedies form and the names and addresses of all the chief public defenders in the Commonwealth. Any request for a public defender should be sent directly to the public defender’s office in the county where you currently reside. (Id. at p. 5.) Notwithstanding these clear instructions, Petitioner did not seek review of the Board’s April 18, 2019 decision. The next year, on June 1, 2020, Petitioner filed in his 2018 Venango County case a motion for collateral relief under Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9541 et seq. On November 9, 2020, the trial court, now the PCRA court, issued an order dismissing Petitioner’s motion as untimely under the PCRA’s one-year statute of limitations, which is jurisdictional. (See PCRA court’s Nov. 9, 2020 and Aug. 25, 2020 orders.) Petitioner did not appeal the PCRA court’s decision to the Superior Court. (Docket sheet for the 2018 Venango County case at pp. 5-6.) On February 23, 2021, the Board denied Petitioner parole. (ECF 4-1 at pp. 6-8.) Petitioner filed an administrative appeal of this decision. In it, he challenged the Board’s decision denying 3 Case 2:21-cv-01062-PLD Document 22 Filed 04/26/23 Page 4 of 21 him parole and also argued for the first time that the elements for the crimes he pleaded guilty to in his 2018 Venango County case (which resulted in the Board recommitting him as a convicted parole violator) were “lacking in fact beyond a reasonable doubt.” (ECF 4-1 at p. 11.) Petitioner argued that the Board’s April 18, 2019 decision recalculating his parole violation maximum sentence date was unlawful and therefore he was being imprisoned “beyond the termination date of the judicially maximum sentence.” (Id.) The Board denied this appeal on or around May 24, 2021, explaining that administrative appeals and requests for reconsideration are not permitted from parole denials. (ECF 4-1 at p. 13.) On or around August 11, 2021, Petitioner submitted to this Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the validity of his custody. He did not pay the filing fee or move for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, however. Thus, the Court issued an order advising him that he must do one of those two things. (ECF 2.) In this same order, the Court explained to Petitioner that he must challenge the validity of his custody under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which is the federal habeas statute applicable to state prisoners like him. See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996) (“Our authority to grant habeas relief to state prisoners is limited by § 2254, which specifies the conditions under which such relief may be granted to ‘a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.’”); Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 484-85 (3d Cir. 2001) (“It is a well-established canon of statutory construction that when two statutes cover the same situation, the more specific statute takes precedence over the more general one…. In the instant action, both Sections 2241 and 2254 authorize [the petitioner’s] challenge to the legality of his continued state custody…. applying the ‘specific governs the general’ canon of statutory construction to this action, we hold that [Petitioner] must rely on Section 2254 in challenging the execution of his sentence.”). 4 Case 2:21-cv-01062-PLD Document 22 Filed 04/26/23 Page 5 of 21 The Court provided Petitioner with the standard form to be used in § 2254 habeas cases and directed him to complete and submit it along with the statutory filing fee or a properly completed application to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF 2.) Petitioner subsequently submitted the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the standard form for a § 2254 habeas case (ECF 4) along with the $5.00 filing fee. He claims that he is being imprisoned beyond the expiration of his maximum sentence due to an alleged error made by the Board in calculating his parole violation maximum sentence date. (ECF 4 at pp. 5-8, 13; see also ECF 15 at pp. 2-6.) Petitioner also challenges the validity of his convictions in the 2018 Venango County case, claiming he pleaded guilty to “charge[s] that did not apply to [him].” (Id. at pp. 5-7.) He also claims his trial counsel was ineffective for “fail[ing] to recognize and convey legal defenses to [him]” and for allowing him “to get sentenced on charges that did not apply to [him].” (Id. at p. 8.) Petitioner asserts that because those convictions are allegedly invalid, the Board’s subsequent action based on them (the April 19, 2018 decision recommitting him as a convicted parole violator and recalculating his parole violation maximum sentence) is also invalid. (Id. at p. 13; ECF 15.) Respondents have filed the Answer (ECF 10) and Petitioner has filed the Reply (ECF 15.) II. Discussion A. Claims Challenging the Board’s April 18, 2019 decision are procedurally defaulted Respondents assert that the Court should deny Petitioner’s claims challenging the Board’s April 18, 2019 decision because he did not exhaust his available state court remedies. The “exhaustion doctrine” requires that a state prisoner raise his federal constitutional claims in state court through the proper procedures before he litigates them in a federal habeas petition. See, e.g., Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997). It is “grounded in principles of comity; 5 Case 2:21-cv-01062-PLD Document 22 Filed 04/26/23 Page 6 of 21 in a federal system, the States should have the first opportunity to address and correct alleged violations of state prisoner’s federal rights.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). It “is designed to give the state courts a full and fair opportunity to resolve federal constitutional claims before those claims are presented to the federal courts[.]” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). Importantly, the Supreme Court has held that a petitioner must have “invoke[d] one complete round of the State’s established appellate review process[,]” in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. Id. The related doctrine of procedural default, like the doctrine of exhaustion, is “grounded in concerns of comity and federalism,” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 730. As the Supreme Court recently explained: State prisoners . . . often fail to raise their federal claims in compliance with state procedures, or even raise those claims in state court at all. If a state court would dismiss these claims for their procedural failures, such claims are technically exhausted because, in the habeas context, “state-court remedies are. . . ‘exhausted’ when they are no longer available, regardless of the reason for their unavailability.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92-93, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 165 L. Ed.2d 368 (2006). But to allow a state prisoner simply to ignore state procedure on the way to federal court would defeat the evident goal of the exhaustion rule. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 111 S. Ct. 2546. Thus, federal habeas courts must apply “an important ‘corollary’ to the exhaustion requirement”: the doctrine of procedural default. Davila [v. Davis], 582 U.S., at — , 137 S. Ct. [2058], 2064 [2017]. Under that doctrine, federal courts generally decline to hear any federal claim that was not presented to the state courts “consistent with [the State’s] own procedural rules.” Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 453, 120 S. Ct. 1587, 146 L. Ed.2d 518 (2000). Together, exhaustion and procedural default promote federal-state comity. Exhaustion affords States “an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights,” Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3, 102 S. Ct. 18, 70 L. Ed.2d 1 (1981) (per curiam), and procedural default protects against “the significant harm to the States that results from the failure of federal courts to respect” state procedural rules, Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750, 111 S. Ct. 2546. Ultimately, “it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal district court to upset a state court conviction without [giving] an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation,” Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204, 70 S. Ct. 587, 94 L .Ed. 761 (1950), and to do so consistent with their own procedures, see Edwards, 529 U.S. at 452-453, 120 S. Ct. 1587. 6 Case 2:21-cv-01062-PLD Document 22 Filed 04/26/23 Page 7 of 21 Shinn v. Ramirez, 142 S. Ct. 1718, 1732 (2022). To succinctly summarize it, the procedural default doctrine provides that a Pennsylvania state prisoner in a non-capital case defaults a federal habeas claim if he: (1) failed to present a claim to the state court and cannot do so now because the state courts would decline to address the claim on the merits as state procedural rules (such as the state’s waiver or limitations rules) bar such consideration; or (2) failed to comply with a state procedural rule when he presented the claim to the state court, and for that reason the state court declined to address the federal claim on the merits. See, e.g., Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000); O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 851-56 (1999) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (describing the history of the procedural default doctrine); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Lines v. Larkins, 208 F.3d 153, 162-69 (3d Cir. 2000). The first scenario is what has occurred here. As the Board explained to Petitioner in its April 18, 2019 decision, in order to properly exhaust a claim challenging its decision, Petitioner had to first file an administrative appeal within 30 days of the mailing of the Board’s decision, 37 Pa. Code § 73.1. If that appeal did not succeed, Petitioner then would have to file an appeal with the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 763(a), and thereafter seek allowance of appeal with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Pa.R.A.P. 1114; Williams v. Wynder, 232 F. App’x 177, 179-80 (3d Cir. 2007). Petitioner did not complete these steps. The time for him to do so has long since expired. As a result, Petitioner procedurally defaulted the claims he raised in his habeas petition that challenge the Board’s April 18, 2019 decision. A petitioner may avoid the default of his claims by demonstrating that the federal habeas court’s failure to consider them will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. This type of “gateway” actual innocence claim requires evidence of “actual 7 Case 2:21-cv-01062-PLD Document 22 Filed 04/26/23 Page 8 of 21 innocence” that is “so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error[.]” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995); see, e.g., Reeves v. Fayette, SCI, 897 F.3d 154, 157 (3d Cir. 2018). Where, as is the case here, the petitioner pleaded guilty, he also must establish his actual innocence not only of the count to which he pleaded guilty (Counts 1 and 2), but also of the other charges the government excused as part of the plea bargain process (Counts 3 and 4). Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623-24 (1998). The Supreme Court has cautioned that “tenable actual-innocence gateway pleas are rare[,]” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013), and that “[t]he gateway should open only when a petition presents ‘evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error.’” Id. at 401 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316). This case is not one of those rare cases in which the actual-innocence gateway would apply. A petitioner may also overcome the default if he shows “cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law[.]” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. “‘Cause’ under the cause and prejudice test must be something external to the petitioner, something that cannot fairly be attributed to him[.]” Id. at 753 (emphasis in original). Here, Petitioner could have pursued an administrative appeal of the Board’s April 18, 2019 decision and the failure to do so must be attributed solely to him. Thus, he cannot establish the requisite “cause” to overcome his default. Because Petitioner has procedurally defaulted his claims challenging the Board’s April 18, 2019 decision recommitting him as a convicted parole violator and recalculating his parole violation maximum sentence, those claims are denied. 8 Case 2:21-cv-01062-PLD Document 22 Filed 04/26/23 Page 9 of 21 B. Claims challenging the validity of Petitioner’s convictions in the 2018 Venango County case are time-barred Respondents assert that the Court should deny Petitioner’s claims because they are timebarred under the applicable one-year statute of limitations, which was enacted by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) and codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 4 It requires, with a few exceptions not applicable here, that habeas corpus claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be filed within one year of the date that the petitioner’s judgment of sentence became final. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 5 As explained above, Petitioner’s judgment of sentence became final on April 8, 2019. Thus, he had until on or around April 8, 2020 to file a timely federal habeas petition challenging his 2018 Venango County convictions. 6 Petitioner did not commence this habeas action until on or around August 11, 2021, thereby making the claims untimely by at least 16 months. Respondents also assert that Petitioner defaulted his claims challenging his convictions in the 2018 Venango County case. The Court’s disposition on timeliness makes it unnecessary to reach this additional issue. 5 The date upon which AEDPA’s one-year limitations period commenced is determined on a claim-by-claim basis. Fielder v. Varner, 379 F.3d 113, 118-22 (3d Cir. 2004). In this case, the statute of limitations for each of Petitioner’s claims challenging his 2018 Venango County convictions began to run on the date his judgment of sentence became final in accordance with § 2244(d)(1)(A). The remaining of provisions § 2244(d)(1) do not apply to any of Petitioner’s claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). 6 AEDPA provides that “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The PCRA motion Petitioner filed on June 1, 2020 was filed after AEDPA’s statute of limitations expired, so it could not serve to statutorily toll the limitations period under § 2244(d)(2). Additionally, because the state court held that motion was untimely filed under state law, it does not qualify as a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review” under § 2244(d)(2). Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005) (a state postconviction petition that is “rejected ... as untimely ... was not ‘properly filed’ ... and ... [does] not entitle[ ] a federal habeas corpus [petitioner] to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2).”). 4 9 Case 2:21-cv-01062-PLD Document 22 Filed 04/26/23 Page 10 of 21 The Supreme Court has held that AEDPA’s limitations period “is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). A petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows both that: (1) he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing. Id; see also Wallace v. Mahanoy, 2 F.4th 133, 143-44 (3d Cir. 2021); Ross v. Varano, 712 F.3d 784, 798-804 (3d Cir. 2013). “This conjunctive standard requires showing both elements before we will permit tolling.” Sistrunk v. Rozum, 674 F.3d 181, 190 (3d Cir. 2012) (emphasis in original)). The Court of Appeals has further instructed that: “[t]here are no bright lines in determining whether equitable tolling is warranted in a given case.” Pabon v. Mahanoy, 654 F.3d 385, 399 (3d Cir. 2011). Nevertheless, “courts must be sparing in their use of equitable tolling,” Seitzinger v. Reading Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 165 F.3d 236, 239 (3d Cir. 1999), and should do so “only when the principles of equity would make the right application of a limitation period unfair.” Miller [v. New Jersey State Dept. of Corr.], 145 F.3d [616, 618 (3d Cir. 1998)]. Id. Petitioner has failed to establish that extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing a timely federal habeas petition or that he was diligent in pursuing federal habeas relief. He asserts that because of the COVID-19 pandemic he “could not go to [the] law library to reserve and work on [his federal habeas petition].” (ECF 15 at p. 1.) This argument does not support equitable tolling, at least for the amount of time that would be required to save his claims from being time-barred. By the time the COVID-19 pandemic would have begun to effect prison operations in March 2020, about 11 months had already expired from AEDPA’s one-year limitations period. There are no grounds to equitably toll the limitations period during that 11-month period. Thus, once any tolling lifted, Petitioner only had approximately one month to file a timely federal habeas petition. And if the Court equitably tolled AEDPA’s limitation period beginning in March 2020, that tolling would 10 Case 2:21-cv-01062-PLD Document 22 Filed 04/26/23 Page 11 of 21 be lifted no later than by June 2020 because by that month Petitioner was able to file a PCRA motion in state court. If he could do that, he could also have filed a federal habeas petition. Petitioner may not have understood the implications of waiting so long to file a federal habeas corpus petition. It is well established, however, that “lack of legal knowledge or legal training does not alone justify equitable tolling.” Ross, 712 F.3d at 799-800 (citing Brown v. Shannon, 322 F.3d 768, 774 (3d Cir. 2003) (equitable tolling not justified where petitioner had one month left in limitations period in which he could have filed “at least a basic pro se habeas petition” at the time that petitioner’s attorney informed him that he would not file an appeal in state court on his behalf and could no longer adequately represent him)); and Doe v. Menefee, 391 F.3d 147, 177 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Given that we expect pro se petitioners to know when the limitations period expires . . . such inadvertence on Doe’s part cannot constitute reasonable diligence.”) Finally, in McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013), the Supreme Court recognized that the actual-innocence “gateway” to federal habeas review developed in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) for procedurally defaulted claims extends to cases in which a petitioner’s claims would otherwise be barred by the expiration AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. As explained above, this case is not one of those rare cases in which the actual-innocence gateway would apply. In conclusion, Petitioner has shown neither that an “extraordinary circumstance” stood in his way of filing his claims challenging his convictions in his 2018 Venango County case within AEDPA’s statute of limitations or that he acted with the required diligence sufficient to justify the amount of equitable tolling that would be required to save his claims from being time-barred. Nor has Petitioner demonstrated that this is one of the rare cases in which the actual innocence exception to the statute of limitations recognized by McQuiggin applies. Therefore, his habeas 11 Case 2:21-cv-01062-PLD Document 22 Filed 04/26/23 Page 12 of 21 claims challenging his convictions in his 2018 Venango County are time-barred and the Court will deny them for that reason. III. Certificate of Appealability AEDPA codified standards governing the issuance of a certificate of appealability for appellate review of a district court’s disposition of a habeas petition. It provides that “[u]nless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from…the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). It also provides that “[a] certificate of appealability may issue ... only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a [certificate of appealability] should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Applying that standard here, jurists of reason would not find the Court’s disposition of Petitioner’s claims to be debatable. Accordingly, the Court will not issue a certificate of appealability on any of Petitioner’s grounds for relief. IV. Conclusion Based on all of the foregoing, the Court will deny the Petition (ECF 4), deny a certificate of appealability, and direct the Clerk of Court to close this case. An appropriate Order follows. 12 Case 2:21-cv-01062-PLD Document 22 Filed 04/26/23 Page 13 of 21 BY THE COURT: Date: April 26, 2023 /s/ Patricia L. Dodge PATRICIA L. DODGE United States Magistrate Judge 13 Case 2:21-cv-01062-PLD Document 22 Filed 04/26/23 Page 14 of 21 Case 2:21-cv-01062-PLD Document 22 Filed 04/26/23 Page 15 of 21 Case 2:21-cv-01062-PLD Document 22 Filed 04/26/23 Page 16 of 21 Case 2:21-cv-01062-PLD Document 22 Filed 04/26/23 Page 17 of 21 Case 2:21-cv-01062-PLD Document 22 Filed 04/26/23 Page 18 of 21 Case 2:21-cv-01062-PLD Document 22 Filed 04/26/23 Page 19 of 21 Case 2:21-cv-01062-PLD Document 22 Filed 04/26/23 Page 20 of 21 Case 2:21-cv-01062-PLD Document 22 Filed 04/26/23 Page 21 of 21
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